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IN 1960-2021: PRIORITIES AND FEATURES**

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ПРИОРИТЕТЫ И ОСОБЕННОСТИ**

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INTRODUCTION

The relevance of the study is determined, first of all, by the need to comprehend the accumulated experience in the formation and implementation of the foreign policy of the «small» states of Africa, whose role in the context of globalization in various spheres of modern international relations is becoming more and more noticeable. The study of the features of the formation and implementation of the foreign policy of the Cameroonian Republic allows us to understand the logic and limits of the participation of this Central African country in international relations, to identify the main features of the presence and responsibility of Cameroon in the world community. The relevance of this research topic is also observed through a number of factors:

First, the need to understand foreign experience in the formation of effective mechanisms of implementation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon – an economic engine of the Central African zone whose role in various fields of international relations is increasingly becoming more important.

Second, Cameroon's geostrategic position in western part of Central Africa – a region where the geopolitical situation is evolving dynamically, characterized by instability, intersecting the interests of new global players, for example China. Moreover, the study is particularly marked by the policy led by Cameroon, aiming at the rapprochement and active cooperation with traditional partners of the Western powers, mainly France and Great Britain, as well as the expansion of relations with the United States, Russia and China. This requires situation careful analysis.

Third, the particular relevance of the research topic is given by the swiftness of the Cameroonian Republic's entry into the processes of world politics which realities are noticeably reflected in the country's foreign policy. Under President A. Ahidjo, the beginning of Cameroon's foreign policy was outlined, aiming at changing the previous foreign policy model in line with a steady trend towards expanding cooperation between African countries with non-Western partners, which also determines the relevance and practical significance of the research.

Fourth, the relevance of this research topic is that an in-depth study of the problems and challenges that Cameroon, which gained independence in 1960, was confronted with in the formation and implementation of its foreign policy will allow to formulate the necessary conclusions and recommendations which could be used in the future, when giving the orientations of the state's foreign policy in the difficult conditions of the formation of the multi-polar world.

The relevance of a comprehensive study of the experience of transforming the foreign policy of the Cameroonian Republic was emphasized by the adoption of the new Agenda 2063, which is Africa's master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future.

During the history the principles of Cameroon's foreign policy were largely correlated with the concepts of independence, non-alignment and African unity, but at the present stage, the state's foreign policy focuses primarily on the ideas of peace and security, sustainable development, African integration and South-South cooperation. In this light, the study of the peculiarities of the development of Cameroonian foreign policy is an important research task that has both scientific and practical dimensions.

Literature review. Scientific works of African, Russian and Western researchers devoted to topical problems of international relations and foreign policy became important were applied in the research.

Historiography in Russian can be grouped into the following: *the first group* includes studies that examine the basic principles and mechanisms of Cameroon's foreign policy as well as analyzing the dynamics of its development taking into account the role of key decision-making centers, the role of Western countries in shaping foreign policy initiative, etc. The historiographic group primarily includes the works of Soviet and Russian scholars who study it both from a theoretical, methodological and empirical perspective. And this has been

thoroughly covered in the scientific works of a number of Russian scholars: V.R. Filippov¹, V.I. Salnikov², V.A. Lavrentyev, L.V. Lavrentyeva³.

The monograph by A.A. Shvedov⁴ provides an in-depth analysis of the formation of the foreign policy and the development of bilateral cooperation between the independent African Countries with Western countries and member states of the OAU. In addition, the author pays attention to the specific of Cameroon's foreign policy in the context of the establishment of multilateral institutions on the African continent.

The analysis of the foreign policy in the context of internal wars in Cameroon are presented in the collective monographs of I. P. Konovalov and G. V. Shubin which highlight the role not only played by Western countries in the internal conflicts but also the valuable interest of Western powers⁵.

The second group is represented by literature which highlights the peculiarities and development of Cameroon's African policy which has found its way in the practical embodiment and involvement in the activities of interstate institutions of regional and sub-regional nature. Studies are devoted to the activities of the regional and sub-regional organizations with the participation of the Republic of Cameroon in addressing security issues and its role in the integration processes in Central Africa as well as the settlement of conflicts in the region. Of importance are the studies produced by N.G. Gavrilova, G.M.

¹Филиппов В. Р. Политика Франции в Камеруне. Политика и общество. 2015. № 4. С. 531-542; Филиппов В. Р. Камерун первая жертва политики «Франсафрик» // Геополитический журнал. 2016. № 1. С. 64-76.

²Рене Н., Сальников В. И. Косвенное управление в постколониальном государстве (на примере Камеруна). In: государство и общество в современной политике. 2019. С. 156-163.

³Лаврентьев В. А., Лаврентьева Л. В., Блохин М. А. Современные тенденции развития международных отношений на примере РФ и Республики Камерун // Инновационная экономика: перспективы развития и совершенствования. 2021. № 1 (51). С. 108-113.

⁴Шведов А. А. Независимая Африка: внешнеполитические проблемы, дипломатическая борьба. / Под общ. ред. и с предисл. Ан. А. Громыко. М., 1983.

⁵Коновалов И. П., Шубин Г. В. Современная Африка: войны и оружие / И. П. Коновалов, Г. В. Шубин. М.: издательство «социально-политическая мысль». 2012. 476 с.

Kostyunina, I.B. Matsenko, K.A. Pantsereva, L.Y. Prokopenko , V.A. Usova, among others⁶.

Of particular interest is the work of G.M. Kostyunina⁷ which addresses a number of issues of fundamental importance to modern Cameroon. One of the issues of Cameroonian Afrocentric policy is the inclusion of the economic integration process. According to G.M. Kostunina, the completion of the formation of the Continental Free Trade Area will be an important step towards deepening integration process in Africa and moving closer to the goal set by the African Union. However, the author emphasizes the strong disintegration factors still persist on the continent which includes a low level of economic development, a low degree of economic interdependence and complementarity, differentiation between the level of economic development and average per capital GDP, political differences and armed conflicts.

Russian scholars such as A.S. Balezin, A.M. Vasiliev, L.V. Geveling, M.A. Osmina, V.V. Pavlov, I.V. Sledzevsky, O.A. Smirnova and others have studied various issues of regional security, geopolitical and economic development in Tropical Africa⁸.

⁶ Костюнина Г. М. Интеграционные процессы в Африке: история и современный этап // Российский внешнеэкономический вестник. 2016. № 4; Маценко И. Б. Африка: реализация «Целей развития тысячелетия» // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2012. № 8–9; Панцерев К. А. Страны Африки в современном взаимозависимом мире: диалог культур или столкновение цивилизаций? / К. А. Панцерев // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Политология. Международные отношения. 2015. № 4; Панцерев К. А. Страны Тропической Африки в условиях глобализации мирового порядка // Известия Российского государственного педагогического университета им. А. И. Герцена. Серия Общественные и гуманитарные науки. 2011. № 130; Прокопенко Л. Я., Шубин В. Г. Африканский ренессанс // Ученые записки Института Африки РАН. М., 2001. № 24; Усов В. А. Африканский союз: цели и реальность // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2010. № 12; Африка: от Лаосского плана действий до НЕПАД. Эволюция концепций экономического развития. М., 2005. Африканская интеграция: социально-политическое измерение: [Монография] / [Подгот.: Потёмкин Ю. В., Рыбалкина И. Г., Громова О. Б. и др.; Отв. ред. Потёмкин Ю. В.]; Рос. акад. наук. Ин-т Африки. М., 2003.

⁷Kostyunina G. M. Integration processes in Africa: history and present stage // Russian Foreign Economic Journal. 2016. № 4. P. 34–50.

⁸ Балезин А.С. Черная Африка: прошлое и настоящее / [А.С. Балезин и др.]; под ред. А.С. Балезина, С.В. Мазова., И.И. Филатовой. М.: Университет Дмитрия Пожарского, 2016; Васильев А.М. Африка и вызовы XXI в. М.: «Восточная литература» РАН. 2012; Гевелинг Л. В. Четвертая республика в Нигерии: хроника политического насилия //

The main directions of technological modernization of socio-economic systems in Africa are considered by a team of authors in the IARAN's 2019 collection «The African Economy in the Era of the Global Technological Revolution»⁹. Of particular relevance to this study is the development of Cameroon's scientific, technological development and the digital economy.

In the monograph of Russian Scientists-Africanists, «Africa: Environment and Man (Growth of Socio-ecologic Crisis)¹⁰» for the first time, the problem of environmental degradation in the context of human activity is comprehensively studied. A conclusion was drawn about the socio-ecologic crisis on the African continent. This crisis turned out to be significant for understanding the new trends in the foreign policy of Cameroon.

The Collective research by scholars from the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences is of great importance for understanding multilateral and bilateral cooperation in Africa, disclosing the international context and the development of relations between regional players on the African continent, as well as leading powers with African countries and the Republic of Cameroon¹¹.

Конфликты в Африке: причины, генезис и проблемы урегулирования (этнополитические и социальные аспекты). М.: Институт Африки РАН. 2013. С. 147–173. Африка: региональные аспекты глобальных проблем / Н.И. Аникина, И.В. Дмитриева М.М. Голанский и др. / Отв. ред. С.А. Бессонов; Институт Африки (Москва). М. 1994; Осминина М.А., Смирнова О.А. Анализ нестабильной ситуации на Африканском континенте: сравнительный анализ, характеристики // Система ценностей современного общества. 2010. № 14. С. 142-147. Павлов В. В. Политика транснациональных банков в Африке (Проблемы и тенденции 80-90-х годов). Ученые записки Института Африки РАН Выпуск 19. М., 2000; Следзевский И.В. Самоорганизация кризисного социума: религиозная мобилизация масс в постколониальной Африке (Кризис африканского развития и его последствия) / И.В. Следзевский // Африка: поиск идентичности и диалог с миром: Ежегодник – 2018 / [Л. В. Пономаренко и др.] под ред. Н.С. Кирабаева. М.: РУДН. 2018. С. 8-34.

⁹Экономика Африки в эпоху глобальной технологической революции. Сборник статей. Отв. редактор к.э.н. Морозенская Е.В. М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2019.

¹⁰Маценко И.Б. Африка: окружающая среда и человек (нарастание социоэкологического кризиса). Отв. Ред. И рук. Авторского коллектива ви гусаров. М.: Институт Африки Ран, 2013.

¹¹Африка: региональные аспекты глобальных проблем / Н. И. Аникина, И. В. Дмитриева, М. М. Голанский и др. / Отв. ред. С. А. Бессонов; Институт Африки (Москва). М. 1994; Громыко А. А. Мировые державы в Африке и интересы России / Отв. ред. Ан. А.

The work of A. D. Savateev, a specialist at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, notes the presence of this movement in other regions of the world in the research project of radical movements «Christians and Muslims in Tropical Africa»¹².

The third group includes works on Cameroon's bilateral relations with the leading countries of the world such as the France, UK, China and Russia. Undoubted interest are the scientific works of scholars such as O.V. Rybalchenko¹³, M.V. Zhurba¹⁴, A.D. Stoyanov¹⁵, T.D. Khasanov¹⁶, A.A. Zabella¹⁷, L.V. Ponomarenko¹⁸, M.S. Kucheryavenko¹⁹. whose works deal with the mechanisms, characteristics and development of bilateral diplomacy with Cameroon.

Громько. М., 2010; Дейч Т. Л., Корендясов Е. Н. Российско-африканские отношения в условиях глобализации / Отв. ред. Т. Л. Дейч, Е. Н. Корендясов. М., 2009; Дейч Т. Л., Корендясов Е. Н. Россия в конкурентной борьбе за африканские минерально-сырьевые ресурсы / Отв. ред. Т. Л. Дейч, Е. Н. Корендясов. М., 2011. 188 с; Азербает С. Г., Бондаренко Д. М., Борзова А. Ю., Дейч Т. Л., Денисова Т. С., Журавлев В. Л., Юртаев В. И. Новые партнеры Африки: влияние на рост и развитие стран континента / Отв. ред. Т. Л. Дейч, Е. Н. Корендясов. М.: Институт Африки РАН. 2016.

¹²Саватеев А. Мусульмане и христиане Тропической Африки // Россия и мусульманский мир. 2004. № 7. С. 75-87.

¹³Табопда Т. Б., Рыбальченко О. В. Камерун и Россия: перспективы бизнес-коммуникации // Электронный сетевой политематический журнал. Научные Труды КубГТУ. 2019. № S8. С. 101-105.

¹⁴Журба М. В., Станислас М. К. Особенности регулирования международной торговли в Республике Камерун // Экономические исследования и разработки. 2019. № 3. С. 50-55.

¹⁵Стойнов А. Д. Неоколониализм в политике Франции на современном этапе // Неделя науки СПбПУ. 2019. С. 356-359.

¹⁶Хасанов Т. Д. Своеобразие типов повтора в текстах новогоднего обращения глав государств Франции и Камеруна // Гуманитарные исследования. 2020. № 2. С. 30-36.

¹⁷Забелла А. А., Кассе Ныгусие В. М. Военно-техническое взаимодействие Китая и Африканских стран в начале XXI века // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2019. № 2. С. 77-86.

¹⁸Забелла А. А., Пономаренко Л. В. Торгово-экономическое сотрудничество КНР со странами Африки // Американская стратегия сдерживания КНР и конфликтный потенциал в Азии и Африке. 2018. С. 107-118.

¹⁹Кучерявенко М. С. Исторические предпосылки социальной дифференциации английского языка в Камеруне // Вестник Череповецкого государственного университета. 2013. Vol. 1, № 4 (51). С. 81-85.

Of particular scientific interest are works of O.S. Kulkova²⁰ on the EU and UK foreign policy towards African countries. The author pays special attention to the process of forming the conceptual foundations of British relations with African countries, analyses British participation in the settlement of conflicts directly affecting the interest of Cameroon.

The problem of increasing China's economic and political influence in Africa has received a lot of coverage in Russian historiography. Various aspects of Sino-Cameroon bilateral relations have been studied by authors such as D.A. Degterev²¹, T.L. Deich²², T.M. Solovyova²³, V.P. Titov²⁴ and others.

The Degterev's article «China-Africa: important aspects of relations»²⁵ is useful for this thesis as China, in implementing its foreign policy in Cameroon uses the same methods that were used by the Soviet leadership at the time namely: building infrastructure, humanitarian aid, increasing contacts at the highest level, frequent exchange of delegations and full cooperation.

The author concludes that in the presence of comprehensive works on Cameroon's foreign policy in the post-colonial period through the prism of the

²⁰ Кулькова О. С. Африка и ЕС: в преддверии четвертого совместного саммита. М.: Российский совет по международным делам. 2014; Кулькова О. С. Африканская политика Великобритании (1997 – 2012 гг.). М.: Российский совет по международным делам. 2012.

²¹ Дегтерев Д. А. Китайская экспансия в Африку: «свято место пусто не бывает»? // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2005. № 2. С. 35-41.

²² Дейч Т. Л. Китай как лидер БРИКС в Африке // Восходящие государства-гиганты БРИКС: роль в мировой политике стратегии модернизации. М., 2012; Дейч Т. Л. Экономическая активность Китая на Африканском континенте // Страны Востока: социально-экономические, этно-конфессиональные и социокультурные проблемы в контексте глобализации. Памяти А. И. Петрова. М., 2012; Дейч Т. Л. Китай «завоевывает» Африку. М.: РСМД, 2014; Дейч Т. Л. «Китайский век» для Африки // Международная жизнь. 2013. № 10. С. 89-102; Дейч Т. Л. Китай и Индия в Африке: азиатская альтернатива западному влиянию? // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2007. № 9. С. 20-27; Дейч Т. Л. Китай торгует с Африкой. Плюсы и минусы для стран континента // Африка и Азия сегодня. 2014. № 8. С. 42–47.

²³ Пономаренко Л.В., Соловьева Т.М. КНР–Африка: новые ориентиры взаимоотношений. // Вестник РУДН, Серия: Международные отношения. 2015. № 1. С. 32–42.

²⁴ Пономаренко Л. В., Титов В. П. Китай – Африка-Россия: феномен мировой политики XXI века. М., 2008.

²⁵ Дегтерев Д. А. Китай-Африка: важные аспекты отношений // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2005. № 6. С. 84–91.

implementation of its multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, there were no publications by Russian authors analyzing the comprehensive aspect of the Cameroonian foreign policy as dealt with by the thesis, namely: developments, tools, mechanisms and features of the country's foreign policy from 1960-2021.

Foreign historiography includes issues relating to various aspects of Cameroon's foreign policy have been widely covered. A special place is occupied by the works of some western authors who have studied the post-independence Cameroon's foreign policy such as M.W. DeLancey²⁶, L.P. Blanchard²⁷, M. Bloom²⁸, J.O. David²⁹, L. Grubbs³⁰, W.B. Lee³¹, E.T. Nna³², B. McSherry³³, R. Mates³⁴, B.N. Mpegna³⁵, D. Anatole., Y. Wang., L. Hu., M.C. T. Vanessa³⁶, G. Perkins³⁷. The works of the aforementioned scholars have provided an in-depth analysis of the current political, economic, cultural and humanitarian processes in Africa as well as analysis of the fundamental factors affecting the dynamics.

The basic priorities of Cameroon's foreign policy, its dynamic and development have become the object of study by American and British

²⁶Delancey M. W. Cameroon: Dependence and independence. Routledge. 2019; Delancey M. W. The construction of the Cameroon political system: The Ahidjo years, 1958–1982 // Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 1987. Vol. 6, № 1-2. P. 3-24.

²⁷Blanchard L. P. US. African Command (AFRICOM) // Congressional Research Service. 2014.

²⁸ Bloom M., Matfest H. Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram's Terror // PRISM. Vol. 6, № 1. P. 104-121.

²⁹David J. O. Boko Haram: The Socio-Economic Drivers // Springer. 2015.

³⁰Grubbs L. Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s. Amherst, MA : University of Massachusetts Press, 2009.

³¹Lee W. B. Cultural Differences and Decision Making: The Example of the Support to Primary Education Project in Cameroon. 1990.

³² Nna E. T. La néocolonialité des curricula du primaire au Cameroun: 1963-2001 // Historical Studies in Education/Revue d'histoire de l'éducation. 2020.

³³Mcsherry B. The Political Economy of Oil in Equatorial Guinea // African Studies Quarterly. 2006. Vol. 8, № 3.

³⁴ Mates R. Challenges of conflict and cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa // Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Studia Europaea. 2021. Vol. 66, № 2. P. 5-22.

³⁵Mpegna B. N. La politique française de coopération culturelle en Afrique : l'exemple du Cameroun. Paris : L'Harmattan. 2014. 268 p.

³⁶ Anatole D., Wang Y., Hu L., Vanessa M. C. T. China-Cameroon Agricultural Cooperation: Challenges of Agricultural Development in Cameroon // Journal of African Foreign Affairs. 2021. Vol. 8, № 3. P. 49.

³⁷Perkins G. East versus West: Chinese and American development efforts and perceptions in Cameroon // Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. 1392. 2012.

researchers such as W.R. Johnson³⁸, K. Kewir³⁹, N.T. Niambi⁴⁰, A.H. Kristen⁴¹ and F.M. Stark⁴². In particular, A.H. Kristen considers that Ahidjo and Biya have both used the security forces to repress threats from below and stabilize their dictatorships. Combined gendarme, army, and paramilitary units have been deployed to defeat the southern maquis rebellion of the 1960s; the mass protests for democratization in the 1990s; the fight against Boko Haram, beginning in 2014; and the Anglophone separatist movement, which exploded in 2017.

The role of Cameroon in multilateral institutions and especially in various international organizations to which the country is a member, is reflected in the published monographs by I.L. Claude⁴³, S. Gill and D. Law⁴⁴, R. Murray⁴⁵, P.D. Williams and A. Boutellis⁴⁶. Also, the foreign policy of Cameroon and its bilateral relations with the leading countries of the world are reflected in the works of E.J. Eluke⁴⁷, R. Daniel and V. Shubin⁴⁸, S.A. Khan and F.M. Baye⁴⁹.

³⁸Johnson W. R. *The Cameroon Federation*. Princeton University Press, 2015.

³⁹ Kewir K. *Leadership and economic integration: the case of the Cameroon-Gabon couple*. Center for strategic research and analysis 2015. <http://cesran.org/leadership-and-economic-integration-the-case-of-the-cameroon-gabon-couple.html>

⁴⁰Niambi N. T. *France et Chine en Afrique centrale : de la compétition à la coopération ?* Paris: L'Harmattan. 2019. 160 p.

⁴¹Harkness K. A. *Cameroon: the military and autocratic stability* // Oxford research encyclopedia of politics. 2020.

⁴²Stark F. M. *Federalism in Cameroon: the shadow and the reality* // Canadian Journal of African Studies. 1976. Vol. 10, № 3. P. 423-442.

⁴³ Claude I. L. *Collective legitimization as a political function of the United Nations*. International organizations. Vol. 20, № 03. 1966.

⁴⁴Gill S., Law D. *Global Hegemon and the Structural Power of Capital* // International Quarterly. 1989. Vol. 33, № 4. P. 475-499.

⁴⁵Murray R. *Human rights in Africa: from the OAU to the African Union*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

⁴⁶Williams P. D., Boutellis A. *Partnership peacekeeping: challenges and opportunities in the United Nations–African Union Relationship* // African Affairs. 2014. Vol 113, № 451. P. 254-278.

⁴⁷Eluke E. J. «US-Cameroon cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram.» // Епістемологічні дослідження в філософії, соціальних і політичних науках. 2015. № 4. С. 115-121.

⁴⁸Daniel R., Shubin V. *Africa and Russia: The Pursuit of Strengthened Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* // Africa and the World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018. P. 51-69.

⁴⁹Khan S. A., Baye F. M. *The impact of China-Africa trade relations: Case study of Cameroon* // European Journal of Education Studies. 2019.

The following Cameroonian scholars: J. Takougang⁵⁰, E. Ngolle Ngolle⁵¹, T. Bylka⁵², O.F. Mujih⁵³, N.G. Emmanuel, studied Cameroon's foreign policy and how it changed during the period with inaugurated of new leaders who participated in its development. The scholars have critically examined the various roles that such leaders played and their contributions to the development and implementation of the foreign policy.

Of particular interest are studies by African and Cameroonian scholars on the formation and development of Cameroon's foreign policy. They analyze Cameroon's basic priorities of foreign policy and its dynamic nature since independence with focus on the period from 1960 to 2021. Among the Cameroonian authors who have studied the country's foreign policy since independence are J. Takaugang⁵⁴, M. Azevedo⁵⁵, P.A. Ngwafu⁵⁶, J.A. Amin⁵⁷, A.

⁵⁰Takougang J. The demise of Biya's new deal in Cameroon, 1982-1992 // The leadership challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya, 2004. P. 95-122.

⁵¹Ngolle Ngolle E. Democratic change and foreign policy in Africa: the case of Cameroon // Beiträge/Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen. 1996. № 4.

⁵²Bylka T. The political and economic conditions of modernization in the independent Cameroon // *Africana Bulletin*. 1987. № 34. P. 81-91.

⁵³Emmanuel N. G. «Donor-Patrons and Aid Clients: The Case of France and Cameroon». *African Humanities*. 2010.

⁵⁴Takaugang J. Continuity and Change in Cameroon's Foreign Policy in the Post-Ahidjo Era // *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs*. 1993. P. 135-153.

⁵⁵Azevedo M. The Post-Ahidjo Era in Cameroon // *Current History*. 1987. Vol. 86, № 520. P. 217-230.

⁵⁶Ngwafu P. A. Cameroon's Foreign Policy and Inter-African Relations in the Post-Ahidjo Era. *Post-Colonial Cameroon: Politics, Economy and Society*. 2018. P. 257.

⁵⁷Amin J.A. Paul Biya's Foreign Policy: The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon Under Paul Biya. 2004. P. 153; Amin J. A. Equality, Non-Interference, and Sovereignty: President Ahmadou Ahidjo and the Making of Cameroon-US Relations // *African Studies Review*. 2021. Vol.64 , № 4. P. 826-853.

Eyinga⁵⁸, N. Kofele-Kale⁵⁹, M. Mbonjo⁶⁰, P. Konings and F.B. Nyamnjoh⁶¹, J.L. Nfi⁶², P. Ada and R.M. Mbida⁶³.

Scholars such as F. Bakoup and D. Tarr⁶⁴, R. Nkendah⁶⁵, D.C. Fonchamnyo⁶⁶, N.C. Nguindip⁶⁷, as well as D. Diaw and A. Lessoua⁶⁸, analyze in their works the role that the country played in CEMAC, in which Cameroon is an active member and in peacekeeping operations in Africa and especially in Central Africa in which the country participated together with other countries.

Thus, it can be concluded that the historiography of the study provides a sufficiently comprehensive overview of the historical aspect of the study as well as an expertise and analytical perspective of the subject. However, the implementation aspect of Cameroon's multilateral foreign policy at the regional and sub-regional level is not well articulated, although it is discussed by a number of researchers when attempting to analyze or predict the development of the

⁵⁸Joseph R. «Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadu Ahidjo.» Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers.1978.

⁵⁹Kofele-Kale N. Cameroon and its foreign relations // African Affairs. 1981. Vol. 80, № 319. P. 197-217.

⁶⁰Mbonjo M. Cameroon Across the Divide: Foreign Policy Priorities in West and Central Africa. Chatham House. 2013

⁶¹Konings P., Francis B. N. Negotiating an Anglophone identity: A study of the politics of recognition and representation in Cameroon. Brill. 2003.Vol. 1.

⁶²Nfi J. L. The Reunification Debate in British Southern Cameroons: The Role of French Cameroon Immigrants. Langaa RPCIG. 2014.

⁶³Ada P., Mbida R. M. International organizations as shields in Cameroon foreign policy. African Foreign Policies in International Institutions. New York. NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 2018.

⁶⁴Bakoup F., Tarr D. The economic effects of integration in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community: some general equilibrium estimates for Cameroon // African Development Review. 2000. Vol. 12, № 2. P. 161-190.

⁶⁵Nkendah R. Estimating the informal cross-border trade of agricultural and horticultural commodities between Cameroon and its CEMAC neighbours // Food Policy. 2013. Vol. 41, P. 133-144.

⁶⁶Fonchamnyo D. C. The export-diversifying effect of foreign direct investment in the CEMAC Region // Journal of Economics and International Finance. 2015. Vol. 7, № 7. P. 157-166.

⁶⁷Nguindip N. C. The Right to Non-discrimination and the Protection of Foreigners Status within the CEMAC Sub-Region: The Case of Cameroon, Chad and Gabon // Journal of Human Rights Law and Practice. 2018. Vol. 1, № 2. P. 46-58.

⁶⁸Diaw D., Lessoua A. Natural resources exports, diversification and economic growth of CEMAC countries: On the impact of trade with China // African Development Review. 2013. Vol. 25, № 2. P. 189-202.

Cameroonian foreign policy. This makes it necessary to conduct special studies aimed at analyzing the mechanisms, characteristics and trends of Cameroon's foreign policy from 1960-2021.

The object of research is the conceptual foundations and the practice of foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon.

The subject of research is the process of foreign policy formation, its directions and forms of implementation in the frame of Cameroon's state policy.

The purpose of the thesis is to identify the priorities and features of Cameroon's foreign policy ranging under the conditions of various political regimes.

In order to achieve the purpose, the following **research tasks** shall be solved:

- show the place and role of foreign policy and diplomacy in the implementation state course of the Cameroonian Republic;
- examine the role of key decision-making centers in the implementation of the Republic of Cameroon's foreign policy as well as the impact of its priorities in the development of the country's foreign policy;
 - consider the basic principles of Cameroon's foreign policy during the reign of A. Ahidjo and subsequent governments;
 - define the prerequisites that characterize the main stages in the development of Cameroon's foreign policy;
 - analyze the features of bilateral relations between Cameroon traditional partners (France, UK, USA) as well as new partners (Russia, China);
 - evaluate Cameroon's relations with its neighbour's countries;
 - explore Cameroon's relations with sub-regional organizations such as the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC);
 - identify the main vectors of Cameroon's multilateral diplomacy in the context of interaction with international and regional organizations (AU and EU);

- show the role of Cameroon's diplomacy in ensuring peace and stability in the Central African region.

The chronological scope covers the period from 1960 to 2021. Cameroon's foreign policy is made up of two separate but complementary phases which include the independence phase. The lower limit was determined in the «African Year», 1960. From independence till 1982, Cameroon was ruled by President Ahidjo who centralized power in Yaounde, the capital, and on one person: himself. Both the late independence phase and the beginning of President Biya's reign were referred to as the upper limit which spanned from 1982-1990. Given that Cameroon has been a multiparty state since December 1990, numerous political parties emerged, most based on ethnic or regional concerns. Moreover, the world economic crisis of 2008 drained down Cameroon economy and this led in 2009-2021 to the need to examine the current status of Cameroon's foreign policy implementation from a global, regional and sub-regional perspective. Thus, the period spanning from 1960 to 2021 allows one to highlight the stages of the country's foreign policy and identify her main features and priorities under different political regimes.

Main Sources of Data. In order to achieve the author's goal and solve the research task, a group of sources were involved, analyzed and systematized and this can be divided into several groups.

The first group «regulatory and legislative sources» include the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon (1960)⁶⁹, (1961)⁷⁰, (1972)⁷¹, (1984)⁷²,

⁶⁹Constitution of the Republique du Cameroun (1960). URL: <https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/cm1960.htm> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

⁷⁰Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon (1961). URL: <https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/cm1961.htm> (date of access: 21.01.2021).

⁷¹Cameroonian constitutional referendum, 1972. URL: <https://africanelections.tripod.com/cm.html> (date of access: 21.12.2020).

⁷²Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon of 1984. URL: <https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/cm1984.htm> (date of access: 25.09.20).

(1996)⁷³, international multilateral treaties⁷⁴ and official documents of the Government of Cameroon. The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation and China's document relating to Africa, namely the White Papers⁷⁵, the African Union documents⁷⁶ and CEMAC documents⁷⁷, are useful for this study.

The second group «clerical sources» represents reports of international and regional organizations, such as: the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC)⁷⁸. This group of sources can also include references, reports and the primarily documents from the relevant departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon. Of particular importance for the study are reports, circulars and directives emanate from a number of departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon such as on African Union,

⁷³Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon. 1996. Yaounde. URL: https://www.assnat.cm/images/La_Constitution.pdf (date of access: 21.01.2021).

⁷⁴ Document on the Abuja Treaty establishing African Economic Community and its purpose in Article 17 of the AU Constitutive Act, Africa Union (AU) Secretariat: the official text. – Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1991.

⁷⁵China's Foreign Aid (2014) // Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. URL:http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7209074.htm (date of access: 10.08.2021).

⁷⁶African Union Handbook 2020. URL: <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Africa/African-Union-Handbook-2020-ENGLISH-web.pdf> (date of access: 03.09.2020).

⁷⁷Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa – CEMAC. URL: <https://vdocuments.net/code-des-douanes-de-la-cemacpdf.html> (date of access: 29.08.2021).

⁷⁸ Protocol on explosive remnants of War to the Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate Effects (Protocol V) (Geneva, 28 November 2003). URL: https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2019/Treaties/treaties_english.pdf (date of access: 17.01.2020); Taking Stock of the Global Partnership for Development // United Nations report on MDG. URL: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> (date of access: 04.01.2021); Security ranking of Cameroon // United Nations, 2014. URL: <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf> (date of access: 04.01.2020); Curbing Violence in Cameroon (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency // International Crisis Group, Africa Report № 216, 03.04.2014; CEMAC Protocole D'accord sur la Coopération en Matière de supervision de la Sécurité. URL: <http://aamac.aero/images/aamac/skill/PROTOCOLE%20ACCORD%20-%20AAMAC%20-%20CEMAC%20-%20OACI.pdf> (date of access: 04.01.2020).

Cameroon-China Bilateral Relations⁷⁹, Cameroon's Bilateral and Multilateral Relations, Cameroon-Russia Bilateral Relations, Cameroon-UK Bilateral Relations, the Gulf of Guinea Commission⁸⁰.

The third group is media sources. This group is represented by such documents as statements and speeches of heads of state and officials, which include the inaugural speech of the president P. Biya dated 06.11.2018⁸¹, statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with the terrorist attack on a military camp in Niger⁸², speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V. Lavrov dated 27.02.2013⁸³.

The fourth group contains statistical sources. The group includes materials from international database systems such as Global Terrorism Data Base⁸⁴, OPED⁸⁵, IMF⁸⁶, which were especially useful in studying energy cooperation

⁷⁹ Cameroon Ministry of External Relations. «Memorandum, Cameroon–China Relations, 1975–2012». Yaoundé: Cameroon Ministry of External Relations. 2013.

⁸⁰ Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Gulf of Guinea Commission, African SubRegional Organization (ASROD) Division, 14th September 2018. URL: <https://www.foreign.govmu.org> (date of access: 03.07.2020).

⁸¹ Inaugural address by H.E. Paul Biya, President of the Republic of Cameroon, on the occasion of the swearing-in ceremony. URL: <https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Biyas-inaugural-speech.pdf> (date of access: 23.08.2020).

⁸² A brief by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in connection with the attack of terrorists on a military camp in Niger // The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 12.12.19. URL: https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ne//asset_publisher/gr5p5x4K0yCa/content/id/395388 (date of access: 14.01.2021).

⁸³ About negotiations of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon Pierre Moukoko Mbonjo. URL: https://archive.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/cm/-/asset_publisher/2xrrL7GWsmQ5/content/id/120518 (date of access: 21.05.2020).

⁸⁴ Information about the study and its results // Global Terrorism Index. URL: <http://gtmarket.ru/ratings/global-terrorism-index/info> (date of access: 14.01.2021).

⁸⁵ Africa Interest in Energy Cooperation with Russia // OPED, 19.05.2019. URL: <https://www.eurasiareview.com/19052019-africa-interested-in-energy-cooperation-with-russiaoped/> (date of access: 28.01.2021).

⁸⁶ IMF Country Report No. 22/75 // Cameroon 2021 article IV consultation and first reviews under the extended credit facility and the extended fund facility arrangements and requests for waivers for performance criteria applicability and nonobservance and modification of performance criterion. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/Search#q=cameroon&sort=relevancy> (date of access: 28.01.2021).

between Cameroon and Russia, as well as their joint action in the fight against terrorism.

Methodology of research results from the multifaceted nature of the chosen topic and bases on a systematic approach to the study of the history of international relations. This research was carried out within the framework of the theory of neorealism⁸⁷ using a number of general scientific principles and methods. The principles of historicism, scientific reliability and objectivity, problem-chronological approach were applied within the research process. The principle of historicism made it possible to analyze the issue under study, taking into account historical realities, the principle of scientific reliability was implemented in the course of the study as a reliance on sources and facts, which made it possible to deeply reveal the problems posed and obtain reasonable conclusions. The problem-chronological approach made it possible to present the main historical events in connection with the formation of Cameroon's foreign policy. On the basis of the problem-chronological principle, the Content was formed and the logic of the presentation of the material in the text of the work was determined.

The use of problem-chronological and systemic approaches which helped to identify the main features of the formation of Cameroon's foreign policy was determined by the need for an objective coverage of the complex of international and regional problems in a context where Cameroon's relations with the world community developed.

Methods of the research. The study employed the historical method of research and analysis as well as system and comparative analysis methods were used. The application of the system analysis method turned out to be necessary to determine the features of Cameroon's foreign policy in various periods of history. The identified constant characteristics have made it possible to more accurately

⁸⁷Waltz K. Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979. P.42; Gilpin R. War and change in world politics. Publisher: Cambridge University Press.1981; Keohane R. Neorealism and its critics. Wiley,1986.

define Cameroon's strategic priorities at the local, regional and global levels. The comparative method made it possible to carry out a comparative analysis of the development of Cameroon foreign policy in the context of the development of relations with foreign states and international organizations. This, in turn, contributed to the analysis of the topic under study as a complex system in which foreign policy is handled as an integral component and a significant tool for implementing the state course of the Republic of Cameroon. The method of comparative analysis was also used when comparing the characteristics of Cameroon's foreign policy at different stages in order to identify its essence and features of evolution.

The scientific novelty of this thesis is determined by the fact that it is the first comprehensive study on the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon in the period 1960-2021. This was carried out taking into account continuous geopolitical changes and the impact of the transition process.

For a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the problem, the researcher studied the main stages of the Cameroon's foreign policy formation. Also, he identified the main features and historical traditions of Cameroon diplomacy. The author analyzed the relationship between Cameroon and its main partners. In the context of the implementation of the state course, he considered the possible prospects for the development of these relations and he identified the factors influencing the highly political course of Cameroon. The dissertation identifies the mechanisms and features the process of making foreign policy decisions, the specifics of Cameroon's interaction with other states within the framework of bilateral and multilateral formats are determined. This fact made it possible to give a comprehensive assessment of the foreign policy of the Cameroon Republic at the present stage of the country's development.

In the course of his research, the candidate original sources and the latest publications were used, primarily in English and Russian. This enabled us to give an up-to-date analysis of the foreign policy situation in Cameroon, to study the

new challenges and threats to regional security which undoubtedly constitute the scientific novelty of the research.

The main provisions for the defense.

1. Since 1960, Cameroon's foreign policy has not been only way of dealing with foreign countries but also a form of active struggle to strengthen the sovereignty of independent Cameroon. The Cameroon's foreign policy was aimed at creating a wide range of international partnership for national and sub-regional development;

2. In the years after Cameroon gained independence (1960), two stages in the development of the country's foreign policy could be distinguished: the first stage (1960-1982) – the formation of an independent foreign policy was associated with the process of building a new state in independent Cameroon which was headed by President A. Ahidjo; the expansion of foreign policy activity – this began with the coming to power of President P. Biya (since 1982); The second stage in the development of Cameroon's foreign policy (the post-1982) integration and stability – this confirmed the continuity of the foreign policy course of the previous period. The most important foreign policy's priority is to become stable in Central Africa. In the sphere of bilateral relations, dialogue diplomacy is being implemented; prosperity and openness –this is the stage of the course for the country's prosperity declared in Cameroon. Diplomacy of prosperity and openness was being implemented in the field of foreign policy;

3. Cameroon was a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU and African Union since 2002) and has often initiated political decisions through this organization that are of importance to the entire region. Most of the relations with other African countries took place outside the OAU but were guided by the AU principles. Since 1976, relations with African countries have been at the heart of Cameroonian leadership's foreign policy as evidenced by the active support for national liberation movements and anti-apartheid fighters. From that period onwards, its foreign policy has been transformed into Afrocentric;

4. Cameroon has sought to develop relations not only with the countries in the African continent but also with the countries of Asia and Europe. Its foreign policy is characterized by its active participation in the Non-Aligned Movement while adhering to the principles of pan-Africanism. The Non-Aligned Movement has been a platform for the Republic of Cameroon to engage with developing countries, positioning and self-identifying itself globally with the claim to be a responsible African power;

5. Cameroon seeks to intensify its relations with the outside world. At present, its foreign policy is primarily driven by pragmatic considerations. The country's foreign policy of «economic diplomacy» is gaining momentum with particular evidence in its bilateral relations with the UK, China, France, the EU, as well as selected European countries. Of decisive importance for Cameroon is the policy towards the countries of its subregion. At the same time, France remains the most important economic partner with which Gabon has a strong diplomatic cooperation, which is evidenced by about stable and priority cooperation. Cameroon encourages good neighborliness with Gabon, Central African Republic, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, with which Cameroon shares historical and cultural ties. Cameroon's foreign policy is aimed at supporting economic integration, continental unity and pan-Africanism, which were the focus of President A. Ahidjo's policy. Cameroon's interaction with partners in the African Union, with CEMAC member countries is aimed at integration processes in Central Africa. Cameroon is strengthening its political position in the region;

6. Initiating a course toward the democratization of society and the transition to a multi-party system of government in 1993, the leadership of Cameroon carried out a correction of the former foreign policy model in the context of a new national positioning at the regional and global levels. The main focus of Cameroon's foreign policy began to focus on economic diplomacy. From 2001 to 2019, President Paul Biya carried out active economic diplomacy. The President made numerous trips abroad to present an attractive image of Cameroon abroad and to win the favor of wealthy countries. As a result, P. Biya managed to

agree with the IMF and the World Bank on a concessional program for the repayment of external debt, and in 2017 to agree with creditors to write off more than half of the external debt, which brought Cameroon's economic diplomacy to a new level;

7. Issues of peace, security, and integration are central to Cameroon's foreign policy in Africa. For Cameroon, the current international challenges, in particular the development of sub-regional integration, are of vital interest, it is for this reason that the country continues to play a significant role in the creation and functioning of institutions and bodies of regional integration structures, especially through its financial contribution and political initiatives, as well as active participation in achieving the goals of the Economic Community of Central African Countries and the African Union.

Theoretical significance of the thesis. The theoretic significance of the study is that the totality of the results, the theoretic conclusions and provisions obtained by the author, makes a certain contribution to the study of the role of foreign policy in ensuring the involvement of small African states in modern international processes. Using the example of Cameroon, the importance of a comprehensive study of the foreign policy of this group of countries is shown, both in the context of the development of relations with the countries of the region, the leading powers of the world, international intergovernmental organizations, and in the implementation of a foreign policy course of the Republic of Cameroon. For the first time, the English language sources introduced into scientific circulation contribute to a comprehensive study of this issue. The main provisions of the dissertation are of interest to Africans, experts and researchers involved in the political process and international relations to which African countries participate.

Practical significance of the research is due to the fact that the main provisions and conclusions contained in the dissertation can be used as reference materials, and the scientific development of a number of specific issues, the key points, conclusion and practical recommendations are taken into account when

considering relevant issues in CEMAC, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Gulf of Guinea Commission, African Union and UN amongst others. In addition, these materials can be used to develop outlines for lectures on courses for bachelors, masters and postgraduates students studying foreign policy of African countries and various aspects of international relations and security problems in Central Africa such as integration processes in the region and the participation of African states in the activities of international organizations by ensuring regional security.

In addition, the materials used in the thesis with its conclusion and analytical approaches may be used in the workings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation among others which is to develop and clarify a number of aspects of Russian foreign policy towards African countries.

Reliability and validity of research fundings is provided by a representative source and information base, a systematic approach to the analysis of the problems posed, an appeal to expert assessments of Russian, Western and African researchers, and the use of various scientific research methods.

Approbation of the thesis. The results of this thesis are presented in reports at international scientific conferences and conferences of young scientists of RUDN University:

February 28th 2020: Africa and the formation of new system of International relations: Africa's Past, Present and Future» (RUDN, Moscow)

February 17th 2021: Страны Востока в XXI веке: неравномерность экономического роста и неравенство социально-экономического развития (Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS, Moscow)

February 26th 2021: Conflict Situation in the horn of Africa and National responses to the Covid-19 pandemic (AFNSIR-2021)

May 24-28, 2021: 15th African studies Conference: Destinies of Africa in the modern world (Institute for African studies)

April 29th 2021 Развитие российско-африканского сотрудничества: ситуационный анализ положения дел в странах, имеющиеся потенциалы для сотрудничества, использование уроков истории, отрицание колониальных принципов. Всестороннее развитие братских отношений как фактор сохранения общечеловеческих ценностей.

26th IPSA World Congress of Political Science 2021 (IPSA Virtual platform, June 10th - 15th, 2021).

January 27th, 2021: COVID-19 in Africa: Responses and prospects for recovery (Columbia University Events).

For a plain understanding of the results, one can see the author's publications including those recommended by the Higher Attestation Commission at the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation: Series «International relations», Journal of Human Sciences, Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences.

The thesis was presented at the meeting of the Department of theory and history of international relations of RUDN-University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences and recommended for defence.

Structure of the thesis. The dissertation consists of the introduction, three chapters, conclusion, list of sources and literature.

CHAPTER 1. FOREIGN POLICY FORMATION PROCESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

1.1. Preconditions and Stages of Development of Cameroon's Foreign Policy

The process of decolonization that began, and the independence gained by Cameroon brought the country to the international arena. On January 1, 1960, Cameroon became a sovereign state and a new participant in international relations⁸⁸.

The role and place of the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon in the modern world is difficult to understand without analyzing the prerequisites and development of its foreign policy. The formation of the country's foreign policy was accompanied by significant difficulties, both objective and subjective⁸⁹.

Moreover, having been under the colonial control of no less than three powers for over 76 years before achieving full independence in 1960, the formation of Cameroon's foreign policy proceeded in the context of the Cold War and the strong influence of external factors, but after a while the country becomes a full-fledged participant in international relations, both on the African continent and outside it. The line of behavior of other countries in relation to Cameroon also changed, this reflected the process of development of its foreign policy and the gradual departure from the policy of isolation. Hence, compared to most of its neighbouring countries, Cameroon's history has been characterized by periods of apparent peace and stability followed by periods of often-violent unrest. The Federal Republic of Nigeria and Chad have known civil war and several coups d'etat; the Central African Republic is practically a failing state in which France has intervened on a regular basis; Only Gabon enjoys similar stability and peace . Cameroon's two presidents to date, Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-82) and Paul Biya

⁸⁸Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon law №. 96-06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972. URL : https://www.assnat.cm/images/La_Constitution.pdf (date of access: 21.11.2020).

⁸⁹Rivkin A. The Politics of Nation-Building: Problems and Preconditions // Journal of International Affairs. 1962. P. 131-143.

(1982-), have both managed to keep the country from joining the ranks of failing states. It seems that since 1960⁹⁰ one can speak of two stages in the development of Cameroon's foreign policy.

The first stage started conditionally from the moment of independence (1960-1982) when President Ahmadou Ahidjo was the head of state⁹¹. Cameroon's foreign policy formulation process is a highly personalized matter, and has been dominated by the style and personality of President Ahmadou Ahidjo. The foreign policy of Cameroon during this period was defined by many researchers as «isolationist foreign policy,» or «limited foreign policy,» since Cameroon sought to gain diplomatic independence⁹² as it was strengthening political independence. At the same time, Cameroon began to develop a strategy of diplomatic relations, implying the maintenance of relations with at least one state of each continent.

The presidency of A. Ahidjo is indeed, above all, characterized by isolationism and a somewhat limited foreign policy. However, this means that Cameroon was closed at the diplomatic level to other countries, with the exception of its partners, namely France and its African neighbors⁹³.

There are three main reasons for this «modest» positioning of Cameroon in contemporary international relations.

First of all, one should point out the low level of development of the new state. Formally, Cameroon liberated itself from French colonial domination⁹⁴, but the cooperation agreements signed on the day of the declaration of independence actually left the leading positions. In subsequent years, agreements were signed

⁹⁰Manue G. R. L'indépendance du Cameroun. *Revue des Deux Mondes* (1829-1971). 1960. P. 461-473.

⁹¹ Until the peaceful and constitutional transfer of power on 6 November 1982, Ahmadou Ahidjo had served as the country's only head of state since independence in 1960. P. 65.

⁹²Kofele-Kale N. Cameroon and its foreign relations // *African Affairs*. 1981. Vol. 80, № 319. P. 197-217.

⁹³Delancey M. W. The construction of the Cameroon political system: The Ahidjo years, 1958–1982 // *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 1987. Vol. 6, № 1-2. P. 3-24.

⁹⁴King A. D. Exporting 'Planning': The Colonial and Neo-Colonial Experience // *Urbanism Past & Present*. 1977. № 5. P. 12-22.

with a number of other states (USA in 1961 and 1972; with West Germany in 1962; with France in 1960, 1972 and 1974; with China in 1962; with Russia in 1962, 1963 and 1979), but none of these countries received the privileges that were given to France⁹⁵.

Secondly, by 1960, the world was already divided into ideological blocs, where the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR) determined the main directions of world politics, and the leading powers of the French level played an important role in regional affairs, «guiding» small countries, for example, such as Cameroon⁹⁶.

Moreover, in Africa, as the researchers noted, the ideology of decolonization formulated by de Gaulle as «France's responsibility for the liberated African territories» was transformed into an official concept that guided many of his followers, subsequently determining the African policy of France⁹⁷. In After Cameroon which had gained independence, their ability to influence the situation somewhat decreased. However, after the 1984 coup, the tide turned again in favor of France. Thus, for the first time in the history of modern Cameroon, internal political events had a decisive influence on the country's foreign policy.

As a result, Cameroon joined the group of states, which, as noted by G.V. Fokeev, «threw at the end of 1960 an open challenge to the forces of revolutionary progress and anti-imperialism in Africa»⁹⁸.

In 1960, Cameroon became a member of the United Nations (UN). From October 24 to October 26, 1960, Cameroon contributed to the creation of the military-political African and Malagasy Union (AMU), which initially included: Ivory Coast, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Benin, Congo, Cameroon, Mauritania, Malagasy Republic, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Central African Republic, Association

⁹⁵ Mbembe J. A. Le spectre et l'Etat: des dimensions politiques de l'imaginaire historique dans le Cameroun postcolonial // Revue de la Bibliothèque Nationale. 1989. № 34. P. 2-13.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Высоцкая Н. И. Африканская политика Франции (конец XX – начало XXI века). Очерки. М., 2006. С. 11.

⁹⁸ Фокеев Г. В. Внешняя политика стран Африки. М.: Международные отношения. 1968. С. 77.

of the countries of the former French West Africa (FWA) and French Equatorial Africa (FEA). Cameroon was among the 12 countries of the Brazzaville grouping, whose leaders at a conference in Monrovia (May 8–12, 1961) spoke in favor of an alternative understanding of the principles of African unity as political unification and as cooperation⁹⁹. Subsequently, the AMU countries at the Conference of African Heads of States and Government in Addis Ababa (May 23-25, 1963), when creating the Organization of African Unity (OAU), opposed the idea of Kwame Nkrumah to create a continental federal government in favor of the «bouquet of Africa» (Leopold Senghor).

In economic terms, Cameroon has relied on regionalization, actively participating in the formation of the Equatorial Customs Union (ECU), which was created in 1959 with the full approval of France¹⁰⁰. Later, the ECU's will become the Central African Customs and Economic Union (CACEU)¹⁰¹.

Regarding monetary policies, the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) replaced the Central Bank of the States of Equatorial Africa and Cameroon, which had replaced the Institut d'Emission de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française established in 1955 to issue currency for French colonies in French Equatorial Africa (AEF) and the mandate territory of Cameroon. Established on 23 November 1972, the current membership includes the former French colonies in the AEF (Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Gabon), Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony. The Development Bank of Central African States is associated with the BEAC, and both are affiliated with the Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC). The Commission Bancaire de L'Afrique Centrale (COBAC)¹⁰² and the Central African Clearing House are also associated. The head- quarters is in Yaoundé.

⁹⁹ Фокеев Г. В. Внешняя политика стран Африки. М.: Международные отношения. 1968. С. 99.

¹⁰⁰ Bach D. Francophone regionalism or Franco-African regionalism? : State and Society in Francophone Africa Since Independence // Palgrave Macmillan, London. 1995. P. 200-212.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Kalieu Y. Le contrôle bancaire dans la zone de l'Union monétaire de l'Afrique centrale. Penant: revue de droit des pays d'Afrique. 2002. Vol. 112, № 841. P. 445-472.

1964 is a very important year, marking a new stage in Cameroon's foreign policy. It was in this year that Cameroon, for the first time, participated in the Second Summit Conference of Heads of States or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement between 5 and 10 September 1964 in Cairo¹⁰³. United Arab Republic (Egypt) was the second conference of the Non-Aligned Movement which followed the Belgrade Conference of 1961 and preceded the Lusaka Conference of 1970¹⁰⁴. It should be emphasized that by joining the Non-Aligned Movement, Cameroon began to defend the position of the majority of third world states.

The policy of non-alignment remained a key foreign policy thrust of almost all of the country's governments. All Cameroonian governments since independence have, in one way or another, adopted a policy of non-alignment. They invariably declared their support for the goals of the Non-Aligned Movement's policy: to oppose any military alliance, apartheid, the arms race, to help strengthen UN, democratization of international relations, socio-economic development and restructuring of the international economic system, as well as international cooperation based on equality¹⁰⁵. Nevertheless, Cameroon's policy of non-alignment has more than once demonstrated an unfair attitude towards certain events in Africa and the world, when Cameroon actually supported Western countries. Examples include the support for the presence of American troops in Lebanon and British troops in Jordan in 1958, a position at the UN General Assembly on the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, and a contribution to funding the UN operation in the Congo.

Since its independence, different governments have pursued a policy of non-alignment in different ways. The government of President A. Ahidjo, one of

¹⁰³Williams G. *The Non-aligned Movement : Third-World Political Organizations* // Palgrave Macmillan, London. 1987. P. 50-71.

¹⁰⁴Jack H. A. *The Cairo Conference* // *Africa Today*. 1958. Vol. 5. № 2. P. 3-9.

¹⁰⁵NAM Summits: Meeting Topics for: General Views URL: <http://cns.miis.edu/nam/index.php/site/issuesByTopic?fid=5&tid=10&tname=General%20Views> (date of access: 21.11.2020).

the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, has demonstrated a strong commitment to the ideas of NAM¹⁰⁶. Cameroonian combat troops in Angola greatly impressed fellow non-aligned nations. However, the 1976 world conference of the Nonaligned Movement applauded Cameroonian internationalism, «which assisted the people of Angola in frustrating the expansionist and colonialist strategy of South Africa's racist regime and its allies.»

However, the advantage of the Non-Aligned Movement for Cameroon remains that it offers a platform for expressing its views on issues related to the development of small and underdeveloped countries, including Cameroon. After the end of World War II, the era of the Cold War began: the struggle between two superpowers, each of which sought supporters using various political tools. As the Cold War continued, new independent states arose in the international system¹⁰⁷. To strengthen your global dominance, each of the superpowers tried to influence these states in different ways. This fact divided the world into two power blocs: the western led by the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the eastern led by the Soviet Union and its supporting states¹⁰⁸.

R. Nixon, the former US President, noted that, from the very beginning, the Non-Aligned Movement covered issues theoretically unrelated to the Cold War, including anti-colonialism, anti-racism, economic development, and, under Arab influence, anti-Zionism¹⁰⁹. The goals of the Non-Aligned Movement are opposition to any military alliance, apartheid, the arms race, the creation of foreign military bases on the territories of the member states. Equally, the Non-Aligned Movement consisted in strengthening the United Nations, democratization of international relations, socio-economic development and

¹⁰⁶ NAM Summits: Meeting Topics for: General Views URL: <http://cns.miis.edu/nam/index.php/site/issuesByTopic?fid=5&tid=10&tname=General%20Views> (date of access: 21.11.2020).

¹⁰⁷Gaddis J. L. International relations theory and the end of the Cold War // International security. 1992. Vol. 17, № 3. P. 5-58.

¹⁰⁸Gaddis J. L. The Cold War: a new history. Penguin. 2006. P. 53

¹⁰⁹ Arnold J. R., Wiener R (ed.). Cold War: the essential reference guide. ABC-CLIO. 2012. P. 154.

restructuring the international economic system and international cooperation based on equality¹¹⁰.

Pan-Africanism is a fundamental and constant principle of Cameroon's foreign policy. The country is asserting herself a «natural pan-African vocation¹¹¹» because of her other «Africa's vocation in miniature born out of geography and the story¹¹²». This issue is why Cameroon is the union of the continent a kind of «political transcendental»; that is, a fundamental political principle that makes sense in anytime and anywhere in its international political agenda. It is a constitutional commitment in which the country «affirms its will to work for the construction of a united and free Africa» because he «convinced that Africa's salvation lies in achieving solidarity increasingly close with African countries» (Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon). The unit of Africa is, on the one hand, the pledge of independence and dignity of African states which are globally weak and which therefore «should unite more in order to counterbalance the influence of the big and medium powers that tend to call into question their independence¹¹³ by nature,».

The fight against colonialism and racial discrimination. This historic task, that the African peoples are willing or determined to accomplish by all means according to President Ahidjo, is among the fundamental objectives of the OAU as recorded in the charter. From the preamble, it proclaims the commitment of the Heads of State and Government to combat colonialism in all its forms. The fight against colonialism is one of the seven guiding principles listed in article 3 of the charter. She has long been with the eradication of racial discrimination, one of the workhorses of Cameroonian diplomacy. It is also President Ahmadou Ahidjo who

¹¹⁰ Ныгусие Кассае В. М. Хайле Селассие I—император Эфиопии. М.: РУДН. 2016. С. 254- 270.

¹¹¹ Ahidjo A. Fondement et Perspectives du Cameroun Nouveau. Saint Lambert. Paris. 1976.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Biya P. Pour Le Libéralisme Communautaire. Paris, Pierre Michel Fabre/Abc. 1987. P. 69.

had the privilege of presenting at the 24th session of the UN General Assembly, on October 8, 1969, the manifesto on southern Africa¹¹⁴, the Lusaka manifesto¹¹⁵.

This document advocates the peaceful way to resolve the problems of southern Africa without prejudice, however, to the obligation to resort to force in the event of failure of the African initiative. As President Ahidjo reminds us in this regard in his speech, «how would the violence of oppression not call for the violence of revolt in a world that would lock itself in deafness.» And in fact, Yaoundé, whose nationals' passports already clearly state that they are prohibited from traveling to racist countries of southern Africa, is campaigning not only in favor of international sanctions against these countries but also for increased support for the movements of national liberation who fight them.

Cameroon also participated in the OAU summits on a more regular basis in order to regain its influence in continental politics¹¹⁶. Cameroon also sought to get rid of the clutches of France and, probably, from criticism of other African countries on this issue¹¹⁷. At the same time, the president was converting to Islam in order to bring the Arab countries closer together. Indeed, the country's oil production was on the rise and the country sought to join the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 1973, Cameroon became an associate member, as it did in the next two years.

Since 1972, Cameroon has been a member of the OAU Liberation Committee, within which she has made a valuable contribution to the fight against colonial domination in Africa. Signatory of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Cameroon pays particular attention to respect for the rights of peoples to self-determination.

¹¹⁴ Shamuyarira N. M. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, Lusaka 14th-16th April 1969, full text commentary on the Lusaka Manifesto // African Review. 1971. Vol. 1. № 1. P. 66-78.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Bayart J. F. L Etat au Cameroun // VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee. 1979. Vol. 13, № 1. P. 80-81.

¹¹⁷ Pawoumoton A. Les intérêts français en Afrique noire francophone. Thèse pour le doctorat en science politique. Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV, 1998.

From Angola to South Africa via Rhodesia and Namibia, Cameroonian diplomacy provides unconditional support to the liberation movements recognized by the OAU and fought by the racist colonial regimes (popular movement for the liberation of Angola MPLA, the ANC, the Swapo, etc.)¹¹⁸. Yaoundé thus condemns Bantustan's policy in the context of the fight against apartheid in South Africa. It adheres to the main international legal instruments adopted within the framework of the UN and which condemn all forms of racial discrimination in southern Africa. This is particularly the case with the convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, the convention on the suppression of the repression of the crime of apartheid or in the international conventions against apartheid in sports.

In the Western Sahara affair, Cameroon, while recognizing the right to self-determination of the Saharawi people, opposed the admission of the Democratic Saharawi Arab Republic as the 51st member of the OAU in February 1982. In fact, like 18 other delegations, Cameroon left the job after the OAU Secretary-General, Mr. Eden Kojo, accepted the recognition.

Another feature of the African policy of the A. Ahidjo government was its rejection of any form of regional or sub-regional cooperation¹¹⁹, with the exception of the creation of a continental government. Although the president P. Biya after A. Ahidjo has implemented some of his political ideas.

Cameroon's limited ability to take unilateral action prompted her to seek to pursue her foreign policy activities with the help of international and African regional organizations such as the UN, the AU, the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC)¹²⁰. Membership in these organizations provided

¹¹⁸ Ewumbue-Monono C. Respect for international humanitarian law by armed non-state actors in Africa // *International Review of the Red Cross*. 2006. Vol. 88. № 864. P. 905-924.

¹¹⁹ Takaugang J. Continuity and Change in Cameroon's Foreign Policy in the Post-Ahidjo Era. *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs*. 1993. P. 67.

¹²⁰ The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/975). URL : <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/situation-central-africa-and-activities-united-nations-regional-office-central-5> (date of access: 10.02.2021).

Cameroon with a platform to advocate for her interests, as well as an opportunity to become a leader in addressing a number of issues of interest to the African continent. For example, through the UN and CEEAC, Cameroon has been able to take part in numerous peacekeeping missions which have earned it international respect as a partner in global stability and as a moral leader in African affairs¹²¹. However, Cameroon's involvement in international peacekeeping functions was driven largely by the desire to raise funds for her armed forces, rather than a desire to address the problems of peace and security. Such activities allowed Cameroon to influence events in neighboring African countries, sometimes spending their own resources on it.

Furthermore, President A. Ahidjo's support for the liberation struggle in a number of African countries and his desire to free the continent from the colonial rule demanded the investment of large resources of Cameroon in this process¹²². This issue exhausted the country's reserves and, ultimately, influenced the policies of subsequent governments. Although the governments of various countries have adopted a number of measures to support the economy, they have had little effect. The sharp decline in export earnings coincided with the rise in crude oil prices caused by global market fluctuations. All these adverse external events led to high import costs and high inflation, and the result was numerous armed interventions by the military in politics.

From 1961 to 1972, Cameroon was a federation consisting of two relatively autonomous parts: French-speaking and English-speaking. But in 1972, Ahidjo abolished these two entities and created the United Republic of Cameroon¹²³. He also established one-party rule by creating the Cameroon National Union (CNU),

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Song W. I. *The Clash of the Titans: Augustine Ngom Jua, Solomon Tandeng Muna, and the Politics of Transition in Post-Colonial Anglophone Cameroon. 1961-1972.* 2015. Thèse de doctorat. Howard University. P. 34.

¹²³ Nelson H. D. *Area handbook for the United Republic of Cameroon.* US Government Printing Office. 1974.

a movement that guaranteed uncontested elections at all levels¹²⁴. The official goal of the party was to promote development while ensuring national unity.

The second stage in the development of Cameroon's foreign policy began with the advent of power in 1982 by President P. Biya. The political alternation that took place at the head of the Cameroonian state on November 6, 1982 following the resignation of Ahmadou Ahidjo had an impact on the nation's foreign policy. As Maurice Kamto noted in the early hours of Paul Biya's supreme magistracy, the Cameroon of «Renewal» breaks with the past, especially in foreign policy¹²⁵.

Indeed, in a political and institutional context where the foreign policy is classified as a «reserved area» of the President of the Republic – highest point of the building institutional and administrative – any change in the holder of the function can only have repercussions on the manners to develop and conduct foreign policy. With the advent of Paul Biya as head of state and the promotion of a new government program called «renewal national¹²⁶», foreign policy will feel the effects. Thereby, its doctrinal foundations will be enriched with new principles and its implementation will experience a new impetus. Among the new principles that will emerge include the promotion of a new world economic, political and cultural order, the non-hegemonic regionalism, presence and participation active in international affairs.

The new world economic, political and cultural order. This principle is a part of the doctrinal innovations introduced by President Paul Biya in his political program of¹²⁷. First supported as single requirement to belong to multilateral bodies like the G77 and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) who have made it a question essential, the option for the claim of a

¹²⁴ Prouzet M. Le Cameroun. Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence. 1974.

¹²⁵ Kamto M. «Le réveil de la diplomatie camerounaise», L'Afrique diplomatique, économique et financière. février-mars 1985. № 2. P. 14-19.

¹²⁶ Rmilija A., Mandale J. The People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) and the renewal of its core organs: Cameroon. Clinical Medicine Insights. 2020. Vol. 1, № 1. P. 09-23.

¹²⁷ Biya P. Le message du renouveau: discours et interviews du président Paul Biya, novembre 1982-novembre 1983. Editions Sopecam. 1984. P. 245.

new order world economy will subsequently be erected in dimension fundamental to Cameroon's international action. The search for a new world economic and cultural order stands against a critical background; especially the criticism of international system of development and unequal exchange/ unfair, structured and maintained at all costs by the great industrial nations. Because underdevelopment appears more in Yaoundé as the result or rather the «product of development» of the industrialized countries, the establishment of «a new economic order» appears as one of the best ways to solve problems facing the world¹²⁸.

The first economic objective of the foreign policy of the Cameroon is to intensify the framework of its development cooperation. This is to enable the country to make better use of benefit from the resources of international cooperation as as a development tool. The establishment of partnerships new ones and the consolidation of traditional ones are at the center of the economic agenda of Cameroonian external action. This sometimes takes on the appearance of international economic marketing.

The second economic objective of foreign policy is the opening of external markets for Cameroonian companies. This is to promote the foreign trade of Cameroon and at the same time build the country in space secure economy, capable of welcoming and making fruitful the Foreign investments. In any case, the construction and the promotion of Cameroon as an investment opportunity is a fundamental aim of national diplomacy which involves therefore an important economic aspect.

The third economic foreign policy objective is to raise Cameroon to the rank of so-called emerging economies very medium term; in any case by 2035¹²⁹. This requires the construction of an adequate infrastructure, an acceleration of growth, a deepening of human progress and social, an appropriation of the scientific-technological tool necessary for economic and commercial innovation.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Cf. République du Cameroun, Cameroun : Vision 2035, Yaoundé, ministère de l'Économie, de la Planification et de l'Aménagement du territoire, juin 2009.

Economic and trade agreements. Cooperation is simultaneously a norm and an institution of international relations. It is both a translation of friendship and concord between nations; an imperative of mutual aid and solidarity as an essential element of the ordering of relations between nations. Cooperation has been consecrated and legitimized in the within the international community through the resolution 2625 (XXV)¹³⁰ of the UN General Assembly which tersely states: States have a duty «to cooperate with each other», regardless of the differences between their political, economic and social systems, in the various fields of international relations, in order to maintain peace and international security and fostering progress and stability international economics. Cameroon has thus concluded a multitude of Agreements of cooperation with a variety of States in areas of various activities.

Economic and trade agreements following the liberal tradition and the promotion of friendship among nations aims to make trade between nations the guarantor of global prosperity¹³¹. This idea is included in the spirit and the letter of the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic relations which establishes a necessary link between the promotion of friendly relations and development economic relationships. A state's search for business partners, investment opportunities and outlets outside national borders is designated under the generic term of economic diplomacy. This last has taken on considerable importance in the relations of post-Cold War bilateral or multilateral international organizations in due to the geo-economic vogue¹³². In this, economic and commercial considerations now prevail over classic politico-military ones; they increasingly determine strategic choices and guide the international policy of States. This omnipresence of the economy influences the Cameroonian foreign policy which

¹³⁰ Law №. 1968-LF-3 of the 11th June 1968 to set up the Cameroon Nationality Code.

¹³¹ Grotius H. *Le droit de la guerre et de la paix*, trad. fr. Pradier-Fodéré, Paris, PUF (publ. orig. 1625). 1999.

¹³² Lorot P. *La nouvelle grammaire des rivalités internationales. Introduction à la géoéconomie*. 1999; Du Castel V. *La géoéconomie et les organisations internationales*. Editions L'Harmattan. 2001.

gives an important place to the negotiation and conclusion of economic agreements. Three major sectors form the backbone of these economic agreements: investment, taxation and trade.

It can be said that the all-round diplomacy and policy of Cameroon has been fundamentally correlated with the principles of international morality and is aimed at cooperation, peace, security, dialogue, development, peaceful settlement of conflicts and neutrality. In addition, the foreign policy of Cameroon was distinguished by the search for peace and the desire for leadership at the regional and continental levels.

Upon assuming the supreme office of the country, Biya set an agenda of a new society based on rigor and moralization. His economic philosophy is based on the idea of Communal Liberalism, which foresees a profound transformation of the present political principles and institutions in a bid to build a new political society. Given the very high expectations of the Cameroonian masses and intellectuals, change has been rather minimal. The Biya regime has suffered against a background of an unfortunately bloody but unsuccessful coup attempt, a crushing economic crisis in the 1980s, and an image of indecision and contradiction.

One of the major aspects of Cameroon's economic crisis was the almost total collapse of the country's banking system in 1989¹³³. Many banks were loss-making, several had made large loans that could not be recovered, there was a tendency to overstaff, and management was frequently deficient. Paribas Cameroon, Cameroon Bank, and the development bank (Banque Camerounaise de Développement) were liquidated¹³⁴.

The government was a major investor in the four collapsed banks. In addition to internal problems, the banks were hit heavily by the overall economic crisis facing the country. A Société Financière de Recouvrement (SFR, sometimes

¹³³ Jua N. Cameroon: Jump-starting an economic crisis. *Africa Insight*. 1991. Vol. 21, № 3. P. 162-170.

¹³⁴ DeLancey M. D., DeLancey M. W., Mbuh R. N. *Historical dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon*. Rowman & Littlefield. 2019.

titled Société de Recouvrement des Créances du Cameroun) was established to assist in the liquidation of the banks. As people lost confidence in the formal banking system, many withdrew their funds and turned to the informal.

Cameroon's foreign policy from 1990 to 2008 is characterized by the appearance of a multi-party system¹³⁵ at the national level.

The 1990-s experienced the «transition to democracy» of the majority of countries of the South, Cameroon's foreign policy will see its doctrinal corpus grow further with the subscription to the rule of law and human rights standards, governance and the promotion of environmental sustainability. Hence, the post-1982 democratic process proceeded along, three major developments such as:

- legislative elections of March 1992;
- presidential elections of October 1992;
- the 1991 November Tripartite meeting.

Cameroon's foreign policy in the post-1982 is also characterized by the appearance of signs of globalization. Globalization is a global structural process leading to a gradual change in the world space into a single homogeneous structure, in which flows of capital, goods, services, ideas and information circulate freely, forming an international institutional, legal and cultural-information field¹³⁶. In doing so, it is assumed that «the whole world is being built according to the Western model»¹³⁷. Globalization is also seen as the formation of a global financial market and capital market, free and efficient flow of capital between countries and regions, the formation of a single integrated system of supranational regulation of international monetary relations, activities transnational companies, transnational banks and international multinational financial institutions and funds.

¹³⁵ Ndulu B. J., O'Connell S. A. Governance and growth in sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of economic Perspectives*. 1999. Vol. 13, № 3. P. 41-66.

¹³⁶ Абрамова И. О., Поликанов Д. В. Интернет и Африка: параллельные реальности. М., 2001. С. 93.

¹³⁷ Уэбстер Ф. Теории информационного общества / Пер. с англ. М. В. Араповой, Н. В. Малыхиной. М., 2004. С. 366.

The norms of globalization were largely responsible for Cameroon's increasing participation in international affairs during this period. It must be said that the challenges of globalization for African states and Cameroon, including, can be attributed to two categories: – in political terms: the transition to democracy and the rule of law which contributes to the political stability of African states. Professor Luke Sinjun talks about the importance of the political aspect and develops the concept «democratic loyalty»¹³⁸. In this regard, the issues of peacekeeping and security come to the fore and become decisive for the development of Africa and the influence of the country in the process of globalization; – in economic and social terms: scientific and technological control, the desire to avoid an economic downturn due to the crisis and structural adjustment, since the 1980s and 1990s were a time of difficult economic situation in Africa¹³⁹.

Cameroon's foreign policy began with the country's plan to achieve a new vision of development by 2035, this is the process period of the country's prosperity. In keeping with Vision 2035, the United Nations system in Cameroon, through its Cooperation Framework, wants to contribute to making Cameroon «a land of opportunity, citizen engagement and well-being for its population»¹⁴⁰.

This trend will increase with the advent of globalization marked by an «omnipresent economy»; or rather a partial erasure of geopolitics in front of geoeconomics. As a developing country, the Cameroon's foreign policy has a strong dimension economic; that is to say, it aims both at the construction of the country as a safe land for investment, a buoyant market and a land of precious wealth and resources. What's more, this policy is part of a strong logic of capturing resources linked to international cooperation and the mobilization of international financing

¹³⁸ Sindjoun L. La loyauté démocratique dans les relations internationales: sociologie des normes de civilité international. 2001. P. 31– 50.

¹³⁹ АМИН С. (2002). Африка: жизнь на грани. Режим доступа: http://scepsis.ru/library/id_486.html.

¹⁴⁰ United Nations Cameroon. URL : https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Cameroon_Cooperation_Framework_2022-2026-ENG.pdf (date of access 10.02.2021).

for the purpose of building development. If we can't really talk of a shift in Cameroonian diplomacy towards economic promotion and «international commercial canvassing», it nevertheless remains obvious that the problem of the «Cameroon in globalization» is posed in terms of «conditions and premises for sustainable development and fair¹⁴¹».

It can be said that Cameroon's all-round foreign policy and policies are basically consistent with international moral principles, aiming at cooperation, peace, security, dialogue, development, peaceful resolution of conflicts and neutrality. In addition, the foreign policy of Cameroon was distinguished by the search for peace and the desire for leadership at the regional and continental levels. It should be noted that there is not a single state in the world that is not able to offer the international community its somewhat original foreign policy. And for Cameroon, the search for peace is a universal principle and goal that can be taken a priori to understand the essence of its foreign policy. The two stages make it possible to highlight the characteristic features of the development of Cameroon's foreign policy in the context of globalization, as well as to see the role of the Presidents of the Cameroonians Republic – A. Ahidjo and P. Biya, which will be discussed below.

1.2. The Main Centers of Development and Decision-Making in Foreign Policy

The decision-making actors are made up of those «who hold specific powers conferred by the standards constitutional and legislative structures, and by the administrative structures that institutionalize their roles»¹⁴². In each state, these participants usually include the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Parliament. While depending on the nature of the regime, which is itself dependent on the institutional distribution of powers, the first two actors

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Gomes R. C., Liddle J., Gomes L. O. M. A five-sided model of stakeholder influence: a cross-national analysis of decision making in local government. *Public Management Review*, 2010. Vol. 12, № 5. P. 701-724.

are masters in the development and determination of the architecture of foreign policy, the last, although participant, exercises more of a control mission.

However, for a foreign policy decision to work in a country, every citizen must directly or indirectly contribute to it. In a democratic country like Cameroon, her citizens are represented in government by various interest groups such as elected representatives in the executive and legislators (politicians) working with the technocrats and supporting staff of various ministries, departments and agencies of government. This working practice is in line with the administrative structure practiced globally. And in the representatives for instance, the Republic of Cameroon recognizes among others three arms of government namely, Executive, Legislative and Judiciary .

In Cameroon, *the President of the Republic* is a real «Supreme Pontiff»¹⁴³ in matters of foreign policy by the powers constitutional positions he holds and the diplomatic functions he exercises. The categories of «presidential pre-eminence»¹⁴⁴, «master builder»¹⁴⁵, have often been used to indicate the position of the Head of State in the public sector of the foreign policy. This clearly appears as a true diplomatic hegemon. Indeed, the President of the Republic in Cameroon has very strong powers in the field of foreign policy. Under article 5 (1) of the constitution, he has the power to determine foreign policy which constitutes, in the definitional perspective of Marcel Merle, an integral part of the policy of the nation¹⁴⁶.

The Cameroonian constitution establishes the primacy of the president in the executive domain¹⁴⁷, conferring extensive and overriding powers upon him,

¹⁴³ Ankar D. Rigidity Measures. On Constitutional Amendment. *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*. 2017. Vol. 4, № 14.

¹⁴⁴Ibid. P. 15.

¹⁴⁵ Koffi M. T., Sindjoun L. *Le Président de la République au Cameroun (1982-1996)*. Les acteurs et leur rôle dans le jeu politique. Bordeaux, CEAN-IEP., 1996. 45 P. *Études internationales*. 1997. Vol. 28, № 3. P. 666-667.

¹⁴⁶ Merle M. *La politique étrangère*. FeniXX, 1984. P. 45.

¹⁴⁷ Schatzberg M. G. *An African Experiment in Nation Building: the bilingual Cameroon Republic since reunification* edited by Ndiva Kofele-Kale Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press. 1980. Pp. lii+ 369. \$26.50. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*.1981. Vol. 19, №3. P. 521-524.

including the right to negotiate and ratify agreements and treaties (Art.9.4). Although the constitution provides that certain types of treaties must be submitted before ratification for approval by the National Assembly (art. 9.4) or pass a referendum (art. 30.2b), this provision is effectively neutralized by art. 21 which empowers the President to legislate by ordinance. The constitution does not impose any obligation on the president to accept or act on the advice of his cabinet or parliament. In fact, with the latter, it enjoys parallel legislative powers (art. 2.1. of the Constitution of 1972).

A. Ahidjo established quite friendly relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States by opening Cameroonian embassies in both countries respectively in 1964 (Moscow)¹⁴⁸ and 1961 (Washington)¹⁴⁹. Some countries such as Ivory Coast, Gabon, Brazil, etc. were inspired by the capitalist system called a free economy or market. Capitalism is an economic and social system based on private ownership of the means of production and exchange. Other countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea... have chosen a socialist system involving a state-run economy. Socialism is an economic and socio-political system based on the state control and the collectivity of the means of production and exchange. It must be said, however, that in both cases, third world countries in general and Cameroon in particular often add modifications in order to adapt them to their context.

There are ten semi-autonomous regions with Governor of each region as head of executive of the state government who is also the symbol of authority and number one in the hierarchy of that particular region. The last is the local government officials who perform the governors' duties on a smaller scale.

In the legislative arm of government, Cameroon has two chambers which are referred to as National Assembly and the Senate. They are to make laws for the country. The Senate President who is elected by members after the

¹⁴⁸ Cameroon Embassy in Moscow. URL: <http://ambacam.ru/> (date of access: 21.11.2020).

¹⁴⁹ Cameroon Embassy in Washington. URL: <http://www.cameroonembassyusa.org/> (date of access: 21.11.2020).

proclamation by the President is head of The Senate while the Honourable Speaker is elected by members of the house and is head of House of Representatives. The Senate comprises of 100, with 70 members being indirectly elected by regional governing councils and 30 members being appointed by the president.

In matters of foreign policy, the parliament has a number of powers (legislative empowerment of the President of the Republic) to adhere to or ratify the agreements and international treaties, control of the external action of the government and the allocation of financial resources to the administration of external relations. As a government policy in its own right, the parliament has control over policy exterior. This control is done by hearing the government and administrative officials on some aspects of the State's foreign policy considered to be of concern for national life.

The hearings, which may concern the Minister of External Relations, the ministers delegated to the latter as well as the other members of the government working in the external sector or senior officials who work there, usually take place behind closed doors. This control is also done through written or oral parliamentary questions addressed during the plenary sessions of the Parliament.

Finally, control is exercised through the establishment of a parliamentary commission of inquiry. The Parliament also has legislative competence in matters of external policy¹⁵⁰. It is indeed up to the Parliament to empower, by passing appropriate laws, the President of the Republic to proceed with the accession or ratification of treaties and other international legal commitments. That legislative empowerment gives parliament the «last word» in the control and validation of the content of certain international legal instruments to which the State is committed. This power to authorize the ratification or approval of treaties and agreements is subject to ex-post control. This is a genuine participation in decision-making in the area of external affairs of the State. The Parliament finally

¹⁵⁰ Adigbuo E. R. Role conflicts in foreign policy: Nigeria's dilemma over Bakassi Peninsula. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 2019. Vol. 37, № 4. P. 404-420.

has the decision-making power which is the financial means to be made available to the Ministry of External Relations through the vote of the budget. This vote is more a matter of a priori control of national foreign action. It is during the discussion on this budget that the national representation expresses some of its concerns about the diplomatic life of the nation¹⁵¹.

The presidents of the Senate and the National Assembly exercise noble and prestigious diplomatic functions in Cameroon. At least three of these functions can be identified¹⁵²:

(1) the function of representing the State in certain international bodies effecting the action of the Parliament. The President of the Chamber represents the State of Cameroon at the level of inter parliamentary bodies as well as various other international meetings that involve the national representation. He is notably the head of the parliamentary diplomacy;

(2) the function of representation or rather of diplomatic replacement of the Head of State. In Cameroonian practice, the President of the National Assembly, and soon of the Senate, most often takes over from the Head of State for a number of international meetings as well as both bilateral and multilateral. Here, the head of the legislature appears as a missionary of the Head of State, his special envoy or plenipotentiary. This practice has, for example, led Alain Didier Olinga to wonder about the relationships of independence and constitutional equality established between the legislative power and the executive power;

(3) the function of receiving or welcoming emissaries and foreign envoys. In Cameroon, it is a common practice to welcome ambassadors and special envoys from friend-countries by the presidents of the Senate and the National Assembly.

These receptions take the form of courtesy visits, information and even addressing issues that are sometimes part of the mission of government agencies.

¹⁵¹ Ngwafu P. A. *Cameroon's Foreign Policy and Inter-African Relations in the Post-Ahidjo Era. Post-Colonial Cameroon: Politics, Economy, and Society*. 2018. P. 257.

¹⁵² Sindjoun L. « L'action extérieure de l'Assemblée nationale : éléments d'analyse politiste », *Études internationales*. Vol. XXIV, №4. 1993. P. 54.

He also receives, instead of the Head of the State, foreign emissaries and envoys and messages intended for the nation.

Implementers of foreign policy. Although he is the head of the government institution appointed to «run and administer¹⁵³» the external affairs of the State, the Minister of External Relations does not have powers in terms of its development and determination. According to the provisions of Article 2 of Decree No. 2013/112 of April 22, 2013 on the organization of the Ministry of External Relations, «The Minister of External Relations is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the external relations policy adopted by the President of the Republic.» It therefore clearly appears that the latter is above all an agent of execution, a director of a play written by someone else; i.e., the Head of State. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister participates in the design of foreign policy through the suggestions for action that he submits to the Head of State.

As the boss of a government agency, the responsibilities of the Minister of External Relations¹⁵⁴ are primarily administrative. Also, he is the boss of the administration of foreign relations and the head of the diplomatic staff of the State. It plays the role of interface between the «national administrative world» and the external world; he is the main negotiator of the State – without prejudice to the constitutional competence of the President of the Republic in the matter –, his spokesperson and main communicator in diplomatic circles. In addition, the Minister of External Relations exercises the responsibility of a lawyer defending national interests abroad and of appointed curator of the «international memory» of the State¹⁵⁵.

Under the provisions of Decree No. 2013/112 of April 22, 2013 which organizes the Ministry of External Relations and sets the powers of its holder, the Minister of External Relations is responsible for «the protection of Cameroonian nationals and interests abroad» (art. 2). This responsibility is based on the relevant

¹⁵³ Berridge G. *Diplomacy: theory and practice*. Springer Nature. 2021. P. 54.

¹⁵⁴ Berridge G. *Diplomacy: theory and practice*. Springer Nature. 2021. P.29.

¹⁵⁵ Pigeaud F. In :Africa Yearbook Volume 16. Brill. 2020. P. 209-219.

principles of international law which recognize the prerogative of each State to defend its nationals wherever they are. It is also based on relational exclusivity with external powers, to which the minister agrees on the first hand, and on the national representativeness. On the other hand, he embodies of course. It is so somehow an administrator of the territories that lie beyond the State, out of sovereignty. The Minister for External Relations is, in sum, the remote citizen manager; the protector of extraterritorial national interests and the guardian of the great national portal.

In Cameroon, the Minister of External Relations exercises at least three main functions in the field of foreign policy. These functions include representation, negotiation, and dialogue¹⁵⁶.

The Minister of External Relations is responsible for the conduct of relations with foreign powers, international institutions and «other subjects of the international community». As such, he is the interface between the internal and the external; between inside and outside. This is a function somewhat paradoxical because exerted on the areas of jurisdiction and areas that do not come under sovereignty of State. Because the field of external relations comes of his main responsibility, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is then the real boss of international action state official.

The Minister of External Relations is responsible for direct negotiation with foreign powers. As such, he is the spokesperson for the State within bilateral or multilateral international bodies. It is he who formulates the State commitments to foreign powers, makes know the country's position on major international and national issues, negotiates treaty commitments of State.

Non-governmental diplomacy, as a «new diplomacy»¹⁵⁷, has today reached its letters of nobility to the extent that the International Non-Governmental

¹⁵⁶ Inamete U. B. Foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria. Susquehanna University Press. 2001. P. 54.

¹⁵⁷ Kleinwächter W. WSIS: A new diplomacy? Multistakeholder approach and bottom up policy in global ICT governance. Information Technology and International Development. 2004. Vol. 1, № 3-4. P. 3-14.

Organizations (INGOs) which are the main animators have broadened their area of action and international influence. These INGOs, estimated today at more than 20,000 worldwide, have, for the most powerful ones, international strategies, structures intelligence, diplomatic services, if not sometimes also powerful, influential and efficient than those of many states. There has thus emerged at the global level a diplomacy known as «not government» to which a few characteristics can be attached: operational diplomacy focused on the supply of certain public services (health, food, environment, schooling, poverty); Tribunician diplomacy based on advocacy, defence, denunciation or raising awareness of the great causes of humanity; alternative diplomacy that is rooted in lobbying and influencing, especially decision makers who lead the world on the political and economic¹⁵⁸ plan (alterglobalism). In Cameroon, there is a non-governmental diplomacy supported by NGOs and which, depending on the nature of the actors and objectives pursued either in collision or in collusion with public diplomacy. In conflict, we can classify emerging NGOs as growth governance structures that carry speeches and implement action plans.

In Cameroon, the fundamental component of economic, financial, and industrial technique falls within the competence of the ministerial departments techniques, which, as a result, carry out international activities and proper diplomatic relations, sometimes partially escaping sometimes totally in the follow-up, control and coordination of the ministry of External Relations. Cameroon's foreign policy is therefore implemented through several micro-diplomacies which poses problems of overlap, coherence and competition between administrations. Most ministries thus have cooperation services not managed by the civil servants from the Ministry of External Relations¹⁵⁹; what is

¹⁵⁸ Rothkopf D. J. La caste:[les nouvelles élites et le monde qu'elles nous préparent]. R. Laffont 2009. P. 57.

¹⁵⁹ Pigeaud F. Cameroon. In : Africa Yearbook Volume 16. Brill. 2020. P. 209-219.

not without causing many malfunctions in a context where the coordination of foreign policy is practically not ensured in an efficient and optimal manner¹⁶⁰.

The Ministry of Finance. According to the organic distribution of governmental competences, this ministerial department deals, by virtue of the decree № 2013/066 of February 28, 2013, in the entire sector of State financial cooperation. In this capacity, the Minister of Finance is responsible for «monitoring monetary cooperation», «monitoring the affairs of the International Monetary Fund», of the «financial control foreign exchange, currency and exchange regulations», monitoring, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, the files of the Organization for the Harmonization of the Business Law in Africa». The Minister of Finance is thus the leader of the State monetary and financial diplomacy.

Ministry of Economy, Planning and Territorial Development. This acts as the Ministry of Economic Cooperation. He is in charge of Economic Cooperation international by virtue of its attributions which include, among others, «the coordination of actions undertaken with the various multilateral and bilateral partners within the framework of the economic recovery and recovery program»; «the monitoring of sub-regional and international cooperation, in particular with the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, CEMAC and ECCAS»; «monitoring of affairs of the World Bank, the EU, the African Development Bank and Islamic Bank of development»; «prospection, negotiation, finalization and monitoring of the execution of agreements and conventions of loans». The Minister of Economy, Planning and Regional Planning manages the economic diplomacy of the state.

In general, the interaction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and other departments involved in the implementation of Cameroon's foreign

¹⁶⁰ Ngayap N. A. F. La coordination de la politique étrangère : une analyse des rapports de pouvoir entre les acteurs étatiques de la politique étrangère du Cameroun 1960-2010, mémoire de Master en histoire, Université de Yaoundé I. 2010-2011. P. 67.

policy is quite effective¹⁶¹. We can already observe the fruits of this interaction in terms of the parliamentary ratification of international treaties. In this activity, the parliament has the right to vote after the consideration of the draft by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Between these two stages, the text must pass through the General Secretariat of the Government and through the ministries responsible for relations with Parliament and the Administrative Court. This procedure is not always followed. Often, the ministries omit information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for financial reasons, or speed up the process during negotiations or for the purpose of not disclosing information due to the specifics of some agreements. In the event of a difference of opinion between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another ministry, arbitration by the Prime Minister or the President of Cameroon is required. In general, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is under competitive pressure from the President of the Cameroonian Republic and his staff, and from other ministries. But at the same time, it must be said that the functions of ensuring international cooperation lie mainly with the Cameroon Foreign Ministry¹⁶².

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must ensure the proper functioning of its administration which participates in the development of foreign policy by submitting proposals to the bodies of political power, that is, to the government and the apparatus of the President of the Republic. The MFA is thus in charge of administrative matters, and must interact with external services, as well as ensure the settlement of litigation¹⁶³. It is important to remember that all the institutions mentioned above directly or indirectly participate in the formation of the concept and implementation of Cameroon's foreign policy.

¹⁶¹ Ngayap N. A. F. *La coordination de la politique étrangère : une analyse des rapports de pouvoir entre les acteurs étatiques de la politique étrangère du Cameroun 1960-2010*, mémoire de Master en histoire, Université de Yaoundé I. 2010-2011. P. 67.

¹⁶² Amin J. A. *Paul Biya's Foreign Policy: The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon Under Paul Biya*. 2004. P. 153.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

The Ministry of Defense: implementation of the defence policy plays an important role in the Cameroon's foreign policy. This ministerial department has, according to the institutional architecture of the government, recognized skills in monitoring and implementing important sectoral aspects of foreign policy, in particular military and strategic ones. It «follows international military cooperation»¹⁶⁴ as well as international strategic and polemological foresight. The Ministry of Defense is also responsible, through the Cooperation Division military, of «monitoring the negotiations of cooperation agreements and military technical assistance with foreign countries; the administrative management of technical and military cooperation actions resulting from agreements concluded with foreigners»¹⁶⁵. The Ministry of Defense also has diplomatic, consular and even protocol skills outside. It implements a real military diplomacy led by the services of the Defense Attachés created within diplomatic missions abroad. In the military and defense field specifically, these ensure the tasks of representation, promotion of friendly relations, of information and protection of national interests devolved to classical diplomacy.

As from the 1st of January 1960, Cameroon was not initially open at the diplomatic level to all other countries, which made it possible to speak of a kind of isolationism in the state course of the country. In the realities of the modern world, the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon required modernization and promotion of national interests in accordance with new principles. As a result of «the completion of preparations for the country's transition to a new strategy for long-term and sustainable development until 2035»¹⁶⁶, a state policy was formed based on the principle of pragmatism.

¹⁶⁴ Art. 73 du Décret n 2001/178 du 25 juillet 2001 portant organisation générale de la défense et des états-majors centraux.

¹⁶⁵ Art. 2 du Décret n 2005/229 du 23 juin 2005 portant organisation de la Division de la Coopération militaire.

¹⁶⁶ Lo-oh J. L. «Le Cameroun des Grands Ambitions»: The Place for the Youth in Cameroon's «Vision 2035» to become an Emerging Economy in 2035. *Journal of Educational Policy and Entrepreneurial Research*. 2014. Vol. 1, № 4. P. 117-127.

The main directions and priorities of the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon at the present stage are determined in accordance with the goals and objectives set by the President of the Republic of Cameroon in his speech on September 12, 2012 «Cameroon Vision – 2035: a new emergence agenda of the state»¹⁶⁷. In this keynote address, the Head of State defined the main principles, priorities, and objectives of the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon. In fact, the Prosperous Cameroon Strategic Plan, proposed by the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, formulated the main prospects for the development of the State and determined the long-term tasks of the country's foreign policy.

In the Strategic Plan, the main directions of the strategic development of Cameroon were defined under the slogans: «Cameroon an Emerging, Democratic and United country in diversity»¹⁶⁸: – sustainable development – which is a new paradigm and defines the methodology and structure of the overall strategy for a prosperous Cameroon. The new development model is designed to ensure human well-being, social justice, sustainable economic growth and environmental protection; – management – the system of legal, institutional and economic regulation being created is completely determined and should provide solution of the tasks set in the plan of strategic development of the country; – infrastructure – a significant increase in the level of development of economic infrastructure (transport, energy, digital infrastructure) is required; – human capital – is recognized as the most valuable for Cameroon, and the personnel necessary for the implementation of the country's strategic development plan must receive a special level of training and meet the high requirements of the strategic plan.

The foreign policy of Cameroon is traditionally based on the principles of multipolarity, balance of interests, pragmatism, mutual benefit and firm defense of the country's national interests¹⁶⁹. This approach preserves the continuity of

¹⁶⁷ Mouity P. M. Le Gabon à l'épreuve de la politique de l'émergence. Paris. 2012. P. 38-60.

¹⁶⁸ Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Cameroon for the Period FY17-FY21 // World Bank. 2017. P. 36.

¹⁶⁹ Kofele-Kale N. Cameroon and its foreign relations. African Affairs. 1981. Vol. 80, № 319. P. 197-217.

foreign policy, defining a new stage in the development of Cameroon's foreign policy as pragmatic and active. International activity reflects the strengthening of the role and international authority of the state, and also increases its influence in the region and its importance in the global economy and the activities of financial organizations.

On the other hand, given the reality today's world, the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon requires modernization and promotion of national interests in accordance with the principles of pragmatism¹⁷⁰. Pragmatism in foreign policy is expressed in a focus on protecting national interests. Pragmatism is based on an objective assessment of one's own resources, the priority of systemic and peripheral goals, and the determination of ways to achieve them. Activity is expressed in the planning and implementation of foreign policy, the promotion of ideas and initiatives¹⁷¹.

Cameroon calls on all states of the world to equality, taking into account common interests and non-interference in internal affairs, and stands for the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. The foreign policy of Cameroon is also built taking into account the principle of a differentiated approach and several levels of interaction with foreign countries and international organizations. The application of this principle makes it possible to ensure:

1) development priorities, concentrating the main efforts and resources on their achievement;

2) compliance of the distributed human and financial resources with the political and economic interests implemented in practice¹⁷².

¹⁷⁰ Маценко И. Б. Африка: реализация «Целей развития тысячелетия» // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2012. № 8-9. С. 34.

¹⁷¹ Бажанов Е.П., Бажанова Н.Е. Международные отношения в XXI веке. М., 2011. С. 158-160.

¹⁷² Merle M. Politique intérieure et politique extérieure. Politique étrangère. 1976. Vol. 41, № 5. P. 409-421.

In addition, the application of a differentiated approach in the field of external cooperation includes the expansion of Cameroon's diplomatic presence abroad. Due to the emphasis on active participation in international affairs, Cameroon is interested in constantly improving its foreign policy. Conscious of its responsibility and role in the region, Cameroon considers its priority task here to be ensuring regional stability. Wherein Cameroon plans to focus its policy on the development of integration in Africa in order to reduce the risk of conflicts and solve socio-economic problems, turn the Republic of Cameroon into a full-fledged a player pursuing a comprehensive foreign policy.

Taking into account that economic integration is one of the effective ways to move the country to a stable position in the system of international relations, Cameroon strengthens the economic space cooperation in order to implement their foreign policy. Within the framework of this process, the following basic principles are observed: inviolability of political sovereignty, economic legitimacy of decisions, progressive, pragmatic and mutual benefit, equal representation parties in all cases of integration and consensus at all levels of interaction in the implementation of policies.

Cameroon is also making efforts to develop friendly and stable relations with all countries of the world and international organizations; seeks to comply with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and recognizes the fundamental importance of the rule of law for political dialogue and interstate cooperation; supports international efforts to combat arms trafficking; together with others states in a bilateral and multilateral format, takes an active part in the fight against terrorism, extremism, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, human trafficking and illegal immigration, organized crime and corruption¹⁷³.

¹⁷³ Kakdeu L.M. Discours, cultures et représentations politiques au Cameroun. Sergiu Mișcoiu, Hygin F. Sedagban Kakai, Folly L. Kokou Hetcheli, Recul démocratique et néoprésidentialisme en Afrique Centrale et Occidentale, Iași: Institutul European. 2015. P. 34.

The development of Cameroon's multilateral relations with African states is focused on the joint efforts of countries and regions to counter the problems of internal and external threats through enhanced cooperation in economic policy, cultural and humanitarian dialogue, based on reciprocity, equality and mutual benefit. The Cameroonian Republic aims to further strengthen its strategic relations with European countries and institutions with which strategic partnership agreements have been signed or are being prepared for signing. Cameroon also intends to make efforts to develop relations with the EU, which is its important partner in the economy, trade and investment.

In general, the modern foreign policy of Cameroon, based on the Strategic Plan – 2035¹⁷⁴, as a presidential initiative, determines the long-term oriented strategic interests of the country and sets the country the task of reaching a new level of development.

1.3. Place of Foreign Policy in the Process of Implementing the State Policy of the Republic of Cameroon

The foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon is a relatively new phenomenon on the international stage. It is the instrument through which the State of Cameroon manages its relations with its external partners, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic representatives. According to a realistic approach to international relations, the goal of foreign policy is to protect interests of the state, including from the point of view of power. In this regard, the foreign policy of Cameroon obviously contains a pan-African dimension that connects the future of the state of Cameroon and sub-regional Africa¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷⁴ Cameroon Tribune (2021). URL: <https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/37727/fr.html/national-development-strategy-the-new> (date of access: 10.02.2020)

¹⁷⁵ Barnery J. Une politique etrangere active // Geopolitique africaine.1986. P. 147-152.

It is important to note that the first attempts to form the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon began in the 1960s, but during these years there was no continuity. After the 1967 change in the integration model, the institutionalization of foreign policy in its formation was acceptable¹⁷⁶.

It is important to pay attention to the fact that Cameroon has not experienced major violence since independence. Apart from occasional episodes of a coup in 1964 and popular uprisings in 1990, the country looks calm compared to some of its African neighbors. A culture of peace exists in the customs of Cameroon. From the point of view of the country's foreign policy, Cameroon, like Togo, for example, has no other real alternatives than to speak in favor of peace and regional stability. However, an example Togo is important here, because for this state the search for peace is absolute and excludes any military intervention in this country and beyond its borders. In Cameroon, on the contrary, troops were sent to participate in peacekeeping operations on the continent. In Cameroon, the search for peace is carried out through the mediation of the President of Cameroon and effective participation in peacekeeping operations.

The goal of Ahmadou Ahidjo's foreign policy is to strengthen peace, contribute to the stabilization of the situation on the continent and, in particular, to resolve conflicts in Africa. Ensuring peace is, first of all, an important attribute of personal image President of Cameroon Ahmadou Ahidjo and at the same time it is a guarantee for Cameroon in terms of receiving foreign investment¹⁷⁷. According to President Ahmadou Ahidjo, this commitment to regional peace is based on the well-being of its own country: «My actions in favor of peace, the mission of arbitration or mediation in conflicts have been completed. My country, Cameroon, is one of the few countries in Central Africa that enjoys its peace and stability since independence. This is a defining factor in my commitment to our

¹⁷⁶ Kombi N. M. *La politique étrangère du Cameroun*. Editions L'Harmattan. 1996. P. 75.

¹⁷⁷ Ebogo F. *La vision camerounaise de l'intégration sous-régionale à l'épreuve de l'insécurité transfrontalière. Une diplomatie au service de l'émergence du Cameroun ce du Cameroun*. P. 271.

continent»¹⁷⁸. During the coming to power of President Ahmadou Ahidjo, his policy was focused on the consolidation of the nation and the formation of his image in the regional arena. To achieve this goal, he returned the country to a single-party state system. In this perspective, he created the Cameroon National Union (CNU) in 1966. And thanks to his desire for national unity, he made Cameroon a stable and peaceful country, while civil wars were going on all over the continent. After more than two decades of one-party rule, Ahmadou Ahidjo decided to lead his country towards a multi-party system, emphasizing the democratization of institutions, which was the main goal of his foreign policy¹⁷⁹.

It should be emphasized that the current President Paul Biya continued the policy of the previous President Ahmadou Ahidjo. He supports the idea of peace, the idea of economic diversification and the idea of cooperation. Difference consists only in reforming foreign policy and expanding the model of the presence of the Republic of Cameroon in the world¹⁸⁰. In this regard, we can note the main changes in the actions of the President in favor of development. Participation of all forces in the implementation of the Prosperous Cameroon project remains a priority for the Cameroonian government, which takes into account the views of non-state actors on issues of national interest.

These consultations were intended to gather views and build consensus on the topic. It is in this spirit that President Paul Biya based his idea on a national political interest in the implementation of major integration projects in the Central African region, including the creation of a single passport between the CEMAC member states in November 2012. The government systematically engages in dialogue on various aspects of Cameroon's foreign policy, through the practice of public consultations, which are of particular interest. It should also be added that

¹⁷⁸ Abé C. Espace public et recompositions de la pratique politique au Cameroun. Polis/RCSP/CPSR. 2006. Vol. 13, № 1-2. P. 29-56.

¹⁷⁹ Mahop A. T. E. Les grandes orientations des politiques économiques au Cameroun sous l'ère du président Ahmadou Ahidjo de 1960 à 1982: analyse historique. Analele Universității Dunărea de Jos din Galați. Seria Istorie. 2009. № 08. P. 213-227.

¹⁸⁰ Gabriel J. M. Cameroon's neopatrimonial dilemma. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 1999. Vol. 17, № 2. P. 173-196.

in order to reorganize the bodies, a new structure must be created to attract investment to Cameroon.

The following economic priorities have been identified: economic policy orientation (market economy), economic growth (purchasing power), market size, geographic location, skilled workforce, communications and energy infrastructure, rating of international institutions, debt, socio-political stability in the country and the quality of national institutions. In order to attract more investors from different backgrounds, local authorities have undertaken a reform process under the Prosperity Cameroon Strategic Plan¹⁸¹.

As the first reform, the reorganization of individual units, in particular, the creation of a ministry for the promotion of investment, public works, transport, housing and tourism. The ministerial department is responsible for promoting investment and is a strong signal and confirmation of the government's willingness to work to attract investment.

Law and diplomacy are in a structural interaction in external policy cooperation and implementation. Diplomatic practice is a legally framed/codified activity just as the law is an instrument of diplomatic practice. These are overlapping realities; one assumes and calls the other and vice versa. If the law is an instrument of diplomatic practice, it goes without saying that each State can have a «foreign legal Policy¹⁸²» that is to say, in the sense of Guy Ladreit de La Charrière, «the way in which a State (...) applies public international law to its diplomatic action»¹⁸³. In his policy in general and its diplomatic practice in particular, Cameroon mobilizes the law as a bulwark of sovereignty and independence, a means of legitimizing international public action and – above all – as an instrument of consolidation of the bases of its international cooperation. Hence the diplomatic practice of concluding cooperation agreements in fields as diverse as friendship, economy and commerce, science, technology and culture.

¹⁸¹ Ngwana T. University strategic planning in Cameroon: what lessons for sub-Saharan Africa?. Education Policy Analysis Archive. 2003.

¹⁸²Ibid.

¹⁸³Ibid. P. 469.

Cameroon does not situate its external relations in outside of this friendly setting. Indeed, for a country whose diplomacy has, among other vocations, to «contribute to creating an international society which is fully human ¹⁸⁴», the construction of friendships can only constitute the backbone of the foreign policy. Moreover, in the dogmatic design of foreign policy, friendship is both the foundation and the goal of a nation's international deployment.

It is important to pay attention to the fact that Cameroon has not experienced major violence since independence. Apart from isolated episodes of the 1984 coup, and the popular uprisings of 2016¹⁸⁵, which led to the current Anglophone crisis, the country seems calm compared to some of its African neighbors. A culture of peace exists in the customs of Cameroon. From the point of view of the country's foreign policy, Cameroon has no alternative but to speak out in favor of peace and regional stability. However, an example of Togo is important here, because for this State the search for peace is absolute and excludes any military intervention in this country and beyond its borders. In Cameroon, on the contrary, troops have been sent to participate in peacekeeping operations on the continent. In Cameroon, the search for peace requires the mediation of the Cameroonian President and effective participation in peacekeeping operations.

Politics from above or grand politics, foreign policy can be considered as the politics of the summits; politics at the top in that it is, on the one hand, a domain controlled by the Heads of States and, on the other hand, an interaction between sovereign entities. Because those who occupy the summits of the State are the supreme designers and the main directors, foreign policy is the responsibility of the major policy whose aim is «the definition of the superior interests of the state and the people»¹⁸⁶. In Cameroon, action at the highest level, formal symbolism, is a remarkable and even paramount moment in the country's international life. These actions at the top take various forms three of which can

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. P. 52.

¹⁸⁵ DeLancey M. W. 2007. «The construction of the Cameroon political system: The Ahidjo years, 1958–1982.» *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 6 (1–2): 3–24.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. P. 16.

be selected and briefly presented: participation in international summits, the official trips of the Head of State and the practice of sending emissaries or special envoys¹⁸⁷.

Hosting the headquarters of international organizations, *Inter alia* non-governmental is a governmental option for the implementation of foreign policy¹⁸⁸. This welcome aims to open up the State internationally and its consequent influence. Its purpose is also to capture the resources and other opportunities offered by these organizations, which, more and more, carry out programs of aid and significant social or community development. Like any state engaged in trade international relationship, Cameroon has a vision or rather a representation of the different continental entities that make up the globe. It/she also has a diplomatic strategy approach to infiltration and influence. This approach fits in a set of ideological projections, logic practices whose readability very often appears blurred because of the bursting, the inextricability or even the contradiction of the issues pursued.

The diplomatic representation of Cameroon goes beyond the countries which host the above-mentioned diplomatic and consular missions. Indeed, through multiple accreditations, Cameroon provides diplomatic coverage for 26 countries on the continent¹⁸⁹. Analysis of the continental location of embassies and consulates indicates two salient facts that characterize the Cameroonian diplomatic deployment. First, there is a concentration if not a diplomatic density in what we might call the natural «concentric circle of solidarity» from the country; in particular, its regional area of belonging that is the Central African region. The establishment of this first circle is justified by the fact «that there is between [Cameroon] and some of [its] immediate or distant neighbors, centers of

¹⁸⁷ Bokalli E. S. «L'action internationale du Chef de l'Etat camerounais. Itinéraires et enjeux de ses déplacements à l'étranger entre 1996 et 2006». 2005/2006.

¹⁸⁸ Membership of international organisations of Cameroon. URL: <https://fortuneofafrica.com/cameroon/2014/01/24/membership-of-international-organisations-of-cameroon/> (date of access: 20.20.2021)

¹⁸⁹ Kofele-Kale N. Cameroon and its foreign relations. *African Affairs*. 1981. Vol. 80. № 319. P. 12.

common interest which condemn [them] to closer and better organized cooperation within the framework of joint cooperation bodies¹⁹⁰.

The inner circle includes the country's immediate neighborhood; essential framework for the preservation of its territorial sovereignty, its inner stability and the construction of a space of meaning and solidarity. Cameroon thus has embassies and consulates in all the countries of its immediate vicinity and close. Hence a very strong diplomatic integration of the country in the subregion.

In addition to a presence of a quasi-mechanical diplomacy in its neighborhood, Cameroon is moving, as far as the rest of the continent is concerned, towards a species of selective diplomatic engagement in which the presence diplomacy is restricted to a few countries.

The level of economic growth and development of Cameroon determined the nature of her foreign policy choices and decisions. G. Lentner argues that wealth is a prerequisite for certain types of foreign policy; it is prerequisites, conditions, approaches, and implementation.

Cameroon's economy was stable in the immediate aftermath of independence. This event is due to the fact that in the late 1980s, budget deficits compelled Cameroon to resort to external borrowing and to accept the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in structural adjustment programs¹⁹¹.

Official visits emphasized the political will of the President. As noted, «He is able to create partnerships, attract investors. He works a lot. He loves to do business with businessmen and investors¹⁹².» These visits were, on the whole, a good opportunity to develop bilateral relations. President A. Ahidjo made visits to foreign countries to sign partnership agreements, inviting partners to invest in the economy of Cameroon. The signed agreements became the basis for foreign

¹⁹⁰Kofele-Kale N. Cameroon and its foreign relations. African Affairs. 1981. Vol. 80. № 319. P. 19.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹² Official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/news> (date of access: 21.12.2020).

participation in the development of Cameroon. The agreements were aimed at the development of such sectors as: agriculture, fisheries, transport infrastructure, logging, water resources.

To sum up, it should be emphasized that the foreign policy line of President P. Biya, in general, differs from that pursued by A. Ahidjo, who demonstrated adherence to the Cameroonian model of isolationism and focused his efforts on conflict resolution. President P. Biya tried to build a pragmatic political model, involving Cameroon in solving global issues in the international arena and pursuing a policy of diversifying partnerships and achieving a multi-level presence of the Cameroonian Republic in the system of international relations.

The political will of the President directs the country's foreign policy towards active involvement in the implementation of the country's economic development strategy and building a prosperous Cameroon.

CHAPTER 2. BILATERAL DIPLOMACY OF CAMEROON

Cameroon's foreign policy is based theoretically on the establishment of relations with every country on the basis of equality, reciprocity, mutual respect of sovereignty, and non interference. Such a policy is designed to contribute to harmonizing international relations and creating a truly and fully human international community¹⁹³. According to President Paul Biya, this policy leads toward a more interdependent mankind, which ensures the autonomy of weak nations and protects their freedom through peaceful coexistence. In fact, Cameroon remains closely aligned with and dependent on France. Economic relations with the United States and China have taken on new importance recently. It is the head of state who determines the foreign policy of Cameroon. The implementation of this policy is done with the help of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by a minister.

As part of its diplomacy, Cameroon belongs to a variety of international organizations at the regional, continental, and world levels. According to a Cameroon government statement, Cameroon makes the Charter of the United Nations the base of its foreign policy. This support was made manifest when Cameroon occupied the seat of a nonpermanent member at the Security Council and held the chairmanship of this important institution at a time of extreme tension on the international arena. This attachment to peace and international solidarity is exercised as a matter of priority in the relations Cameroon has with its immediate neighbors.

But in 1968¹⁹⁴, the efforts of the President of the Republic, A. Ahidjo, gave new momentum to Cameroon's policy in this area. A sort of restructuring has taken place. Indeed, Cameroon's diplomacy was based on the good of the state, the preservation of its stability and influence in the international arena. By setting

¹⁹³ Diplomacy and Nation-Building in Africa: Franco-British relations and Cameroon at the end of empire. Bloomsbury Publishing. 2012.

¹⁹⁴ Nkwi P. N. Rethinking the role of elites in rural development: a case study from Cameroon. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 1997. Vol. 15, № 1. P. 67-86.

priorities, President A. Ahidjo was forced to build the unity of the nation around the values of peace and solidarity. Continuing the political course of nationalists, he saw the prospects for the development of the country in unity and stability¹⁹⁵. The image of Cameroon on the world stage is the result of the diplomatic efforts of President A. Ahidjo, whose political course was characterized by openness and readiness for dialogue¹⁹⁶.

With regard to the geographical aspect of Cameroon's foreign policy, the implementation of foreign policy dialogue means that Cameroon is committed to exchange of views with partners, as well as taking into account their position in politics, especially when it comes to global challenges. Thus, openness allows Cameroon to become better known on the world stage, establish and maintain good relations with all members of the international community, and, as a result, attract foreign investment to Cameroon, which contributes to the economic and social development of the country¹⁹⁷. It can be said that for Cameroon, bilateral diplomacy is defined by the concept of dialogue and leads to the implementation of an assistance program in terms of financial technology and knowledge development.

Thus, the essence of what P. Biya said is the need to develop mutually beneficial partnerships that can support African countries, create a solid foundation for development, help them rethink and improve their level of development, ensure strong economies and sustainable growth. During such meetings, representatives of Cameroon implement this economic aspect of Cameroonian diplomacy.

¹⁹⁵ Barnery J. Une politique étrangère active. *Geopolitique africaine*.-mars 1986; Bignoumba ME Le système politique gabonais. Thèse pour le doctorat Etudes africaines. 1992.

¹⁹⁶ Buo S. K. 1973. «President Ahidjo's Fifteen Years.» *Africa Report*. March–April 2017.

¹⁹⁷ Mokube E. *Diplomacy and Nation-Building in Africa: Franco-British Relations and Cameroon at the End of Empire*, Mélanie Torrent. 2012.

2.1. Cameroon-Great Britain: Historical and contemporary relations

Relations between Cameroon and Great Britain do not date from the first war. This country has marked its presence in Cameroon since the 17th century, more precisely in 1650. On this date, it joined the Portuguese on the coast of Cameroon. And for more than two centuries, they carried on trade on the coast. This trade was sometimes regulated by agreements concluded with the coastal chiefs. As proof, we can allude to the treaty of June 18, 1840 signed by the English and the coastal chiefs¹⁹⁸.

In 1885, when the country became a German colony in accordance with the sharing of the African cake between the great European powers, at the second Berlin conference, these relations were interrupted. The two powers will only return following the peace conference of Versailles in 1919¹⁹⁹.

Historically, Cameroon's political future has been linked to British and Commonwealth politics. Although A. Ahidjo led the movement for the independence of Cameroon and helped a number of other British colonies to gain independence, this did not have a significant impact on relations between Cameroon and Great Britain. A solid foundation has been created to strengthen bilateral relations through a commitment to joint problem solving and opportunities. Cameroon and the UK are also linked by the relationship between the peoples of the two countries, who share the values of democracy and the rule of law, the desire for prosperity and security, and a deep and genuine desire to solve global problems²⁰⁰.

¹⁹⁸ Ndille R. Missionaries as imperialists: Decolonial subalternity in the missionary enterprise on the Coast of Cameroon 1841-1914. *Sumerianz Journal of Social Science*. 2018. Vol. 1, № 2. P. 51-58.

¹⁹⁹ Crozier A. J. The Establishment of the Mandates System 1919-25: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference. *Journal of Contemporary History*. 1979. Vol. 14, № 3. P. 483-513.

²⁰⁰ Ardener E. *Kingdom on Mount Cameroon: Studies in the history of the Cameroon Coast, 1500-1970*. Berghahn Books. 1996.

Contacts between the two countries are old and date back to pre-colonial times with the installation of English missionaries on the Cameroonian coast. They occupied 1/5 of the Cameroonian territory and established an indirect administration there²⁰¹. After decolonization, the English part of Cameroon gained independence within the framework of reunification with the French part.

Cameroon's most famous feature is that it includes territory formerly ruled by the French and a smaller part formerly ruled by the British. Given this dual Franco-British colonial heritage and the country's declared commitment to non-alignment, it would be reasonable to expect an even-handed policy towards France and Britain²⁰². In practice, however, Cameroon's foreign policy has traditionally leaned in favor of France. This asymmetric foreign policy is partly a reflection of domestic pressures, as well as the different reactions that Cameroon is generating in Paris and London. British efforts in aid, trade and culture were very weak compared to the active policies pursued by Paris.

Several factors are responsible for the relatively weak British economic influence in Cameroon. It should be remembered that Britain's links with the Cameroonian co-ownership were limited to the English-speaking sector (ex-Southern Cameroon, ex-Western Cameroon). With reunification, these ties ended when English-speaking Cameroon left the Commonwealth and the sterling area to enter the franc area - a move that resulted in the loss of «imperial preferences» for western Cameroonian products, especially bananas, which were traditionally exported to the UK. But even before Commonwealth preferences were abolished in 1966, the UK's share of imports from Western Cameroon steadily declined from 77% in 1951 to around 45% during federation²⁰³. This share fell further to less than 20% in 1964, although the pound sterling collectively continued to supply

²⁰¹ Nzume A. N. British and French administration of peoples on the southern borderlands of Cameroon: The case of the Anglo-French inter-Camerouns boundary 1916-1961. University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies (United Kingdom). 2004.

²⁰² Ardener E. The political history of Cameroon. The world today. 1962. Vol. 18, № 8. P. 341-350.

²⁰³ Kofele-Kale N. Cameroon and its foreign relations. African Affairs. 1981. Vol. 80, № 319. P. 197-217.

about 43% of Western Cameroon's imports. The transition to the franc area that followed the reunification disrupted trade in western Cameroon to the point that a number of large British companies were forced to withdraw entirely from the Cameroonian market. Such companies include department store retailers such as the United Trading Company, R and W. King and Kingsway, which sold its large network to the French firm Printania. The vacuum created by the fleeing Britons was quickly filled by French companies seeking to expand their commercial dominance through Mungo: SHO (Société de Haut-Ogoué), SCOA (Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain), CFAO (French Company for West Africa), SONAC (Cameroon National Company)²⁰⁴.

Weak in trade and law in aid, the British cultural presence, even in that sector of Cameroon where English is widely spoken (North-West and South-West provinces), is just insignificant.

To be sure, the British still maintain a symbolic presence in Cameroon. For example, the number of British employees working in the country under the UK Aid program has increased over the past few years. In 1971, 131 British personnel were posted to Cameroon, and by 1977 the number had nearly doubled to 248²⁰⁵.

Table 1.

Direction of Cameroon's Export trade (Million CFA frs.)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
USA	5,416	4,135	4,856	3,486	6,177	5,178	5,178	5,840	4,615
Japan	369	207	335	793	1,828	1,754	2,084	3,604	3,399
UK	1,160	806	971	828	1,195	1,471	1,048	858	1,241
France	13,000	13,997	15,774	21,945	20,145	15,816	16,330	22,329	31,002
EEC	23,969	24,458	32,870	43,327	45,720	38,761	37,641	53,765	83,297
Africa	2,112	1,376	4,451	4,860	5,209	6,579	6,119	9,210	10,668
Total World Export	74,732	78,415	96,338	124,674	129,897	118,331	110,718	155,273	230,021

²⁰⁴ Gentili A. M., Willard R. J. The Cameroon Federation. Political integration in a fragmentary Society, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1970. Pp. 426 ([\$12.50]. Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica. 1972. Vol. 2, № 2.

²⁰⁵ Kofele-Kale N. Cameroon and its foreign relations. African Affairs. 1981. Vol. 80, № 319.

Source: Calculated from UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Statistical Yearbook 1975 Part 4. p. 36–11.

Table 2.

Direction of Cameroon's import trade (Million CFA frs.)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
USA	1,883	2,519	2,665	3,211	5,165	4,964	8,527	6,711	6,528
Japan	1,532	1,432	1,225	1,285	1,595	1,857	1,830	1,467	2,396
UK	1,622	1,376	2,163	2,305	2,499	2,894	2,552	2,137	3,878
France	18,900	25,905	24,394	28,059	33,932	34,331	36,369	35,321	49,344
EEC	25,807	34,231	32,726	37,385	46,730	47,557	49,861	48,661	69,486
Africa	2,112	2,777	4,580	5,414	6,307	6,447	6,905	7,448	10,197
Total World Import	82,420	106,383	105,321	120,749	150,390	154,134	165,166	160,340	227,533

Source: Calculated from UN ECA, African Statistical Yearbook. Part 4. 1975. P. 36-11.

The British aid contribution fell far below the quantity provided by the Federal Republic of Germany or Canada, for example. Britain is also very weak trading partners in comparison with the volume of Cameroon's external trade with France²⁰⁶. For the period 1966-1974, the annual British export trade to Cameroon averaged less than 2%, and British imports from Cameroon were under 1% per year.

Since 1971, over 400 Cameroonian students and trainees have also received academic and non-academic training in the UK as part of the UK Technical Assistance Programme²⁰⁷. A comparable number of Cameroonian students have studied in US and African universities under the African Scholarship Program of American Universities (ASPAU), the African Graduate Fellowship Program (AFGRAD), and the Inter-African Universities Program (INTERAF) sponsored

²⁰⁶ Doumbe E. D., Belinga T. A Gravity model analysis for trade between Cameroon and Twenty-Eight European Union countries. Open Journal of Social Sciences. 2015. Vol. 3, № 08. P. 114.

²⁰⁷ Partee G. Youth Work, Youth Development and the Transition from Schooling to Employment in England. Impressions from a Study Mission. American Youth Policy Forum, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 719. Washington. DC 20036-5541. 1996. P. 61.

by USA and returned home to occupy important positions of responsibility in the Cameroon government²⁰⁸.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Cameroonian-British bilateral relationship has been filled with multidimensional content in the political, diplomatic, defense, economic and social fields. In 1960, the first constitution of Cameroon was written, affirming the status of full independence of the state. The 1960 constitution defines certain aspects of freedom, such as Cameroon's enforcement of treaties. For example, section Art 39 and 40²⁰⁹ of the constitution provides that, on the implementation of treaties, among other things, Parliament may make laws for Cameroon or any part thereof relating to matters not included in the legislative lists for the purposes of the implementation of any treaty, convention or agreement between the Federation and any other country or any agreement or decision of an international organization of which the Federation is a member. But notwithstanding this republican status of Cameroon, the country has remained a member of the Commonwealth Nations of which the Queen of England is the head.

The cooperation agreements signed by the two countries constitutes the legal basis. These include, among others:

- Economic and Commercial Cooperation Agreement (London 1963);
- Technical Cooperation Agreement (London 1963);
- Cultural Cooperation Agreement (London 1963);
- The agreement establishing a joint commission between the two countries (1987 Yaounde);
- Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the Government of the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments;

²⁰⁸ The Current Vice-Minister of Education, Dr Dorothy Limunga Njeuma, Did Her Under-Graduate Work at Pembroke College, Brown University, Rhode Island Under ASPAU (African Scholarship Programme for American Universities).

²⁰⁹ The 1960 Constitution. URL: <https://Mjp.Univ-Perp.Fr/Constit/Cm1960.Htm> (date of access: 08.05.2020).

- Interim Agreement establishing an Economic Partnership Agreement between the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the one part, and the Republic of Cameroon, of the other part(London 2021)²¹⁰;

- Ordinance N°2021/001 of 19 January 2021 to extend the effects of the Cameroon-European Union Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland²¹¹;

- Law No. 2021/001 of 16 April 2021 to Ratify Ordinance no. 2021/1 of 19 January 2021 to Extend the Effects of the Cameroon - European Union Economic Partnership Agreement to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland²¹²;

- Decree No. 2021/387 of 28 June 2021 to ratify the Stepping Stone Agreement towards a Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland²¹³;

- Law No. 2021/011 of 28 June 2021 to authorize the President of the republic to ratify the Stepping Stone Agreement towards a Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the United Kingdom²¹⁴.

During his visit, Brian Olley, British High Commissioner to Cameroon, stated that «We discussed many different subjects including how we can reinforce partnership between Great Britain and Cameroon and how Cameroon can confront many challenges like fighting terrorism, the problems of the six countries of the CEMAC region, the Anglophone issue and investments by British

²¹⁰ Interim Agreement. URL: UK/Cameroon: Interim Agreement Establishing An Economic Partnership (Date Of Access: 10.01.2020).

²¹¹ Ordinance N°2021/001. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/multimedia/documents/8720-Ordinance-N-2021-001-Of-19-01-2021> (Date Of Access: 10.01.2020).

²¹² Law №. 2021/001. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/multimedia/documents/8873-Law-N-2021-001-Of-16-04-2021-Page-1> (Date Of Access: 10.01.2020).

²¹³ Decree №. 2021/387. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/multimedia/documents/8970-Decree-N-2021-387-Of-28-06-2021> (Date Of Access: 10.01.2020).

²¹⁴Law №. 2021/011. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/multimedia/documents/8972-Law-N-2021-011-Of-28-06-2021> (Date Of Access: 10.01.2020).

companies in Cameroon. It was a great opportunity to underline the great historic cultural links that unite our two countries. We discussed also the future in terms of the Commonwealth. (...) This meeting was a great opportunity for me to update the President not only on the social housing project but also on other projects by British companies in Cameroon. So, it was a very useful opportunity for me to underline where we are in the various negotiations and the progress we are making.» Cameroon's foreign policy places great emphasis on the UK based on strengthening bilateral relations as well as capitalizing on the opportunities that both countries offer. Cameroon is the UK's 120th largest trading partner²¹⁵, accounting for less than 0.1% of total trade. Total trade in goods and services between the UK and Cameroon was £200 million in 2019²¹⁶.

Cameroon is the UK's 120th largest trading partner. The UK and Cameroon have signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that ensures mutual continuity of trade²¹⁷. An agreement has been reached to delay the current trade agreement between the EU and Cameroon from January 1st, 2021. The agreement allows companies to trade as freely as they do now, without any additional barriers or tariffs, and provides a foundation for expanding our trade relationship in the future. The UK's total trade in goods and services with Cameroon in 2019 was £200 million²¹⁸. The agreement will maintain tariff-free market access to the UK, while also guaranteeing continued market access for the UK's exporters, who sold £51m in goods to Cameroon in 2019.

Table 3.

Trade between Cameroon and the UK, 2019 (£ million)

²¹⁵ EU Member States Are Treated as Individual Trading Partners with The United Kingdom
²¹⁶ UK Total Trade: All Countries, Non-Seasonally Adjusted. URL: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/internationaltrade/datasets/ukttotaltradeallcountriesnonseasonallyadjusted> (date of access: 10.01.2020).
²¹⁷ Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukcameroon-interim-agreement-establishing-an-economic-partnership-ms-no-22021> (date of access: 10.01.2020).
²¹⁸ONS (2020). URL: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/internationaltrade/datasets/ukttotaltradeallcountriesnonseasonallyadjusted> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

	Trade in goods	Trade in services	Total trade
Our exports to Cameroon	51	80	131
Our imports from Cameroon	58	11	69
Total trade	109	91	200

Source: UK total trade: all countries, non-seasonally adjusted // ONS. 2020. URL : <https://www.ons.gov.uk/> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

The UK is therefore ranked 11th among Cameroon's export markets, with 2.1% of total exports, and 18th among suppliers, with 1.4% of overall imports. British investments and projects in Cameroon mainly concern mass distribution, water and energy, social housing, IT, banking, high finance, or hydrocarbons, etc²¹⁹.

Ranil Jayawardena, Minister for International Trade, said: «The United Kingdom is committed to supporting developing countries by encouraging growth through trade. The preferential terms for their key exports, such as bananas, will support jobs and economic development in Cameroon, and make sure British consumers get the products they want»²²⁰.

As regards security and the humanitarian situation, the British diplomat affirmed that his country is «determined to help Cameroon overcome the difficulties it is facing» to continue its march towards progress, referring in particular to the fight against terrorism in the Far North region and unrest in the North West and South West regions. Cameroon has in the past benefited from the support of the UK in the war against the terrorist group Boko Haram and the

²¹⁹ Ndoye O., Pérez, M. R., Eyebe A. The markets of non-timber forest products in the humid forest zone of Cameroon. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute. 1997. P. 45.

²²⁰ Speech Delivered by Ranil Jayawardena Minister for International Trade on December 30th. URL : <https://www.miragenews.com/united-kingdom-and-cameroon-secure-economic-partnership-agreement/> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

management of refugees. London is willing to continue this much-appreciated support²²¹.

In February 2018, Harriett Baldwin, the UK's Minister for Africa arrived in Cameroon. On the Anglophone crisis, she urged the various actors involved in the conflict to sit down on the negotiating table for dialogue. Still in 2018, specifically in November, there was a parliamentary exchange in the House of Lords on the Anglophone crisis. On that special occasion, the House of Lords have, for the first time spoken out on the on-going devastating Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, urging the powers that be to take urgent steps towards ending a conflict they say is fast becoming a full blown civil war. They were unanimous that it was high the UK government moved from mere words to «concrete actions» in order to help resolve the lingering crisis²²². In April 2019, the Anglophone crisis was on the menu of discussions in the House of Commons. During the discussions, the British government reaffirmed its commitment to appease the situation in the English-speaking part of Cameroon and called on the Commonwealth to become more involved in this crisis.

In addition to the worth praising initiatives, donations to the affected populations have been made by the UK. One still remembers the donation of 2.3 million euros in humanitarian aid to English-speaking regions made by Great Britain.

In March 2019, «the UK, on behalf of 38 members of the Human Rights Council, expressed its deep concern about the deteriorating human rights situation in Anglophone regions, and called on Cameroon to engage fully with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights»²²³. However, it should be

²²¹ Foyou V. E., Ngwafu P., Santoyo M., Ortiz, A. The Boko Haram insurgency and its impact on border security, trade and economic collaboration between Nigeria and Cameroon: An exploratory study. African Social Science Review. 2018. Vol. 9, № 1. P. 7.

²²²The Guardian Post. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IDPersons/OP_GuardianPostCameroon16Nov2018.pdf (date of access: 19.01.2020).

²²³ Human Rights Watch. Cameroon: 'Killings, Destruction in Anglophone Regions', 2021. URL: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/19/cameroon-killings-destruction-anglophone-regions> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

noted that the contribution of England has so far been residual, very insignificant to what is expected. As a former colonial power, England should be at the forefront of the Anglophone question within the Security Council and be accommodating with Cameroonian power bilaterally. With its historical past and its current partnerships with Cameroon, England is currently one of the best peacemakers in the English-speaking part of Cameroon for historical and socio-political reasons.

From the historical perspective, it is worth recalling that, in the aftermath of World War II, especially with the birth of the United Nations, which replaced the League of Nations, Cameroon's legal status underwent change. It changes from the status of Mandate to that of Trusteeship. This new process implied a new international status. It is, in reality, only a change of legal regime because the country remains in the hands of the same foreign powers²²⁴. This change in legal status therefore does not really affect the daily experience of the populations or the management methods of foreign powers because «despite its international status, French-speaking Cameroon is an» associated territory» of the French Union.

As for Anglophone Cameroon, it is associated in its administration by the «United Kingdom with its colony of Cameroon». The clauses that define this new legal regime are found in Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter and in the Trusteeship Agreements approved by the United Nations on December 13, 1946²²⁵. England therefore has an obligation to remember and must not. No case to leave orphan the English-speaking part of the country as is the case today. In the name of this obligation to remember, he must be strongly involved in the current Anglophone crisis by imposing respect for the historical pact and socio-political legacies.

²²⁴ Njung G. N. The British Cameroons mandate regime: The roots of the twenty-first-century political crisis in Cameroon. *The American Historical Review*. 2019. Vol. 124, № 5. P. 1715-1722.

²²⁵ UN docs. A/250, Dec. 11, 1946; A/250/Add. 1/Eev. 1, Dec. 12, 1946; A/250/Add. 2/ Dec. 12, 1946; A/P.V./104, Nov. 1, 1947; A/P.V./105, Nov. 1, 1947.

The Cameroonian diaspora in the UK has about 12000 people (plus or minus 5,000)²²⁶. It is vibrant and prosperous. The ranks of British merchants in Cameroon are also growing. All this testifies to a relationship built on solid foundations. Bilateral diplomatic relations are also fruitful. In general, there is still great potential for mutually beneficial cooperation in relations between the UK and Cameroon. Both countries recognize the importance of partnership. The UK and Cameroon have a lot in common: similar legal systems, the same language, common history, etc.

For the same reasons that held her for long outside La Francophonie, Cameroon has observed the Commonwealth from a distance. It was finally on November 1, 1995 that, after long adventures essentially linked to the internal political situation, Cameroon is finally admitted into the great family of the 153-state strong Commonwealth. Since then, the cooperation and the partnership between the two entities have been strengthened. Cameroon has even acquired, because of her dual membership, French-speaking and English-speaking, a high symbolic value in the dynamics of cooperation between the International Organization of La Francophonie and the Commonwealth²²⁷.

It is well known around the world that the Commonwealth is what is commonly called a «gentlemen's club»; that is to say an association of nations which want to be civilized and who share the same attachment to the British crown as well as its symbolic and civilizational leadership. The Organization, which has no written constitution, has principles, standards and values which serve as codes of communication and recognition between its members. These constitute what

²²⁶Demographic information for Cameroonians living in Britain. URL: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/demographicinformationforcameroonianslivinginbritain> (date of access: 21.09.2020).

²²⁷ Pondi J. E. Cameroon and the Commonwealth of Nations. The Round Table. 1997. Vol. 86, № 344. P. 563-570.

could be called, in a political terminology, the common civilizational heritage²²⁸ of the States.

In the Commonwealth Declaration of Principles adopted in 1971 in Singapore by the Conference of Heads of States and government²²⁹, the following elements are clearly specified: promotion of peace and world order, support of United Nations, support and promotion of representative institutions, adoption of legal guarantees of individual freedom, recognition of racial equality and struggle against oppression and racial discrimination, equitable distribution of wealth.

In 1991, another Declaration called the Harare Declaration²³⁰ adds to these principles those of sound business management and the promotion of fundamental political values: rule of law, human rights, free and transparent elections. This set of values and principles are fully in line with the fundamental political options of the Cameroon both internally and externally. What justifies and legitimizes Cameroon's membership in this grouping of States described by President Paul Biya as a «great international organization».

Cameroon maintains multifaceted cooperation with the Commonwealth which, after only one and a half decades, presents a relatively positive assessment. This cooperation, which is part of the philosophy and spirit of the partnership, is deployed essentially in the fields of politico-institutional reform, capacity building and consultancy.

The Commonwealth actively and sustainably supports the political and institutional reforms undertaken by Cameroon and which are in accordance with the principles and values contained in the Harare Declaration. Strengthening of

²²⁸ Sindjoun L. La formation du patrimoine constitutionnel commun des sociétés politiques, *Éléments pour une théorie de la civilisation politique internationale*. Dakar, CODESRIA. 1998. 72 P. *Études internationales*, 30(4). P. 815-817.

²²⁹ Public Archives of Canada, Arnold Smith Papers, Vol 23/3, Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, Singapore, 15-22 January 1971: Minutes of Meeting and Memoranda, HGM (71) 12th Meeting, p 212. The summary of the position of most members can be found on pp 211-215.

²³⁰ For the Harare Commonwealth Declaration, see section under 'Documentation', *The Round Table*, № 321, January 1992. P. 103.

the rule of law, democracy, human rights and civil society is the major area of partnership between Cameroon and the Gentlemen's Club²³¹.

Thus, there exists between Cameroon and the Commonwealth a kind of politico-institutional partnership, better still a politico-institutional dialogue whose style is similar to that put on footing with the European Union. The institutional framework for implementation of this political partnership was formalized by the creation, by the Cameroonian Head of State, of the «Commission Cameroon-Commonwealth presidential election» on the reforms policies on December 14, 2002. The reforms to be undertaken on reciprocal agreement between the two parties concerned four important areas in particular: the electoral process, the judicial system, decentralization, and human rights. This political partnership has effectively led to an appreciable development marked by:

1) the implementation of electoral governance reflected in the creation of «Elections Cameroon» – independent body responsible for the organization and the management of elections;

2) strengthening protection of human rights through the restructuring of the Commission National Human Rights and Freedoms (CNDHL);

3) the improvement of the institutional framework for the fight against corruption with the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) in 2006;

4) improving transparency and public management with the creation of the Court of Accounts;

5) strengthening the judicial system and the launch of its computerization and audit technical process;

6) prison reform. The partnership for capacity building is about essentially on the training activity through the granting of scholarships and the organization of numerous seminars, workshops and conferences.

²³¹ Commonwealth Secretariat, London: 'Report to Heads of Government' and 'Concluding Statement of the Roundtable of Heads of Government of Commonwealth Africa on Democracy and Good Governance in Africa', Gaborone, Botswana, 23–25 February 1997, pp 1–4 and 27 February 1997. P. 1–3.

The Commonwealth Business Council (CBC) thus organized in Cameroon in 2006 and 2008, two major investment forums having successfully concrete, to the creation of the Prime Minister Investment Council – chaired by the Prime Minister, Head of Government – as well as the intensification of public-private partnership²³².

On the register of the reception of large international meetings organized under the aegis of the Organization, Cameroon has also hosted important meetings such as the 36th session of the African branch of parliamentarians of the Commonwealth in 2005, the Conference of Ministers of the Commonwealth in charge of Information Technology and of the communication on September 2005 as well as the 29th Conference of the Association of Tax Administrators of Commonwealth (Association of Commonwealth Tax Administrators)²³³. In the register of technical cooperation, Cameroon regularly participates in various meetings and conferences organized there, namely:

- the Commonwealth Health Ministers Meeting (CHMM);
- the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting (CFMM);
- the Commonwealth Education Ministers Meeting (CEMM);
- the Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting (CLMM);
- the Commonwealth Sports Ministers Meeting (CSMM).

Finally, mention should be made of the participation in sporting events such as the Commonwealth Games Kuala Lumpur (1998), Manchester (2002), Melbourne (2006)²³⁴.

We can thus note the roots of the social, political and cultural division, which lead each part of the country to want to identify with the foreign power

²³² Kshetri N. Institutional and economic foundations of entrepreneurship in Africa: An overview. *Journal of developmental entrepreneurship*, 2011. Vol. 16, № 01. P. 9-35.

²³³ Ngo M. B. E. Addressing human rights challenges in Cameroon with the focus on corruption. *Addressing Human Rights Challenges in Cameroon with the Focus on Corruption*. 2019. (02.10.2019).

²³⁴ Lockstone L., Baum T. Fun in the family: Tourism and the Commonwealth Games. *International Journal of tourism research*. 2008. Vol. 10, № 6. p. 497-509.

which governs it. As part of its colonial master, the UK government must significantly get involved in the on-going crisis by coming up with an Action Plan and related ways-out to stop the crisis.

2.2. Cameroon and France in a Bilateral Format of Partnership

France was the mandate and trust authority of the League of Nations and the United Nations for the larger portion of Cameroon from 1916 to 1960. Consequently, both countries entertain a privileged relationship to the present time²³⁵. The secret agreements (Franco-Cameroun accord of 25 December 1959) helped to boost France's continuous tie to independent Cameroon. In May 2009 French Prime Minister François Fillon visited Cameroon and renegotiated these accords, ending France's right to military intervention in Cameroon. This is a part of a plan to end France's paternalist relationship with Cameroon.

Today, France remains Cameroon's most significant foreign partner. Foreign trade, foreign investment, and military, cultural, and political connections remain strong²³⁶.

Cameroon is cited as being among the former French colonies that sought to reduce their ties with Paris. The perspective of Neo-Colonialism, of which Kwame Nkrumah was one of the main supporters, was opposed to the vision of gradual disengagement. Nkrumah defined this perspective in *The Last Stage of Imperialism*: «Imperialism: 'The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy are directed from outside.'²³⁷«Advocates of the neo-colonialism paradigm who seek to draw attention to the continuing European presence in Africa

²³⁵ Ngoh V. J. The political evolution of Cameroon. 1979. P. 1884-1961.

²³⁶ Renou X. A new French policy for Africa?. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 2002. Vol. 20. № 1. P. 5-27.

²³⁷ Nkrumah K., Nkrumah K. Neo-colonialism: The last stage of imperialism. 1965. P. 51.

'compare this reality with the ideal of total mastery of one's destiny'²³⁸ and conclude that any changes in the structure of Euro-African relations are merely minor adjustments designed to guarantee the preservation of the larger framework. Again, Cameroon's ties to the former metropolis are generally cited as evidence of an ongoing neo-colonialist relationship²³⁹.

France's privileged position in Cameroon stems from historical ties forged over time and maintained by a complex web of emotional, psychological and legal ties. Let us consider the legal ties.

The legal framework for France's participation in her former African colonies in general and Cameroon in particular is contained in a series of cooperation agreements signed on the eve of independence. A series of agreements was concluded by France with each of the 14 states when they gained independence.

On November 13, 1960 and amended in February 1974, the Ahidjo government signed ten separate treaties with France: a diplomatic convention; a cooperative agreement on economic, monetary and financial issues; the convention governing relations between the Treasury of France and Cameroon; a general agreement on technical cooperation in personnel matters²⁴⁰; an agreement on cooperation in civil aviation, air navigation, air bases and meteorology (July 19th, 1974); agreement on military-technical assistance²⁴¹; convention on the role and status of the French military mission in Cameroon; cultural convention (February 21st, 1974); consular convention²⁴²; and judicial matters²⁴³. Although

²³⁸ Zartman I. W. Europe and Africa: decolonization or dependency? Foreign Affairs. 1976. Vol. 54. № 2. P. 23.

²³⁹ De Gregori T. R., Gutkind P. C. and Wallerstein I., Eds.: The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Book Review). Journal of Economic Issues (pre-1986). 1980. Vol. 14, № 000004.

²⁴⁰ General Agreement for technical co-operation in personnel matters No. 14662. Signed at Yaounde on 21st February 1974. P. 65.

²⁴¹ Agreement on military co-operation No. 14661 (with annex and exchange of letters). Signed at Yaounde on 21st February 1974. P. 2.

²⁴² Consular Convention No. 14659 (with annex). Signed at Yaounde on 21st February 1974.

²⁴³ Agreement on co-operation in judicial matters No. 14660 (with exchange of letters). Signed at Yaounde on 21 February 1974. P. 3.

the government refused to commit itself to the agreement on a common defense, a temporary military agreement was adopted. The said-agreement allowed the French troops to repress the national movement in the first years of independence, and then waged an armed struggle against the Francophile regime of Ahidjo.

France, the largest country in Europe, has continued to influence the African space, including Cameroon, in recent years. F. Mitterrand said: «Without Africa, there will be no history of France in the twenty-first century»²⁴⁴. Since the end of the Cold War, French influence has gradually increased in Cameroon.

Relations between Cameroon and France are based on a bilateral dialogue and on a mutually beneficial cooperation between the parties concerned. A range of agreements and conventions in all fields form political and legal basis of Franco-Cameroonian relations. Cameroon and France unite in the diplomatic, economic, cultural and technological fields. The role of France in the context of Cameroonian politics is decisive. France is a key player in the country due to her historical influence. That is why France is still present in Cameroon.

At this stage, the political dialogue between Cameroon and France has expanded. Relations between the two countries have been replete with high-level visits, including senior politicians and heads of state. It should be noted that among the official visits that have taken place, one can first of all allude to the visit to Cameroon of the then President of the French Republic, François Mitterrand in 1989, the visit of Jacques Chirac in 2002, François Hollande, President of the French Republic on July 3, 2015 and that of Laurent Fabius (Minister of Foreign Affairs) in 2003. The visit to France by president Paul Biya in 1990 and in 2006 reaffirms their long standing relations and a testimony of their commitment to fight terrorism²⁴⁵. «We are determined to work side by side with

²⁴⁴ Bourgi A. La politique française de coopération en Afrique: le cas du Sénégal. Vol. 30, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence. 1979.

²⁴⁵ Official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/news> (date of access: 21.12.2020).

Cameroon to help them fight terrorism, reduce conflict and lay the foundations for the future stability and prosperity that will benefit us all²⁴⁶«

France is building cooperation relations with Cameroon taking into account the priority orientations displayed by the latter in terms of economic and social policy such as:

- contribute to economic development by supporting economic diversification policies (forestry, agriculture, mining, fishing) through the optimal use of oil resources, the creation of an effective investment program and the implementation of structural reforms in many sectors of the economy;

- help the Cameroonian Government to sustainably set up economic and social development and to pay particular attention to environmental issues, particularly in the forestry sector;

- actively participate in programs initiated by the Cameroonian government to better distribute the fruits of economic growth, that is to say, the fight against poverty, the education of the Cameroonian population and health. In order to be more competitive on the international market, Cameroon is betting on economic diversification by strengthening partnerships with France in the oil and forestry sectors. Within the framework of the French mission in Cameroon, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recommended the creation of a «reserve fund for future generations²⁴⁷.» The French party underlined the importance of this initiative which should enable Cameroon to better manage her oil revenues in a perspective of sustainable development.

In fact, Cameroon is faced with the need to base her growth and development on the diversification of her economic activity, the gradual reduction of pockets of poverty²⁴⁸, and thus, the policy of public investment is suitable for

²⁴⁶Official document of the Embassy of the Republic of Cameroon, France, French Republic on the France-Cameroon Bilateral Relations, 26 May 2006.

²⁴⁷ International Monetary fund. URL: <https://www.imf.org/en/Search#q=cameroon&sort=relevancy> (date of access: 21.08.2020).

²⁴⁸ Doh P. The responses of the higher education sector in the poverty reduction strategies in Africa: The case of Cameroon. 2012.

this purpose. The economic and social contribution of French companies to the development of Cameroon is significant. With the exception of timber, the production of which began during the colonial period, the exploitation of most other strategic goods (oil, mining) developed after independence.

In 2010, France, with over 150 subsidiaries of companies operating mainly in the forestry, oil and mining industries, was the largest investor in Cameroon (about 80%). Thus, even after gaining state independence, the country's economy is still in the hands of French companies²⁴⁹.

In addition, throughout this period, most of the natural resources were exported in raw form (timber, oil, ore), without processing. Cameroon remained dependent on the level of technical and technological support. At the same time, Cameroon, compared to other new independent countries, is markedly attached to her former mother country. Bilateral trade is characterized by a historical commercial position and France has a special place in Cameroon with about 21% market share by 2014. However, this figure steadily declined in subsequent years due to the emergence of new competitors. In total, about 120 branches of French companies operated in Cameroon, and French investments collectively reached more than 1 billion euros by the end of 2014. These figures do not take into account the investment flows of oil companies, which invested hundreds of millions of euros per year, etc.

Despite some decline in French exports to Cameroon, the French trade and economic presence allows France to maintain a strong position in the field of industrial equipment, food and wine and spirits, pharmaceuticals, as well as the entire range of services (marine, aviation, rail, maintenance, construction, distribution). France's participation is also diversifying into links with the goals of diversifying the Cameroon economy. The extensive legal framework created in the development of the Franco-Cameroonian agreement has been constantly

²⁴⁹ Carmody P. *The new scramble for Africa*. John Wiley & Sons. 2017. P. 56-58.

strengthened and confirmed since the 1960s. This reflects the evolution and continuity of relations between the two countries.

French economic hegemony in Cameroon has been maintained through control of the local currency which is pegged to the French franc²⁵⁰. Cameroon is tied to the franc monetary zone through her membership in the French established and controlled Central Bank of the Equatorial African States and Cameroon (BEAC)²⁵¹. The name was changed to La Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale following the 1973 negotiations.

The 1960 accord compelled the member states to hold all their reserves in French francs on deposit in an account with the French treasury. Recent revision of the accord now gives member states stronger representation vis-a-vis France²⁵², although the latter's power was not significantly reduced. Also revised was the provision which obliged member states to centralize all their foreign exchange reserves in the French treasury; now only 80 per cent of foreign holdings need to remain in France.

Defense cooperation between Cameroon and France is based entirely on the logic of French-African relations. It is carried out through the Defense Agreement of February 2, 1974, published in the Official Journal on December 17, 1975²⁵³. The purpose of the agreement was to provide French military assistance if a state party to the agreement was subjected to external aggression. This implies permission to base French troops in the country, and provides France with a unique military presence in Cameroon. But some see these agreements as a continuation of colonization by other means that make the independence of the

²⁵⁰ The advantages to member states for staying in the franc zone are: the liberty of unlimited transfer of funds within this zone; liberal access to the Paris Exchange market; and the harmonisation of national exchange regulations. Mali which refused in 1962 to join the West African Monetary Union (preferring instead to establish its own independent currency) experienced so much difficulty that it was forced to rejoin the franc zone.

²⁵¹ Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale. URL : <https://www.beac.int/> (date of access: 21.08.2020).

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Accord de coopération militaire. URL: http://www.obsarm.org/obsarm/transfert_armes/accords/cooperation.htm (date of access: 01.08.2021).

participating states theoretical rather than real. In Cameroon, there is an extensive French military base, which is of strategic interest for France's actions in this part of the continent.

French exports to Cameroon in 2017 were valued at €537 million, while imports were €476 million in 2018. Cameroon's exports increased from US\$2.673 million in 2000 to US\$7.730 million in 2019, growing at an average annual rate of 6.81%²⁵⁴. As a result, Cameroon runs a current account deficit with France, as most of her trade is in commodities. Consequently, this does not adequately offset her imports. The French presence in Cameroon is highly diversified with more than 100 subsidiaries and around 200 businesses owned by French citizens²⁵⁵. France's foreign direct investment was estimated at €796 million in 2016, compared to 3.5% in 2015²⁵⁶.

Despite trade agreements such as the Economic Partnership Agreement, in 2020, Cameroon recorded a trade deficit with France and this was estimated at 186,793,643.52 FCFA²⁵⁷. This is the result of the quality of Cameroonian trade, which is dominated by primary products such as crude oil and agricultural products such as cocoa and coffee which do not add significant value to the Cameroonian economy²⁵⁸. Conversely, Cameroon imports processed foods and manufactured goods such as cereals, wine, plants and machinery, as well as a range of services.

²⁵⁴ Cameroun - Exportation de biens et services (BdP, US\$ courants). URL: <https://knoema.fr/atlas/Cameroun/Exportation-de-biens-et-services> (date of access: 27.12.2020).

²⁵⁵ Aldrich R. Greater France: A history of French overseas expansion. Macmillan International Higher Education. 1996.

²⁵⁶ Cameroon – Q&A from the press briefing (27 Apr. 2020). URL: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/cameroon/> (date of access: 24.04.2020).


²⁵⁷ Cameroon trade balance, exports and imports by country 2017. URL: <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CMR/Year/2017/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/by-country> (date of access: 24.04.2020).

²⁵⁸ Cameroon calls for freeze on Douala port contract over Bollore court case. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cameroon-port-idUSKBN1X329O> (date of access: 24.04.2020).

Cameroon's exports to France reflect the broader structure of her exports to the rest of the world. The structure of Cameroon's trade with the world determines the types of goods and services she can export to France. Cameroon's ICT exports are estimated at 0.05%, while those of France are estimated at 3.8%²⁵⁹. Similarly, the added value of the services sector is estimated at 51.6%, while that of France amounts to 71.03%. The share of agriculture in GDP was estimated at 15.18% in 2020²⁶⁰, while that of France was estimated at 1.7%²⁶¹.

Figure 1.

Cameroon GDP



Source: Trading Economics. URL: <https://tradingeconomics.com/> (date of access: 24.04.2020).

Franco-African Summit. Bringing together France and the leaders of its ex-colonies in Africa, the first Franco-African Summit was held in Paris in November 1973²⁶². Ten former colonies of France and one of Great Britain, the bilingual Mauritius, attended. At first these were annual events, but now they are biannual.

²⁵⁹ International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files. URL: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.CCIS.ZS?end=2017&locations=CM&start=1986&view=chart> (date of access: 24.04.2020).

²⁶⁰ Statista. URL: <https://fr.statista.com/recherche/?q=Cameroon> (date of access: 24.04.2020).

²⁶¹ Trading Economics. URL: <https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/gdp> (date of access: 24.04.2020).

²⁶² Chafer T. Franco-African Relations: No Longer So Exceptional?. African Affairs. 2002. Vol. 101, № 404. P. 343-363.

Since 1996, all African countries have been invited to attend, making attendance much broader than in the past. The venue shifts between France and Africa. A Conference of Foreign Ministers meets beforehand to set the agenda. Summit Conferences provide an opportunity to discuss a variety of issues of interest to the members, to serve as a dialogue between the North and the South, and to take stands on major political and economic issues of world interest. The 21st summit was held in Yaoundé in January 2001.

The International Organization of La Francophonie brings together fifty-six States altogether and fourteen observers spread across five continents. The unifying foundation of the Organization is, on the one hand, the sharing of the French language and, on the other hand, the community of values of peace, cooperation, solidarity and sustainable development. The organization, sponsored by France, «has among other objectives to promote the ideals democracy, the respect for human rights and progress²⁶³.» As Cameroon has stayed away from the greats for a long time, that is international politico-linguistic groups, in particular La Francophonie and the Commonwealth, because of its duality French-English language²⁶⁴, she is not a member of the OIF November 19, 1991. Since then, relations between the two entities have been strengthened both institutionally, technically and socio-culturally.

Cameroon also shares with La Francophonie the principles of respect for the sovereignty of States, the neutrality with regard to matters of domestic policy of the States and of the preservation of the diversity of languages and cultures. That option for the promotion of cultural diversity and multiculturalism²⁶⁵ is particularly appropriate for a State with strong ethnic and linguistic diversity. Cameroon could therefore only join La Francophonie from the moment where it

²⁶³ Ager D. E. «Francophonie» in the 1990's: Problems and Opportunities. Multilingual matters. 1996.

²⁶⁴ Braimah B., Adam B. Y. A Review of Literature on Ghana's Dual Membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and La Francophonie: A Paradox of Necessity. ADRRI Journal (Multidisciplinary). 2017. Vol. 26, № 8. P. 1-11.

²⁶⁵ Jacob E., Armstrong C., Mann G. The Choice of Francophonie in Postcolonial Africa. 2013.

is projected as «a space for dialogue, cooperation and partnership with the deepest respect for its historical and cultural diversity and that its unity is based on a community of values and language. Additionally, Cameroon shares with La Francophonie a vision of development as well as a conception of human-centered security²⁶⁶.

It is by making man flourish in his concrete existential situation that we build a true and sustainable peace. Thus, the Declaration of Saint Boniface, which indicates that «the prevention of crises and conflicts is also based on the safety of the individual, the satisfaction of his vital needs, in particular that of living in peace, respect for all one's rights, including the right to development, any conditional requirements by the existence of a democratic state governed by the rule of law», seems an answer to these vital questions from President of Cameroon: «What freedom can there be (...) for a starving population (...)? What democracy can we speak of (...) in a country where there is famine (...)? What dignity (...) for a man who does not have enough to eat?» Institutional, technical and socio-cultural Cooperation between Cameroon and La Francophonie is rich and diverse. This cooperation is more active in institutional and economic, technical and cultural fields. Institutional cooperation is more focused on the strengthening of the democratic process, the support of the institution parliamentarians, support for justice, civil society and decentralized public authorities²⁶⁷.

Since 1997, the OIF has observed all Cameroonian elections and financially supported the building of expertise and capacities in electoral matters. The project to modernize Cameroonian justice (establishment of a National Committee for the dissemination of the law) also benefits from the support of the Organization. In

²⁶⁶ Gamkrelidze T., Zouinar M., Barcellini F. The «old» issues of the «new» artificial intelligence systems in professional activities. *Digital Transformations in the Challenge of Activity and Work: Understanding and Supporting Technological Changes*. 2021. Vol. 3, P. 71-86.

²⁶⁷ Feussi V., Robillard D. «La francophonie»: prolégomènes à une perspective de la réception. Ursula Reutner, *Francophonie, Manuals of Romance Linguistics*, de Gruyter. 2017. P. 5.

the economic field, La Francophonie brings a significant competition in terms of funding and expertise with regard to the strengthening of national capacities in the fields as diverse as trade negotiations, access to official development assistance markets, the regional integration, etc.

Financial support from La Francophonie through the Special Development Program (PSD) is deployed on the field of socio-community development and poverty reduction. By way of illustration, between 2004 and 2005, Cameroon was ranked second among beneficiary countries PSD subsidies in the Central Africa-Ocean zone Indian. On a technical level, cooperation with La Francophonie is substantially oriented towards the field of technologies information and communication.

As for the field of cultural cooperation, it is the one which, for obvious reasons, mobilizes more substantial support from the Organization. The funding received by the Cameroon goes primarily to the sectors of education, training, publishing and distribution of books, assistance with film and audiovisual production, financing cultural industries as well as the mobility of artists without forgetting the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity.

Cameroonian participation in the activities of La Francophonie is very active and dynamic²⁶⁸. This response is done both at the level of institutional consultation bodies and of civil society. At the institutional level, Cameroon participates regularly in all deliberation and follow-up meetings organized within the framework of La Francophonie. Cameroon also shows a fairly high level of participation. Dynamic to the parliamentary bodies of the Francophonie, the country has already had to host a few general assemblies of the The Parliamentary Assembly of La Francophonie (AUF) and to elect some of its parliamentarians to prestigious positions: Vice-President of the AUF (Honourable Hilarion Etong in 2006) and President of the AUF Africa Regional Assembly (Honourable Nicolas Amougou Noma in 1998). With regard to participation in the operating budget of

²⁶⁸ Ondigui J. L. T. M. La contribution culturelle de la F/francophonie dans la politique étrangère du Cameroun. 2016. P. 45.

the OIF, Cameroon has always fulfilled its obligations. Financial commitment to the Organization. The country's financial contributions, both statutory and voluntary, are paid regularly, with annual disbursements reaching nearly 120 million CFA francs²⁶⁹.

Finally, Cameroon participates as much as possible in the animation of the administrative structure of the OIF. A number of prestigious human resources of the country are often put at the service of the Organization under the investment policy nationals in the international civil service. Some administrative positions of Cameroonian nationals can be indicated through the following table:

Table 4.

List of State Heads

Name of Heads	Administrative Positions
Gaston Payom (1989-1992)	General Director of Education and Training
Jean Tabi Manga (1992-1998)	General Director of Education and Training
René Obam Nlong (1999-2005)	Director of Social Development and solidarity
Émile Tanawa (2003-...)	Director of the AUF Caribbean Office
Denise Epote Durand (1998-...)	Director of TV5 Afrique
Guillaume Nseke (2007-2010)	Permanent Representative of the OIF to the African Union and the Commission United Nations Economic Forum for Africa

Source: compiled by the author

²⁶⁹ La Francophonie, an area of multilateral cooperation. URL: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/francophony-and-the-french-language/la-francophonie-an-area-of-multilateral-cooperation/> (date of access: 21.05.2020).

So, cooperation with France is a traditional direction in the foreign policy of the Cameroonian Republic. The history of relations between Cameroon and France can be traced from the moment of colonial dependence. Cameroonian-French cooperation, at the present stage, is focused on priority areas of political, economic and social activities.

2.3. Mutual Relations Between Cameroon and the USSR / Russia

Diplomatic relations were established on February 20, 1964. Cameroon officially recognized the Russian Federation as the successor state of the former Soviet Union on January 14, 1992²⁷⁰. In January 1960, at the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev addressed the issue of slavery and colonialism and came out with a motion to put an end to slavery and also urged all colonial powers to grant independence to the colonies and their peoples²⁷¹.

Bilateral Russian-Cameroonian relations have absorbed the valuable experience of mutual respect and trust over almost 60 years of diplomatic cooperation. A. Ahidjo, in his desire to provide the necessary support for the new independent Cameroon, hoped that close relations with the Soviet Union would allow him to diversify the sources of aid for Cameroon. According to E. Korendyasov, Russian Africanist scholar, African governments have begun to reconsider their foreign policy priorities, their close attachment to national interests and the goal of overcoming their economic backwardness, bearing in mind the new realities generated by deepening interdependence, and the need to take into account the interests of all regions and peoples²⁷².

²⁷⁰The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Official Website. URL: https://archive.mid.ru/en/web/guest/main_en (date of access: 21.05.2020).

²⁷¹ UN Multimedia. Nikita Khrushchev Urges End to Colonialism: URL: <https://www.unmultimedia.org/classics/asset/C809/> (date of access: 20.04.2020).

²⁷² Korendyasov E. African States' foreign policies in the 21st century: New opportunities and challenges. In : Africa's Growing Role in World Politics. 2014. P. 7-16.

President P. Biya after A. Ahidjo, however, did not experience any difficulties in using the existing mechanisms of cooperation. According to Moscow, Cameroon plays an important role in regional cooperation and therefore appreciates relations between the two countries²⁷³. In 2017, relations between Cameroon and Russia witnessed a boost,²⁷⁴ after 60 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries.

During a working visit to Moscow in January 2011, Minister of Foreign Relations A. E. Ayissi signed a Memorandum of Understanding between the Foreign Ministries of Russia and Cameroon on the mechanism for holding political consultations.

In February 2013, negotiations were held in Moscow between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, S. Lavrov, and the Minister of External Relations of Cameroon, P.M. Mbonjo²⁷⁵.

In June 2014, consultations took place in Yaounde with the participation of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, M.L. Bogdanov, who was also received by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Cameroon P. Yang. The next round of negotiations took place on October 16, 2017 in Moscow between M. Bogdanov and Minister Delegate to the Minister of External Relations of the Republic of Cameroon, responsible for relations with the Commonwealth, J. D.Ngute²⁷⁶.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Cameroon-Russia: Ready to foster cooperation. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/news/audiences/2121-cameroon-russia-ready-to-foster-cooperation> (date of access: 21.05.2020).

²⁷⁵ About negotiations of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon Pierre Moukoko Mbonjo. URL: https://archive.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/cm/-/asset_publisher/2xrrL7GWsmQ5/content/id/120518 (date of access: 21.05.2020).

²⁷⁶ Press release on Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov's consultations with Joseph Dion-Ngute, Minister Delegate of the Cameroon Ministry of External Affairs in Charge of the Commonwealth. URL: https://archive.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/cm/-/asset_publisher/2xrrL7GWsmQ5/content/id/2904479 (date of access: 21.05.2020).

Russia seems conducive to the emergence of Cameroon and the reasons mentioned relate, on the one hand, to its population, synonymous with economic dynamism, estimated at twenty-five million inhabitants since 2004 and which remains the main natural resource of the country in which one can include the investment in human capital of positive externalities in terms of skills, qualifications and professional development²⁷⁷. In Cameroon, on the other hand, it could be a challenge for Russia to seek the visibility it had worked hard to gain in Africa. Contrary to its Western counterparts, the Russian strategy is to «drop the ripe fruit into the basket of sympathy without having to shake the tree and lose the largest of the still green fruit to the ground²⁷⁸.» Far from generating autonomous development, Cameroon would in reality mark a new stage in its quest for emergence, because it is endowed with strategic natural reserves of all kinds with unlimited potential (oil, bauxite, cobalt, nickel, iron, gas, gold, diamond, etc.), as well as its cash crops (cocoa, coffee, banana, rubber, cotton)²⁷⁹.

Economically, the lure of post-bipolar isolationism in Russia and its recognition by Cameroon a year later in 1992, with serious consequences, really hampered their ability to relate. There are two major factors in this cooling of the Russian-African relationship: the almost total disinvestment and the abolition of Russian assistance programs in Africa²⁸⁰, due to its internal difficulties and its intransigence in demanding the reimbursement of debts contracted by African countries. during the Soviet era, fed the image of an unfriendly Russia²⁸¹ which subsequently lost the benefit of the Soviet commercial heritage in Africa. The particularly demonstrative cases found in the Russian-Cameroonian scientific literature are the announcement in 1998 of the suspension, due to non-profitability, of the Douala-Moscow-Douala airline by the company Aeroflot and

²⁷⁷ Maze J. P. M. Cameroun: «le doux rêve d'émergence»: Finira-t-il par s' évaporer?. Bod-Books on Demand. 2015. P. 94.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., P.26.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., P.16.

²⁸⁰ Fidan H., Aras B. The return of Russia-Africa relations. Journal des. 2010. P. 56.

²⁸¹ Shubin V. Russia and Africa: moving in the right direction?. In : Africa in International Politics. Routledge. 2004. P. 114-127.

the dissolution of the marketing agency for Russian vehicles in Douala (CATECO)²⁸².

A key idea is the profiling of a Russian-Cameroonian bilateralism that survives thanks to strategic ambiguities. Realists and Dependencyists offer new and obviously safe resources for this purpose. Although timid, military-technical cooperation²⁸³ is proving to be of great importance and is currently facing the increasingly assertive geostrategic interest of Russia in Cameroon and vice versa. It is from this imperative of modernization and technologisation that Russia reinforces its position as the center of gravity of the structures of force and of the military-industrial complex²⁸⁴, via the sale of arms which today constitutes an important source of its income. Russian arms was justified in Cameroon by the need to fight against the proliferation of Boko Haram terrorist groups, through the «supply of Mi-8MT/Mi-17 transport helicopters as well as used modernized Mi-24V/Mi-35²⁸⁵». The development of this technical-military cooperation is Rosoboron export's marketing priority. This Russian manufacturer aims to provide Cameroon with a military technological potential commensurate with the security challenges facing it and which concern, for example, the purchase of the Pantsir-C1 missile defense system and armoured personnel carriers. However, the process of strategic building of this relationship encounters a number of ontological and political obstacles, but these are clearly overcome by constructive ad hoc partnerships, synonymous with the annual ritual confirmations surrounding diplomatic-military exchanges.

The presence of the Cameroonian Minister of Defense in Moscow each year energizes this military cooperation though it does not shelve Russian progress

²⁸² Cameroon Embassy in Moscow. URL: <http://ambacam.ru/> (date of access: 21.11.2020)

²⁸³ Arkhangelskaya A. Le retour de Moscou en Afrique subsaharienne?. *Afrique contemporaine*. 2013. no 4. P. 61-74.

²⁸⁴ Morenkova P. E. Les principes fondamentaux de la pensée stratégique russe. L'Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire (IRSEM) URL: www.defense.gouv.fr/irsem (date of access: 10.01.2021).

²⁸⁵ Gelin K. J. C. Cameroon fighting Boko Haram. *Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения*. 2017. Vol. 17, no 4. P. 727-737.

towards greater cooperation with Cameroon in the field of defence, as evidenced by the mission of Russian military experts in May 2021 in Yaoundé and that projected by the Cameroonian Minister of Defense in the first quarter of 2022 in Moscow, for the purpose of signing a Framework Agreement for Military Cooperation. Such an inherently evolutionary strategic rapprochement paves the way for a true strategic partnership in the future.

At the same time, Russia provides Cameroon with adequate training on the emergence of modern forms of defense and security. Said training is periodically part of the adaptation of cooperation and security strategies to major challenges such as collective violence, transnational organized crime or the control of borders and migratory flows²⁸⁶. Intended for the training of Cameroonian police and gendarmerie personnel, they ensure the reliability and consistency of the procedures of the sectors of activity taken individually: maintenance of order, territorial surveillance, criminology, intelligence research, transmissions, judicial police. Both parties ensure that all admitted trainees have a level of intellectual reference allowing them to easily follow the lessons given in Anglo-Russian bilingualism. All trainees, at the end of the training, are subjected to a series of tests organized by their respective academies. These tests usually show good levels in Cameroonians, so the success rate is high. On observation of the facts, the great harshness of the Russian climate suggests a conception of training «based on biased assumptions of human nature favoring masculinity». A resounding view that permeates feminist theory in international relations is that women continue to play an active role in security activities. Cameroon therefore generally seems to be satisfied with Said training without generic ambiguity and it should be emphasized that this reinforces its strategy of extensive feminization of its defense and security forces, thus escaping feminist stereotypes of fragility and unavailability²⁸⁷.

²⁸⁶ Babayo D. Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigerian-Cameroon Relations (2009-2019). Thèse de doctorat. Kwara State University (Nigeria). 2021. P. 76.

²⁸⁷ Kouma J. C. G. International implications in the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. *Gênero & Direito*. 2020. Vol. 9. No 2. P. 16-19.

In the past, Cameroon has pursued prudent fiscal and monetary policies that have helped bring down inflation, stabilize the currency, and increase Cameroon's foreign exchange reserves. Policies in sectors such as mining, which are critical to Russia's foreign policy, have been revised to allow investors to participate more actively in the economy. This attracts foreign investors, encouraging them to invest in areas such as agriculture, which is good for local and export markets; creation of processing factories for the production of aluminium oxide for the aluminium industry; real estate, telecommunications infrastructure and the establishment of processing plants for cotton, textiles, as well as factories for the production of stationery, shoes and bags, etc.

The Republic of Cameroon has shown interest in international initiatives, and Cameroon and Russia hold close positions on many important and topical international issues, including in the field of security. Despite the differences in the potential of the two countries, Russia and Cameroon have cooperated constructively in the areas of non-interference in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity. At international forums, including at sessions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the similarity of the views of the two countries on issues of peace and international security, combating international terrorism, commitment to resolving any conflicts through dialogue and negotiations²⁸⁸.

Russia is trying to carve out a surface of respectability in the field of higher education which constitutes an important element of its soft power in Cameroon. This conceptualization, it should be specified, brings us back at first sight to the theorization of the realist paradigm. In this ambitious undertaking, which contrasts sharply with the Soviet past and competitive strategies based so far on discretion, Russia then seems to be developing a considerable institutional arsenal with a view to expanding its cultural influence in Cameroon as a powerful vector

²⁸⁸ Kanet R. E. *L'Union Soviétique et les Pays en Voie de Développement: Rôle de l'Aide Militaire et des Transferts d'Armes.* (The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: The Role of Military Aid and Arms Transfers) In *L'Union Soviétique dans les Relations Internationales*, edited by F. Conte and J. L. Martres. Paris: Economica. 1982. P. 89.

of humanization. It displays a declared desire to attract Cameroonian students by exporting its know-how in terms of budgetary places in its university institutions, financed by the State. This offer of Russian scholarships for the benefit of Cameroon via Rossotrudnichestvo has been quantitatively since 2017 at 47 for holders of the baccalaureate, license and master's degrees. Its cultural and strategic interests oblige it to attach importance to the generous allocation of scholarships for the purpose of densifying Russian expertise in highly qualified labor for the technical sustainability of major structural projects in Cameroon.

Moreover, even if attempts in this direction remain timid, there is an intensification in the conclusion of university cooperation agreements between these two countries that have joined the Bologna process (in 2003 for Russia and in 2007 for Cameroon). These Agreements enable the mobilization of scientific potential around the same objective, namely that of sustainable development.

In 2014-2015 Russia provided assistance to Cameroon in the amount of \$3.8 million as a targeted contribution to the International Civil Defense Organization (ICDO)²⁸⁹. The supplied Russian special equipment (cross-country vehicles with rescue equipment, simulators for fire engines, water quality control laboratories, tents, diesel generators) was used to strengthen the protection of civilians from floods and other natural disasters.

In 2014, through the ICDO, humanitarian assistance was provided in the amount of 2.5 million US dollars to refugees from the Central African Republic and Nigeria that were living on the Cameroonian territory (177 tons of sunflower oil and 1.5 thousand tons of flour).

In June 2015, at the invitation of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia, Cameroon Minister for Territorial Administration and Decentralization R. E. Sadi visited Russia. During the visit, areas of bilateral cooperation in the field of civil defense were determined, on the issues of training Cameroonian

²⁸⁹ ICDO Official Website. URL: <http://icdo.org/newslist> (date of access: 12.05.2021).

specialists and interaction within the framework of the ICDO. A corresponding memorandum was signed to that effect.

Despite these particularly difficult hurdles, Russia set its sights on Cameroon at the 2019 Sochi summit²⁹⁰, conferring a special honor on President Paul Biya. When we know that «soft-eying is a tactic that has always been part of the geopolitical arsenal» of the powers, the ideological-political anchoring of this act carries a geopolitical reference in more than one ways. In all cases, the geopolitical dimension is involved, but in a variety of ways. Mutatis mutandis, Russia would do well to take into account the status of «African Sage» and its impact in the new Russian-African relations²⁹¹. This Russian enthusiasm and good faith should therefore not make us lose sight of this apparently petty calculation which freezes its strategic calculations. This illustration allows us to deepen the research questions that cross this reflection but do not constitute the anticipated answers or the hypotheses to be verified. We know almost nothing about the concrete Russian motivation for this project, perhaps, its clarity is yet to come. Nevertheless, it will be understood that the Said project belongs to the order of the reserved domain while it is partly linked to a scientific world and symbolic actions. It therefore becomes essential to understand the absence of the applicant at the Said summit and the non-collation of this title until then, as a complex approach born of theoretical knowledge and field experience that cannot give rise to a real network of strong hypotheses to be verified. This could later constitute a reliable knowledge base available for reflection and action in the Russian-Cameroonian bilateral framework. It quickly becomes clear that this state of affairs has been sociologically situated against the background of the particular morphology of Russian-Cameroonian relations, thus giving a voice to certain transnationalist leaders with populist overtones who constantly question the effectiveness of this political act with multifaceted challenges. Beyond the fairly

²⁹⁰ Muresan A. The Russia-Africa Summit. 23-24 October 2019. P. 2.

²⁹¹ Абрамова И.О., Фитуни Л.Л. Новая стратегия России на африканском направлении. *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*. 2019. Vol. 63. No 12. P. 90-100.

fluid and labile debates in time and space, this descriptive and phenomenological approach addresses this problem today, in a contradiction to their bilateral historicity, showing schizophrenia with regard to ancestry of their cooperation.

In the context of inter-parliamentary cooperation. In May 2017, the Russia-Cameroon Friendship Group was formed in the National Assembly of Cameroon, which included five deputies from the ruling party and one from the opposition Social Democratic Front.

As part of the improvement of the legal framework, on May 28, 2015 in St. Petersburg, conventions were concluded between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Cameroon on the transfer to serve a sentence of persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty and on extradition²⁹². Both documents were ratified by the Russian side (in November and December 2016). A similar move by had been done in 2018²⁹³.

Russia supports Cameroon's fight against piracy. The Government of the Russian Federation has expressed its readiness to become an international partner with the Republic of Cameroon in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea²⁹⁴.

In February 2014, the Russian Business Center(RBC) was established in Yaounde, which assists in the promotion of Russian products to the market of Cameroon and neighboring countries, the formation of business ties between entrepreneurs and economic operators in Russia and Cameroon²⁹⁵.

The Objectives of the Russian Business Center (RBC) Are:

²⁹² Decree №2018/459 of 03 August 2018 to ratify the Convention between Cameroon and Russia on the transfer of persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/news/the-acts/decrees/3025-decree-n-2018-459-of-03-august-2018-to-ratify-the-convention-between-cameroon-and-russia-on-the-transfer-of-persons-sentenced-to-deprivation-of-liberty?highlight=WyJydXNzaWEiXQ>(date of access: 21.05.2020).

²⁹³ Decree №2018/457 of 03 August 2018 to ratify the Convention between Cameroon and Russia on extradition. URL:<https://www.prc.cm/en/news/the-acts/decrees/3023-decree-n-2018-457-du-03-august-2018-to-ratify-the-convention-between-cameroon-and-russia-on-extradition?highlight=WyJydXNzaWEiXQ> (date of access: 21.05.2020).

²⁹⁴ Russia supports Cameroon's fight against piracy. URL: <https://www.prc.cm/en/news/audiences/2282-russia-supports-cameroon-s-fight-against-piracy?highlight=WyJydXNzaWEiXQ>(date of access: 21.05.2020).

²⁹⁵ RBC Official Website. URL: <https://ruce.cm/en/> (date of access: 12.05.2021).

1. contribution of increased production in Cameroon and Central African countries in the markets of Cameroon;
2. contribution to output growth and production of Cameroon Central African countries in the markets of the Russian Federation;
3. Contributing to the increase in Russian production on the markets of Cameroon and Central African countries;
4. establishing business relationships between foreign partners of the Russian Federation, Cameroon and Central African countries;
5. the creation of the single platform for international cooperation, relations, exchange of opinions and experience;
6. the holding of conferences and round tables for the development of trade and economic relations between Russia and Cameroon, countries of Central Africa.

The model of the country's competitive development in the context of globalization, found by the leadership of Cameroon, makes it possible to use the potential of diplomacy in a new way, orienting it towards conjugation of local ones. All these promising areas are waiting for investors from Russia, who are invited to cooperate in the implementation of investing in support of Cameroon in its desire to create a «Prosperous Cameroon» as an important center of regional security and prosperity.

Thus, the relations between Cameroon and Russia are developing steadily, facilitated by a common position on compliance with contractual obligations and respect for UN mandatory principles. Russia is demonstrating the behavior of a proactive power in the African approach of international relations. This has a positive impact on the Cameroonian-Russian cooperation. With regard to Russia's policy in Africa, Yevgeny Korendyasov emphasizes that «presently a political and diplomatic sphere of Russian-African partnership is the main and the most productive one and that the principles of respect for national sovereign and non-interference in internal affairs, upon which the UN Charter is based, have ceased

to be immutable²⁹⁶«. This perhaps explains why Russia remains an important ally to Cameroon as their cooperation has been tailored to maintain an intensive political dialogue and to successfully develop trade, economic, investment, and expand military-technical cooperation especially in the field of security.

2.4. The Chinese Foreign Policy Track in Cameroon

The rapid rise of China's economy over the past three decades has attracted considerable global attention. With record economic growth, China became one of the world's first industrial, aerospace and nuclear powers in the early 2000s, leading both in industrial production and in the extraction of various natural resources. To facilitate structural change, China encourages the introduction of technology and promotes the development of advanced economic sectors such as software production, new materials, telecommunications, biotechnology, and healthcare²⁹⁷.

China has long invested significant political and financial capital in Cameroon. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1971, relations have been dominated by Beijing's implementation of several symbolic but notable projects and the regular exchange of delegations. Like many China-Africa economic partnerships, the China-Cameroon partnership was born in the late 1990s and early 2000s²⁹⁸. Today, China is one of Cameroon's main partners both in trade and in development, particularly in infrastructure projects.

From 1971 to 1997, Sino-Cameroonian relations were largely shaped by Beijing's desire to increase its diplomatic allies and show its solidarity with the Third World and, to a lesser extent, the non-alignment policy of Yaounde and his

²⁹⁶ Korendyasov, E. Russia Returns to Africa. // Institute of African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. 2014. P. 41.

²⁹⁷ Толоконникова Е. В. Экономика Китая в 2015 году и ее роль в международной экономике. Вестник евразийской науки. 2015. Vol. 7, № 5 (30).

²⁹⁸ Brautigam D. The dragon's gift: the real story of China in Africa. oUP oxford, 2011.

hopes of weakening French domination impact on Cameroon's economy and foreign policy²⁹⁹. Like many other African countries, Cameroon's relations with China were initially politically important but economically marginal.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Cameroon and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in March 1971 and the termination of any official ties between Yaoundé and Taipei were important to both sides. For President Ahidjo in Cameroon, this came immediately after he had beheaded the Union of the Population of Cameroon (UCP) with the help of the French military. The UCP was a Marxist opposition movement that tried to overthrow his increasingly authoritarian rule by force. With the opening of diplomatic relations, Beijing promised to stop supporting the UPC³⁰⁰ rebel organization in exchange for gaining another ally in the fight against Taiwan at a critical moment; later, in 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China (Republic of China or Taiwan) as China's sole representative at the UN.

Taking advantage of the Sino-Western rapprochement, Ahidjo visited China and met Mao Zedong in 1973: he was the first African president to visit that country since the most chaotic part of the Cultural Revolution³⁰¹. Four years later, he paid another visit to China.

In the following years, several notable and symbolic infrastructure projects were launched in Cameroon, including the construction of the new Presidential Palace (Palace of Unity) and the Hall of National Congresses (Palace of Congresses) in Yaounde (opened in 1977 and 1985 respectively). In addition, a major hydropower project, the Lagdo Dam in the north of the country, was financed by a \$75 million Chinese loan (completed in 1982). In 1972, the first trade agreement was signed (followed by a second, signed in 2002), and in 1984, an agreement on cultural cooperation was concluded. At the same time, Beijing

²⁹⁹ Oyono D. *Avec ou sans la France?: la politique africaine du Cameroun depuis 1960. Avec ou sans la France?* 1991. P. 1-201.

³⁰⁰ Shinn D. H., Eisenman J. *China and Africa*. University of Pennsylvania press. 2012. P. 68.

³⁰¹ Fodouop K. *Le Cameroun: autopsie d'une exception plurielle en Afrique*. Le Cameroun. 2010. P. 48.

launched a medical assistance program, turning Cameroon into a window to the rest of the continent. As early as 1975, it began sending Chinese medical teams and it proposed the construction of two hospitals equipped with Chinese doctors, one in Mbalmayo, south of Yaounde (opened in 1975) and another in Gidera, in the Northern Region (1976). This led to a very close cooperation in the fight against malaria, which soon began to gain momentum (see below). This later development has long been the most prominent feature of Sino-Cameroonian cooperation.

Sino-Cameroonian trade relations. Since the late 2000s, China has become one of Cameroon's top trade partners. In 2012, Sino-Cameroonian trade represented 12.3% of Cameroon's foreign trade, against 4% in 2005, elevating trade with China to about the same level as that with France and three times that with the US (3.8%), although China has remained behind the EU (41.4%). When the EU was excluded, Beijing identified in 2012 as Cameroon's top bilateral customer (15.3% of its exports), surpassing Portugal (11.8%), the Netherlands (11.3%, buying 70% of Cameroon's cocoa), Spain (11.2%) and France (8.6%)³⁰². This is significant, as in 2012 China was only its third supplier with a 10.4% share, behind Nigeria at 17.8% (which does not include refined oil and consumer goods which are reportedly smuggled from this neighbour), and France (11.8%).

This trade is very much modelled on the North–South structure, as China buys raw materials and sells manufacturing and consumption products. Its imports have been mainly driven by a rapid increase in oil purchases³⁰³, especially since 2008 (62% of Chinese imports in 2012). Cameroon's oil exports increase caused a trade deficit for China in 2006 and 2008, but this has since been reversed. Chinese exports to Cameroon are mainly electrical appliance, textiles, footwear, vehicles such as motorbikes and tractors, mechanical and electrical products, and cement. There was also a period of rapid increase of imports of food products

³⁰² Business in Cameroon, 15 December 2013. P. 13.

³⁰³ Mbajon V. The Economic Cooperation between Cameroon and China. *Journal of African Union Studies*. 2019. Vol. 8. No 3. P. 95-113.

from China, but since 2003 Cameroonian purchases of Chinese grains have gone down while the share of manufactured goods and machineries has gone up. In other words, China has replaced Cameroon's traditional suppliers in these areas. Cameroonians complained about their widening trade deficit with China (\$174 million in 2012 according to Chinese sources) and about the fact that some Chinese imports, such as ceramics or shoes, compete with local products³⁰⁴. The smuggling of fake drugs (pharmaceutical products) from China and India coming through Nigeria has also been mentioned as a growing concern³⁰⁵.

Chinese investments in Cameroon. Cameroon as an investment environment, due to endemic corruption (ranked 144 in 2013 compared to 134 in 2011, according to Transparency International)³⁰⁶, is not considered very favorable, and is in any case less attractive than many other African economies such as Ghana or the Ivory Coast. Since the late 1990s, President Biya has been trying to persuade Chinese companies to invest more in his country, especially in oil and manufacturing, with little success³⁰⁷.

A clear example of the difficulties encountered is the Chinese car assembly project in Cameroon. Unfortunately, China abandoned it in 2013 due to repeated delays in reaching an agreement with the government³⁰⁸.

Oil and mining. In April 2009, Yan Chang, a Shaanxi provincial Natural Gas company, signed a \$62 million production sharing agreement with the National Hydrocarbons Company (NHC) and began exploring for onshore oil in

³⁰⁴ Personal interview, European country embassy's economic councillor, Yaoundé, 16 January 2014. P. 1.

³⁰⁵ Njegweha J. Les activités réticulaires de contrebande et de trafic de médicaments en Afrique centrale: socio-analyse de pratiques génératrices de l'insécurité humaine. Enjeux: bulletin d'analyses géopolitiques pour l'Afrique centrale. 2013. N° 49. P. 7.

³⁰⁶ Transparency International. URL : http://www.transparency.org/country#CMR_DataResearch_SurveysIndices (date of access: 24.04.2020).

³⁰⁷ Konings P. The politics of neoliberal reforms in Africa: State and civil society in Cameroon. African Books Collective. 2011.

³⁰⁸ Cameroun - Véhicules chinois «Made in Cameroon» : Qui torpille le projet de montage de l'usine? URL : <http://www.camer.be/29742/12:1/cameroun-vehicules-chinois-made-in-cameroun-qui-torpillele-projet-de-montage-lusine.htm> (date of access: 24.04.2020).

two blocks it had acquired for 18 million dollars, Yan Chang controlling 75% and SNH 25% of the shares of Yang Chang Logone Development Holding Company, the joint venture created by the companies.

In 2011, it successfully drilled an oil well in the Zina-Makary block in the Logone Birni basin in Cameroon's far north, near Chad³⁰⁹. However, in July 2014, the growing Boko Haram insurgency across the Nigerian border forced this company to suspend operations and recall its workers from the area³¹⁰.

The other investment is much larger. In November 2011, Addax Petroleum, a Swiss company, was acquired by China Petroleum & Chemical Corp (SINOPEC) in 2009. It then bought Royal Dutch Shell's 80% stake in Pecten Cameroon Corporation (PCC) for \$538 million, consolidating its position as Cameroon's second largest oil producer, behind Perenco, an Anglo-French company. SNC owns the remaining 20%. The acquired company was renamed Addax Petroleum Cameroon Company. Obviously, not included in Cameroonian statistics, this investment allowed China to access 11 blocks with 32 fields in production (12,000 bpd in 2011)³¹¹.

In the mining industry, the only notable investment was made by Sinosteelcam, a subsidiary of Sinosteel, for iron exploration in the Lobe concession, near Kribi in the South region³¹². A few Chinese private companies, some of which arrived in 2013 after being expelled from Ghana, operated in iron and gold mining concessions, particularly in the Southern Region. China was seen as a potential shareholder in the Mbalam-Nabela iron ore project, located across the border with the Republic of Congo³¹³. Located 510 km from the sea, this mine

³⁰⁹ Reuters, 27 July 2011.

³¹⁰ Wall Street Journal, 15 July 2014.

³¹¹ Addax Petroleum website URL: <https://www.addaxpetroleum.com> (date of access 10.02.2021).

³¹² Jansson J. Patterns of Chinese investment, aid and trade in Central Africa (Cameroon, the DRC and Gabon). University of Stellenbosch, Centre for Chinese Studies, Johannesburg, 2009.

³¹³ Tsounkeu M. «Mapping Chinese development assistance in Africa: An analysis of the experiences of Cameroon» African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD). 2011.

would not be operational until a railway line and a mining terminal in Kribi were opened.

In June 2011, the Chinese company Hanlong was interested in taking over Sundance for 1.4 billion dollars, but the negotiations failed in 2013, partly because the Chinese government did not believe that Hanlong was in a position to complete the project³¹⁴. In June 2014, it was decided that a Portuguese construction company, Mota-Engil, would build the railway³¹⁵.

Military and Agriculture features. Until 2000, there was little military cooperation between China and Cameroon. To be more precise, after it began in 1975, this cooperation was limited to the training of a few Cameroonian officers in China: a fairly low level and the sale of military equipment on an interest-free loan.

Between 1995 and 2004, China sold an unknown number of small arms and light weapons to that country. It was only in 2001 that the first high-ranking delegation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) visited Cameroon, headed by Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Quanxu. Since then, exchange visits have intensified and arms sales have increased. For example, in 2011, Cameroonian Defense Minister Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo'o met in Beijing with PLA Commander-in-Chief General Guo Bosong, which marked the beginning of closer cooperation between the two countries, especially in terms of the supply of military equipment.

While Cameroon's weapons are mostly sourced from the US, France or Spain, China has been able to sell more military equipment, especially since 2000³¹⁶. A few years later, Cameroon purchased several infantry fighting vehicles

³¹⁴ Mutations, 8 May 2013. URL: <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201305081198.html> (date of access: 24.09.2021).

³¹⁵ Portuguese company Mota-Engil to build Mbalam-Kribi railway. URL: <https://www.businessincameroon.com/mining/0706-4873-portuguese-company-mota-engil-to-build-mbalam-kribi-railway> (date of access 10.02.2021).

³¹⁶ Shinn D. H. Et Eisenman, Joshua. China and Africa. University of Pennsylvania press. 2012.

and tank destroyers from China³¹⁷. One of the three MA60s purchased from China was integrated into the Cameroonian Air Force as a transport aircraft³¹⁸.

Cameroon is purposefully making efforts to further integrate into the structures of the international financial market and contributes to the development of the domestic financial sector. However, there is a risk of economic turmoil, given that Cameroon's economy has until recently been under French patronage, often opposed to fundamental changes in the Cameroon economy. Indeed, on the one hand, China cooperates with Cameroon on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual development³¹⁹. Moreover, this fact enriches and raises the level of bilateral cooperation. On the other hand, Cameroon intends to further develop its partnership with China, deepen and expand cooperation in all areas to make this mutual partnership a real example of South-South cooperation. With a population of just over one million and a strong economy, Cameroon is increasingly opening up to new economic and trading partners such as China. Its location in the heart of Central Africa gives Cameroon a unique opportunity. China seeks to explore new forms of cooperation with Cameroon through the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, as well as opportunities to strengthen business cooperation between countries³²⁰.

At the same time, priority is given to cooperation in the field of agriculture, infrastructure, industry, fisheries, computers and education, in the interests of the Chinese and Cameroonian peoples, that is, cooperation based on the competitive advantages of the parties of both partners. This approach is being considered in Cameroon despite the shortcomings and problems of bilateral cooperation between China and Cameroon, especially since it gives Cameroon the prospect of

³¹⁷ Janes. URL : Janes | Latest defence and security news (date of access: 24.09.2021).

³¹⁸ 237 online. URL :<http://cameroon-info.net/stories/0,62054,@,cameroun-camair-copourquoi-les-avions-ma60-sont-ils-bloques-en-chine.html> (date of access: 24.09.2021).

³¹⁹ Дегтерев Д. А. Китай-Африка: важные аспекты отношений. Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2005. № 5.

³²⁰ World investment Report 2014. URL: http://unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2014/wir14_fs_ga_en.pdf (date of access: 24.09.2021).

an alternative vector of development and, accordingly, the opportunity to put forward their conditions in the framework of cooperation with their Western partners.

In this regard, it can be concluded that for Cameroon, the experience (both positive and negative) of Sino-Cameroonian cooperation will be useful for the development of bilateral partnership both now and in the future.

An economic strategy is currently being developed and implemented in Cameroon as part of a national development strategy to secure a secure economic supply. Alliance strategy consists of two parts: internal strategy and external strategy³²¹. And it is clear that the problems of managing the development of Cameroon itself can be included in the internal strategy. And the foreign strategy comes down to providing the country, most of all, reliable ties with economic partners. The long-term strategic partnership between China and Cameroon has not yet been finalized and can only be assessed on the basis of a comprehensive review of existing programs, related to different areas.

For the development and prosperity of Cameroon, its participation to the processes cooperation of the entire world community, for Cameroon to rid itself of poverty, disease and upheaval, it is no exaggeration to say that the efforts of the whole world are needed. In this context, the further development of bilateral relations creates ample development opportunities for China and Cameroon cooperation with other regions of the world. So, Cameroon and China fruitfully cooperate in political, diplomatic, economic, commercial, cultural, educational and other fields.

Sino-Cameroon cooperation contributes to the involvement of Cameroon in the process of globalization. In this sense, cooperation is not only beneficial to both sides, but also beneficial to the world as a whole. In fact, both states are committing themselves to creating a new type of strategic partnership. A partnership that, in the most optimistic calculations, should contribute to the

³²¹ Merle M. La Politique Étrangère. Paris: PUF. MERLE, Marcel (1985).“Politique intérieure et politique extérieure”, in Forces et Enjeux. 1984.

development of African countries, helping to change the international economic order on the continent. For a prosperous, stable and developing Africa, Cameroon will always be in the interests of peace and development on the planet³²².

As the study showed, Cameroon, in its positioning on the world stage and in the sphere of bilateral relations, both with traditional and new foreign partners, has passed a difficult path from nationally conservative isolationism in foreign policy to the course of the country's global openness in the name of sustainable development. It seems that the evolution of the foreign policy of the Republic of Cameroon takes place in the general logic characteristic of many African states at the beginning of the 21st century. These African states are trying to «shape their foreign policy in the framework of the formation of a new fair world political and economic legal order³²³».

China is today one of the main economic and political partners of Cameroon³²⁴. It won't change in the future. Yaoundé will officially continue to maintain close and friendly relations with the world's second largest economy. The recent changes that this article has tried to highlight are limited and must be placed in context. Cameroon will continue to depend on China for what it does best: infrastructure projects. It will also keep the door open for Chinese companies wishing to invest more in the energy sector, the manufacturing industry or even agriculture, a sector that needs to improve its productivity to reduce cereal imports from Cameroon and eventually help him achieve self-sufficiency. At the same time, like a growing number of its African neighbours, Cameroon will probably be more cautious and refrain from putting all its eggs in one basket, and cultivate as many partnerships as possible. Politically, Yaoundé is likely to remain a reliable partner for Beijing, active within FOCAC and

³²² Окунева Л.С., Орлов А.А. Восходящие государства-гиганты БРИКС: роль в мировой политике, стратегии модернизации // Сборник научных трудов. М.: МГИМО-Университет, 2012. С. 52.

³²³ Khan S. A., Baye F. M. China-Africa economic relations: The case of Cameroon. AERC Scoping Studies on China-Africa Economic Relations. 2008.

³²⁴ Cabestan J. P. China–Cameroon relations: Fortunes and limits of an old political complicity. South African Journal of International Affairs. 2015. Vol. 22. No 1. P. 67-91

demonstrating South– Southern solidarity and convergence of views, particularly around the principles of non-interference and neutrality.

The model of the country's competitive development in the context of globalization, found by the leadership of Cameroon, makes it possible to use the potential of diplomacy in a new way, orienting it towards conjugation of local ones regional and global advantages for national development and greater international inclusion.

CHAPTER 3. PRIORITY AREAS OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON AT THE PRESENT STAGE

Cameroon's multilateral action is also deployed on the regional stage in Africa and Europe. It is a multilateralism whose action framework is made up of international organizations with a regional vocation. We can therefore speak of a Cameroonian regional multilateralism referring to the country's participation to the life of regional international organizations. At the African continental level, Cameroon acts within the main permanent regional forum that is the African Union while, in the European area, the European Union is its preferred framework for action. This action also extends to sub-regional institutions such as CEMAC and many other regional groupings of a functional and technical nature.

3.1. Cameroon's Participation in the United Nations

The United Nations Organization has historically asserted itself as a framework for enhancing the sovereignty of States; a forum for recognition and discussion among peers; a body for the collective legitimization of international standards. Moreover, it is a space for global political integration, the implementation of collective security and the universalization of the promotion of humanity as a whole. It is therefore right that, in Cameroon's foreign policy discourse, the UN should be legitimized as «the expression of a collective will in the service of peace, human dignity and solidarity among peoples³²⁵.» With such a cardinal place in the dynamics of world politics, the UN has gradually become the main field of the international multilateral game, a forum for attracting states which project their strategies of international affirmation, their ambitions for leadership, hegemony and influence. It follows that all the states of the world each have, if not a policy, at least a tradition of relations with the UN which today

³²⁵ Biya P. Op. cit. P. 124.

embodies multilateralism in its quintessence³²⁶, its vitality and its universality. Cameroon is not outside this projection and this collective investment of the world organization. Its investment in it is both a matter of history, of a specific vision of the organization and is part of a set of ongoing relationships, not to mention participation in its administrative bodies.

Cameroon has maintained excellent and cordial ties with the UN since its admission into the organisation on 20 September 1960. Historic and privileged ties bind Cameroon to the UN. Our country is considered «a UN pupil,» because of the essential role played by this organisation towards Cameroon's attainment of international sovereignty, from 1945 to 1960. This cooperation witnessed a high point in recent years, with the peaceful settlement (one such model) of the Bakassi conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Head of State, H.E Paul Biya has actively participated in major international meetings held at the UN headquarters in New York (1995, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010). On these occasions he initiated indelible ideas considered as Cameroon's labels: World Ethics Committee; Hunger Observatory; and Active Solidarity.

In addition, President Paul Biya's personal enthusiasm towards a peaceful resolution of the Bakassi case by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)³²⁷, under the auspices of the United Nations, reflects his commitment to respect international law. It also demonstrates the continued commitment of Cameroonians for peace, dialogue and good neighbourliness. It can therefore serve as an example³²⁸.

³²⁶ UN documents can be found on: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.html> (Search by document symbol, e.g. A/63/100).

³²⁷ Paulson C. Compliance with final judgments of the International Court of Justice since 1987. *American Journal of International Law*. 2004. Vol. 98, no 3. P. 434-461.

³²⁸ Ibid.

Cameroon chaired the bureau of the council as a first-term member in 2001. The third term expired in May 2014. Currently, Cameroon sits on several committees and specialised agencies:

- Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC) of UNESCO;
- Intergovernmental Council of the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) of UNESCO;
- Executive Council of the International Civil Defence Organisation (ICDO);
- Board of Directors of the Universal Postal Union (UPU);
- Board of Directors of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU);
- Board of Directors of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO);
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) under which the Central Africa Regional Office is hosted by Cameroon;
- Board of UNICEF;
- Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC);
- United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) -(ECOSOC);
- Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
- Board of UNIDO.

The UN System in Cameroon is comprised of 18 agencies (WB, UNECA, UNIC, FAO, IMF, OHCHR, UNHCR, ILO, WHO, UNIDO, UNAIDS, WFP, UNDP, ITU, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIFEM). A new roadmap of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) (2013 to 2017); a 03 key instrument of the reform of the UN System, was signed on 30 March 2012. It constitutes the reference framework of all UN System interventions in our country for the duration of the aforementioned cooperation cycle. UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA and the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT) proceeded to the signing of their respective Country Programme and Action Plan on 2 April 2013.

This signing marks a significant step in the implementation of an agenda for a reform of the UN System in Cameroon. It is part of the logic of the Paris Declaration, and in line with the harmonisation and simplification advocated by the UN Secretary General and supported by the Government of Cameroon. UNDP helps Cameroon to develop and share solutions to problems related to the following questions: democratic governance; poverty reduction at the base; crisis prevention and recovery; environment and energy.

UNDP is also helping Cameroon to achieve the objectives of sustainable development. On 30 June 2010 the UN action in Cameroon was felt through the financing and implementation of the following programs: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): US\$ 21.344 million over 5 years (2008-2012) ; World Bank (IBRD/IDA): 12 IDA and GEF projects; 3 Projects of Regional Operations; 6 projects of the Trust Fund ; International Monetary Fund (IMF) : Cameroon has agreed with the IMF seven (7) credit agreements for a total of US\$ 530.57 million of special Drawing Rights (SDRs) since 19 September 1988 (signing of the first stand-by credit agreement)³²⁹.

Cameroon's opinion has often been sought especially during decolonisation, apartheid, internal crises in some brotherly countries, disputes between our countries and other African countries or conflicts between States. Indeed, thanks to the strong commitment of the Head of State, H.E Paul Biya, in favour of a peaceful resolution of the Bakassi crises by the ICJ, Cameroon has preserved its territorial integrity and sovereignty over a disputed part of its territory. The implementation of the ICJ decision was followed by a series of tripartite meetings with the UN Secretary General as a key player³³⁰. Our country is home to several sub-regional offices of the United Nations: the Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa (UNCHRD-CA) -

³²⁹ Human Rights and the Millennium Development Goals // [Electronic resource] UNDP. URL: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HRAndMDGsInPractice.pdf> (accessed: 10.12.2021).

³³⁰ United Nations (1992). Basic Facts About the UN // [Electronic resource] ISSUU. URL: <https://issuu.com/unpublications/docs/basicfacts> (accessed: 15.12.2021).

(created under the leadership of Cameroon); the Sub-Regional Centre of the United Nations Information; etc. Cameroon has participated in a number of UN peace-keeping operations, Cambodia (1992), Kosovo, and now in Burundi, Ivory Coast (2004), CAR, DRC, Haiti and Sudan, etc.

On the sub-regional level, Cameroon has invested significantly in the implementation of UN and African Union (AU) Resolutions on security issues in Central Africa. Thus Cameroon is at the initiative of the creation of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX).

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) : The ILO is funding and monitoring many projects in partnership with donors. These include: the US\$ 420,000 education programme on HIV/AIDS in partnership with the UN ; the US\$ 2,448,270 project on the «Promotion of decent work through economic empowerment of communities vulnerable to ICTs»; and the US\$ 649,000 sub-regional project against child trafficking for purposes of exploitation in Central West Africa in partnership with the United States of America; etc.

Participation of Cameroon in UN peacekeeping operations. Cameroon has always taken an active part in PeaceKeeping Operations (PKO) initiated by both the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU)³³¹. The different Cameroonian contingents were often made up of military, police, military observers and others. The participation of Cameroon's Defense Forces (CDF) in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) at times takes the individual form, at times the collective form, with respect to the strategic, operational and / or tactical level of (PKO)³³².

Overall, the participation of (CDF) in (PKO) in Africa is quite often individual, as was the case in Darfur (Sudan), Angola, DRC, Rwanda, CAR, Ivory Coast and Mali. In these cases, many warrant officers and officers of (CDF) were sent on request of the UN and / or the AU as observers. They often meet at the

³³¹ United Nations (1992). Basic Facts About the UN. Op. cit.

³³² Agyemang-Bioh N. P. E. Preparing for United Nations International Peacekeeping Operations in the Third Millennium. Accra: Imagine Consult, 2000. P. 73.

operational and even at the strategic level, either because of their individual skills, or through seats reserved for Cameroon.

Furthermore, the Cameroonian government has placed at the disposal of the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic (UNMCAR), on the 8th of February 1999, a staff for the training of civilian police.

At expiration of the mandate of the (UNMCAR), in February 2000, a Cameroonian senior officer was occupying the head of training of the civilian police, function that was maintained within the framework of support office of the United Nations for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (SOUNCPCA)³³³.

Cameroonian Defense Forces responded by contingents of four officers on behalf of the AU in South Sudan within the framework of «Darfur DESK» (operations monitoring program for the benefit of the AU).

From 2005, contingents of 10, then of 20 observers succeeded one other. Since the transition from African Union Mission in Sudan (AUMS) to the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNMD), they are groups of 05 officers in relays.

In Ethiopia, a Cameroonian officer was part of the staff of the African Standby Force (ASF), and since 2003 in Ivory Coast; another one is part of the staff of the United Nations mission in Ivory Coast (UNMIC) serving as a military representative of the President of the AU Commission³³⁴.

With the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF), and the establishment of regional brigades, Cameroon takes an active part in the multinational force of Central Africa (MFOCA) and Rapid Alert Mechanism of Central Africa (RAMCA).

Cameroon is also a candidate to host the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) where the logistic devices will be stored to later on be assigned to peace - keeping missions initiated and conducted under the banner of African institutions. Hence,

³³³ Agyemang-Bioh N. P. E. Preparing for United Nations International Peacekeeping Operations in the Third Millennium. Accra: Imagine Consult, 2000. P. 75.

³³⁴ Safo A. Ghana's Participation in International Peacekeeping As a Foreign Policy Tool. Op. cit. P. 20.

Cameroon, which in its cooperation with the UN and the AU puts its seaport and airport infrastructure at the disposal of the Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO), is highly appreciated by the UN and African organizations coordinating the conduct of this peace - keeping missions³³⁵.

Cameroon and the handling of refugees and migrants. Cameroon has a tradition of welcoming refugees and migrants and continues to a policy of open borders for asylum seekers. It is in this spirit that Cameroon is a signatory of all the major treaties on refugees, notably the Convention of 1951 on the status of the refugee (known as Geneva Convention) and the Convention of the OAU of 1969 regulating aspects of refugees in Africa³³⁶.

Also, Cameroon adopted in July 2005, a law defining the judicial framework for the protection of refugees, which was applied as from November 2011. President Paul BIYA has always called for total solidarity in the handling of issues related to refugees and migrants. He notably declared at the rostrum of the 63rd session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, in September 2008, that: «The troubles they go through are very inhuman. The extortions and discrimination they face on a daily basis are unacceptable.»

The sub region being prone to violence and persistent instability, Cameroon continues to receive refugees and asylum seekers coming from the neighbouring countries, mainly the Central African Republic (CAR) and Nigeria.

Presently, Cameroon is hosting nearly 350 000 refugees and migrants of several nationalities with about 250 000 refugees from the Central African Republic. It is in Cameroon that one finds the greatest number of refugees from the CAR (there were 247 245 as of 8 June 2015, according to the HCR). These are recent refugees who have fled the CAR since December 2013 (almost 139 000), because of the waves of violence and political instability (confrontations

³³⁵ UN Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front. Op. cit.

³³⁶ United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights // [Electronic resource] UN. URL: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf> (accessed: 10.12.2021).

between armed groups of seleka and anti-balaka) ; and refugees who fled from the North-West of their country between 2006 and 2010, as a result of the increase in banditry and other forms of criminality³³⁷.

The Government gives protection and asylum to persons who are legible for HCR and has provided land for 08 refugee camps in Cameroon. Minawao in the Far North Region, Gal and Borgof in the Adamawa, Gado-Badzez, Timangolo, Mbile, Lolo and Ngari-Singo in the East Region. The authorities provide armed escorts to refugees and humanitarian workers in the operational zones, facilitating access to the refugees and local health centres, with the support of the HCR³³⁸.

Table 5.

Visits of high officials of the United Nations System in Cameroon

1. The current Secretary General, H.E. Ban KI-MOON paid an official visit to Cameroon (from 9 to 11 June 2010).
2. Former Secretary General, H.E. Kofi ANNAN paid three visits to Cameroon (2000, 2002 and 2005).
3. The President of the 64th session of the General Assembly Ali TRIKI paid a visit to Cameroon in May 2010. His successor Joseph DEISS also visited Cameroon (27 to 29 January 2011).
4. Koichiro MATSUURA, Director General of UNESCO (9 January 2009)
5. Antonio GUTERRES, High Commissioner of UNHCR (2 to 4 March 2010, and 24 and 25 March 2015)
6. Kanayo F. NWANZE, President of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (in 2006 and on 29 February to 3 March 2012)

Source: compiled by the author

The Sustainable Development Agenda is a comprehensive plan of action for humanity, the planet and prosperity, which also aims to strengthen peace around the world. To achieve these objectives, the United Nations in Cameroon supports the State of Cameroon, civil society organizations, private actors and development partners in the design and implementation of activities conducive to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in Cameroon.

³³⁷ History of UNHCR // UNHCR. URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/history-of-unhcr.html> (accessed: 15.12.2020).

³³⁸ UN Human Rights Liaison Unit Division of International Protection UNHCR // [Electronic resource] Refworld. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ffd31262.pdf> (accessed: 15.12.2020).

Finally, active cooperation with the UN continues the legitimization of Cameroon's statehood and permanent state sovereignty. There is a guarantee that the institution will seek redress for Cameroon in the event of any form of aggression, whether internal or external. Cameroon has also participated in solving world problems by supporting UN resolutions regarding the elimination of apartheid in South Africa and the granting of independence to colonial countries, among others.

3.2. Cameroon and The African Union: The Main Vectors of Cooperation

The African Union (AU) is an African state organization established on July 9, 2002 in Durban, South Africa, in accordance with the Sirte Declaration of September 9, 1999. Two years after its constituent treaty was signed, the AU replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU)³³⁹. A year later, in July 2003, at the Maputo summit in Mozambique, several institutions, including the African Union Commission, the Pan African Parliament and the Peace and Security Council, were founded. One of the objectives of the AU is to «promote peace, security and stability in the continent». One of the AU principles is «peaceful resolution of conflicts among the member states of the Union through appropriate means decided by the Assembly»³⁴⁰.

Since the middle of the 20th century, «a political discussion has been held between supporters of the concept of African nationalism about the nature of

³³⁹ Charter of the Organization of African Unity. URL : <https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Charter%20of%20the%20Organization%20of%20African%20Unity.pdf> (date of access: 08.08.2021).

³⁴⁰ Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union; Adopted by the 1st Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 3 February 2003 // [Electronic resource] African Union. URL https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7785-treaty-0025_-_protocol_on_the_amendments_to_the_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_e.pdf (accessed: 10.12.2021).

inter-African relations, about ways of rapprochement and forms of cooperation between African countries after they achieve independence»³⁴¹.

The growth of nationalistic tendencies led to the evolution of Pan-Africanism. «If initially it was pan-African nationalism, then gradually there was a transition to state nationalism»³⁴². Julius Nyerere emphasized: «The role of African nationalism is different and must be different from the nationalism of the past. We must use nation-states as a means to unite Africa and prevent our enemies from using them as a tool to divide Africa. African nationalism is meaningless and anachronistic and dangerous if it is not at the same time pan-Africanism»³⁴³.

As a result, a confrontation was formed between two leading trends: the concept of «Africa of the Fatherlands»³⁴⁴ and the federal structure of Africa, officially they are Monrovia and Casablanca groups.

Africa is emerging from a structurally weak, politically nascent colonization whose voice cannot be heard on the international stage. States therefore realize that their development can only be possible in unity and solidarity. It is in this wake that the OAU was born in 1963 and was replaced by the AU in 2000. Following its independence, Cameroon defined the principles of its foreign policy which would enable it to maintain relations with its immediate neighbors in particular and Africa in general.

The idea of unity was launched at the end of the 19th century by blacks in the diaspora. These blacks included: Malcolm X, Marcus Garvey, Web Du Bois and their purpose was to raise awareness of African domination by Western

³⁴¹ Громько А.А. Африка в мировой политике. Наука. 1986. С. 56.

³⁴² Thompson V.B., Gupta A., Nyerere J.K. Africa and unity: The evolution of Pan-Africanism. Science and Society. 1971. Vol. 35. No 3. P. 34.

³⁴³ Денисова Т. С. Джулиус Камбараре Ньерере-Первый Президент Свободной Танзании. Отв. ред. ЮН Винокуров. М.: Институт Африки РАН, 2010. 94 с. Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность. 2011. № 5. P. 199-203.

³⁴⁴ Gagiano A. Recovering and recovering from an African past: four women's quest narratives. Journal of Transatlantic Studies. 2019. Vol. 17, № 3. P. 269-289.

powers through Pan-Africanism³⁴⁵. In the 20th century, Africans concerned about the liberation of the continent took up the theses of Pan-Africanism. This was the case of Francis Kwame Nkrumah who in his book *Black Africa Must Unite* wherein he advocates the political and economic unity of the continent. But he is not understood by his peers who are divided into two groups³⁴⁶:

-The Casablanca group which wants the creation of the United States of Africa;

-The group of Monrovia (Liberia) which thinks that African unity must be achieved through solidarity and regional groupings. This last thesis triumphed on May 25, 1963 in Addis Ababa and the OAU was born. This organization is therefore the result of the desire of African Heads of States to put an end to the political antagonisms that were weakening the continent.

The objectives of the OAU. Among the main objectives of this organization, we can mention:

- The sovereign equality of States;
- Respect for borders inherited from colonization;
- The peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
- The elimination of colonialism in all its forms.

In addition to its strategic location on the African continent, its diversity and its natural, human and cultural complexity, Cameroon offers one of the most enviable geographical and climatic panoramas, capable of making it a priority tourist destination in Africa. Cameroon is distinguished by political stability, its local economic environment offering advantages for trade, market flexibility, a large internal market (over 19 million potential consumers), abundant natural resources and an important seafront. Paul Biya has made «peace, security, stability rigor and moralization, his major axes of governance in Cameroon». In

³⁴⁵ Adeleke T. Black Americans and Africa: A critique of the Pan-African and identity paradigms. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*. 1998. Vol. 31, no 3. P. 505-536.

³⁴⁶ Nkrumah K., Arrigoni R., Napolitano G. *Africa must unite*. London : Heinemann. 1963.

2014, Biya received the Pan-African Lawyers Union award for the peaceful resolution of conflicts³⁴⁷ which was presented to him by the Former President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. Cameroon, «because of its demographic weight and its diversified economy, appears as the main economic power of the sub-region» and therefore offers undeniable economic assets, as well as a gateway to Central Africa³⁴⁸. The south-western part of Cameroon is located in the Gulf of Guinea and, despite its many assets, the country is currently plagued with increasing crime. Coastal states are trying to secure their coasts in a concerted effort. A symbiosis between African States is a necessity, because the fight against criminality by a single State is much less effective than collective action which involves the amalgamation of technical, human and operational means³⁴⁹.

Cameroon and the OAU/AU: support and permanent commitment. As a founding member, Cameroon has «invested» in the continental organization by adopting a specific vision of it; by placing emotional and symbolic capital in it, by occupying a decisive position (of founding member), by granting it political credit as well as a preponderant diplomatic significance. It follows a relationship of real «fidelity» and deep «attachment» of Cameroon to this organization.

The Cameroonian construction of the OAU/AU. In Cameroonian diplomatic discourse, the OAU/AU is considered both as an instrument of liberation, of consultation/coordination and construction of identity, continental.

First for Cameroon, the OAU is an instrument of continental emancipation with regard to its two main political objectives of completing decolonization and the achievement of national independence. Thus, it is through the representation and presentation of the OAU as «an instrument for realizing the fundamental aspirations of African peoples to freedom, unity and progress» that the President

³⁴⁷ Cameroon Tribune: Paul Biya Laureate of the UPA Prize for the Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts.

³⁴⁸ Cottin K. J. Cameroon's contribution to the African Union's security plan (2000-2018). Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Политология. 2019. Vol. 21. No 1. P. 78-89.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

Ahmadou Ahidjo legitimized the commitment of Cameroon in the Organization. Paul Biya reiterated this view of the Continental Organization as a crutch of liberation, often stating in his speeches and writings:

«...the OAU [has] contributed to raising awareness among all Africans of their community of destiny (...) it has been able to assert itself as a privileged framework for encounter and dialogue, a necessary and indispensable instrument for the total liberation of our continent and the strengthening of African unity³⁵⁰».

Second, the OAU is envisaged in the Cameroonian foreign doctrine as «a continental body for the coordination and harmonization of actions undertaken at the level of the sub-regional organizations for economic promotion, social and cultural [of] States³⁵¹.» This OAU promotion as a framework for consultation and cooperation with a view to the acceleration of continental development is once again corroborated by Paul Biya who affirms:

«At the time of the great together, the OAU (...) is of paramount importance as a framework for consultation and joint action by all the States in the face of the adversities of international society³⁵²». In the ongoing regionalization dynamic within the continent, the OAU is seen by Yaoundé as «the top of an institutional pyramid firmly rooted in all African regions and sub-regions, embodying the most effective expression and more dynamic of their possibilities for collective action³⁵³».

Third, the OAU is a mold for creating regional identities and African personalities according to its specific roots. It is therefore «an irreplaceable instrument for the affirmation of the African personality right down to its foundations³⁵⁴»; a vector for the structuring of a regional consciousness and identity necessary for the achievement of political independence and economic prosperity/sovereignty. Indeed, in a context where «regional identity has been

³⁵⁰ Le président Paul Biya parle à l'Afrique et au monde, op. cit.

³⁵¹ Ahmadou A. Nation et développement: Dans l'unité et la justice. FeniXX. 1969. P. 25.

³⁵² Ibid. P. 23.

³⁵³ Ahmadou A. Nation et développement: Dans l'unité et la justice. FeniXX. 1969.P. 28.

³⁵⁴ Ahmadou A. Nation et développement: Dans l'unité et la justice. FeniXX. 1969. P. 195.

made a stake in the future success and failure of regionalization³⁵⁵ « regional organization has asserted itself as a vector of identification – and even of identification – of the states and peoples of the continent. This reinforces the feeling of belonging, born of geographical proximity, the regularity of interactions and flows as well as the shared perception of the existence of the African continental subsystem.

Cameroon's traditional, constant and active commitment within the OAU/AU is not only due to the fact that the organization is intended to welcome all African States and that Cameroon, as an important actor of the continent, can only be a member. Continental membership as a legitimate basis for Cameroon's membership of the OAU/AU is also coupled with the concordance, coincidence or rather compatibility of the aims and objectives of the organization with the cardinal options intangibles of Cameroon's international vision and policy. The same characteristics of Cameroon's vision in the world, the principles of representation and insertion, and the values advocated by the continental organization nourish the relationship between these two entities.

«... on non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for their integrity and territorial sovereignty, and in Africa in particular on African unity and solidarity, the fight against the last bastions of colonialism and the misdeeds of apartheid in southern Africa, and finally on development of the continent»³⁵⁶.

Cameroon's participation in the OAU/AU. As one of the founding members, Cameroon has participated fully and resolutely to the activities of the continental organization since 1963. This participation takes many forms and involves contributions to the budget, participation to its governing body and its activities, membership in its professional bodies, hosting events organized or sponsored by the Organization. In the case of Cameroon, it has benefited from some aid and financial support from the organization.

³⁵⁵ Schajer H.D., Dupoirier E. L'identité Régionale: problèmes théoriques, perspectives politiques. 1994. P. 330-344.

³⁵⁶ Paul Biya, Interview, Cameroon Tribune №2581 du/01/1983, publié dans Le message du renouveau, op. cit.

As regards the contribution to the organization's budget, Cameroon rose, for the 2008 budget year, to the 8th rank of contributors with 1,247,247 (one million two hundred and forty-seven thousand two hundred and forty-seven) US dollars. Beyond this contribution, Cameroon has always been one of the major and regular contributors to the OAU/AU budget. In addition to this budgetary contribution, there is financial support intended to support the implementation of certain specific initiatives of the organization. Also, for the implementation of the Sirte Declaration which led to the creation of the AU, Cameroon granted a contribution of US\$25,000. It also provides financial support to the implementation of the African Monetary Fund (AMF). For the implementation of the Yaoundé Declaration during the closing session of the work of the «Africa 21» International Conference, Cameroon paid the African Union a sum of US\$300,000.

With regard to participation in OAU/AU institutions and structures, Cameroon has shown genuine commitment. The country thus participates in:

- Inter-African Phytosanitary Council (IAPSC)³⁵⁷;
- Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA)³⁵⁸;
- African Monetary Fund (AMF)³⁵⁹;
- African Ministerial Conference on Decentralization and Local Development (AMCOD)³⁶⁰;
- The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)³⁶¹;

³⁵⁷ IAPSC official website. URL : <https://auiapsc.org/> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

³⁵⁸ SCSA official website. URL: <https://uia.org/s/or/en/1100017645> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

³⁵⁹ Protocol on the establishment of the African Monetary Fund. URL : [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36417-treaty-0046_-\(date of access: 10.01.2020\).pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36417-treaty-0046_-(date%20of%20access%3A%2010.01.2020).pdf) (date of access: 10.01.2020).

³⁶⁰ AMCOD official website. URL : <https://library.au.int/all-african-ministerial-conference-decentralization-and-local-development-amcod-3> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

³⁶¹ New Partnership For Africa's Development (NEPAD). URL : <https://au.int/en/organs/nepad> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

- African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)³⁶²;
- The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC)³⁶³.

Indeed, to liberate the continent from the colonial yoke, we noted the material, political and diplomatic support that Cameroon provided to the liberation movements of southern Africa from colonialism and racial discrimination. As such, the PR AA had presented the Lusaka Manifesto to the UN, that is to say a declaration devoted to the decolonization of this region of the continent. In addition, Cameroon suspended in 1963 all relations with Portugal, which persisted in maintaining its colonial empire in Africa. In 1965, he condemned the unilateral declaration of Southern Rhodesia and made Great Britain responsible for the tragedy of the Zimbabwean people. According to the Cameroonian Prime Minister, African unity is based on 3 fundamental principles;

- The rehabilitation of the continent and its inhabitants in their dignity;
- The fight against hatred and cultural opposition, establish love and fraternity;
- The organization of a common front for the economic and social development of the whole continent.

Despite its objectives and principles coupled with a commitment sometimes crowned with success, African countries have become aware of the failure of the OAU with regard to the integration and economic development of Africa. It is to remedy this failure that the AU was created to meet the expectations of the people.

Cameroon adheres to the ideals of the AU, as evidenced by the participation of its leaders in various AU summits. It ratified the constitutive act of the AU in 2002. Several, Cameroonians, among which Elizabeth TANKEU the African trade commissioner, hold key positions within the organization. Over a decade, it has benefited from 840 billion CFA francs to finance 58 projects aimed at

³⁶² African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)website. URL : <https://www.aprm-au.org/> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

³⁶³ The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AUPSC). URL : <https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/42-psc> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

reducing poverty, improving social services and increasing agricultural production. It is the regional headquarters of the African Development Bank.

However, in reality, disintegration processes were intensified, leading to the formation of political and sub-regional groupings, among which were the following most significant:

- 1) Casablanca group;
- 2) African and Malagasy Union (AMU)³⁶⁴.

«The members of the inter-African associations of the Casablanca Group (established in 1961) were countries that were previously part of various colonial empires that had both a republican and a monarchical system. Within the framework of the group, the idea of Afro-Arab unity was realized, since it included Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The group had a clear anti-colonial and anti-imperialist orientation³⁶⁵».

«The African and Malagasy Union (created in 1961 on the basis of the Council of Concord and the Brazzaville grouping) united countries that were previously part of one colonial empire, and only the countries of Tropical Africa, more or less homogeneous in socio-economic terms. They were the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Mauritania, Madagascar, Senegal, Chad, Central African Republic. Within the inter-African organizations of this group, not only political, diplomatic, economic and cultural, but also military cooperation's were established, and at the same time, it was envisaged to maintain comprehensive ties with the former metropolis. AMC participants, in joint statements, openly opposed any continental association of African countries that would limit their national sovereignty»³⁶⁶.

³⁶⁴ African and Malagasy Union (Brazzaville Group). URL : <https://uia.org/s/or/en/1100007378> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

³⁶⁵ АНЬЯОХА С.Ч. Роль и место Нигерии в ОАЕ/АС (1963–2003). URL: http://africana.ru/history/nigeria_oae.htm (date of access: 10.01.2020).

³⁶⁶ АНЬЯОХА С.Ч. Роль и место Нигерии в ОАЕ/АС (1963–2003). URL: http://africana.ru/history/nigeria_oae.htm (date of access: 10.01.2020).

The concept of the OAU was revised at the summits in Lomé in 2000 and in Lusaka in 2001, and in 2002 the heads of African states presented a new continental Union (AU). According to Da Costa (2007), «In the 21st century, the new movement of Pan-Africanism is still striving for the long-awaited unity and solidarity, but at a fundamentally new level, the essence of which is the recognition of the fact that development, peace, security and democracy in Africa are interconnected and interdependent»³⁶⁷. This new understanding of Pan-Africanism explains the demise of the OAU and the birth of its successor, the African Union. The AU symbolizes the collective efforts of Africa in seeking integration and development. A number of development strategies in the early years of independence aimed at freeing the continent from imperialism did not produce positive results. P.G. Adogame argued that African leaders' difficulties in promoting Pan-Africanism were due to the lack of a clear ideological definition of the concept, as well as their inability to recognize pan-Africanism as a viable ideological plan for continental unity and development³⁶⁸.

Key elements of integration such as open borders, security and trade are essential for Africa's economic and social development. Therefore, African leaders seek to integrate the continent on the basis of the ideals of Pan-Africanism and maintain a single territorial jurisdiction based on a common strategy of inclusive growth and sustainable development. N'Guettia K.R. stated in 2007 that only economic and political integration offers the opportunities needed to solve global problems and negotiate on the international stage³⁶⁹.

The process of African integration was reinforced by political changes on the continent. Human capital, which is the main factor of integration, gradually modifies political regimes — from autocracy to democracy. This is manifested in

³⁶⁷ Da Costa P. Civil Society Organizations and the African Union: Towards a Continental Advocacy Strategy for World Vision. Nairobi: World Vision. 2007.

³⁶⁸ Adogame P. G. Pan-Africanism revisited: Vision and reality of African unity and development. African Review of Integration. 2008. Vol. 2, № 2.

³⁶⁹ Kouassi R. N. The itinerary of the African integration process: An overview of the historical landmarks. African Integration Review. 2007. Vol. 1, № 2.

the fact that in recent decades, power has been transferred from one party to another. This contributes to the expansion of markets for member countries through interstate relations, scaling economies, technological progress and increasing human capital. The African Union represents Africa's collective efforts in search of integration and development. A series of development strategies in the early days' independence led to numerous initiatives aimed at freeing the continent from imperialism. Successful integration is essential for Africa today.

Cameroon is heavily involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa under the aegis of the AU³⁷⁰. Various Cameroonian contingents are made up of military, police, military observers and other troops. The participation of the Cameroon Defense Forces (DFC) in military peacekeeping operations (MPO) can be individual or joint, according to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of these operations. Individual participation in PKOs commits a minimum number of soldiers, most of whom are contractors (military or police) working either at the operational level or at the strategic level. Collective participation involves contingents joining larger groups in an operation. Overall, the DFC's engagement in peacekeeping in Africa is mostly individual, as was the case in Darfur (Sudan), Angola, DRC, Rwanda, Ivory Coast and Mali³⁷¹. In December 2010, the AU Defense and Security Committee chose Cameroon as the headquarters of the African Union's Continental Logistics Base (CLB). This decision was ratified during the Conference of Heads of States in January 2011. The CLB was to start its activities in 2014. The CLB headquarters agreement was signed on October 12, 2015 in Yaoundé, and was followed by several technical meetings aiming to bring forward the date of its start. The first meeting took place in November 2015, the second and third were held in January and June 2016. At the third meeting, which was held in Addis Ababa, Cameroon agreed with the AU on the terms of reference of the parties.

³⁷⁰ See: Ministry of Defense, Cameroon.

³⁷¹ A Remarkable Cameroonian Participation in the Maintenance of Peace in the World. Daily Le Jour.

Agreements introduced by the African Union are applicable in Cameroon as the country is a member state and has ratified these laws. The main legal source is the Constitutive Act of the African Union; all other laws proceed from this act³⁷².

Cameroon is a member state of the AU and a founding member of the Organization of African Unity, which was later transformed into the African Union. It endorsed the Charter of the UN, the International Covenant on Human Rights (civil and political), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights³⁷³. The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) at the dawn of the new millennium marked a turning point in the continent's integration process. It was not a question of a simple change of name but of a substantial structural transformation whose objective was to respond to two major challenges: to enable Africa to take advantage of globalization and to respond to the various crises to which the continent is facing³⁷⁴. Faced with major socio-economic and security challenges, such as the emerging terrorist threat, which feeds on the social instability prevailing on the continent, the AU adopted a wide range of legal and organizational instruments to limit the expansion of terrorism on its territory.

The unprecedented rise of jihadism in Africa, which weighs heavily on the security of the continents, is rooted in the weakness of the mechanisms developed by the AU to counter the terrorist threat at the regional and continental levels. Despite some progress made in the field of security, many flaws remain in the system, which relegate the Pan-African institution to the rank of weak link in cooperation against terrorism. The cross-border nature of the threat requires that the problem be addressed at the continental level; however, this must be done as

³⁷² Ebang M. *The Legal Framework of Mining in Cameroon*. Yaoundé: L'Harmattan Cameroun. 2005.

³⁷³ Djiazet Mbou Mbogning S. *Access to Justice in Cameroon*. Paris: L'Harmattan. 2005.

³⁷⁴ Nkalwo Ngoula J. L. *The African Union Confronted with Terrorism: Strengths and Challenges of African Security Policy*. Fact Sheet, Cameroon. April 2016.

part of a cohesive and coordinated effort in developing an effective counter-terrorism strategy.

Also, solving the many dysfunctions of AU governance is essential to get Africa out of the vicious circle of insecurity.

Peace and security issues have often been at the center of debates, notably at the first ordinary summit in Maputo in July 2003. To make up for previous failures, African Heads of States and Government adopted a bold new Defense policy. The implementation of this policy provided that a common effort is made to benefit the whole continent. Pending the establishment of the Peace and Security Council³⁷⁵, the central body and, with it, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of 1993, serve as an organizational framework. One year after the 35th OAU at the July 1999 summit, the States adopted the Algiers Convention, the first hemispheric agreement on the prevention and fight against terrorism, translated into the three official languages³⁷⁶.

In September 2002, a high-level intergovernmental meeting of AU member states took place in Algiers, during which the countries endorsed a plan of action to implement their commitments and obligations. The plan included specific provisions on police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, repression financing of terrorism, exchange of information and coordination, etc. Thus, the anti-terrorist effort of African States has taken a leap forward, reinforced by the Additional Protocol to the Algiers Convention (July 2004) which specifically aimed to «strengthen the effective implementation of the Convention»¹⁰. Article 3 (d) of the Protocol endorses the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, whose main objective is to «coordinate

³⁷⁵ On September 16, 2003, only 16 of the 53 African Union member states ratified the Protocol on the establishment of the African Union. See document CAB / CEG / 23.22 of the African Union.

³⁷⁶ It is important to recall the Resolution on Strengthening Cooperation and Coordination among States [AHG / Res.213 (XXVIII)] adopted by the OAU in 1992 with the purpose of combatting the phenomena of extremism and terrorism.

and harmonize efforts to prevent and combat international terrorism in all its aspects «.

In general, over the past two decades, the Cameroonian Republic has been actively involved in the implementation of continental initiatives, in matters of protecting the interests of the continent, especially in connection with the creation of NEPAD and the AU. Before the establishment of NEPAD, the African continent was trying to create new room for maneuver, to join globalization in an attempt to change its international marginal position and avoid «containment on the periphery of world politics.» At the same time, NEPAD was both a political response and a way to respond to the rejection of democracy, which did not take root well on this continent. The connection of Cameroon to this transnational dynamic is explained, first of all, by the need to search for external donors. This means that Cameroon needs to turn this into an internal political and strategic resource in order to adapt to the international and regional system.

3.3. Cameroon and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa: Growing Security and Deeping Regional Integration

In the contemporary world, nation states with parochial boundaries are proving incapable of withstanding globalization exigencies. Consequently, regional cooperation and integration are necessary especially for the weak African states³⁷⁷. While sovereignty reduction is an indispensable attribute of real integration process, its introduction has always been a difficult task. The year 1994 witnessed the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, popularly known by its French acronym CEMAC, with

³⁷⁷There exist many regional organizations in Africa, notably Union of Arab Maghreb (UAM), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

supranational vision to replace the Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa (UDEAC)³⁷⁸.

CEMAC is a sub-regional organization with six member states³⁷⁹ (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon). It aims at promoting sub-regional integration within the framework of economic and monetary union through common political, financial, legal and economic structures and policies. Excessive willingness to maintain and exercise sovereignty was the fundamental factor that led to the demise of UDEAC. Consequently, unlike many texts, the constitutive act of the Treaty instituting CEMAC contains no provision regarding the sovereignty of states.

Cameroon's strategic position in CEMAC. Located at the crossroads of two major geopolitical groups, namely Central Africa and West Africa, Cameroon has a notorious asset in the sub-region. In addition to her openness to the sea, she is the only CEMAC country bordering all the others. This natural advantage allows Cameroon to serve the landlocked states of the sub-region, namely the Central African Republic and Chad through special agreements. Indeed, the trade of these two states depends 80% on Cameroon³⁸⁰. This transit is possible through the Autonomous Port of Douala and the Douala-N'Djamena and Douala-Bangui roads. Through bilateral conventions on the transport of goods (these are the Conventions of December 22, 1999 on land transport of goods between the Republic of Cameroon and the Central African Republic and the Convention of April 13, 1999 on road transport between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon), these three States have set up an operational transit system intended to facilitate trade on the Douala-N'Djamena corridor, 1850 km long (with 1830 km at the Cameroon and 20 km in Chad) and the Douala-Bangui

³⁷⁸ Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) was established on 16 March 1994 at N'Djamena, Chad, and went operational on 5 February 1998 after the Conference of Heads of States and Governments of the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) member states in Libreville, Gabon.

³⁸⁰ Institut National de la Statistique (2014), Enquête sur les échanges transfrontaliers de marchandises au Cameroun: bilan méthodologique et résultats, Yaoundé-Cameroun.

corridor along 1455 km (with 850 km in Cameroon and 605 km in CAR) (CEMAC, 2017). A good part of the goods in the direction of the North of the Congo also passes through Cameroon³⁸¹.

The economic dynamism of Cameroon in the sub-region. At a first glance, it should be noted that Cameroon has large deposits of raw materials occupying an important part of its economy. Cameroon is also an «average»³⁸² oil producer, with an important advantage, that of being located at the bottom of the Gulf of Guinea, an area renowned for the good quality of its crude oil and its location on the high seas³⁸³.

The country also has the second largest forest area in Africa after the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). She also has the second largest hydroelectric potential on the continent, still after the DRC³⁸⁴. Developing her hydroelectric potential would enable her to meet not only her own electricity needs but also the needs of other countries in the sub-region. Frank Ebogo notes in this regard that: «by its middle position on the African hydro-political chessboard, Cameroon is finally called upon to play the role of pivotal state in the new dynamic of hydro-political integration³⁸⁵». All these natural resources make up an important lever of the Cameroonian economy.

Then, with the diversity of her offer of agricultural products and horticulture, Cameroon can be considered as the agricultural pole of the sub-region. The country, which moreover presents the best agricultural performance of the CEMAC, exports foodstuffs to each of the countries of the sub-region. Some CEMAC States are almost dependent on imports of certain food products

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Eyinga A. Government by state of emergency. Gaullist Africa: Cameroon Under Ahmadu Ahidjo. 1978. P. 100-110.

³⁸³ Kounou M. paradoxes et misères du pétrole africain. Enjeux: bulletin d'analyses géopolitiques pour l'Afrique centrale. 2008. N°36.

³⁸⁴ Manciaux C., Georges D (23 juin 2012). «Cameroun : mettre les voisins sous tension», Jeune Afrique, <<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/27708/economie/cameroun-mettreles-voisins-sous-tension/>> (date of access: 21.11.2020).

³⁸⁵ Ebogo F. La vision camerounaise de l'intégration sous-régionale à l'épreuve de l'insécurité transfrontalière. Une diplomatie au service de l'émergence du Cameroun ce du Cameroun.

from Cameroon. These are bon and Equatorial Guinea because of their proximity to the main supply sites but also their relatively low purchasing power³⁸⁶.

The CEMAC region in Africa is also known to be one of the two CFA zones in Africa³⁸⁷. Before independence, economic unions were created by the French in the central and western parts of Africa, which were under their rule. French West Africa (AOF) is the first of these unions created in 1898 by bringing together Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Sudan (current Mali), Dahomey (current Benin), Upper Volta (current Burkina Faso), Mauritania and Niger³⁸⁸. Later in 1910, French Equatorial Africa (AEF)³⁸⁹ was created, bringing together Chad, Ubangi-Chari (today the Central African Republic), Congo and Gabon. Cameroon was, however, quite distinct in that it was ruled by both Britain and France, and the aforementioned colonies later gained independence around 1962, thus ending all previous agreements with France and becoming a country in her own rights³⁹⁰.

Figure 2.

Map of Central Africa highlighting CEMAC member states

³⁸⁶ Nkendah R., Ako E., Tamokwe B., et al. *Le Commerce Transfrontalier Informel des Produits Agricoles et Horticoles entre le Cameroun et ses voisins de la CEMAC: Implications sur la Sécurité Alimentaire Sous régionale*. Économie rurale Investment Climate and Business Environment Research Fund (ICBE-RF): Dakar, Senegal., 2011.

³⁸⁷ Now used to refer to the currency Communauté Financière Africaine – CFA franc, the CFA came into existence many years before the creation of a common Euro currency and was used to identify the French colonies and communities in Africa (Colonies / Communauté françaises d’Afrique) prior to their independence. The CFA franc was created by former French colonies with a fixed exchange rate against the French franc as a means of escaping the devaluation of the French franc after the Second World War. Consisting of two kinds: The West African CFA franc and the Central African CFA franc, this currency is currently being used in fourteen African countries, two of which were colonised by other European countries Guinea-Bissau (colonised by Portugal) and Equatorial Guinea (Spanish colony) and twelve of which were former French colonies: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, and Gabon.

³⁸⁸ Zafar A., Kubota K. *Regional Integration in Central Africa: Key Issues*. The World Bank. 2003.

³⁸⁹ French equatorial Africa. URL : <https://www.loc.gov/resource/gdclccn.a22000965/?sp=1> (date of access : 10.02.2021).

³⁹⁰ Ibid.



Source: Adapted from the CEMAC Official Website. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Locating-CEMAC-in-Africa-Source-The-Habari-Network-2012_fig1_323870868 (date of access : 10.02.2021).

Sub-regional multilateralism is one of the most expressive and dynamic dimensions of the implementation of Cameroonian foreign policy. At the same time according to the happy expression of Guillaume Devin, institutional management of closeness and deployment of neighbourhood diplomacy, sub-regional multilateralism could be a part of the several Cameroonian «foreign policy diplomacies». In the analysis of sub-regional multilateralism, three major institutional frameworks (in view of their economic, political and geopolitical importance) can be briefly presented, in particular the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)³⁹¹.

³⁹¹ Nkendah R. «Estimating the informal cross-border trade of agricultural and horticultural commodities between Cameroon and its CEMAC neighbours.» *Food Policy* 41 (2013): 133-144.

The relationship between Cameroon and Bangui-based CEMAC is both part of a political commitment and part of the pursuit of related strategic goals that are critical to building continental unity and the country's economic viability³⁹².

Cameroon occupies a strategic position in Central Africa at the crossroads of the Sudanese world and the Bantu world. On the sub-regional geopolitical chessboard, the country manifests in multiple respects as a country with geographic continuity with the rest of the sub-region, and her internal economic and social influence has a significant impact on the lives of neighboring countries. A role as a regional economic locomotive stems from this pivotal place in Central Africa. Cameroon's participation in the life of CEMAC is based on these geographical, anthropological-cultural and politico-axiological fundamentals.

Geophysically, Cameroon is obviously part of Central Africa. The country shares borders with all other CEMAC countries, notably: Chad (North), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo (South), Central African Republic (East). Forested southern Cameroon belongs to the greater Congo basin, while the northern Sahel is in geophysical continuity with Chad and the CAR. Cameroon is strongly integrated into Central Africa from the point of view of settlement. There is an anthropological continuity with the other neighboring countries of Central Africa. In the south, the Beti-Bulu-Fang (Pahouins) populations who live on both sides of the state borders precede in a way to a human unification of Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea³⁹³. The same is true in the east of the country with the Gbayas populations that Cameroon shares with the CAR. In the north, the Arab populations of Choas, Moundangs, Kotokos, etc. straddle Cameroon and Chad.

³⁹² Multinational: Central Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2019-2025. URL : https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/board_documents/central_africa_risp_2019-2025_final_english.pdf (date of access : 14.02.2020).

³⁹³ Meye Lydie Ella. La région transfrontalière à l'épreuve de la régulation et de la tolérance de l'immigration. Etats, individus et réseaux dans les migrations africaines. 2004. P. 173-187.

Cameroon's anchoring in CEMAC is also political and symbolic. At the political level, we note that Cameroon belongs to the group of countries in the process of democratization, which characterizes the political life of the states of Central Africa, from Gabon to Equatorial Guinea and from Chad to the Congo. From a symbolic point of view, Cameroon is considered by the other Central African states as a «brother country» and is thus projected as a pole of investment, hope, and expectation in the sub-region where an intense circulation of refugees from the states of the sub-region towards Cameroon and the construction of the country as a place of origin in the imaginations of ethnic groups such as the Rwandan Hutus, the Gabonese Fangs and the Central African Gbayas, etc.

Cameroon's CEMAC policy is part of a number of strategic objectives related to the implementation of her regional doctrine.

The first objective is that of the institutionalization of «concentric circles of solidarity» which is based on putting basis of «sub-regional cooperation organizations constituting realistic, articulated and coherent economic wholes»³⁹⁴. The international policy of «concentric circles of solidarity» is what «explains [the] attitude [of Cameroon] towards the various efforts in [the] Central African sub-region, in all the states grouped within UDEAC (...)»³⁹⁵.

The second strategic objective of relations between Cameroon and CEMAC is a part of the implementation of the non-hegemonic regional policy built into the cardinal doctrine of foreign policy. Cameroon's strategy of international affirmation, based on the defense of legitimate national interests and the avoidance of the complex of the first leader, leads to the choice of sub-regional multilateralism as a framework for regional action. Sub-regional multilateralism is thus a means of sharing the burden of leadership in the region.

The third strategic goal of Cameroon-CEMAC relations is to accelerate the construction of sub-regional integration. According to President Paul Biya «In the

³⁹⁴Paul B. Opening speech of the eighteenth UDEAC summit, Yaoundé in *Anthologie des discours*. 12 December 1982. Vol. I. P. 54.

³⁹⁵Paul B. Opening speech of the eighteenth UDEAC summit, Yaoundé in *Anthologie des discours*. 12 December 1982. Vol. I. P. 56.

regional or sub-regional framework, Cameroon endeavors to promote integration orientated towards common objectives of economic and social development³⁹⁶ [...] It is in this sense that the pursuit of the work of unification of Central Africa, based on the current framework of the Union of Central African States (UDEAC), deserves all the efforts of our country³⁹⁷«. Cameroon, as the dominant economy of CEMAC, plays a major role in boosting regional integration at the governmental, entrepreneurial and civil society levels.

At the legal level, the country is a party to the Accords, following conventions and pacts:

-Pact of non-aggression, solidarity and mutual assistance between the CEMAC Member States signed on January 28, 2004³⁹⁸;

-Convention on the fight against terrorism signed on May 25, 2004³⁹⁹;

- Judicial cooperation agreement signed on January 28, 2004⁴⁰⁰;

- Extradition agreement between CEMAC members signed on January 28, 2004⁴⁰¹.

At the political and institutional level, Cameroon is fully involved in CEMAC. In the area of institutional participation, Cameroon plays an active and leading role in all CEMAC bodies. The country is a member of the Economic Union of Central Africa (UEAC), the Monetary Union of Central Africa (UMAC),

³⁹⁶ Biya P. Un nouvel élan. Africa Multi Media. 1997.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. P. 23-24.

³⁹⁸ Le Pacte de non agression, de solidarité et d'assistance mutuelle entre les États membres de la CEMAC, adopté à Brazzaville le 28 janvier 2004 (ratifié par le décret N°2006/50 du 30 janvier 2006. URL : <http://www.droit-afrique.com/upload/doc/cemac/CEMAC-Accord-2004-pacte-non-agression.pdf> (date of access: 21.12.2020).

³⁹⁹CEMAC-Convention-on-the-Fight-Against-Terrorism. URL : <https://www.lawandisrael.org/wp-content/uploads/Topics/Terrorism/Anti-Terror-Legislation/Regional/CEMAC-Convention-on-the-Fight-Against-Terrorism.pdf> (date of access: 21.12.2020).

⁴⁰⁰ L'Accord de coopération judiciaire entre les États membres de la Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale (CEMAC), adopté à Brazzaville le 28 janvier 2004 (ratifié par le décret N°2006/48 du 30 janvier 2006.

⁴⁰¹ L'Accord d'extradition entre les États membres de la CEMAC, adopté à Brazzaville le 28 janvier 2004 (ratifié par le décret N° 2006/49 du 30 janvier 2006.

the Community Court of Justice and about twenty specialized institutions of CEMAC.

Cameroon is actively involved in the development and dissemination of the CEMAC sub-regional international regime, constantly striving to incorporate into its national practice the norms and values carried and promoted by the organisation. Amongst these norms and values to which Cameroon adheres, we can mention the construction of a common sub-regional space structured around the rule of law, democracy and human rights, political and economic governance, the preservation ecosystems and environmental standards, the facilitation of the free movement of goods for people through the establishment of a CEMAC passport, and the creation of «structural axes» linking the various Member States, the establishment of a regional motor vehicle liability insurance through the CEMAC pink card, support for legal instruments for the promotion of peace and security and effective participation in the sub-regional peacekeeping force, in this case FOMUC⁴⁰².

With regard to Cameroon's economic commitment in the CEMAC, it appears more substantial due to her support the initiatives undertaken in the development of the macroeconomic framework through the Regional Reform Program (PRR), tax and customs reforms and the coordination of economic policies. Since 2001 in any case, Cameroon has participated to the negotiations and the adoption of texts on the reform of corporate tax, the revision of the customs code, the economic regimes applicable to the region, the approval of customs experts and brokers. Actions are under way to harmonize national immigration regulations and settlement rights and to develop Community legislation to remove barriers to the free movement of people and goods; rationalize border controls.

⁴⁰²Activités de la FOMUC et déploiement de l'EUFOR Tchad/RCA. URL :REPUBLICQUE CENTRAFRICAINE (RCA) / UNION AFRICAINE / CONSEIL DE PAIX ET DE SECURITE 130EME REUNION | Database of Press Releases related to Africa - APO-Source (wordpress.com) (date of access: 21.12.2020).

Regional peacekeeping remains relevant to Central Africa for a number of reasons. First, it enables member countries to use their limited resources for domestic development needs. Second, it also gives the country an opportunity to test its military potential. As mentioned earlier, due to limited resources, Cameroon's participation in international peacekeeping missions is often driven more by the desire to obtain financial support for its armed forces than to address peace and security issues. This issue explains why a sub-regional body is vital to Cameroon's foreign policy.

In addition, Cameroon has invested both human and financial resources to achieve sustainable peace and security in Central Africa through participation in missions, as well as negotiations and other peace and security initiatives. It is known that the state has succeeded in establishing a negotiating process in a number of conflicts between ECOWAS and CEMAC member countries, even when other regional leaders failed to do so. These countries include, Darfur⁴⁰³, Congo, Soudan.

Cameroon belongs to the Central African zone which has been illustrated for several years by a proliferation of conflicts. However, the phenomenon of globalization experienced since the end of the cold war has confirmed the interdependence between states, including in terms of security. Thus, the participation of Cameroon in the peacekeeping operations aims first of all at her own security with regard to her geographical proximity with a number of sources of tension, in particular in the Central African sub-region undermined by numerous civil wars⁴⁰⁴. Raising more security concerns outside the conflict zone

⁴⁰³Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly. URL : Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly (date of access: 16.01.2020).

⁴⁰⁴Ropivia M.L. L'Afrique centrale embrasée : pour une géopolitique de pacification régionale. In enjeu numéro 25, la prévention des conflits en Afrique centrales pour une culture de paix.

strictly speaking, because, of the phenomenon of regional expansion of the conflicts initially circumscribed on a national level⁴⁰⁵.

At the sub-regional level, officers from the Cameroon Defense Forces have been deployed with other blue helmets in EX-Zaire (KIVU)⁴⁰⁶, Chad⁴⁰⁷, CAR⁴⁰⁸, Burundi⁴⁰⁹, Ivory Coast⁴¹⁰ and Rwanda⁴¹¹. To stick to this sub-region, let us mention in details that a contingent of 20 soldiers intervened in South KIVU at the request of the High Commissioner for Refugees in 1995, later, a group of 03, then 05 officers have also intervened in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo as observers since the same year, 1995. One of our troops' staff officers also participated to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC)⁴¹² to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement in the country⁴¹³.

⁴⁰⁵ The phenomenon of regionalization of internal crisis in certain countries was experienced in the case of the Great Lakes conflict that started with the Rwandan genocide. We also currently have the case of Darfur and its impact in Chad, the Central African Republic and Cameroon.

⁴⁰⁶ Secretary-General Condemns Deadly Attack on Peacekeepers in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo. URL : <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?f1=series&as=1&sf=title&so=a&rm=&m1=p&p1=UN%20Press%20Release.%20Secretary-General.%20Statement&ln=en> (date of access: 10.01.2020).

⁴⁰⁷ Resolution 1834 (2008) / adopted by the Security Council at its 5981st meeting, on 24 September 2008. URL : Security Council resolution 1834 (2008) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)] (date of access: 08.04.2020).

⁴⁰⁸ Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly. URL : <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3954934?ln=en> (date of access: 08.04.2020).

⁴⁰⁹ Resolution 2090 (2013) / adopted by the Security Council at its 6918th meeting, on 13 February 2013. URL : <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/743816?ln=en> (date of access: 21.12.2020).

⁴¹⁰ Resolution 2000 (2011) / adopted by the Security Council at its 6591st meeting, on 27 July 2011. URL : Security Council resolution 2000 (2011) [on renewal of the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 31 July 2012] (date of access: 21.12.2020).

⁴¹¹ Resolution 1332 (2000) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4247th meeting, on 14 December 2000. URL : Security Council resolution 1332 (2000) [on extension of the mandate of UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)]

⁴¹² Resolution 1925 (2010) / adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on 28 May 2010. URL : <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/683422?ln=en> (date of access: 21.12.2020).

⁴¹³ Messia Ngong L. La diplomatie militaire camerounaise. La diplomatie militaire camerounaise. 2019. P. 65.

In the CAR, the Cameroonian government made available to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) on February 8, 1999, personnel for the training of the civilian police. When MINURCA's mandate expired in February 2000, a senior Cameroonian officer served as head of training for the civilian police; a function which has been maintained within the framework of the United Nations Support Office for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

Internal stability. This is a prerequisite for sending Cameroonian soldiers to areas of activity outside the national territory. The maintenance of territorial integrity and domestic stability is the first priority, and the deployment of the national defense forces to the sea is the guarantee of national sovereignty. This is why during the border conflict on the Bakassi peninsula, which called for the mobilization of forces for this question of internal security and sovereignty, it was almost difficult or even impossible to have large contingents of soldiers who could be mobilized for the operations of peacekeeping, despite the political will of the government.

3.4. Cameroon and the European Union: Interaction and Prospects Cooperation

Relations between Cameroon and the EU are governed by the Cotonou Agreement. The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 in the capital of Benin and revised in 2005 in Luxembourg, links the EU with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP)⁴¹⁴. This agreement is the most ambitious and the broadest agreement concluded between developed and developing countries. It supersedes the Lomé Convention signed at Lomé in 1975⁴¹⁵. The main purpose

⁴¹⁴ Delegation of the European Union to Cameroon. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/guinea/documents/eu_guinea/accord_de_cotonou_25_juin_2005_fr.pdf (date of access 10.02.2020).

⁴¹⁵ Accord de Cotonou. De Lomé I à Lomé IV bis/ – URL: http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/lome_history_fr.htm (date of access 10.02.2020).

of this support and trade agreement is to encourage and accelerate the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP states, on the one hand, and to strengthen and diversify their relations with the EU and its Member States in a spirit of solidarity and mutual interest, on the other hand. The Cotonou Agreement defines three directions cooperation: political cooperation, trade and economic cooperation and financial cooperation.

A major political and development actor, the EU is also Cameroon's leading trading partner. Relations between the EU and Cameroon date back several decades. The year 2017 marked the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which establishes the European common market and establishes the policy of cooperation with the future African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries.

A major political and development actor, the EU is also Cameroon's leading trading partner. Relations between the EU and Cameroon date back several decades. The year 2017 marked the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which establishes the European common market and establishes the policy of cooperation with the future African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries. The strategic objectives of the EU's relationship with Cameroon are:

1. Promote and support government efforts in favor of human rights, good public governance, improvement of the business environment, sustainable management of natural resources, fight against corruption, gender equality and minority rights in compliance with international agreements signed by Cameroon, which guarantee social and security stability;

2. Advance the coherence of national policies as described in the Strategy Paper for Growth and Employment (DSCE) in the service of modern, transparent and efficient management of public finances, and modernization of the production apparatus, essential to poverty reduction and the objective of inclusive and job-creating growth;

3. Support the growth of the agricultural sector, the development of the most vulnerable and poor rural, semi-urban and peri-urban areas, through support for the DSCE objectives in terms of integrated rural development;

4. Implement the Step Agreement towards an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and carry out the actions and procedures for its replacement by the EU-Central Africa Regional Economic Partnership Agreement currently under negotiation. After ratification, the Stage Agreement towards an Economic Partnership Agreement will govern, with the financial support of the EDF, in particular the Regional Indicative Program (RIP), and other forms of financing, all commercial relations between the EU and Cameroon. Its dual trade and development vocation will enable it to contribute to the achievement of the country's trade-based growth and sustainable development objectives;

5. Encourage the complementarity of technical and financial partners, particularly at the level of European aid via a move towards multi-annual joint programming and the alignment of aid with Cameroon's development policy transcribed in the DSCE and with sectoral strategies.

The procedures of Cameroon-European Union cooperation. Interactions between Cameroon and the EU are part of at least two main processes: one economic linked to the granting of development aid, and the other, more political, based on an in-depth political dialogue with the Cameroonian government.

– *The economic process:* development aid is the main modality of economic cooperation between the EU and Cameroon. The EU intended to increase development aid to 0.7% of GNP States by 2015. Aid resources are allocated through the European Development Fund (FED) which is in its 10th allocation. This includes subsidies earmarked for financing development programs («aid linked to specific projects, support for sector programmes, general sector budget support, aid humanitarian aid and crisis prevention assistance, support for civil society and via civil society, rapprochement standards, rules and legislation, etc.»)

416.

Table 6.

⁴¹⁶ Louis M. Le consensus européen pour le développement, Luxembourg, Communautés européennes. 2006.

Development programmes of the European Development Fund for Cameroon.

Development programmes	Years
First FED	1959-1964
Second FED	1964-1970(The Yaoundé I Convention
Third FED	1970-1975 (The Yaoundé II Convention)
Fourth FED	1975-1980 (The Lomé I Convention)
Convention Sixth FED	1985-1990 (The Lomé III Convention)
Seventh FED	1990-1995 (The Lomé IV Convention)
Eighth FED	1995-2000 (The Lomé IV Convention The mid-term review IV bis)
Ninth FED	2000-2007 (Cotonou Agreement)
Tenth FED	2008-2013 (The Cotonou Agreement review)

Source: compiled by the author

The Cotonou Agreement stipulates that political dialogue is an important aspect of partnership. Wanted global, balanced and thorough, it sets itself among other objectives: «to encourage mutual understanding and to facilitate the definition of common priorities and principles (...), It also includes an assessment of regular developments relating to respect for the rights of rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and the good management of public affairs (...)»⁴¹⁷.

⁴¹⁷ Articles 8 de l'Accord de Cotonou, op. cit., P. 8 - 9.

The Cotonou Agreement⁴¹⁸ aims to smoothly integrate the Organisation of African Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP)⁴¹⁹ States into the world economy, by strengthening their production, supply and trade capacities. This requires a growing ability to attract investment, establish strong trade and investment policies, and deal effectively with all trade-related issues.

The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are the commercial pillar of the Cotonou Agreement. They reflect a common ambition to create a new partnership between the EU and the various ACP regions, including Central Africa. This strengthened economic partnership aims to put trade at the service of development⁴²⁰.

An EPA has been negotiated since 2003 between the EU and Central Africa (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Chad)⁴²¹.

However, given the difficulties inherent in negotiating an agreement covering a large number of countries, Cameroon and the EU agreed on December 17, 2007 on an interim EPA⁴²² to be applied until a regional agreement can enter into force. The main advantage of this option was to allow Cameroon to continue to benefit from trade preferences that it could have lost, in the event of application of the rules of the World Trade Organization.

The interim EPA grants Cameroon duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market, while import duties on 80% categories of goods originating in the EU will be dismantled by Cameroon over a period of 15 years old. These are mainly non-locally produced inputs used by Cameroonian industry. The elimination of

⁴¹⁸ The Cotonou Agreement. URL :<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=celex:22000A1215%2801%29> (date of access: 18.09.2021).

⁴¹⁹ ACP official website. URL : <http://www.acp.int/content/secretariat-acp> (date of access: 18.09.2021).

⁴²⁰ Fiche d'information sur l'Accord de Partenariat Economique intérimaire UE-AFRIQUE CENTRALE (Cameroun). URL : Fiche APE intérimaires - Afrique Central: Cameroon (europa.eu) (date of access: 18.09.2021).

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² Journal officiel de l'Union européenne. URL : <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2009:057:FULL&from=EN> (date of access: 18.09.2021).

import duties will reduce input costs for local businesses and will also benefit consumers⁴²³.

Cameroon has excluded 20% of goods originating in the EU from the dismantling of tariffs to ensure the protection of certain local agricultural markets and industries, but also to maintain tax revenues. The excluded goods were mainly agricultural and non-agricultural processed products and they include most types of meat, wine and spirits, malt, dairy products, flour, certain vegetables, wood and wood products, used clothing and textiles, paints and used tires⁴²⁴.

The Agreement also includes commitments by the EU and its Member States to help Cameroon improve its competitiveness, as well as measures to help exporters meet EU import standards (sanitary and phytosanitary measures). In addition, it includes cooperation on the establishment of more efficient customs procedures, as well as tax adjustment, to ensure that the removal of customs duties will not destabilize the country's public finances.

Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and used for the first time in 1959, the objective of the European Development Fund (EDF) is currently the financing of the cooperation activities provided for by the Cotonou Agreement. In Cameroon, between the 1st EDF signed in 1960 and the 11th EDF signed in 2014, the tool provided more than 953.43 million euros (626 billion CFA francs) in development grants for projects in various fields.: infrastructure, environment and forests, education, health, trade and industry, agro-industry, rural development, social projects, etc. Cameroon also benefits from the regional envelope of the 11th EDF for Central Africa which has as priority areas: political integration and cooperation in matters of security and peace, economic and commercial integration and sustainable management of resources, nature and biodiversity.

⁴²³ European Commission official website. URL : Regions - Trade - European Commission (europa.eu) (date of access: 18.09.2021).

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

In 2009, the EU and Cameroon signed a Funding Agreement aiming to support the improvement of governance in the timber sector in Cameroon⁴²⁵. The implementation of this Agreement called for a national Legality Assurance Scheme (LAS) for wood, and included three components: strengthening the capacities of the Ministry in charge of forests; supporting the establishment of a new traceability system for wood; and supporting the creation of an independent audit mechanism for the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and trade (FLEGT)⁴²⁶ system. This support for the establishment of the measures set out by the Voluntary Partnership Agreement also involves mobilizing the thematic budget headings of the European Commission under the Environment and Natural Resources Thematic Programme (ENRTP), which mainly supports the involvement of national civil society organizations in the FLEGT process. The EU's financial contribution for these different projects and programs is estimated at 6.6 billion FCFA⁴²⁷.

Since 1975, trade relations between the ACP countries and the EU have been based on a regime of non-reciprocal trade preferences, which gives almost all goods from the ACP countries duty-free access to the European market. However, these trade preferences have not stopped the growing marginalization of ACP markets in world trade or in exchange with the EU. They also failed to overcome the high dependence of ACP countries on certain export commodities.

⁴²⁵ Décret №2016/367 du 03 août 2016 fixant les règles d'origine et les méthodes de coopération administrative applicables aux marchandises de l'Union Européenne dans le cadre de l'Accord d'étape vers l'Accord de Partenariat Economique. URL : <https://www.prc.cm/fr/multimedia/documents/4756-decret-n-2016-367-du-03-08-2016-ape> (date of access: 18.09.2021).

⁴²⁶ Accord de partenariat volontaire entre l'union européenne et la république du cameroun sur l'application des réglementations forestières, la gouvernance et les échanges commerciaux des bois et produits dérivés vers l'union européenne (FLEGT) URL : Microsoft Word - APV version signée.DOC (europa.eu) (date of access: 18.09.2021).

⁴²⁷ Accord de partenariat volontaire entre l'union européenne et la république du cameroun sur l'application des réglementations forestières, la gouvernance et les échanges commerciaux des bois et produits dérivés vers l'union européenne (FLEGT) URL : Microsoft Word - APV version signée.DOC (europa.eu) (date of access: 18.09.2021).

Today, the EU is Cameroon's leading trading partner. Cameroon's exports to the European market are estimated at 46% of total exports. Its imports from the EU account for about 35% of all imports⁴²⁸. Most of Cameroon's global trade flows are concentrated in the CEMAC zone. The same applies to almost half of the sub-region's GDP and population. The EU remains Cameroon's leading trading partner.

The Cotonou Agreement is aimed at the smooth integration of the ACP countries into the world economy, strengthening their production, supply and trade potential.

The Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP). Its mission is to contribute to the prevention of crises, to react to them in order to propose solutions, while creating a safe and stable environment throughout the world.

The Emergency Trust Fund for stability and the fight against the root causes of irregular migration and the phenomenon of displaced persons in Africa.

This fund aims to strengthen regional stability in order to respond to the challenges of irregular migration and forced displacement. It also aims to facilitate the management of migration.

The instrument «Civil society organizations and local authorities». Its objective is to strengthen civil society organizations and local authorities, with the aim of improving governance and accountability through an inclusive policy-making process, the aim being to enable citizens and populations to express and structure their demands, particularly in the fight against injustice and inequality.

Banana Accompanying Measures (MAB). These measures aim to strengthen the competitiveness of the banana sector, promote economic diversification and address broader social, economic and environmental impacts. In Cameroon, the projects aim more specifically to improve the working and

⁴²⁸ Accord de partenariat volontaire entre l'union européenne et la république du cameroun sur l'application des réglementations forestières, la gouvernance et les échanges commerciaux des bois et produits dérivés vers l'union européenne (FLEGT) URL : Microsoft Word - APV version signée.DOC (europa.eu) (date of access: 18.09.2021).

living conditions of workers, and to improve the environmental conditions for banana production⁴²⁹.

EU humanitarian aid, through the European Commission's Directorate for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), focuses on needs, while paying particular attention to the most vulnerable victims. In Cameroon, the EU's humanitarian funds make it possible to provide aid to refugees, in terms of accommodation, food, access to drinking water, sanitation, health care and protection of childhood.

European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB is the bank of the EU and the largest multilateral borrower and lender in the world. Since October 2016, the headquarters of the EIB Regional Office for Central Africa has been in Yaoundé.

As part of the «Sustainable Energy for All» (SE4ALL) process and on the occasion of the «Focus on Energy», which was held during the Paris Climate Conference (COP21), the Cameroonian government, the European Commission and France signed a joint declaration to strengthen cooperation on sustainable energy and climate change on December 7, 2015. This document constitutes a political commitment by the three parties with a view to defining concrete actions which are gradually being implemented⁴³⁰.

Partnership with the EU is seen by Cameroon as an important and effective tool for improving living conditions in the country. It requires trust and mutual understanding. It allows Cameroon to count on political, economic and financial assistance. A very important part of the partnership is the achievement of common positions and the development of common approaches to solving the problems of peace and security in Africa, Europe and throughout the world. The main focus is on three areas. First, the partnership highlights the need for a better common

⁴²⁹ Banana Programme – Banana support measures (MAB) – Axis 4 – expansion of plantations Cameroon 2016. URL : <https://www.welcomeurope.com/en/calls-projects/banana-programme-banana-support-measures-mab-axis-4-expansion-of-plantations-cameroon-2016/> (date of access: 18.09.2021).

⁴³⁰ Déclaration Conjointe De l'Union Européenne, De La République Du Cameroun Et De La République Française Concernant Une Coopération Renforcée Dans Le Domaine De L'énergie Durable. URL : [declaration_conjointe_0.pdf](#) (europa.eu) (date of access: 22.11.2021).

understanding of the causes of conflicts and their resolution. Second, the importance of strengthening cooperation in the prevention and regulation of conflicts, including in the long term, is noted. Finally, we are talking about cooperation in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and peace consolidation. Improved coordination of approaches and initiatives in this area are recognized as fundamental cooperation in the field of security. According to Cameroon, the concept of partnership with the EU implies sustainable, long-term cooperation, which is necessary for both sides. It can become a new tool in the development of political and economic cooperation, as well as cooperation in the field of security.

Thus, we can conclude that the issues of peace, security and integration are central to Cameroon's foreign policy in Africa. It is shown that as a result of the adoption and implementation of the updated concept of Cameroon's foreign policy, it will be possible to strengthen regional and global national security; create a favorable international environment around Cameroon and strengthen friendly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with all countries and states of the world; ensure a high level of integration of Cameroon into the international community and the world economy, based on the diversification of the national economy; as well as to strengthen international cooperation in the cultural, humanitarian, scientific, educational and other related fields. The Republic of Cameroon continues the policy of diversifying its partnerships in the international diplomatic arena. President P. Biya is developing economic partnerships with the AU, the UN, the EU and other international partners. The EU-Cameroon cooperation program is designed to promote the implementation of economic and social reforms in the country. This cooperation is necessary for the growing Cameroon to acquire the best experience and skills. The cooperation program between the EU and Cameroon is unique, because it is the result of an ongoing constructive dialogue between the EU and Cameroon.

CONCLUSION

In the conclusion section of the research, the findings of the work done are summarized, including the main conclusions and generalizations.

It is concluded that the foreign policy of the modern Republic of Cameroon is aimed at creating a wide range of international partnerships in the interests of national development, security and achieving a multi-level presence of the Republic of Cameroon in the system of international relations. The principle of independence, which presupposes equality between Cameroon and all developed and developing countries, has always had a methodological importance in the development of Cameroon's foreign policy. This model of foreign policy is also based on the following basic principles: consensus at all levels of political interaction; the inviolability of the political and economic sovereignty, pragmatism and mutual benefit in international cooperation, equal representation of the parties in all cases of integration. The foreign policy of Cameroon is built within the framework of a differentiated approach and several levels of interaction with foreign countries and international organizations.

It is shown that foreign policy is the most important tool and condition for the implementation of the state course of Cameroon. It aimed at unlocking the development potential of the country. The conclusion substantiated that the President of the country plays a key role in the process of making foreign policy decisions which noticeably actualizes the task of analyzing the institution of presidential power and the role of the President in determining the main directions and priorities of Cameroon foreign policy.

The findings equally show that during the period 1960-2021 foreign policy is becoming one of the most important tools for the country's progressive development to ensure its competitiveness in the region. Despite the internal political upheavals that took place in 1984, Cameroon continued to introduce a successful foreign policy, and the main reason for the success of diplomacy is precisely to ensure continuity in foreign policy and to apply the course initiated by A. Ahidjo in accordance to modern realities.

It is shown that Cameroon is a presidential republic and the key role in the process of making foreign policy decisions belongs to the president of the country, who determines the main directions and priorities of foreign policy; Also, the positive image of Cameroon on the world stage is the result of the diplomatic efforts of the presidents who led the country at different stages of her development. Hence, the diplomatic activity is one of the areas to which the head of state pays special attention.

The characteristic of modern diplomacy of Cameroon, which can be called «multilateral diplomacy», is presented due to its active participation to global, regional and sub-regional organizations such as the UN, the AU and CEMAC.

It has been established that external factors have a strong influence on the foreign policy of Cameroon. It is possible to single out two stages in the foreign policy of Cameroon since independence:

The first stage (1960-1982) – the formation of an independent foreign policy – is associated with the process of building a new state in an independent Cameroon, headed by President A. Ahidjo. The foreign policy of Cameroon during the presidency of A. Ahidjo was carried out on the principles of pragmatic isolationism, neutrality and dialogue in international affairs;

The second stage (the post-1982) – the expansion of foreign policy activity – began with the coming to power of President P. Biya (1982). At this time, the multilateral diplomacy of Cameroon is being formed, especially manifested in the format of Cameroon's participation in the activities of the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, the establishment of new diplomatic missions and permanent missions. In the field of foreign policy, the priorities are peace and stability in Africa. Cameroon implements the diplomacy of non-alignment and development, the essence of which President P. Biya expressed in the maxim: «Neither left nor right, always forward».

In the development of Cameroon's foreign policy (1994-2008) – integration and stability – confirmed the continuity of the foreign policy of the previous

period. The objectives of President P. Biya 's foreign policy are to strengthen peace, contribute to the stabilization of the situation on the continent and, in particular, to resolve conflicts in Africa. Ensuring peace is, above all, an important attribute of the personal image of the President of Cameroon. The most important foreign policy priority is stability in Central Africa. Cameroon participates in mediation and peacekeeping missions in Chad, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Dialogue diplomacy is implemented in the sphere of bilateral relations.

Since 2009 – prosperity and openness. This is the stage of the course declared in Cameroon for the prosperity of the country, according to the country's plans to reach new horizons of development. At the heart of the key principle of «prosperity» was the idea of creating more wealth, more employment opportunities, more diversified economies. To this end, the President of the Republic, P. Biya, launched the Strategic Development Plan of Cameroon until 2035, the essence of which was expressed by three strategic guidelines: «Industrial Cameroon. Green Cameroon. Cameroon Service. The principles of ensuring sovereignty and international inclusion, the concept of dialogue, and the influence of the French language factor played a decisive role in the development of the foreign policy. In the field of foreign policy, a diplomacy of prosperity and openness is being implemented. The growing involvement of Cameroon in international affairs has increased the importance of foreign policy activities in the format of multilateral diplomacy.

Facts have shown that Cameroon's active participation to global, regional and sub-regional organizations is one of the main directions for achieving her foreign policy objectives. Through the AU, Cameroon has participated in numerous mediation activities in conflict resolution, election monitoring, and peacekeeping operations, and has gained international support and recognition as a leader in African affairs. Cameroon is considering participation in regional and sub-regional organizations as a continuation of domestic politics, since regional conflicts in the future can potentially move to her territory and affect her internal

security. Hence, the observance of treaty relations with CEMAC is an important direction of foreign policy states.

The results show that in the current (third) phase of development of its foreign policy, Cameroon continues to pursue a policy of diversifying her partnerships on the international stage. Cameroon's characteristic multilateral diplomacy is aimed at obtaining financial and technical assistance, as well as infrastructure development. Strong economic partnerships are developing with the EU, France, UK, Russia and China.

It is revealed that Russia and Cameroon have a history of relations. After the collapse of the USSR, the situation began to change after Russia stepped up her political dialogue with African countries, including Cameroon, which gave impetus to the expansion of economic cooperation. At the beginning of the 21st century, the parties signed agreements on trade, economic and military-technical cooperation. Successful projects, supported by the leaders of Cameroon and Russia, were initiated by a number of Russian companies. Russia has expanded development assistance to Cameroon. However, the establishment of cooperation in the new format is a slow and difficult process, complicated by intense competition from other powers.

It is shown that at present, the Sino-Cameroon relations are at a new historical milestone in their development, when both countries are striving to maintain and strengthen the achieved level. The growing participation of China in the development of Cameroon is determined by the following factors. To begin with, China has always considered the development of friendship and cooperation with Cameroon as an important basis of her foreign policy. Furthermore, China takes a pragmatic approach to cooperation with Cameroon, without any prior political conditions. Moreover, China pays more attention to humanitarian exchanges with Cameroon. Besides, China is pragmatic about resolving problems through cooperation. The Chinese side is ready to properly resolve these issues in the spirit of mutual respect, cooperation and mutual gain.

It has been established that participation in the processes of international economic integration for Cameroon is one of the effective ways to move the country to a stable position in the system of international relations, subject to the strengthening of the national economy. For Cameroon, the current international challenges, in particular the development of sub-regional integration, are of vital interest. For this reason, the country seeks to play a significant role in the creation and functioning of institutions and bodies of regional integration structures, especially through financial contributions and political initiatives, active participation in achieving the goals Economic Community of Central African Countries. Trade and economic cooperation expands Cameroon's international access to the resources of industrial and innovative development, investments, and technologies in priority sectors, providing a solution to the problem of diversification and technological modernization of the national economy, increasing her competitiveness.

It has been proven that the issues of peace, security and integration in Africa are central to Cameroon's foreign policy. At the same time, the priority goals of foreign policy activity in the modern stage includes: strengthening national security at the sub-regional, African and global levels; creating a favorable international environment around the state and achieving friendly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with all partners; ensuring a high level of integration into the international community and the world economy; expansion of scientific, educational and humanitarian cooperation, including at the sub-regional level. Thus, since independence, Cameroon's foreign policy has generally not changed in its fundamental guiding principles, regardless of which political party was in power.

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