

**PEOPLES' FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY OF RUSSIA NAMED AFTER
PATRICE LUMUMBA**

As a manuscript

LEMANTO EDUARDUS

**SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF INDONESIAN RELIGIOUS
FUNDAMENTALISM**

5.7.7. Social and political philosophy

**Thesis
For a PhD degree in philosophy**

Research supervisor:
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Moscow 2023

**ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ АВТОНОМНОЕ
ОБРАЗОВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ ВЫСШЕГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ
«УНИВЕРСИТЕТ ДРУЖБЫ НАРОДОВ ИМЕНИ ПАТРИСА ЛУМУМБЫ»**

На правах рукописи

ЛЕМАНТО Едуардус

**СОЦИАЛЬНО-ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ ИНДОНЕЗИЙСКОГО
РЕЛИГИОЗНОГО ФУНДАМЕНТАЛИЗМА**

5.7.7 Социальная и политическая философия

Диссертация

на соискание учёной степени
кандидата философских наук

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к.ф.н., доцент Черняк А.З.

Москва

2023

Table of contents

| | |
|---|-----|
| INTRODUCTION..... | 3 |
| Chapter 1. FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE BREADTH OF ITS CONCEPT..... | 17 |
| 1. Genealogy of Fundamentalism..... | 17 |
| 2. The Multifaceted Definitions of Fundamentalism..... | 22 |
| 3. Multiple Views on the Features of Fundamentalism | 33 |
| Chapter 2. INDONESIAN FUNDAMENTALISM: DYNAMICS AND COMPLEXITY ... | 43 |
| 1. A Short Description of Indonesia..... | 44 |
| 2. Indonesian Fundamentalist Groups | 48 |
| 3. Religiously and Politically Motivated Fundamentalism in Indonesian..... | 57 |
| 4. Indonesian Fundamentalism: Religious State vs. Secular State? | 69 |
| Chapter 3. A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION ON FUNDAMENTALISM | 80 |
| 1. Epistemological Issues in Fundamentalism: Critiques from the Western Philosophy .. | 86 |
| 2. Conceptual Flaws in Fundamentalism: Critiques from the Russian Philosophy..... | 135 |
| 3. Fundamentalism as Religious and Epistemological Bias | 160 |
| CONCLUSION | 178 |
| REFERENCES..... | 184 |

INTRODUCTION

Relevance of the research topic.

The topic of this study is Indonesian religious fundamentalism and its epistemological problems. In this regard, any questions that may arise during the study will be considered within the cultural, historical, philosophical, and religious contexts in Indonesia. Being one of the most closely studied problems in Indonesian society, fundamentalism in many situations becomes the main cause of conflicts on religious or political grounds. It has also become widespread as a reaction to the processes of globalization and secularization and because of the influence on the mass media, has become firmly associated with extremist movements and Islamist organizations, that in turn has led to even greater confusion in the interpretation of the concept ¹.

Fundamentalism was originally appeared in hermeneutics and then went beyond the local meaning, appearing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a religious movement of individual groups of American evangelical Christians ² who proclaim unconditional faith in the Bible and the Gospels as a virtue and the basis of daily life and eternity after death ³. It was somehow a reaction to the spirituality restructure and criticism of the dogmatic, social aspects in Christian life, which, in turn, implied the faith reduction to the practice of life. Furthermore, the foundation and subsequent development of the church dogmatics were explained mostly through philosophy and science ⁴. As an example of such results, we can consider the adoption by France of the “Law on the Separation of Church and State” ⁵. It is also important to note that fundamentalism in general is inherent not only in Christianity – it manifests itself in the activities of many other groups and sects, including Islamist ones. At the same time, the problem of

¹ See: *Simonov I.V.* Religious fundamentalism and religious traditionalism: on the question of the correct use of terms // Humanitarian Scientific Bulletin. 2017. No.11. p. 21.

² See: *Челищев В.И.* Фундаментализм в современном мире: истоки, социальная природа и политическая сущность / Автореф. Диссертации / Владимир Игоревич Челищев // Автореф... кандидата политических наук / 23.00.01: Москва.

³ See more: *Volobuev A.V.* Religious and political facets of fundamentalism // Bulletin of the Moscow State Pedagogical University. The series “Philosophical Sciences”. 2018. Vol. 25, No. 1. p. 106.

⁴ *Shagaev I.S.* Religious fundamentalism: definition of the concept and the history of its origin // Almanac of Modern Science and Education. 2014. No. 1 (80). pp. 133-134.

⁵ Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat // Legit France: URL: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000508749> (date of access: 08.11.2023).

fundamentalism terminological clarity remains unresolved due to its close relationship with the socio-cultural life of society: “Modern fundamentalism is monistic and local, tied to ethnic and religious components that somehow reflect the spirit of monistic culture and ideology”⁶.

Due to those notions, the experience of Indonesia becomes relevant, since individual religious groups with fundamentalist views are represented there, but Islamist fundamentalism has become the most widespread because of the significant number of Islam disciples. Since this phenomenon has become an imminent threat to Indonesian society, scientific communities and researchers were invited to study this phenomenon from various points of view, including political, theological, socio-cultural, and even economic. Another problem remains that the movement was viewed only from two main positions: religious and political. The first sees it as an “*inward-looking*” movement of “militant piety” aimed at restoring the role and primacy of religion, which were weakened by modernism and secularism. The second points out this phenomenon as a political movement with “*outward-looking*” goals, that contains the motifs of the political leaders to gain power through religious instruments. The main dilemma here is that both approaches stick to their respective positions, ignoring the underlying relationship between them.

The degree of scientific development of the problem.

The literature used for the study of fundamentalism is divided into three groups. The first is the work of modern scientists, which raises a topic related to fundamentalism and its conceptual problems. The second is the works devoted to the epistemological problems of fundamentalism, in particular the works of recognized researchers in the field of religious fundamentalism. The third is the works of philosophers, both Western and Russian, which, according to the author, are relevant and can be used to study issues of epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of religion related to fundamentalism⁷.

⁶ Cite from: Мальковская И.А., Почта Ю.М. Фундаментализм – угроза или спасение? // Социальное: истоки, структурные профили, современные вызовы / под общ. ред. П.К. Гречко, Е.М. Курмелевой. М.: РОССПЭН, 2009. С. 362.

⁷ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1328%26context%3Ddetd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

Speaking about the *first* group, we should note that it is characterized by a variety of approaches to the study of fundamentalism. This diversity is of particular interest for research, as it draws attention to the study of the phenomenon of fundamentalism in various religious traditions, both Christianity and Islam ⁸.

In the dissertation, the following works were used as sources on the theoretical foundations of fundamentalism and their interpretation: J. Barr “*Fundamentalism*” (1981) and “*Escaping from Fundamentalism*” (1984) ⁹, K. Armstrong “*Battle for God*” (2000) ¹⁰, B. Tibi “*The Challenge of Fundamentalism*” (2002) ¹¹, F. Rahman Malik “*Islam*” (1979), “*Islam and Modernity: Intellectual Transformation*” (1979), “*Revival and Reformation in Islam*” (2000) ¹², M. Barkun “*Religion and Right-wing Nationalists: the Origins of the Christian Identity movement*” (1994) ¹³, H. Markovitch “*Religious Fundamentalism*” (2010) ¹⁴, as well as the works of Indonesian scientists, such as A. S.

⁸ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁹ Author's note: Professor J. Barr (1924-2006) was a Scottish scholar of the Old Testament. He was a professor at Oxford University from 1976 to 1978 and taught Hebrew at Regius from 1978 to 1989. Through fundamentalism and a kind of “escape from it”, J. Barr criticized conservative evangelicalism and its supporters, such as J. Parker, who insisted on the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures. For more see: *Barr J. Escaping from Fundamentalism*. London: SCM Press. 1984; *Barr J. Fundamentalism*. London: SCM Press. 1981.

¹⁰ Author's note: K. Armstrong (born 1944) is a British writer, widely known for her works on comparative religious studies, focused on the general features of religions, such as mercy, compassion and the “golden rule of morality”. This work uses her book “*The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*”. For more information see: *Armstrong K. Battle for God*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2000.

¹¹ Author's note: Professor B. Tibi (born 1944) is a German political scientist of Syrian origin, a specialist in Islamic studies and in the field of Middle East studies. For more information see: *Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism*. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press. 2002; *Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1998.

¹² Author's note: Professor F. Rahman Malik (1919-1988) was a Pakistani modernist scholar and Islamic philosopher known for his support of the reformation of Islam. In Indonesia, the philosophical ideas of F. Rahman's ideas about religion and Islamic philosophy inspired many scholars, such as N. Majid and A. S. Maarif, who were his students, as well as A. Azra and many modern Islamic intellectuals. For more see: *Rahman R. Islam*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1979; *Rahman F. Islam and Modernity: An Intellectual Transformation*. Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica. 1979; *Rahman F. Islam and Modernity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1982; *Rahman F. Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalism*. Edited and with an introduction by Ebrahim Moosa. Oxford: One world Publications. 2000.

¹³ M. Barkun (born 1938) is a political scientist who served as Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He is a specialist in the field of political and religious extremism and the relationship between religion and violence. For more information see: *Barkun M. Religion and the Racist Right: The Origin of the Christian Identity Movement*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press. 1997.

¹⁴ Markowitz is a graduate of Temple University. He started journalism in 1976 and worked for the Pottsville Republican newspaper. He retired from the field in 2006, and since 1999 began writing popular science books and by 2020 became the author of 200 works published in several publishing houses. For more information, see: *Marcovitz H. Religious Fundamentalism*. San Diego: ReferencePoint Press. 2010.

Maarif¹⁵, N. Majid¹⁶, and A. Azra¹⁷. From their point of view, although fundamentalism is not directly synonymous with the radical movement, nevertheless, some of its forms increase the likelihood that this movement will develop into a radical one. In the Russian science it is important to point out researchers who work on the problems of fundamentalism, such as: Yu.M. Pochta¹⁸, A.V. Volobuev¹⁹, I.V. Kudryasheva²⁰, E.V.

¹⁵ Professor A. S. Maarif (1935-2022) is a prominent Islamic cleric and an authoritative Indonesian Islamic intellectual. He was Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Muhammadiyah, President of the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) and founder of the Maarif Institute. Maarif was a disciple of Fazlur Rahman. Like his intellectual mentor, Maarif was an adherent of liberal Islam. Budi Munawar Rahman considers Maarif an Islamic neo-modernist. For more information, see: *Maarif A. S. Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita* (Eng: Identity Politics and the Future of Our Pluralism). Jakarta: PUSAD Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2010.

¹⁶ Professor Nurcholish Majid (1939-2005) is an outstanding Indonesian Islamic intellectual. He was also a prominent member of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia: Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars). At one time, he served as Rector of Paramadin University. Majid was known for his idea of Islamic reform. His leading ideas in Indonesian politics were the ideas of a secular state, pluralism and religious freedom. He was a staunch supporter of religious pluralism. His ideas have sparked discussion among Muslim scholars, especially with Islamic literalists-textualists. Among many other controversial ideas of Majid was his political idea. In the 1970s, Majid opposed the "mainstream" in politics, criticizing Islamic politicians who sought to create Islamic political parties. His famous political slogan was: "Yes to Islam, no to Islamic political parties." For more information see: *Madjid N. Islam Doktrin dan Peradaban: Sebuah Telaah Kritis tentang Masalah Keimanan, Kemanusiaan, dan Kemoderan* (Eng: Doctrinal Islam and Civilization: A Critical Study of Faith, Humanity, and Modernity). Jakarta: Paramadina. 1992.

¹⁷ Professor A. Azra (1955-2022) is a prominent Indonesian Islamic intellectual. In 1992, he graduated from the History Department of Columbia University. HASAN, GAGASAN, GAGASAN (UNDEF) GAGASAN (Institute of Democracy dan Bantu Pemerintah). In 2010, he received the rank of Commander of the Order of the British Empire, an honorary Order of the United Kingdom. For more information, see: *Azra A. Gerakan the politics of Islam: Dari Fundamentalism, Modernism, Hingga postmodernism.: Gerakan the politics of Islam: Dari fundamentalism, modernism, Hingga postmodernism*). London: Routledge, 1996.

¹⁸ *Pochta Yu.M. Islamism and Nationalism in the Greater Middle East: enmity or symbiosis? // Asia and Africa Today, 2020 No.3 pp.4-11; Pochta Yu.M. Muslim society between Fundamentalism and Liberalism: the Problem of Civil Society // RUDN Journal of Political Science. 2017. №19(1). pp. 15-24; Pochta Yu.M. Crisis of the Society and its Contemporary Challenges (example of fundamentalism // Estudos do Século XX - Crises de Século N. 10/ Dezembro 2010, (Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal). P.233-244, 2010; Pochta Yu.M., Eremenko T.V. The Political significance of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Postmodern Era // Bulletin of the RUDN. Series: Political Science. 2014. No. 1. pp. 5-18; Malkovskaya I.A., Pochta Yu.M. Fundamentalism – threat or salvation? // Social: origins, structural profiles, modern challenges / under the general editorship of P.K. Grechko, E.M. Kurmeleva. M.: ROSSPEN, 2009.*

¹⁹ *Volobuev A.V. Formation and development of religious fundamentalism: socio-philosophical aspects // Humanitarian Bulletin. 2016. No.11. pp. 1-14; Volobuev A.V. Religious fundamentalism and nationalism: competition or symbiosis? Ethno-religious fundamentalism in some Asian countries // Bulletin "History of ideas and modernity." The series "Philosophical Sciences". 2020. pp. 45-53; Volobuev A.V. The phenomenon of fundamentalism: socio-philosophical analysis // Society: philosophy, history, culture. 2018. No.8 (52). 5 p; Volobuev A.V. The ideological basis of Islamic fundamentalism // Humanitarian Bulletin. 2018. №10 (72). Pp. 1-9; Volobuev A.V. Fundamentalism and the challenges of postglobalism. M.: Prometheus. 2021. 160 pp.*

²⁰ *Kudryashova I.V. Fundamentalism and "fundamentalisms" // Polit. science. 2013. No. 4. pp. 92-105; Filatov S.B. Return to basics (Protestant Fundamentalism) // Fundamentalism / RAS. Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow: Kraft+, 2003. pp. 107-126; Kudryashova I.V. Iran as a case of Islamic modernization // Political Science: Ideas of modernization in political science and political practice. 2012. No.2. pp. 107-133; Kudryashova I.V. How to study the interaction of religion and politics? // Political Science: Religion and Politics. 2013. No. 2. pp. 9-22.*

Romanovskaya²¹, A.V. Mitrofanova²², and others²³. However, their research mainly affected the region of the Middle East or the post-Soviet space. In general, on economic, socio-political issues related to Southeast Asia and Indonesia, in particular, the works of E.A. Kanaev²⁴ should be noted as well as the works of researchers from the ASEAN Center at MGIMO-University²⁵.

The *second* group of works is research on the problems of the spread and radicalization of fundamentalism both in the world and in Indonesia²⁶. The tragedy of

²¹ Romanovskaya E.V. Tradition as a form of social memory: hermeneutic and institutional horizons. Autoref. Diss.... Dr. Philos. Sciences: 09.00.11. / Romanovskaya Evgeniya Vasilyevna; [Place of protection: Saratov]. 2013; *Romanovskaya E.V. Fundamentalism and tradition // Power*. 2012. No.12. pp. 73-77;

²² Mitrofanova A.V. Political religion and fundamentalism // Bulletin of the RUDN. Series: International Relations. 2004. No. 1. URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/politicheskaya-religiya-i-fundamentalizm> (accessed: 08.10.2023).

²³ See: *Sagadeev A.V. The philosophical heritage of the Muslim world and the modern ideological struggle: Scientific analysis. essay / USSR Academy of Sciences. INION. M., 1987. 52 p.*; *Kuznetsova O.V., Smolina N.S., Mareninova V.V. Fundamentalism vs fundamentalism: scientific and everyday ideas // Historical, philosophical, political and legal sciences, cultural studies and art criticism. Questions of theory and practice. Tambov: Diploma. 2014. No.12(50). Part III. pp. 119-124*; *Shagaev I.S. Religious fundamentalism: definition of the concept and the history of its origin // Almanac of Modern Science and Education. 2014. No.1 (80). pp. 133-134*; *Simonov I.V. Religious fundamentalism and religious traditionalism: on the question of the correct use of terms // Humanitarian Scientific Bulletin. 2017. No.11. p. 21*; *An A.S., Ushakova E.V. On the content of the concept of "religious fundamentalism" // Philosophy of Education and Culture. 2018. No.2. pp. 61-65*; *Mitrofanov, A.V., Pyrin, A. G. What is religious fundamentalism / A.V. Mitrofanov, A. G. Pyrin // Bulletin of the Russian Philosophical Society. 2016. No. 3. pp. 89-94.*

²⁴ *Kanaev E., Galchenko E. The Greater Eurasian Partnership: A Re-Energizer of Russia-Indonesia Cooperation? / Russian-Indonesian Cooperation: Past, Present and Development Prospects / Eds. E. Kanaev, E. Astafieva. M.: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020. P. 51–71*; *Kanaev E., Simbolon L., Shaternikov P. Russia-Indonesia Relationship: Assessing Shortcomings and Framing a Response // Southeast Asia: Actual Problems of Development. 2019. Vol. 4. No. 45. P. 95–106*; *Kanaev E. A., Demidenko S. V. Is the "Arab Spring" likely in Southeast Asia? // Southeast Asia: actual problems of development. 2019. No. 3 (44) pp. 28-43.*

²⁵ See: *Baykov A.A., Koldunova E.V. Academic diplomacy in relations between Russia and Pacific Asia/ Bulletin of MGIMO University. 2021,14(5). pp. 7-21*; *Koldunova E.V. Thailand as a "small" state: historical transformation of political identity/ ENOJ Istoriya. 2020, 11(12). - URL: <https://history.jes.su/s207987840010435-7-1>*; *Vershinina V.V., Koldunova E.V., Kuklin N.S. South-East Asia: approaches to peacemaking and conflict resolution // Bulletin of the RUDN. Series: International Relations. 2023. Vol. 23, No. 2. pp. 265-277*; *Koldunova E.V. Two models of trans-regional Islamic movements in South and Southeast Asia: Jamaat Tabligh and Jamaat-i-Islami // Bulletin of the Moscow University. Series 13: Oriental Studies. Moscow: Publishing House of Moscow. Un-ta. 2020. No.2. pp. 35-51*; *Kuklin N.S., & Kuklina L.V. State policy of Indonesia for the protection and preservation of national cultural heritage: history and prospects. Heritage of Centuries, (1). 2021*; *Kuklin N.S. Stages of socio-political development of the Islamic community in Indonesia: cultural identity and national characteristics (Article 2) // Russia and the Muslim world. 2021. No. 4 (322). pp. 69-86.*

²⁶ *Kirchanov M.V. Political Islam in Indonesia in 2021: The Ummah between modernization and radicalization // South-East Asia: Actual problems of development. 2022. №2(55). Part 2. https://vk.com/politvostok?w=wall-52136985_51752 (accessed: 12.09.2023)*; *Kuklin N.S. The Islamic vector in the foreign and domestic policy of Indonesia: a historical retrospective. (article one) // Russia and the Muslim world. 2021. No. 3. pp. 88-103. https://vk.com/politvostok?w=wall-52136985_48681 (date of address: 12.09.2023)*; *N.S. Kuklin. Stages of socio-political development of the Islamic community in Indonesia: cultural identity and national characteristics. (article two) // Russia and the Muslim world. 2021. No. 4. pp. 69-85*; *Kirchanov M.V. The Front of Defenders of Islam as the leading organization of the Indonesian extremely conservative political Islam in the second half of the 2010s // Islam in the modern world. 2022. Vol. 18. No. 2. pp. 163-178.*; *Drugov A. Yu. Indonesia: Why is the Defenders of Islam Front dissolved? // South-East Asia: actual problems of development. 2021. No. 1(50)*; *Kirchanov M.V. Institutionalized forms of radical Islam in Indonesia in the 2010s. // Minbar. Islamic Studies. 2021. Vol. 14. No. 2. pp. 263-283*; *Mukhetdinov D.V. Reception of Egyptian modernism in Indonesia: Harun Nasution on the*

11th September 2001, in many ways forced the Indonesian people to pay attention to this problem of fundamentalism and different ways of radicalization not only overseas, but also in the country. Some of the groups that exist in Indonesia are allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda *: JI (ind. *Jemaah Islamiyah*), Darul Islam* (ind. *Darul Islam*), JAT* (ind. *Jemaah Asharut Touhid*) and MMI* (ind. *Mujahidin Indonesia Timur*), who are supposedly associated with the leadership of JI* ²⁷. Another of the fundamentalist radical groups, which, however, are not classified as extremist or radical ²⁸, is the FID (“Front of the Islamic Defender”, ind. *Front Pembela Islam*).

Since 2020, the FID has been banned in Indonesia as an extremist anti-social organization ²⁹.

The third group of sources and literature covers works that consider fundamentalism from a philosophical point of view. The author also seeks to offer a philosophical approach to fundamentalism as a means of a deeper study of its conceptual and empirical problems. Here it is important to identify the concepts of such philosophers

theology of Muhammad Abdo // *Islam in the modern world*. 2020. Vol. 16. No. 3. pp. 49-64; *Hajiyev T.F.* Once again to the question of Islamization of Indonesia // *Islam in the modern world*. 2020. Vol. 16. No. 1. pp. 193-210; *Rozhkova Z.I.* Democracy in Islamic countries. The experience of Indonesia // *Bulletin of the Moscow University. Series 12. Political sciences*. 2017. No. 6. C. 85-93.; *Tyurin V.A.* Ache – politeia on the periphery of the Islamic world // *Vostok. Afro-Asian Societies: History and Modernity*. No. 3. 2010. pp. 32-47.

²⁷ *Strickler M.* *Jemaah Islamiyah: Lessons from Combatting Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia*. Air University Press, 2017. P. 1-9.

²⁸ *Tibi B.* *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

²⁹ *Widiyanto A.* Violence in Contemporary Indonesian Islamism Scholarship: Habib Rizieq Syihab and ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’ / *Heidar Shadi* (ed) / *Islamic Peace Ethics: Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence in Contemporary Islamic Thought*. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2017. P. 96.

as: L. Wittgenstein³⁰, J. Dewey³¹, S. Kierkegaard³², V. Solovyov³³, N. Berdyaev³⁴, and L. Shestov³⁵. The author will use their works both in Russian and translated into English, as well as research on their philosophical concepts as follows: L. Wittgenstein from the work of D.Z. Phillips “*Wittgenstein and Religion*” (1993)³⁶, D. Dewey *Common Faith* (1934)³⁷, “*Experience and Nature*” (1929)³⁸, “*Darwin's Influence on Philosophy*” (1910)³⁹, as well as the works of researchers of his philosophy – S. Fesmire “*John Dewey and the Moral Imagination*” (2003)⁴⁰ and L.A. Hickman “*Pragmatism as Postmodernism: the Lesson of John Dewey*” (2007)⁴¹, S. Kierkegaard “*Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments*” (2009), and “*The Current Era*” (1962)⁴², V.S. Solovyov, from the works of his researchers: J. Sutton “*The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov*” (1998), and A. Kozhev “*Religious Metaphysics Vladimir Solovyov*” (2018)⁴³,

³⁰ Grayling A. C. Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, 1996. P. 1-6.; Phillips D.Z. Wittgenstein and Religion. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993.; Wittgenstein L. Philosophical research // Wittgenstein L. Philosophical works. Part 1 / trans. M.S. Kozlova, Yu.A. Aseeva. M. 1994; Wittgenstein L. Culture and value // Wittgenstein L. Philosophical works. Part 1 / trans. M.S. Kozlova, Yu.A. Aseeva. M., 1994; Wittgenstein L. Lectures and conversations about aesthetics, psychology and religion / per. V.P. Rudnev. M, 1999.

³¹ Shook J.R., Good J.A. John Dewey's Philosophy of Spirit, with the 1897 Lecture on Hegel. New York: Fordham University Press, 2010.; Dewey J. Freedom and Culture. – NY: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1939.

³² See more: Mooney E.F. On Soren Kierkegaard: Dialogue, Polemics, Lost Intimacy, and Time. USA: Ashgate, 2007. P. 1-5.

³³ See more.: Frank S.L. (editor). A Solovyov Anthology. London: SCM Press Ltd, 1950. P. 7-9; Соловьёв В.С. Чтения о богочеловечестве. М: Юрайт. 2016; Soloviev V.S. Philosophical principles of integral knowledge. М: Academic project. 2011; Solovyov V.S. Essays: in two volumes / B.C. Solovyov - Moscow: Pravda, 1989. / Vol. 2. Readings on God-manhood. pp. 5-172.

³⁴ Tsonchev T. Person and Communism: The Political Theology of Nikolai Berdyaev. Montreal: The Montreal Review E-Publishing, 2021. P. 10-12.; Berdyaev N. A. Philosophy of the free spirit. M. 2009. 460 p.; Berdyaev N.A. New religious consciousness and society / N. Berdyaev. St. Petersburg: Publishing House of M.V. Pirozhkov. 1907. L, 233 [2] p.

³⁵ See: Shestov L.I. Athens and Jerusalem. Edited and translated by Bernard Martin. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966. P. 2-4.; Shestov L.I. Athens and Jerusalem. / edited by E. Krylov. M.: Ripol-Classic. 2017. 414 p.

³⁶ Phillips D.Z. Wittgenstein and Religion. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 1993.

³⁷ Dewey J. A Common Faith. USA: Yale University Press, 1934.

³⁸ Dewey J. Experience and Nature. London: George Allen & Unwin, LTD., 1929

³⁹ Dewey J. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910.

⁴⁰ Hickman L. Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press. 2007.

⁴¹ Fesmire S. John Dewey and Moral Imagination. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003.

⁴² Kierkegaard S. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs. Edited and translated by Alastair Hannay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.; Kierkegaard S. The Present Age. London: Collins Clear-Type Press. 1962.

⁴³ Soloviev V. S. Freedom, Faith, and Dogma: Essays by V. S. Soloviev on Christianity and Judaism. Edited, translated, and with an introduction by Vladimir Wozniuk. United States of America: State University of New York Press, 2008; Sutton J. The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov: Toward a Reassessment. USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998; Kojève A. The Religious Metaphysics of Vladimir Solovyov. Translated by Ilya Merlin and Mikhail Pozdniakov. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018; Grillaert N. What the God-seekers found in Nietzsche: The Reception of Nietzsche's Übermensch by the Philosophers of the Russian Religious Renaissance. Amsterdam – New York, 2008; Smith O. Vladimir Solovyov and the Spiritualization of Matter. Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2011.

N. Berdyaev “*The Fate of Man*” (1960)⁴⁴, L. Shestov “*Kierkegaard and Existential Philosophy*” (1969)⁴⁵.

Thus, the author reviewed the works in English, Russian and Indonesian.

The object of the dissertation is Indonesian religious and political fundamentalism.

The subject is the social-philosophical doctrine of fundamentalism in Indonesia.

The purpose of the work. The purpose of the dissertation is to carry out the features of fundamentalism as a religious and political phenomenon in Indonesia.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following **issues**:

1. To identify the main features and forms of fundamentalism and, in particular, religious Islamic;

2. To analyse the main problems associated with the spread of fundamentalism in Indonesia and consider them within the framework of an *integral approach*, as it draws a line and identifies the connection between these phenomena;

3. To formulate a scientific definition of Indonesian fundamentalism, reflecting the peculiarities of the country case of Indonesia;

4. To identify the epistemological foundations of fundamentalism and criticism of the main approaches common among researchers: 1) a religious approach that does not consider the political component of fundamentalism and therefore perceives this phenomenon as an *inward-looking movement* that does not pursue political goals, 2) a political approach in which fundamentalism is perceived as an *outward-looking movement*, which seeks power for its elites, and therefore does not rely on religious dogmas, as well as to propose and justify the author's approach to the study of fundamentalism that combines both religious and political components, in order to

⁴⁴ Berdyaev N.A. *The Destiny of Man*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960; Berdyaev N.A. *Philosophy of the free spirit* / Introductory article by A. G. Myslivchenko; Podgot. text and note by R. K. Medvedeva. M.: Republic, 1994 / *The fate of man in the modern world (towards understanding our era)*. 318-362 p.

⁴⁵ Shestov L. *Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy*. USA: Ohio University Press, 1969; Shestov L. *Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy*. USA: Ohio University Press, 1969; Shestov L.I. *Kierkegaard and Existential Philosophy (The Voice of the Crying in the Desert)*. / Series: "Philosophical results of the XX century." Moscow: Progress-Gnosis, 1992. XVI, 304 p.

demonstrate the close relationship between the religious faith of fundamentalists and their political motives within the movement;

4. To criticize the moral justifications of extremism and radicalism within the framework of fundamentalism.

The research hypothesis from which the author proceeds is based on the premises of previous studies of the phenomenon of fundamentalism, which, according to the author, reveal two points ⁴⁶. Firstly, fundamentalism is divided into two types, depending on the internal motivation of its supporters: a) religiously motivated fundamentalism (hereafter – RMF) in the sense that the adherents of the movement are guided exclusively by religious goals and rely solely on dogmatics, b) politically motivated fundamentalism (hereafter – PMF), for whose supporters the main goal is to seize and retain power. Secondly, fundamentalism as a whole can be both peaceful and radicalized, depending on the internal motivation of its supporters. Based on these assumptions, the author considers the following theses in the dissertation:

1) Fundamentalism, both the RMF and the PMF, can often turn into a radicalized movement with the acts of violence ⁴⁷;

2) The initial motivation of the movement's representatives does not always imply that those who are guided by religious goals will not necessarily become radicalized, as well as those who are guided by political goals will always use the tools of violence;

3) Both the RMF and the PMF are closely related to each other, but in reality they rather combine elements of each other.

Theoretical and methodological basis of the dissertation research.

The author of the dissertation uses the *comparative method* as universally applied in research. The study of any movement is not limited to the views of one researcher or philosopher, but most often represents a comparative analysis of two or more positions of leading intellectuals in the field of research. To this end, the scientific sources considered

⁴⁶ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL:

<https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁷ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL:

<https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1328%26context%3Ddetd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

in the dissertation belong to two main areas. Firstly, the works of modern fundamentalist researchers, which include F. Rahman, J. Barr, J. M. Marsden, K. Armstrong, M. E. Marty, R. S. Appleby, M. Barkun, B. Tibi, T. Schirrmacher, D. L. Esposito, as well as a number of works by Indonesian researchers. The author explores the similarities and differences of their positions in relation to fundamentalism, which is usually divided into two groups: those who consider fundamentalism primarily and more often only as a political movement, and those who consider it exclusively as a religious movement⁴⁸.

To connect these two types of fundamentalism, the author used an *integral approach*, which is based on the search and analysis of the relationship between religious and political motivation of adherents of fundamentalism⁴⁹. This approach considers the importance of both classical in-text and more innovative out-of-text research for the emergence of the phenomenon of fundamentalism. In this case, the intratextual research studies the epistemological and cognitive problems of fundamentalism, correlating with the key question of what motivates fundamentalists and what is the importance of sacred texts, religious ideals and teachings in their movement. Meanwhile, extra-textual research studies external factors, such as social, political, cultural, and economic, and their impact on the problems that fundamentalism and its supporters in society are trying to solve through their tools. The study focuses on why fundamentalists unconditionally believe in the infallibility of their religious texts and therefore defend them at any cost, trying to resist modernization. Based on these approaches, we can conclude that, unlike ordinary religiosity, this phenomenon does not accept even individual alternatives, therefore this religious position opposes any innovations, which, in turn, leads fundamentalism to three problems: literalism in the interpretation of fundamental religious dogmas, ethical absolutism, assuming the full embodiment of the norms of religious behaviour in reality, as well as the belief in the absolute authenticity of these literal interpretations.

Secondly, the dissertation conducts a hermeneutic analysis of the philosophic ideas, which the author considers relevant to the object of research. To consider the religious

⁴⁸ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁴⁹ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

epistemological problems of fundamentalism, the dissertation uses the *concept of God* by L. Wittgenstein and *religious faith* by S. Kierkegaard. The author also uses D. Hume's concept of the *natural history of religion* and J. Dewey's concept of *the interpretation of religion, religious texts, and doctrines*. In addition, the author also includes in the study an analysis of the key ideas of religious philosophy and metaphysics of Russian philosophers, in particular V. Solovyov, N. Berdyaev and L. Shestov, which are also important for research.

The author also includes in the study an analysis of the key ideas of religious philosophy and metaphysics of Russian philosophers, in particular V. Solovyov, N. Berdyaev and L. Shestov, which are also important for the study.

Scientific novelty of the research. The dissertation is a comprehensive study dedicated to rethinking fundamentalism in Indonesia. The novelty of the study is due to the following factors:

1. The author gives an original definition of fundamentalism, which adequately reflects the current state of this phenomenon development in Indonesia and religious communities in Southeast Asia, which has special advantages in terms of the historical experience uniqueness in the religious tradition development in this geographical region;

2. The author comes to the conclusion that the identification of fundamentalism only with religious or political movements does not fully reflect the current state of problems in Indonesian society, and therefore suggests an integral approach in which specific fundamentalist movements are considered comprehensively: both religious and political organizations that actively use social manipulation, requiring detailed consideration from the point of view of psychology and hermeneutical analysis of the slogans and meanings behind their real actions.

3. The author notes that in the studies of fundamentalism in Indonesia, there are two main approaches to the interpretation of this phenomenon and related groups: religiously oriented fundamentalist groups and politically oriented fundamentalist groups. The former seeks to preserve and even popularize religious teachings, practices, and traditions that, in their opinion, have been marginalized by secular systems or taken under their control (for example, by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Indonesia). Their

movements have an “*inward-looking goal*” or an “*intra-group objective*” in order to force members of their group to live in accordance with religious beliefs and customs. As for politically oriented fundamentalism, according to the author, the main goal of such groups is to gain representation in power, influence on state institutions or the legislative system through the exploitation of religious symbols and the social resource of their adherents. Often such movements promote their direct leaders into politics as representatives of interests;

4. The author introduces into philosophical and scientific circulation a corpus of texts by researchers of Indonesian fundamentalism, not previously represented in Russian science, which makes it possible to significantly enrich the existing approaches to understanding fundamentalism and its phenomena in the Russian environment.

5. The author pays attention to the epistemological problems of fundamentalism, in particular the privilege and infallibility of the beliefs of individual fundamentalist groups in Indonesia. The author reveals the content of their criticism from the scientific community, which is also given insufficient attention in science. At the same time, it is important to note that these problems are typical not only for Indonesia, but for fundamentalism as an international phenomenon, however, the Indonesian experience is also able to significantly expand the understanding of scientific criticism of this problem.

Provisions for the defence:

1. Fundamentalism is defined by the author as a form of reaction to the marginalization of public religious discourse by secular socio-political forces and consists in the desire to return religion to the central importance in the political life of the country. This is accompanied by a duality of perception of the methods of fundamentalism as extremist, aimed at the radical scrapping of the existing order, and nonviolent, aimed at its gradual change. The study of practical cases of the development of fundamentalism shows that supporters of this ideology can adhere to a certain intermediate line between the two mentioned approaches and support both forceful methods of pressure and everyday nonviolent resistance;

2. To solve the problem that has arisen, as well as subsequent criticism, fundamentalism should be studied through an integral approach that considers socio-

cultural, religious-psychological, and political factors contributing to the emergence of fundamentalism in society⁵⁰. In Indonesia, with its syncretic culture, fundamentalism can often include spiritual, political, and social elements inherent in various religious movements and philosophical traditions within the country⁵¹;

3. Indonesian scientific and religious literature has developed its own approaches to the interpretation of the concept of fundamentalism, due to the tradition of Islamic intellectualism, developed in the university culture and the government's special attention to religious tolerance. A wide range of research on this topic has been little studied, but it contains unique and distinctive approaches to fundamentalism and the fight against it as a socially dangerous phenomenon, which can contribute to the dissemination of the Indonesian experience to world practice;

4. Indonesian fundamentalism, both religiously and politically motivated, is characterized by comprehensive criticism, both religious and scientific,⁵² defined as the formation of a tradition of overcoming the social consequences of the actions of fundamentalist groups through the joint efforts of the state and society⁵³.

The scientific, theoretical, and practical significance of the study is due to the fact that the material and approaches contained can be used as a basis for the study of fundamentalism not only in philosophy, but also in political science, cultural studies, religious studies, anthropology, social psychology, etc.⁵⁴ The presented research results can be used in the preparation of lecture courses, teaching materials, thematic seminars devoted to the study of fundamentalism⁵⁵.

Approbation of the results of the dissertation research.

⁵⁰ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Dedt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵¹ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁵² *Ibidem.*

⁵³ *Hosen N.* Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate // Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 2003. Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 419-440.

⁵⁴ *Hood R.W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵⁵ *Челищев В.И.* Фундаментализм в современном мире: истоки, социальная природа и политическая сущность / Автореф. Диссертации / Владимир Игоревич Челищев // Автореф... кандидата политических наук / 23.00.01: Москва. 2006.

The main provisions and conclusions of the dissertation research were discussed at a meeting of the Department of Social Philosophy of the Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education “Peoples' Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba” and were reflected in 5 publications on the research topic, 2 of which were in the journals of the Higher Attestation Commission ⁵⁶, 1 article was published in journal indexed in the SCOPUS database ⁵⁷ and 2 articles – in journals indexed by other databases ⁵⁸. The author of the dissertation made intermediate conclusions at international scientific and practical conferences in Russia and abroad: *Russia and ASEAN in the Asia-Pacific region: Dynamics of interaction, regional processes and global context* (October 14-15, 2022, MGIMO, Moscow), *Democracy and Personality and Racial Politics* (February 5-7, 2021, Vox Populi Institute, Jakarta), *Politics and Democracy* (May 6-7, 2023, Vox Populi Institute, Jakarta), *Identity Politics, Religious Fanaticism, Democracy, and Communism issues* (September 29, 2020, Political and Public Policy Studies (P3S)).

The dissertation compliance with the passport of the scientific specialty. The content of the work corresponds to the fields of research 2, 3, 4, 25, 51, 60 passports of the specialty 5.7.7 – “Social and political philosophy”. The results of the conducted research also correspond to the field of specialty research.

Structure of the dissertation research consists of an introduction, three chapters divided into sections, conclusions, a list of sources and literature.

⁵⁶ Lemanto E. Digital Society and Multi-Dimensional Man: Repositioning Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man // Bulletin of the Russian Peoples' Friendship University named after Patrice Lumumba. Series: Philosophy. M.: Publishing house RUDN, T. 24, No. 2. 2020. pp. 286-296; Lemanto E. Deweyan Critique of Fundamentalism // Bulletin of RUDN University. Series: Philosophy. M.: Publishing house RUDN, T. 27. No. 3, 2023. P. 809-818.

⁵⁷ Lemanto E. Fundamentalism: A Religious Cognitive Bias? A Philosophical Discourse of Religious Fundamentalism. Bulletin of RUDN University PHILOSOPHY SERIES, Vol 27, No 1 (2023): PHILOSOPHY OF V. SESEMANN, p. 163-174;

⁵⁸ Lemanto E. Fundamentalism versus social injustice: Political Economic Dimension of the Indonesian Fundamentalism // KRITIS. 2021. Vol. 30, no. 1. pp. 79-99; Lemanto E. Beyond Dialogue: Etika Dialog Emanuel Levinas (The Ethics of Dialogue from Emmanuel Levinas) // Sapientia Humana. 2021. Vol. 1, no. 02. pp. 26-39.

Chapter 1. FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE BREADTH OF ITS CONCEPT

This chapter contains information about fundamentalism. It discusses the history, definitions, and common characteristics of fundamentalism as defined by numerous well-known thinkers. What is new in this part may just be the writer's definition and additional characteristics of fundamentalism. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will provide an overview of fundamentalism's history. The second section will give a handful of definitions of fundamentalism from eminent researchers in the field. The traits of fundamentalism will be discussed in the third section. In addition, the author's definition of fundamentalism is shown at the end of this chapter.

1. Genealogy of Fundamentalism

Historically, fundamentalism emerged from religious movements in the Christian church in USA in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Curtis Lee Laws,⁵⁹ an editor of the journal *Watchman-Examiner*, popularized the word 'fundamentalism' in a published compilation of that journal titled *The Watchman-Examiner - a National Baptist Paper* in 1920. Initially, the term was used mainly in the context of theological thought and religious movements in the American church and used to express the conservative Protestant thinkers' rejection of liberalist Protestants and their liberal theology inside the American church.⁶⁰

Liberal Protestantism is a Christian intellectual movement that aims to adapt Christianity and its teachings to the rise of evolutionary science. This liberalist theological movement also intended to deepen Biblical critique within Christian theology. In summary, liberal Protestantism is an academic movement that aims to reconstruct Christian theology in the context of modern science, notably in light of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection. Darwin's evolutionism thesis was like challenging the theory of creationism for conservative Christians.

⁵⁹ C.L. Laws was a Baptist pastor and an editor of *The Watchman-Examiner* since 1913 to 1939, a journal founded by the American Baptist group.

⁶⁰ *Schirrmacher T. Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous*. Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft - Culture and Science Publication, 2013. P. 9.

Liberal theology is characterized as a modern approach to the Christian Bible, its beliefs, and religious traditions. This modern approach incorporates the modern hermeneutic system and, more crucially, accommodates modern ethical ideals in the sense that the Bible is no longer considered the sole source of moral principles. Unlike traditional theology, liberal theology does not interpret Scripture literally. Traditional theology is a theology that regards Scripture as the ultimate source of all knowledge. This method of counting the Scriptures is known as scripturalism. Scripturalism is a belief system in which the Bible is seen as the sole source of all human knowledge, possessing a systematic monopoly on truth.⁶¹ Liberal theology, on the other hand, is an intellectual revolutionary in theosophy that accepts the value of other knowledge's worldview, science, current ethics, and the importance of interpretation of the Bible.

In other words, fundamentalism is a term used to describe the reaction of American conservative Protestants to liberal Protestantism, which strives to adapt Christian ideas to evolutionary science and biblical criticism. To summarize, the main goal of liberal theology was to change the method of exegesis of the Bible so that it no longer only takes into account the triple convictions of traditionalist Christians, such as *sola scriptura* (inerrancy of the Bible: *scripturalism*), *sola fide* (the salvation of man comes only from justification by faith: *solafidianism*), and *sola gratia* (salvation comes only from divine grace), but also modern ethics and value systems.⁶²

Let us now look at the academic history of that term and the stages of its evolution. According to Thomas Meyer, the term "fundamentalism" progresses through five stages, beginning with its emergence in the American Protestant church in 1920 and ending with its current use.⁶³

⁶¹ See: *Robbins J.W.* An Introduction to Gordon H. Clark. The Trinity Review (July, August 1993). P. 3. See also: *Crampton W.G.* Scripturalism: A Christian Worldview. The Trinity Review (March-May 2011). P. 1.

⁶² See: *Trenham A.J.* Rock and Sand: An Orthodox Appraisal of the Protestant Reformers and Their Teachings. Edited by Michael Monos. US: Newrome Press LLC, 2018. P. 187-192. See also: *Plass E.M.* What Luther Says: An Anthology. St. Louis: Concordia, 1959. P. 63. See also: *de Witt J.R.* What is the Reformed Faith? Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1981. P. 5. See also: *Lemanto E.* Fundamentalism versus Social Injustice: Political Economic Dimension of the Indonesian Fundamentalism // *Kritis*. 2021. Vol. 30, No. 1. P. 81-82.

⁶³ *Schirrmacher T.* Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous. Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft - Culture and Science Publication, 2013. P. 10-12.

The term “fundamentalism” was first used in 1920 to describe a movement of American conservative Protestant intellectuals and theologians who rejected liberal theology influenced by rationalism and scientific methodology. Fundamentalism in this phase refers to a movement of conservative Protestants who uphold the foundational underpinnings of the Christian faith and the revelatory quality of Scripture. During this time period, liberalists used the term as a severely derogatory theological term to refer to adherents of conservative or literalist theology.⁶⁴ In other words, the term in this phase refers to conservative theologians who oppose liberal theology. The author prefers to refer to it as a theological stage of fundamentalism.

In the second stage, the term 'fundamentalism' was used during philosophical and epistemological debates in the 1960s. At this point, fundamentalism had evolved into a theological movement among Christian theologians, in direct opposition to the fallibilism doctrine of critical rationalist philosophy advanced by Karl Popper and his student, Hans Albers. Fallibilism is a philosophical doctrine that asserts that all knowledge is fallible and questionable. According to this Popperian epistemology, there is no absolute certainty in knowledge. Those who cling to the belief that there is absolute truth are seen as fundamentalists. In this stage, the term 'fundamentalism' has a broader meaning, such as philosophical and epistemological fundamentalism⁶⁵.

The term 'fundamentalism' in this phase is designated not only for the adherents of conservative theology but also for the adherents of other schools of thought in philosophy which claim that there are infallible and unquestionable truths.⁶⁶ This stage is distinguished by a philosophical debate between schools of thought, not only between conservative Christian theologians and relativist philosophers,⁶⁷ but also between the two philosophical schools; the school of absolutism, which recognizes infallible or inerrant

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* P. 10.

⁶⁵ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁶⁶ *Schirrmacher T.* *Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous*. Bonn: Verlag fur Kultur and Wissenschaft - Culture and Science Publication, 2013. P. 10-12.

⁶⁷ *Tibi B.* *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* // *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

truths, and the school of relativism, which claims that truths are relative and tentative. For the philosophers of critical rationalism, there are no infallible truths other than relative truths⁶⁸. This stage might be thought of as a philosophical stage of fundamentalism⁶⁹.

In the third stage, the term 'fundamentalism' was associated with the Iranian Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini's authority in 1979. The Islamic Revolution is another name for the Iranian Revolution. As a result of this revolution, Iran was transformed from a monarchy under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Fundamentalism in this phase has a political meaning⁷⁰. It is a pejorative word given by Western political theories (which glorifies human rights values and the principle of separation of religion and state) to all violent Islamic movements, although it is partly inappropriate. Regarding the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Fundamentalism has a political meaning that refers to political Islam.⁷¹

Besides designating the Islamic Fundamentalism of the Iranian Revolution, the term 'fundamentalism' also refers to the 'Moral Majority' movement in the USA in 1979. The movement was founded by Jerry Falwell. The term is addressed to that movement because the Evangelicals and other conservative religious groups, such as Catholics and Jews, for the first time, are united in a large-scale political movement. Their political coalition aimed at supporting the candidates during the presidential election, particularly for the candidates from the Republican Party in the 1980s. The group mobilized conservative Christians to participate in politics and to support the Republican candidates,⁷² including Ronald Reagan in the presidential election in 1981.⁷³

⁶⁸ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁰ Ozzano L. *Religious Fundamentalism and democracy* // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁷¹ *Ibid*. P. 11.

⁷² See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL:

<https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Ddtd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁷³ J. Falwell (1933-2007) was an American Baptist pastor, a strong believer, and conservative activist. He was also a politician of the Republican Political Party.

One of the main goals of the Moral Majority is to fight the Baptist Church's historic position of keeping religion and politics separate. According to Falwell, the church can no longer be mute on social issues and politically indifferent. For social transformation, the church must be actively involved in politics. From its purpose, Moral Majority was established for political ends. It mobilizes conservative American Christians to participate actively in politics and be fully involved in dealing with social problems.⁷⁴

Concisely, the term “fundamentalism” at this stage relates to the Iranian Revolution and Falwell's Moral Majority. The Iranian Revolution aspired to establish the Islamic Republic. While the Moral Majority sought to restore the role of religion in politics, it also sought to re-establish the prominence of Christian moral ideals in American social life⁷⁵. These movements have two motivations with the same goal: religious and political motivations that seek to unite politics and religion. In other words, fundamentalism at this stage refers to the movement of groups that use religion for political objectives while also using politics for religious ends. This stage can be considered a stage of religious-political fundamentalism⁷⁶.

In the fourth stage, fundamentalism is characterized as a solely political movement, such as the Green Party (*Die Grunen*) movement in Germany. In German politics, the word 'fundamentalism' was applied to the Green Party, which was elected to the German Bundestag in 1983. During this time, German political parties were divided into two groups: the *Fundis* (the German short form for “fundamentalists”) and the *Realos* (the short form for “realists”).

Die Grunen, one of the *Fundis*, is a political party that rejects any compromise with the ruling administration or coalition with other parties. In comparison, the *Realos* are willing to work with other parties to form a coalition. During this stage, the term

⁷⁴ Schirrmacher T. Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous. Bonn: Verlag fur Kultur and Wissenschaft - Culture and Science Publication, 2013. P. 11.

⁷⁵ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1328%26context%3Dedt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁷⁶ Hood R. W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023)

'fundamentalism' refers to political groups that are unyielding and reluctant to abandon their left socialist stance. Shortly, this term is being applied to any political parties and movements that characteristically like the *Fundis*.⁷⁷ At this stage, fundamentalism is referred to as a solely political movement.

In the fifth phase, fundamentalism takes on a new connotation. The term refers to extreme religious, ideological, philosophical, and political movements.⁷⁸ Fundamentalists are conservative Muslim, Hindu, Christian, or Buddhist groups who profess to know the absolute truth. In politics, the term 'fundamentalism' refers to political opponents, typically left-wing religious extremists, or political parties⁷⁹. The term is also associated with extremist movements such as Al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization that legitimizes violence. In philosophy, the term 'fundamentalism' refers to the school of thought that holds that there are absolute, infallible, or inerrant truths⁸⁰.

2. The Multifaceted Definitions of Fundamentalism

As previously stated at the beginning of the first chapter, the term “fundamentalism” has expanded beyond religious movements to include politics, philosophy,⁸¹ and even economics⁸². Its meaning also broadens beyond the theological movements of American Evangelicals theologians and the conservative Protestants to include the economy, politics, and social and cultural movements. The sections that follow will describe the various definitions of the term from various researchers in this field of study.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*. P. 11-12.

⁷⁹ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Dctd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁸⁰ *McDonough R*. Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>.

⁸¹ *Tibi B*. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁸² *Ozzano L*. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

*The organization is restricted in Russian Federation.

According to John Louis Esposito (1940-), fundamentalism is a reactionary and anachronistic movement against a worldwide eruption of religious and quasi-religious concerns on account of the demand for democratization and secularization, and also a movement that offers new modes of particularistic societal identity, ideologies, doctrines, and values.⁸³ Another definition of fundamentalism by Esposito is related to his criticism to the Western meaning of the term and their stereotypes of it. Before defining the term, Esposito shows the three assumptions about its usage.

First, fundamentalists are all those who advocate for a return to fundamental beliefs. Second, the American Protestantism movement of the twentieth century profoundly influenced the notion of fundamentalism, emphasizing the interpreted Bible as important to Christian life and teaching. *Third*, fundamentalism is often equated with political activism, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism, and anti-Americanism. According to Esposito, the facile and inadequate use of the term is likely shaped by the political revolution of the four Islamic states such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran, where their rulers attempted to harness Islam to legitimize their reign and rule.

Esposito refuses to define the term 'fundamentalism,' which is overly weighted with Western stereotype and Christian presuppositions. For Islamic fundamentalism, he is inclined to define it as 'Islamic revivalism' or 'Islamic activism'⁸⁴ because Islam possesses a long tradition of revival (*Tajwid*) and reform (*Islah*), which includes the notions of political and social activism dating from the early Islamic centuries the present day.⁸⁵

Another important definition of fundamentalism is also raised by Martin Emil Marty and Robert Scott Appleby. Both are widely well-known as the editors of *The Fundamentalism Project*, an international scholarly study of conservative religious movements worldwide that began in 1978⁸⁶. The American Academy of Arts and

⁸³ Esposito J.L., Voll J.O. Islam and Democracy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. P. 15.

⁸⁴ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁸⁵ Esposito J.L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. P. 7-8.

⁸⁶ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

Sciences funds the project⁸⁷. The project produced five volumes that are widely referred to as research on fundamentalism.⁸⁸ In those five volumes, the authors gave many definitions. Marty and Appleby's definition rests on the following premises:⁸⁹

- *All fundamentalism is religious*; many fundamentalist groups share the essential characteristics of religious fundamentalists⁹⁰. They build impenetrable dogmatic fortresses around 'the truth' and see their version as absolute, infallible, or inerrant⁹¹.
- *Fundamentalism is not limited to monotheism*; Fundamentalism is not only Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) but also Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhism⁹².
- *Fundamentalists are not fully literalists*; their foundational sources (sacred scriptures, codified oral teachings, and commentaries) express and interpret the experiences of the sacred that led to the formation of their religious communities⁹³. Fundamentalists claim not to interpret but are the narrowest and most ideologically guided interpreters⁹⁴.
- *Fundamentalism not only attracts the poorest*; fundamentalists are not always the poor, jobless people or lacking worldly prospects⁹⁵. They are not the poorest of the poor. They are partly teachers, engineers, medical technicians, and other professionals in the applied sciences⁹⁶.
- *Fundamentalists are not extremists, militants, fanatics, and terrorists*.
- *Fundamentalism does not necessarily lead to violence*; social context and the local or regional political culture have much to say about fundamentalism's directions⁹⁷.
- *Fundamentalists hardly oppose change*; fundamentalists are motivated to change a world they see as godless, but their remedy is not to preserve or recreate the past. They are 'progressive,' not conservative⁹⁸.
- *Cults of personality do not drive fundamentalism*; fundamentalist leaders may be charismatic, spiritual guides, or they may not be, but they are always authoritarian. Fundamentalism appears almost as if by spontaneous combustion or as if spread by

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁸ There are five volumes of the Fundamentalism Project. Volume 1: Fundamentalisms Observed (1991). Volume 2: Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education (1993). Volume 3: Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economic, and Militance (1993). Volume 4: Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements (1994). Volume 5: Fundamentalisms Comprehended (1995).

⁸⁹ Appleby R.S., Marty M. E. Fundamentalism. Foreign Policy. No. 128 (January – February 2002). P. 16–18; 20–22.

⁹⁰ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*.

⁹² Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁹³ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁹⁴ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*.

capillary action, under the guidance of leaders who mumble, stumble, and falter but who are tagged as authorized agents of God because they correctly interpret “the word.”⁹⁹

Fundamentalism, according to Marty and Appleby, is a reactionary religious movement against modernism and secularism¹⁰⁰, which the fundamentalists consider as a godless world that they strive to reshape with their point of view. That movement is fundamentally founded on religious beliefs and traditions that fundamentalists regard as absolute, infallible, or inerrant¹⁰¹. In addition, Marty and Appleby also define fundamentalism as a religious movement that aims to challenge the liberal Western democracies poised to inherit the mantle of failed leftist and nationalist ideologies in some nations.¹⁰²

George C. Marsden provides another significant definition of fundamentalism.¹⁰³ His definition of the term refers to Christian Fundamentalism. We can find his definition from the following phrase: “A fundamentalist is an evangelical who is angry about something....Evangelical is broadly defined as those in traditions emphasizing the Bible as the highest religious authority....”¹⁰⁴ Marsden also remarks that “fundamentalism is militantly anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism...a loose, diverse, and changing federation of co-belligerents united by their fierce opposition to modernist attempts to bring Christianity in line with modern thought.”¹⁰⁵

According to Marsden, fundamentalism is a movement associated with the revival of the Evangelical Protestant traditions that militantly opposes contemporary thought, notably modernist theology, and modern culture. Modernist theology is a theology that recognizes the significance and the centrality of modern methods in interpreting

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰¹ *McDonough R.* Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>.

¹⁰² *Marty M.E., Appleby R. S.* (eds). Volume 3. *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993. P. 1.

¹⁰³ George M. Marsden is an American historian, specifically history of American culture and Christianity. Marsden most dominantly concerns on the history of the interaction between American culture and Christianity-evangelicalism.

¹⁰⁴ *Marsden G.M.* *Fundamentalism and American Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006. P. 235–236.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* P. 4.

Scripture, one of which is the modern philosophical approach that values reasoning and rational procedure. One modernist theological viewpoint, for example, contends that church structures are humanitarian institutions and that religious dogmas are not fully infallible or inerrant¹⁰⁶.

An important definition of fundamentalism is provided by James Barr, an American theologian.¹⁰⁷ Fundamentalism, according to Barr, is a religious movement of people who are willing to impose their religious ideals on another group, particularly fellow religious believers. For the fundamentalists, no other group is correct save themselves. They claim that only their religious dogmas are valid and must be defended at all costs, and hence those truths must be acknowledged by anyone and any group. They claim that their religion, religious doctrine and traditions are superior to all others¹⁰⁸. They also hold that the only reference to any applicable rules and regulations in society is their holy Scripture. They assert that the Bible should only be interpreted literally.¹⁰⁹

Thomas Schirrmacher, a German Christian moral philosopher and a specialist in the Sociology of Religion, also gives an interesting definition of fundamentalism. Schirrmacher defines fundamentalism as “a militant claim of truth which derives its claim to power from non-disputable, high revelation, people, values, or ideologies.”¹¹⁰ Schirrmacher begins his explanation of the term by explaining the 'dual face of religions'.

¹⁰⁶ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ James Barr (1924-2006) was a Scottish Presbyterian intellectual and Old Testament scholar. He was also the Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture at the University of Oxford from 1976 to 1978, and the Regius Professor of Hebrew from 1978 to 1989.

¹⁰⁸ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ *Barr J.* Escaping from Fundamentalism. Great Britain: Worchester, 1984. P. 88. See also: *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹¹⁰ *Schirrmacher T.* Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous. Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft – Culture and Science Publication, 2013. P. 13.

He says, “Throughout history, religions have brought about wars and mass murders, as well as peace in small and large contexts and attention to human rights.”¹¹¹

Schirmacher seemingly defines fundamentalism from its negative side. He says, “One should only speak of fundamentalism when violence is involved, or a true danger for internal security exists.”¹¹² This definition refers to the tragedy of 09/11, where “fundamentalists are understood by the public to mostly be radical, violence-prone, religiously motivated extremists or even simply religious terrorists.”¹¹³ To substantiate his own definition, Schirmacher used the definitions of Christian J. Jäggi (a Swiss ethnologist, religious scholar, and theologian), Stephan H. Pfürtner (a German Catholic moral theologian and social ethicist), and Hans-Gerd Jaschke (a German political scientist).

Jäggi, as Schirmacher explains, was sceptical of the fundamentalist movement. He believed that they would not succeed because of the characteristic of their movement, that they are defensive and forcible. Jäggi viewed that “fundamentalist behavior is, in the long run, an unsuccessful because of those characteristics, in the sense that they attempt backward focused rebellion against social alienation, ethnocultural dislocation, world view homelessness and societal disintegration of the values of modernity and postmodernity.”¹¹⁴

Fundamentalism, according to Pfürtner, is not just related with religious movements. He also used the term to refer to the leftist sociopolitical movement. The term 'fundamentalists', by Pfürtner, was referred to the *fundis* group of the Green Party (*Die Grünen*) in Germany, Jim Jones' Temple sect in the USA, traditionalists in the Catholic church who are against religious freedom, right-wing and left-wing fundamentalism, and even violence-prone football fans and hooligans. Schirmacher quotes Pfürtner's

¹¹¹ *Ibid* P. 8.

¹¹² Schirmacher T. *Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous*. Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft – Culture and Science Publication, 2013. P. 13.

¹¹³ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*. P. 13-14.

definition: “Fundamentalism is a flight into radicalism, and it is often combined with violence while refusing to accept an adequate perception of reality, rationality, and the unfolding of freedom for the individual and society.”¹¹⁵

Finally, Jaschke's definition of fundamentalism emphasized its link to violent movements and terrorist groups. For Jaschke, the leftist and rightist terrorism like IRA,¹¹⁶ the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or Basque Homeland and Freedom),¹¹⁷ and the RAF (Red Army Faction),¹¹⁸ inter alia, are violent fundamentalism in Europe.¹¹⁹

Karen Armstrong, a well-known historian, and prominent professor of religious studies, offers an important definition of fundamentalism as well¹²⁰. Fundamentalism, according to Armstrong, is a militant piety movement with two basic characteristics. On the one hand, fundamentalism can exhibit itself in violent acts such as murder, terrorism, and so on. On the other hand, it can also be a peaceful movement, though she also realized that “the most peaceful and law-abiding fundamentalists are also perplexing because they seem so adamantly opposed to many of the most positive values of modern society.”¹²¹ Armstrong characterized fundamentalism as a movement dedicated to the preservation of religious piety and spiritual militancy. That movement is intended not only to serve the fundamentalists, but also to force the same passion on other persons or groups by violent means.

¹¹⁵ *Schirmacher T.* Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous. Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft – Culture and Science Publication, 2013. P. 14.

¹¹⁶ The IRA-Irish Republican Army emerged throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. This paramilitary organization was a political movement that was dedicated to irredentism through Irish republicanism. They strived for a total independence of Ireland from British rule.

¹¹⁷ Eta-Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom) was an armed leftist Basque nationalist and separatist organization in the Basque Country in northern Spain and southwest France. This group engaged in violent acts. Their aim was to gain independence for the Basque country.

¹¹⁸ The RAF was the West German far-left militant organization founded in 1970. The West German/German government considered this organization a terrorist group.

¹¹⁹ *Schirmacher T.* Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous. Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft – Culture and Science Publication, 2013. P. 14.

¹²⁰ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹²¹ *Armstrong K.* Battle for God. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2000.P. 5.

Fazlur Rahman,¹²² a prominent and worldwide-distinguished Muslim thinker, also rendered an intriguing definition of the term. Rahman defined fundamentalism in a contemptuous tone. Although Rahman disagreed with the use of the term and did not specifically define it, he provided the common features of fundamentalism. He was inclined to use the term 'revivalism' rather than fundamentalism. Fazlur identified fundamentalism as revivalism. Regarding Islamic fundamentalism, he identified three stages of Islamic reform.

The first is the reform before the advent of classical modernism called revivalism, which he equated with fundamentalism. Second, after the period of classical modernism, Islamic reform was called *neo-revivalism*, and he equated it with *neo-fundamentalism*. Third, Islamic reform in the period of postmodernism is called postmodernist fundamentalism. The first two reforms were focused on restoring Islam's pristine 'purity.' In comparison, the basic elan of postmodernist fundamentalism is anti-Western.¹²³

Let us also consider the notion of fundamentalism as defined by Bassam Tibi. In *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Tibi's definition was limited to Islamic Fundamentalism. He provides several definitions as the following:

- Islamic Fundamentalism is Islamism that should not be equated with Islam. Tibi objects to the equitation of Islamism or Islamic Fundamentalism with Islam as a religion. Islamic fundamentalism, according to Tibi, is purely a political movement.¹²⁴
- Islamic Fundamentalism or Islamism is a militant ideology with an absolutist claim to the dominance of political Islam worldwide.¹²⁵
- (Islamic) religious fundamentalism is an aggressive politicization of religion undertaken to pursue non-religious ends. Fundamentalism is only superficially a form of terrorism or extremism, but, for Tibi, two words, *usuliyya* (Fundamentalism) and *tatarruf* (extremism), should not be used interchangeably.¹²⁶

¹²² Fazlur Rachman Malik (1919-1988) was a prominent Pakistani Muslim scholar. He was considered to be a neo-modernist thinker of Islam. His studies and academic works were dominant on Islamic philosophy, socio-political issues, and culture.

¹²³ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* // *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2002. P. ix. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* P. ix.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* P. xiv.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* P. xxv-xxvi.

- Islamic fundamentalism is simply a new global phenomenon in the world of politics that is confined to political ideology, not to religious teachings.¹²⁷
- "Fundamentalism is much more than extremism or terrorism. Fundamentalism is a rather powerful challenge to the existing order of the international system of secular nation-states."¹²⁸
- Islamic fundamentalism is a threat in the sense that it engenders disorder on a grand scale and that it is very different in different places, and the common cause of its emergence is difficult to identify.¹²⁹
- Islamic fundamentalism is a response to globalization and modernism. Fundamentalists stand up against the modern system of secular nation-states, particularly the western countries, because they are inclined to impose their system to be implemented in the Islamic world.¹³⁰
- Islamic fundamentalism is a political Islam in which the fundamentalists politicize religion for their political interest. In other words, Islamic fundamentalism is a political ideology based on an equally selective and arbitrary politicization of religion.¹³¹
- Fundamentalism is a political movement that "does not address religious belief, but rather a sociopolitical worldview, that is, a broad concern about the nature of the state, society, and world politics. However, that concern might be articulated in religious symbols."¹³²

Torkel Brekke offers another intriguing description of fundamentalism.¹³³ Though Brekke does not provide a definitive definition, he does identify the basic causes and formative aspects that give rise to fundamentalism in various religions,¹³⁴ one of which is the marginalization of religion in modern society. According to Brekke, when confronted with this situation, fundamentalists strive to reestablish religion's prominence in modern life.

Fundamentalist movements, Brekke states, aim "to halt or reverse the trend that we called *differentiation* so that religion can reassert the influence it has lost in the modern world...about the role of religion in one or more of the important societal spheres of modern societies...some fundamentalist movements have an all-embracing vision of how

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* P. 2.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* P. 3.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* P. 4.

¹³⁰ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press. 2002. P. 5–6.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* P. 12-13.

¹³² *Ibid.* P. 13.

¹³³ Torkel Brekke is a Professor of the History of Religions and South Asian Studies at the University of Oslo.

¹³⁴ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

to establish a state with the right religious values and laws as an absolute guidance....”¹³⁵ Brekke appears to define fundamentalism as a militant pious religious movement fighting back against alienation and marginalization of religion in the modern world,¹³⁶ as well as to restore the role of religion in politics, economy, and societal life of the modern people.¹³⁷

Also consider Barry M. Rubin's perspective on Fundamentalism.¹³⁸ His understanding of the term is limited to Egyptian Islamic Fundamentalism. Rubin did not define the term in a precise or defined phrase, instead expounding on the formative forces that give rise to fundamentalist groups in that country, from which he discovered that each of the groups wanted to urge the establishment of a more Islamic society. He observes on the four fundamentalist groups in Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood, the *jama'at*, the *jam'iyat*, and the mainstream clergy. According to Rubin, their movements are defined by their political motivations, particularly Egyptian politics toward foreign concerns such as its connections with the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, and the Iranian Revolution.

The Muslim Brotherhood's* external propaganda aimed to promote the image of traditional clergy members as non-violent despite the radical discourse within the movement. While the *Jama'at* group sought a violent revolution, and the *Jam'iyat* group used low-level violence. Though no definite definition is provided, Rubin seems to define (Islamic) Fundamentalism as a religious, political movement of those,¹³⁹ particularly of

¹³⁵ Brekke T. Fundamentalism. P. 101.

¹³⁶ *Ibid* P. 17-34.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*. P. 101-140.

¹³⁸ Barry M. Rubin was an American-born Israeli intellectual. He was an expert on terrorism and Middle Eastern affairs. As a researcher and an academic, he also held a position as a director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA), a professor at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC Herzliya) in Israel, and an editor of the journal of Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA).

¹³⁹ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

the religious groups, who attempt to restore the centrality of religion in the political sphere¹⁴⁰, one of which is through the establishment of an Islamic state.¹⁴¹

It is also noteworthy for offering Indonesian intellectuals' definitions of Fundamentalism. Following a number of terror actions and bombs performed by extremist groups in the early years of the twenty-first century, including as the Bali Bombing in 2002 and the JW Marriott Bombing in Jakarta in 2003, scholarly debate on fundamentalism has grown in Indonesia. In religious and sociopolitical studies, scholarly debate focuses on Islamic fundamentalism¹⁴². It coincides with the rise of religious civil society organizations, particularly Islamic fundamentalist and conservative CSOs. Indonesian researchers in that field have differing perspectives on the subject. The following section contains the viewpoints of two well-known and important intellectuals.

The first is Nurcholish Madjid.¹⁴³ In his work, *Islam Doktrin dan Peradaban: Sebuah Telaah Kritis tentang Masalah Keimanan, Kemanusiaan, dan Kemodernan (Doctrinal Islam and Civilization: A Critical Study of the Problems of Faith, Humanity, and Modernity)*,¹⁴⁴ NM equated fundamentalism with cultism.¹⁴⁵ Cultism is the practice of living in absolute and radical submission to religion, charismatic ideologues, or religious leaders. He criticized Indonesian Islamic fundamentalist groups for vehemently advocating Sharia rule as the national constitution. NM encouraged a new method of understanding religious texts in his academic writings on religion. Sacred scriptures, according to NM, should not be taken literally, but rather contextually.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴¹ Rubin B. *Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics*. USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990. P. 1-2.

¹⁴² Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

¹⁴³ Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) was a prominent Indonesian Muslim scholar and a reputable humanist. His ideas of secularism and pluralism in Indonesia are noteworthy to be taken as the source for this topic. He served as Deputy Chair of the Advisory Board of the Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association. He also served as the Rector of Paramadina University. Madjid is considered as one of the important thinkers for Islamic Reform in Indonesia.

¹⁴⁴ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* // *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ Madjid N. *Islam Doktrin dan Peradaban*. P. 585.

The second is Azyumardi Azra.¹⁴⁶ His definition of the term is found in his work on *Pergolakan Politik Islam: dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme, hingga Post-Modernisme* (Islamic Political Upheaval: from Fundamentalism, Modernism, to Postmodernism)¹⁴⁷. Azra began by distinguishing between two types of fundamentalist movements. The first form is *traditional fundamentalism*, which refers to fundamentalism in the pre-modern age. He classified this type as true fundamentalism in the sense that it is an inward-looking movement that seeks to reform Muslims' religious lives. The second type is fundamentalism in the modern day, known as neo-fundamentalism. He saw this as a reactionary movement by Islamic fundamentalist groups against the Western political and economic system, as well as socio-cultural aspects that they believe are incompatible with Islamic ideals.¹⁴⁸

There are numerous definitions of fundamentalism by various thinkers that are not presented here. However, the definitions provided above are certainly sufficient to denote multiple interpretations of fundamentalism from various perspectives. These definitions appear to cover practically all approaches to fundamentalism, including economic, social, cultural perspective etc.

3. Multiple Views on the Features of Fundamentalism

This section will delineate the common characteristics of fundamentalism according to distinguished thinkers from the fields relevant to this research. Just as the definitions vary, so do the characteristics of fundamentalism. It is because fundamentalism, to a certain extent,¹⁴⁹ is "a cultural product, in the sense that different cultural settings result in different forms of fundamentalism."¹⁵⁰ Fundamentalism's

¹⁴⁶ Azyumardi Azra was one of the well-recognized Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. His studies and scholarly research are predominantly on socio-cultural and socio-political issues of Islam. From 1998-2006, he served as the Chancellor of Universitas Islam Negeri/State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah. In 2010, he received the title Commander of the Order of the British Empire, an honorary title from the British Empire.

¹⁴⁷ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ Azra A. *Pergolakan Politik Islam*. P. 110-111.

¹⁴⁹ *Hood R.W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

¹⁵⁰ *Herriot P.* Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Local, Personal. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. P. ii.

characteristics can also be divided into general and specific features. Therefore, it is necessary to present various characteristics of fundamentalism from several thinkers with various research backgrounds.

Let us begin with the well-known *Fundamentalism Project*, a study project on fundamentalism¹⁵¹. According to this project, fundamentalism has nine features,¹⁵² as the following:

- *Reactivity to the marginalization of religion.* The fundamentalist movements are "concerned first with the erosion of religion and its role in society," Therefore, they protect "some religious content, some set of traditional cosmological beliefs and associated norms of conduct."¹⁵³
- *Selectivity.* Fundamentalism is not merely defensive of the tradition but "selects and reshapes aspects" that differentiate fundamentalist ideology from the religious mainstream.³ Similarly, fundamentalists accept some sides of modernity (particularly its technological and organizational features), but refuse others (mainly the ideological underpinnings of modernity, such as relativism, secularism, and pluralism), some of which are singled out "for special attention, usually in the form of focused opposition."¹⁵⁴
- *Moral Manicheism.* The fundamentalist worldview considers the reality of being "uncompromisingly divided into light and darkness. The world outside the group is therefore contaminated, sinful, doomed; the world inside is a pure and redeemed 'remnant'".
- *Absolutism and inerrancy.* Fundamentalists share a belief in the inerrancy of their sacred texts, "or its analogues (e.g., papal infallibility, a privileged school of Islamic jurisprudence, etc.)"; with a recognizable approach to sacred sources, which opposes the hermeneutical methods.
- *Millennialism and messianism.* In fundamentalists' view, history has a miraculous culmination: "the good will triumph over evil"; and "the end of days, preceded by trials and tribulations, will be ushered in by the Messiah, the Saviour, the Hidden Imam."¹⁵⁵
- *Elect, chosen membership.* The militants of the fundamentalist groups tend to consider their membership as "'elect,' chosen, divinely called."
- *Sharp boundaries.* The idea of a separation between the faithful and the sinful is widespread among fundamentalist movements, with the notion "of a dividing wall and

¹⁵¹ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL:

<https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Dtdt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

¹⁵² Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023); See also: Schirrmacher T. Fundamentalism. P. 27. Schirrmacher cited only eight characteristics from the Fundamentalism Project and also without explanation of each of them. He did not include 'behavioral requirements' as one of the characteristics. Meanwhile, Ozzano cited the nine characteristics from Fundamentalism Project, and for that reason I use his entire quotes. Ozzano quoted from: Marty M. E., Appleby R. S. (eds). *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. P. 399-424.

¹⁵³ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

¹⁵⁴ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

¹⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

other spatial metaphors." The separation can be physical or "implemented through audio-visual boundaries, a distinctive vocabulary, and control over access to the media."¹⁵⁶

- *Authoritarian organization.* Although membership is voluntary, with periodic trends towards equalitarianism, "the typical form of fundamentalism organization is charismatic, a leader-follower relationship." The tension between these two features makes movements sometimes fragile. Moreover, "since there can be no loyal opposition, there is a tendency toward fragmentation."¹⁵⁷
- *Behavioural requirements.* "The member's time, space, and activity are a group resource, not an individual one." In order to create "a powerful affective dimension, an imitative, conforming dimension," groups thus have "distinctive music, [...] dress rules [...] drinking, sexuality, appropriate speech, and the discipline of children", with censorship of reading and audio-visual material.¹⁵⁸

Barr's research also reveals fundamentalist characteristics. The characteristics he presented are limited to fundamentalism among American conservative Christians¹⁵⁹.

There are three major features of the fundamentalists' doctrines, according to Barr:

- A very strong emphasis on the inerrancy of the Bible, the absence from it of any error;
- A strong hostility to modern theology and its methods, results, and implications of the modern critical study of the Bible;
- An assurance that those who do not share their religious views are not really 'true Christians' at all.¹⁶⁰

Another notable characteristic of fundamentalism can also be found in the research of John Esposito. Here is a list of fundamentalist traits, particularly Islamic fundamentalists, shown in his works.

- *Projection of an alternative vision of society.* Esposito views that fundamentalism or revivalism is not anti-modernity or anti-secularism. Fundamentalists only object to westernized and secularized systems that progressively exclude religion from politics. He is inclined to view fundamentalism as a movement that aims at urging the implementation of an alternative vision for society compatible with the values of fundamentalists.¹⁶¹
- *Recentralizing religion into politics.* Fundamentalism is a reactionary movement against the exclusion of religion from politics. In other words, the fundamentalist movement aims to revive religion's centrality in politics.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁶ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵⁹ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Dtd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

¹⁶⁰ Barr J. Fundamentalism. London: SCM Press, 1981. P. 1.

¹⁶¹ Esposito G. The Islamic Threat. P. 9-10.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* P. 11-12.

- *Religious-motivated movement.* (Islamic) fundamentalists strive to gain Islam's reassertion in public life. Their movement aims to restore the centrality of Islamic values in society. Esposito observed that the movement was motivated by a vision to gain an increase in Islamically oriented-governments, organizations, laws, banks, social welfare services, and educational institutions.¹⁶³
- *Conspiratorial and radical movement.* Fundamentalists assume that: (1). "Islam and the West are locked in an ongoing battle, dating back to the early days of Islam, which is heavily influenced by the legacy of the Crusades and European colonialism. (2). "Islam is not simply an ideological alternative for Muslim societies but a theological and political imperative. Since Islam is God's command, implementation must be immediate, not gradual, and the obligation to do so is incumbent on all true Muslims. Therefore, individuals and governments who hesitate, remain apolitical, or resist are no longer to be regarded as Muslim. They are atheists or unbelievers, enemies of God against whom all true Muslims must wage jihad (holy war)."¹⁶⁴
- *Against secular fundamentalism.*¹⁶⁵ Fundamentalists are not anti-modernity, but they stand against secular fundamentalism that tends to relegate religion to the stockpile of traditional beliefs and consider religion valuable only in understanding the past but irrelevant or even regarded as an obstacle to modern political, economic, and social development, and so on.

Bassam Tibi, a distinguished Islamic scholar, phrased another important characteristic of fundamentalism in his work, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*.¹⁶⁶ The characteristics are the following:

- *Ideologically militant.* Fundamentalists are those who strictly hold on to their political ideology, which, according to Tibi¹⁶⁷, has nothing to do with Islam as a religion¹⁶⁸. This common religious understanding is the main reason why he equates fundamentalism to Islamism and objects to equating it to Islam as a religion.
- *Anti-religious pluralism.* The fundamentalists refuse to acknowledge religious plurality. From a fundamentalist point of view, acknowledging religious diversity is considered heresy¹⁶⁹. They only profess the superiority of Islam¹⁷⁰.
- *Politically indoctrinated.* Fundamentalists are indoctrinated to have a deep hatred for the West that, politically and ideologically¹⁷¹, they consider incompatible with their value system.
- *Neo-jihadism.* Fundamentalists are characterized by haphazard interpretations of religious teachings. The idea of jihad, for example, by fundamentalist groups is interpreted as a doctrine that permits terrorism. In fact, jihad in traditional Islamic

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* P. 12

¹⁶⁴ *Esposito G.* The Islamic Threat. P. 19.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* P. 232-233.

¹⁶⁶ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism. P. xiv-xvi.

¹⁶⁷ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

¹⁶⁸ *Ibidem.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibidem.*

¹⁷⁰ *Ibidem.*

¹⁷¹ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Ddetd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

teaching definitely does not allow any violent means. Jihad in Qur'an means peaceful exertion.

- *Anti-secular state.* They challenge the political order of a secular state. Their movement aims at replacing that secular order with a divine or transcendental order, the so-called *hakimiyat Allah*. To achieve that aim, they de-legitimize the secular system and then replace it with their alternative of *nizam Islami* (the Islamic order).¹⁷²

Fazlur Rahman describes some of the features of fundamentalism. As previously stated, Rahman used the term 'revivalism' rather than 'fundamentalism.' He defined *fundamentalism as revivalism*. Islamic fundamentalism or revivalism, according to Rahman, evolved through three stages. The first reform occurred before the advent of classical modernism, which he called *revivalism or fundamentalism*. The second reform occurred after the period of classical modernism, which he called *neo-revivalism or neo-fundamentalism*. The third reform occurred in the period of postmodernism, which he called *postmodernist fundamentalism*. The characteristics of fundamentalism, according to Rahman, are mentioned below:

- *Aimed at purifying religion.* Aimed at purifying religion. Early (Islamic) fundamentalism or revivalism aimed at restoring the pristine purity of Islam. Meanwhile, in neo-fundamentalism or neo-revivalism, the fundamentalists accused the classical modernists of succumbing to the West because they succumbed to the Western socio-political system. In comparison, in postmodernist fundamentalism, the basic elan of their movement is anti-Western.¹⁷³
- *Lack of intellectuality.* As quoted by C. Nielsen, Rahman stated, "Neo-fundamentalism...seems to think it that a divine mission to shut down Islamic intellectual life...However, its assumption that Muslims can straighten out the practical world without serious intellectual effort, with the aid only of catchy slogans, is a dangerous mistake. Not only have neo-fundamentalists failed to seek new sights into Islam through broadening their intellectual horizons, but they have also even let go of the richness of traditional learning."¹⁷⁴
- *Literalism and scripturalism.* Fazlur regarded the fundamentalists as traditionalist conservatives who consider the Koran a book containing absolute truths directly descended from God; therefore, that holy book can only be translated and understood literally.¹⁷⁵
- *Anti-modernism and anti-Western.*¹⁷⁶ Islamic fundamentalism is a reactionary movement towards the failure of modernism as the Western concept to bring Islamic society and the Islamic world to the advancement in various aspects of societal life.

¹⁷² *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism. P. xxvii.

¹⁷³ *Rahman F.* Islam and Modernity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982. P. 136.

¹⁷⁴ *Nielsen N.C. Jr.* Fundamentalism, Mythos and World Religions. New York: State University of New York Press, 1993. P. 101. See also: *Rahman F.* Islam and Modernity: An Intellectual Transformation. Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1979. P. 74.

¹⁷⁵ *Rahman F.* Revival and Reform in Islam. P. 14.

¹⁷⁶ *Rahman F.* Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979. P. 222.

The key features of fundamentalism are also phrased by Karen Armstrong. In *The Battle for God*,¹⁷⁷ Armstrong delivered some interesting fundamentalism characteristics as mentioned below:

- *Violent.* Though Karen Armstrong recognized that only a small minority of fundamentalists commit violence, its manifestations, according to Armstrong, are shocking. She found that this small minority of fundamentalists have gunned down worshipers in a mosque, killed doctors and nurses who work in abortion clinics, shot their presidents, and even toppled a powerful government.
- *Anti-modernity.* Armstrong observed that fundamentalists are even inclined to object to the positive values of modern society. She found that even the most peaceful and law-abiding fundamentalists are perplexing because they seem adamantly opposed to many of the most positive values of modern society. They have no time for democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peace-keeping, free speech, or the separation of church and state.
- *Reactivity to the marginalization of religion.* Fundamentalists are battling against secularism and secularist hegemony that tend to marginalize religion.
- *Cosmic war.* Fundamentalists raised their voices towards the crisis induced by the secularist policies inimical to religion. Therefore, their movements cannot merely be regarded as a conventional political struggle but also as a cosmic war between the forces of good and evil.
- *Conspiratorial.* Fundamentalists perceive that conspiracies are everywhere. They consider themselves as the oppressed groups, and the secularist government is the oppressor. Their movement is driven by fear within them because they think that they, especially their religion, are marginalized and oppressed by secularists, particularly by the secularist governments.

Intriguing characteristics of fundamentalism can also be found in the work of Ahmad Syafii Maarif.¹⁷⁸ as mentioned below:

- *Absolutism.* Fundamentalists are absolutists who perceive themselves as holders of infallible or inerrant religious truths. They also consider that other groups must recognize and admit their absolute religious truths. In their relation to other groups, they strongly hold on to the dictum "either with us or against us."
- *Intolerant and anti-pluralism.* Fundamentalists assume that tolerance is a weakness and a sign of a lack of confidence.
- *Against democracy.* Fundamentalists are inclined to refuse democracy and its fundamental values, such as religious pluralism, human rights, gender equality, and many others¹⁷⁹.

¹⁷⁷ Armstrong K. *Battle for God*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2000. pp. 5-6.

¹⁷⁸ Maarif S. *Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita*. P. 15-17.

¹⁷⁹ Ozzano L. *Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

- *Anti-nationalism*. Indonesian fundamentalists are inclined to stand against national principles, particularly democracy and diversity of religion, contained in Pancasila (five principles). They strive to insist on the implementation of Sharia law. MMI, FPI, HTI, and other Indonesian fundamentalist groups are listed in that characteristic.¹⁸⁰

Another prominent Indonesian Islamic intellectual who thoughtfully observed the issue of fundamentalism was Azyumardi Azra. In *Pergolakan Politik Islam: dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme, hingga Postmodernisme*,¹⁸¹ Azra delineated the three main attributes of fundamentalism as follows:

- *Oppositionalism*. What they oppose is modernism and secularism.
- *Literalism – against the historical-sociological approach*. Fundamentalists object to hermeneutics towards the holy book¹⁸². Azra observed that the fundamentalists are inclined to repudiate any exegesis towards Islamic sacred texts. Fundamentalists argue that holy texts are not allowed to be interpreted contextually and historically.
- *Absolutism*. Islamic fundamentalism, according to Azra, is like a movement against the plurality principle. As they perceive their religious teachings as infallible,¹⁸³ they do not give room for religious plurality.

Before exposing the author's definition, it is important to resketch the definitions of a handful of intellectuals described in preceding parts. Their understanding of the phenomenon is divided into two types of perspectives, which the author refers to be termed religiously motivated fundamentalism (RMF) and politically motivated fundamentalism (PMF)¹⁸⁴. The first perspective comes from those who view fundamentalism solely as a religious movement, in the sense that the phenomenon is defined merely as a militant piety movement with an inward-looking goal of restoring the role and the centrality of religion diminished or devalued by modernism and secularism. In simple terms, this perspective portrays this phenomenon as the response of religious

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* P. 19-23.

¹⁸¹ Azra A. *Pergolakan Politik Islam*. P. 109-110.; See also: Ozzano L. *Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

¹⁸² Ozzano L. *Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

¹⁸³ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website*. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

¹⁸⁴ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1328%26context%3Ddetd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

fundamentalists to the diminution of religion's role as a result of secularism and modernization.

The second perspective raised by those who view fundamentalism solely as a political movement. This perspective views that the phenomenon has outward-looking purposes, in which fundamentalist leaders only use religion, religious teachings and doctrines to further their political power ambitions. In other words, religious fundamentalism is a political movement masquerading as a religious movement, with the goal of gaining political power for fundamentalist leaders rather than restoring the role of religion diminished or eroded by secularism and modernization.

These two views are only the basic approaches toward the phenomenon, which, according to the author, is incomprehensive for different reasons. *First*, the two approaches are the *extratextual studies* of the phenomenon, in the sense that they only focus on external factors that gave rise to the movement, ranging from political, social, cultural, and economic factors¹⁸⁵. *Second*, both approaches consider the motives and objectives of the movement to be separate and unrelated, in the sense that the goal of RMF is assumed to have nothing to do with political motivations, and vice versa, the goal of PMF is perceived to have nothing to do with religious motivations. *Third*, both perspectives assume that the movement will turn violent only if it is driven by political goals and nonviolent if it is motivated by religious aims. In other words, religious motivations do not consequence in violence, however political motivations do¹⁸⁶.

To make the two approaches comprehensive, the author also offers an integrative approach and an *intratextual study* toward the phenomenon. Integrative approach discovers that this study no longer favours one approach over the other, but rather incorporates both. RMF and PMF should be viewed from their interplayed relationship, in the sense that RMF shares the features of PMF and vice versa; PMF also shares the

¹⁸⁵ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹⁸⁶ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Ddetd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

characteristics of RMF. Therefore, the definition of fundamentalism should account for the connectivity and inseparability of religious and political motives¹⁸⁷. The reason is very simple that politics, by definition, tends to exploit religion for political gains¹⁸⁸. Religion is frequently used as a tool for gaining political power. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, may use politics to attain their religious purposes.¹⁸⁹

In addition, *intratextual study* is an inquiry into epistemological issues and cognitive problems within religious fundamentalism. The investigation of epistemological problems within it, according to the author, allows the two prior approaches to become more comprehensive or holistic. This is because the inquiries of religious fundamentalism should not only be confined to the investigation of the external factors that give rise to it, but also the epistemological problems or cognitive issues that it contains. The reason is that epistemological basis of religious cognition also determines the social conducts of fundamentalists, where they can be peaceful but can also turn violent.

To corroborate the intratextual and extratextual study, the author employs psychopolitical approach to fundamentalism that considers the centrality of religious texts for fundamentalist¹⁹⁰ and the importance of political factors that give rise to the movement. A psychological study views fundamentalism as a meaning system that encompasses all of life of the fundamentalists and provides them a framework for motivation, meanings, purposes, and values found wholly within the pages of the sacred text. In other words, the basis for understanding fundamentalism is that all of life of the fundamentalists must be

¹⁸⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸⁸ *Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

¹⁸⁹ Jan-Werner Muller. *What is Populism?* USA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016. P. 136.

¹⁹⁰ *Ralph W. Wood, Jr; Peter C. Hill, Williamson P.W. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*. New York - London: The Guilford Press, 2005. P. 5.

understood in relation to the text.¹⁹¹ Meanwhile, political approach considers the importance of political factors that give rise to the phenomenon¹⁹².

Using the main concepts outlined above, the author defines fundamentalism as a social movement of the pious militant religious in response to the diminishing or the erosion of the centrality of religion in the secular and modern socio-political system. This movement not only demonstrates their specific attitude towards solving socio-political issues, but it also seeks to regain the important role of religion in transforming it in light of their religious teachings, ideals, and doctrines.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.* P. 5.

¹⁹² *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

Chapter 2. INDONESIAN FUNDAMENTALISM: DYNAMICS AND COMPLEXITY

This chapter depicts Indonesian fundamentalism. As stated in the first chapter, Indonesian fundamentalism is the case study for this philosophical investigation. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section, *A Short Description of Indonesia*, will provide a general overview of the country. This section is informative because it contains broad information about Indonesia pertinent to this topic, such as demography, diversity of identities of Indonesian society, languages, religions, and many more. They are key tools for comprehending Indonesian fundamentalism. The second part includes *Indonesian Fundamentalist Groups: History and Polemics*. This section's main substance is about the groups' informatory elements, such as their organizational and ideological traits, status, and the goals of their establishment¹⁹³.

The section also shows the periodization of their movement. It describes the stages of their emergence. The primary purpose of this part is to overview the history and the purposes of the establishment of those groups. This section puts explicitly the periodization of the development of fundamentalism in Indonesia. Unlike American fundamentalism, Indonesian fundamentalism has no definite historical timeline. The only significant imprint of its emersion is from a couple of historical events given by the movement of religious groups, particularly Islamic religious groups that, later on, by Indonesian scholars, are characterized as fundamentalist groups. Darul Islam is a well-known religious group whose existence has always been linked to and is commonly considered the origin of fundamentalist groups in Indonesia today.

The third section, *Religiously and Politically Motivated Fundamentalism in Indonesia*, is a further explanation about two approaches toward fundamentalism, religious and political,¹⁹⁴ described in chapter one. The two approaches will be used to analyses the empirical problems of the Indonesian fundamentalism. Finally, in the fourth

¹⁹³ Hood R. W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

¹⁹⁴ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Dedt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

section, the author specifically presents the characteristics of Indonesian fundamentalism, one of which is the contention between the defenders of religious state versus the defenders of secular state.

1. A Short Description of Indonesia

It is essential to present an overview of Indonesia, like politics, economy, culture, religions, and many other aspects. One crucial aspect that will broadly be portrayed is the relationship between politics and religion because the issue of fundamentalism in the Indonesian context is very much related to it, particularly the movement of Islamic religious groups in politics¹⁹⁵.

Geographically, Indonesia is known as the largest archipelagic country in the world. Indonesia is also known as *Nusantara*. In Kawi, an ancient Javanese, the word '*Nusantara*' is formed from two words; *Nusa* means Island; *antara* means *outer, interval, or interspace*. *Nusantara* means the outer islands. *In a broad sense, Nusantara* is an archipelagic country formed from clusters of islands in the ocean. The country has more than 17.504 islands. Its land area is about 1.922.570 km², and its ocean space is about 3.257.483 km². Indonesia is entirely a tropical country. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia is the largest country. Indonesia is located in Southeast Asia, between the Asian and Australian continents.

Demographically, the total population of Indonesia, based on the population census in 2020, is about 275.501.339 million people. In the world, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country after in first place China (1.425.887.337), followed by India (1.417.173.173), and the United States of America (338.289.857).¹⁹⁶ From the category based on religion, Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the

¹⁹⁵ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

¹⁹⁶ The official report of the World Population Review 2022 // Official website of World Population Review. 2023. URL: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/> (date of access: 12.08.2023).

world (231 million), followed by Pakistan (212), India (200), Bangladesh (153), Nigeria (95-103), Egypt (85-90), Iran (82,5), Turkey (74,4), Algeria (41,2), and Sudan (39,6).¹⁹⁷

From a socio-cultural aspect, Indonesia has diverse religions and ethnic groups. Constitutionally, there are various recognized religions, such as Islam (87.2%), Protestant (6.9%), Catholic (2.9%), Hinduism (1.7%), Buddhism (0.7%), Confucianism (0.05%), and traditional religious beliefs (0,55%).¹⁹⁸ Based on racial family, Indonesia is inhabited by two major races, namely Southern Mongoloid/Austronesia and Melanesia. Austronesians dominantly occupy the western part of Indonesia. While Melanesians mostly occupy the eastern part of the country. Currently, Indonesia has more than 300 ethnicities. In 2010, the Central Bureau of Statistics reported that Indonesia has 1340 tribes. More than 721 mother tongues are still in use in the country, and Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian) has officially been taken as the national language since the Youth Pledge in 1928.¹⁹⁹

Politically, Indonesia is a unitary state called *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* - *NKRI* (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). Indonesia is carrying out a democratic system with multiple political parties. Among the dozens of extant political parties, 10 had voting rights in the Indonesian parliament in the 2014 general election. They are typically divided into two types: *partai-partai agamis* (religious parties), also known as *partai-partai Islamis* (Islamic parties), and *partai-partai sekularis* (secularist parties), which are also referred to as *partai-partai nasionalis* (nationalist parties)²⁰⁰. Religious parties “seek a larger role for Islam in public affairs, “whereas secularist parties “promote a more secular vision of Indonesia's politics and government.”²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ The official report of the World Population Review 2021, reported by CNBC Indonesia // Official website of CNBC Indonesia. URL: <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/>. (date of access: 12.08.2023).

¹⁹⁸ The official report of the Profile Indonesia, an official portal of the Indonesian Government // Official website of Indonesian government. URL: <https://indonesia.go.id/profil/agama>. (date of access: 12.09.2023).


¹⁹⁹ The official report of the Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia, reported by Kompas with the title “Daftar Suku Bangsa di Indonesia: List of Ethnic Groups in Indonesia” // KOMPAS official website URL: <https://www.kompas.com/skola/read/2020>. (date of access: 12.09.2023).

²⁰⁰ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

²⁰¹ See: Fossati D., Warburton E. Indonesia's Political Parties and Minorities. Perspective. No.37, 9 July 2018. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018. P. 2.

Religious parties include PKS – *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party), PKB – *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (The National Awakening Party), PPP – *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party), PAN – *Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party). Their members, however, are not exclusively Islamic cadres. Secularist parties include *Partai Golkar - Golongan Karya* (Party of Functional Groups), PDIP - *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), *Partai Nasdem – Nasional Demokrat* (Party of National Democrats), *Partai Gerindra – Gerakan Indonesia Raya* (Party of Great Indonesia Movement), *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party), and *Partai Hanura – Hati Nurani Rakyat* (People's Conscience Party). It may be necessary to show the distinct difference between elites of Islamic and non-Islamic parties pertinent to studies,²⁰² one of which is discovered in a survey of legislators on the topic of whether the government should prioritize Islam over other religions. The survey revealed that 38% of members agreed or strongly agreed on such question, as seen in the figure below.²⁰³

Figure 1. The government should prioritize Islam over other religions (share of respondents who agree or strongly agree, by party)



Economically, Indonesia is categorized as a developing and middle-income country. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia is the largest economy among ASEAN countries.

²⁰² *Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.*

²⁰³ *Ibid.* P. 3.

From its membership in G-20, Indonesia is recognized as the 17th largest economy in the world based on nominal GDP and the seventh largest in Purchasing Power Balance (PPP). However, Indonesia's problem is the wide gap between the rich and the poor. In 2020, the number of poor people in the country has reached 26.42 million.²⁰⁴ The economic imbalance between the haves and the haves-not is enormous. A study reported that "the income of one conglomerate in Indonesia is almost the same as that of 37 million farm workers."²⁰⁵

This wide gap between the rich and the poor is Indonesia's most significant problem today. One of the triggers for the 1998 Reformation Movement was the economic gap, specifically between Chinese conglomerates, which occupy the most significant number in the conglomerate class, and other ethnic groups. This dissertation picked up two cases related to this problem as a focus of study. There were anti-Chinese riots in Bandung in late 1973 and a bloody anti-Chinese riot in 1998.²⁰⁶ Adam Schwarz's study has a lucid investigation of this problem.²⁰⁷

New Order Era (1966-1998) was marked by corruption of the Suharto regime and his cronies that dominated by Chinese business groups.²⁰⁸ Schwarz described that condition that "...almost any member of Indonesia's corporate elite could be considered a crony...almost all of the wealthiest ethnic-Chinese businessmen owe their start in business to special favors handed out by friends in the government...the top rank of Indonesia's crony businessmen can be said to form a fairly exclusive club."²⁰⁹ Corruption in the country is still a major problem until today's Reformation Era (1998-present). According to research from the Gallup Poll in 2006-2011, corruption continued to

²⁰⁴ See: Press release of Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia) on 15.07.2020 (Presentase Penduduk Miskin Maret 2020 naik menjadi 9.78 persen) (The percentage of poor people in March 2020 increased to 9.78 percent) // Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia / URL: <https://www.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2020/07/15/1744/persentase-penduduk-miskin-maret-2020-naik-menjadi-9-78-persen.html>. (date of access: 13.08.2023).

²⁰⁵ Faishal Rahman, a researcher and an analyst of Megawati Institute, discovered that the income of the 40 richest people in Indonesia grew approximately 17 percent between 2006 and 2016. See: Tempo.co, ed. Dewi Rina Cahyani, Wednesday, 21.03.2018 at 17:25.

²⁰⁶ Schwarz A. *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*. San Francisco: Westview Press Boulder. P. 33-34.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* p. 98-132.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p. 135-144.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.* p. 139.

damage Indonesia.²¹⁰ It is rather difficult to rule out the connection of this problem with the rise of the fundamentalist movement in the post-Suharto era.

Figure 2: Indonesian corruption index



2. Indonesian Fundamentalist Groups

Indonesian fundamentalism, unlike American fundamentalism, had no obvious historical antecedents. It is difficult to pinpoint when and how it originated. It has no clear imprint, at least in the intellectual movement, like in the movement of Protestant theologians in American fundamentalism that aimed at defending their traditional theology against the challenges of liberal theology. Indonesian fundamentalism is mainly marked by the political movement of religious groups. It evolved hand in hand with the political movement of Islamic religious groups²¹¹. Indonesian fundamentalism is political. This part gives a clear overview of the Indonesian fundamentalist groups, notably their organizational traits and status, ideological characteristics, and the purpose of their establishment.

²¹⁰ The result of that research was based on face-to-face interviews with 6,390 Indonesians from 2006 to 2011. Those surveys were conducted in July 2006; April 2007; March 15-25, 2008; April 18 to May 5, 2009; April 4-24, 2010; and May 18-31, 2011. The Abu Dhabi Gallup Center is a Gallup research hub based in the capital of the United Arab Emirates. That survey was conducted by the Gallup center, the world's leading public opinion research firm, and the Crown Prince Court of Abu Dhabi.

²¹¹ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

Table 1: The main list of groups in Indonesia.

| No | Groups and Year of Establishment | Organizational Traits and Status | Ideological Traits | Purpose of Establishment |
|----|---|---|---|--|
| 1 | Darul Islam, 1949. | Banned and designated as a terrorist group by Indonesia, but currently covertly operating | Islamism, <i>Sharianism</i> , <i>Qur'anism</i> , and anti-democracy. | NII (Negara Islam Indonesia: Islamic State of Indonesia - IIS). |
| 2 | Komando Jihad, the 1970s | Clandestine, existing but undercover | Linked to Darul Islam: Islamism. | NII or IIS |
| 3 | Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 1980s | Open and incorporated but disbanded in 2017 by the Indonesian government. Currently, it is suspected that it is still operating secretly. | Pan-Islamism, khalifism, Salafism, jihadism, anti (democracy, secularism, Western, nationalism, communism, capitalism, Zionism) | The Establishment of Khilafah Islam or Islamic state based on Sharia or Islamic law. |
| 4 | Jemaah Islamiyah, 1993 | Clandestine, existing but undercover | Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, Pan-Islamism, Salafism, Wahhabism, anti-Christian sentiment | Islamic State in Southeast Asia |
| 5 | Front Pembela Islam, 1998. | Open and incorporated, disbanded in 2019, but secretly operating. | Sharianism, anti-secularism, | Islamic state of Indonesia. |
| 6 | Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, 2000. | Clandestine, existing but undercover. | Sharianism, anti-America/Western | Islamic State of Indonesia |
| 7 | Laskar Jihad, 2000. | Clandestine, existing but undercover. | Islamism, Sharianism, Salafism, Islamic fundamentalism, | Islamic theocracy in Indonesia. |

| | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| | | | Christophobia, anti-democracy, | |
| 8 | Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, 2008. | Clandestine, existing but undercover. | Supporting ISIS | Islamic state of Indonesia. |
| 9 | Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, 2015. | Clandestine, existing but undercover. | Pan-Islamism, Islamism, jihadism, Salafism. | Islamic State of Indonesia, and Sharianism. |

This second section presents the evolution of Indonesian fundamentalism, particularly Islamic fundamentalist groups. In many studies of fundamentalism, what is generally discussed in Indonesia is the evolution of religious fundamentalist groups that came to rise in the 1980s. However, there is no clear portrayal of the origin of fundamentalist groups and their proliferation in the present time. As a result, it is vital to trace its origins, including when and how it began.

2.1. Indonesian fundamentalism in Old Order era (1945-1965)

The ideological goal of the movement of Indonesian fundamentalist groups is often identified with the polemic of the *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter), known as the polemic of ‘*the seven words*.’²¹² The Jakarta Charter was a historical document drafted by BPUPKI (*Badan Penyelidikan Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia: Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee*). On June 22nd, 1945, the document was established. This group was formed initially to design the script for Indonesian independence, which was later adopted as the Preamble to the Indonesian Constitution. The Pancasila's five principles are at the heart of the document. The definition of Pancasila's principles is presented in the first chapter. Below is the original version of the Jakarta Charter:

²¹² The *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter) is a historical document that contains compromises between the religious and the nationalist groups within the committee of BPUPKI (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia = Preparatory Committee for the Indonesian Independence). BPUPKI was established on March 1st 1945. This committee was initially established to draft the script of Indonesian independence, but the script was eventually taken as the Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution. On the committee, there was an ideological difference between the Islamic groups and the nationalist groups. The Islamic groups urged the implementation of Islamic law on the first principle of Pancasila, and the nationalist groups who objected to it.

“Whereas independence is a genuine right of all nations and any form of foreign occupation should thus be erased from the earth as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice,²¹³

Whereas the struggle of the Indonesian independence movement has reached the blissful point of leading the Indonesian people safely and well before the monumental gate of an independent Indonesian State which shall be free, united, sovereign, just, and prosperous,²¹⁴

By the grace of Almighty Allah and urged by the lofty aspiration to exist as a free nation. Now, therefore, the people of Indonesia declare herewith their independence,

Pursuant to this, in order to form a Government of the State of Indonesia that shall protect the whole people of Indonesia and the entire homeland of Indonesia, and in order to advance general prosperity, to develop the nation's intellectual life, and to contribute to the implementation of a world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice, Indonesia's National Independence shall be laid down in a Constitution of the State of Indonesia, which is to be established as the State of the Republic of Indonesia with the sovereignty of the people and based on the belief in the One and Only God, **with the obligation to abide by Islamic law for adherents of Islam**, on just and civilized humanity, on the unity of Indonesia and on a democratic rule that is guided by the strength of wisdom resulting from deliberation/representation, to realize social justice for all the people of Indonesia.” *Jakarta, June 22nd, 1945.*²¹⁵

The first principle of Pancasila is '*Ketuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*: Belief in God, with the *obligation to carry out*

²¹³ Asian Human Rights Commission // Official website of UNESCO. 2023. URL: <https://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/b1ba8608010ce0c48966911957392ea8cda405d8.pdf>. (date of access: 12.09.2023).

²¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

²¹⁵ See: *UUD 1945 Hasil Amandemen (The Amended Constitution of 1945)*. Compiled by: Redaksi Sinar Grafika. Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2002. P. 78-79. URL: <http://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/b1ba8608010ce0c48966911957392ea8cda405d8.pdf>. The original text is as the following:

“Bahwa sesungguhnya kemerdekaan itu ialah hak segala bangsa, dan oleh sebab itu maka penjajahan di atas dunia harus dihapuskan, karena tidak sesuai dengan perikemanusiaan dan perikeadilan,

Dan perjuangan pergerakan kemerdekaan Indonesia telah sampailah kepada saat yang berbahagia, dengan selamat sentosa mengantarkan rakyat Indonesia ke depan pintu gerbang negara Indonesia, yang merdeka, bersatu, berdaulat, adil dan makmur, Atas berkat rahmat Allah Yang Maha Kuasa, dan dengan didorong oleh keinginan luhur, supaya berkehidupan kebangsaan yang bebas, maka rakyat Indonesia menyatakan dengan ini kemerdekaannya,

Kemudian daripada itu untuk membentuk suatu pemerintah negara Indonesia Merdeka yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia, dan untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial, maka disusunlah kemerdekaan kebangsaan Indonesia itu dalam suatu hukum dasar negara Indonesia yang berbentuk dalam suatu susunan negara Republik Indonesia, yang berkedaulatan rakyat, dengan berdasarkan kepada: Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya, menurut dasar kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab, persatuan Indonesia, dan kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan-perwakilan serta dengan mewujudkan suatu keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia.” Jakarta, 22 Juni 1945.

Islamic law for its adherents.²¹⁶ This principle became a polemic because the seven words, *obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents*,²¹⁷ were removed after the declaration of Indonesian independence on August 18th of 1945. This first and four other principles were established in the charter on June 22nd, 1945. The deletion of the seven words turned out to be the result of a compromise by the members of the committee that aimed to keep the first principle inclusive.

The removal of the *seven words* from Pancasila was not only initiated by the non-Muslim members of BPUPKI, who were few in numbers, but also by the majority of Muslim members. This passage was finally removed, but it remains a polemic till the present time. The vast majority of Indonesian contemporary fundamentalist groups today insist on reenacting the seven sentences into Pancasila's first principle. The movement of contemporary fundamentalist groups have roots in the movement of DI (*Darul Islam: Abode of Islam*), an Islamic rebellious group,²¹⁸ established on August 7th, 1949²¹⁹. DI aimed at establishing NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia: Islamic State of Indonesia*). The group was led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo.²²⁰

DI was initially established for a political purpose: to fight back the Dutch who attempted to reoccupy Indonesia. Through *Perjanjian Renville* (Renville Treaty),²²¹ the

²¹⁶ Samosir O. Democracy, political identity, and the fate of minority politics: Reflections towards Indonesia's National Concurrent Elections in 2024. // *Globus: Гуманитарные науки*. 2021. № 2 (36). С. 14-22. URL: <http://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=46348730>.

²¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

²¹⁸ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

²¹⁹ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

²²⁰ Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo (1905-1962) was one of the prominent Islamic figures in Indonesian history who led the rebellion of *Darur Islam* against the Indonesian government from 1949 to 1962. The aim of his rebellion was to compel the acceptance and the implementation of the Koran as the sole source of legal norms for Indonesia, and also the establishment of the Islamic state of Indonesia based on Sharia law. At his young age, Kartosoewirjo studied at ELS (Europeesche Lagere School), an elementary school established by the Dutch for Europeans, and also at *Inlandsche School der Tweede Klasse* (ISTK), a school established by the Dutch for native Indonesians. At the time of his education at ELS, he met Notodiharjo, a modern Islamic figure, from whom Kartosoewirjo learned the ideas of modern Islam. His political activity and ideas were starting to evolve when he took another step in his education at *Nederlands Indische Artsen School* and after joining *Syarikat Islam* (Islamic Association), an Islamic merchant association, under the guidance of its top leader, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. His political ideas and movement were very much influenced by Tjokroaminoto.

²²¹ The Renville Treaty was a political treaty between the Dutch and the Indonesian government held on December 8th of 1947 on the US warship, Renville, anchored in Jakarta. The treaty was mediated by a special committee of the three states, like Australia, Belgium and the United States. There are three points of the agreement which are opposed by Indonesia, in

Dutch attempted to reoccupy several parts of Indonesia, especially West Java and East Java. That means that the Dutch did not recognize the entirety of Indonesia's independence, proclaimed in August 1945. Kartosoewirjo's initiative to establish NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia: Indonesian Islamic State, IIS*), which is ideologically substantiated by the spirit of the enforcement of *Sharia* (Islamic law) by the current fundamentalist groups, is taken as the ideological principium for their movement. The following is the original proclamation of DI/TII:

“The Proclamation of the Establishment of NII/IIS: We, the Muslims of the Indonesian nation, declare the establishment of NII/IIS, then the law that applies to NII/IIS is Islamic law. Allah the Great! Allah the Great! Allah the Great!

Signed: S.M.Kartosoewirjo.
Madinah-Indonesia, 12 Sjawal 1368/August 7th 1948.”²²²

Politically, DI's establishment had two key political purposes. First, it aimed at terminating the Dutch, who attempted to reoccupy Indonesian territory, particularly West Java and East Java. The Renville Treaty took sides with the Dutch. Second, Kartosoewirjo was dissatisfied with Sukarno's leadership, who had agreed to the Renville Treaty. In addition, a few local elites were dissatisfied with Sukarno's administration. The establishment of DI in South Kalimantan by Ibnu Hajar and South Sulawesi by Kahar Muzakkar, for example, expressed their dissatisfaction with Sukarno's policy of refusing to accept troops from the two regions into the Armed Forces of the United Republic of Indonesia.

DI's movement in West Java, Central Java, and Aceh likewise defined the political positions of their local elites with two shared goals. First, they opposed the central government's proposal to merge Aceh Province and North Sumatra Province into one province, with Medan as its capital city. Second, they opposed communism and socialism,

particular by the DI group. (1). The Netherlands only recognizes Central Java, Yogyakarta and Sumatra as part of Indonesian territory. (2). The agreement divided Indonesian territory into two parts, namely areas controlled by Indonesia and areas controlled by the Dutch. (3). TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia: Indonesian national army*) had to withdraw from West Java and East Java.

²²² See Karl D. Jackson. *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion*. California: University of California Press, 1980. See also: Djashar Djamil, Tri Suseno, dan Wahyu Juantono. *Pemberontakan DI/TII: Di Jawa Barat dan Jawa Tengah serta Operasi Penumpasannya* (The Rebellion of Islamic State/Indonesian Islamic Army: In West Java and the Operation of Its Extermination). Jakarta: Penerbit Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat, 2018.

which were prevalent throughout Sukarno's tenure. The growth of DI, with its goal of establishing Sharia as the national constitution, was ideologically motivated by a desire to resist these two ideologies, which they saw as anti-Islamic and atheistic. The ongoing movements of Indonesian fundamentalist groups today are ideologically similar to the DI movement.

2.2. Indonesian fundamentalism in the New Order era (1966-1998)

During the New Order era, Indonesian fundamentalism reached its second stage.²²³ The development of fundamentalist extremist groups characterizes Indonesian fundamentalism during this time period. During this period, three groups were the main 'players', namely, KJ (*Komando Jihad: Jihad Command*), which existed in the 1970s²²⁴; HTI (*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir*), which entered Indonesia in the 1980s; and JI (*Jemaah Islamiyah: Islamic Congregation*) that established in 1993. Ideologically, KJ, HTI, and JI are pan-Islamist organizations that seek to build an *Islamic Khilafah* or Islamic state.

Let us have a look at KJ in particular. KJ's movement was covert or underground. KJ was considered an ideological continuation and branch of DI. KJ's religious and political goal, like DI's, was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. The arrest of KJ's two members, Haji Ismail Pranoto and Dodo Muhammad Darda, the son of S.M. Kartosoewirdjo, demonstrates the existence of this gang. Pranoto and Dodo were arrested and imprisoned for attempting to resurrect the NII (Negara Islam Indonesia: Indonesian

²²³ *Orde Baru* (New Order), abbreviated as ORBA, is designated to the reign of Suharto. ORBA substituted the ORLA (*Orde Lama: Old Order*) after Sukarno, the first president and ruler of ORLA, was dethroned in 1966. The ORBA regime was in power from 1966 to 1998. It was torn down by the student reform movement in 1998.

²²⁴ Komando Jihad (Jihad Command: JC) was an Islamic fundamentalist extremist group. It was established in 1968 and exterminated through intelligence operations in the mid of 1980s. The emersion of JC remains a controversy until today. There are differences of opinion among Indonesian researchers and analysts regarding this group. The first group viewed JC as an independent fundamentalist group which had three goals. First, JI aimed at establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia. Second, JI aimed at establishing the Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Council. Third, JI stood against the national Constitution of 1945 and the national principle of Pancasila, and encouraged the Indonesian government to reenact the Jakarta Charter, particularly restoring the principle of 'carrying out Islamic law' to the first principle of Pancasila. The second group is those who consider the establishment of JC purely a political delude of the ORBA regime. They claim that the purpose of the establishment of JC by ORBA regime was to distract public attention from the fraud in the presidential election in 1977. However, the dissent of the two groups does not dismiss the fact that JC was a fundamentalist extremist group that had the objective of the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia that is constitutionally based on sharia law.

Islamic State).²²⁵ KJ was first founded to aid the New Order regime in deposing the old regime's political opponents and cracking down on the Darul Islam revival movement. Abdul Qadir Djaelani founded Komando Jihad in 1967 as a coalition of Muslim student organizations led by the Muslim Students of Indonesia (Pelajar Islam Indonesia: PII).

It is said that Komando Jihad was "a front to support the New Order in its purge of elements of the old regime...crackdown on the Darul Islam revival...Komando Jihad has gone down in history as a government conspiracy."²²⁶ The problem was that the group grew into a political force that posed a threat to the New Order authority. Their movement was seen as a Darul Islam revival movement. One example was in the case of the former PII secretary for North Sumatra, who attempted to resurrect Darul Islam by increasing the number of DI members in the region. These new DI members consolidate their force and continue to urge the establishment the Islamic State of Indonesia. Their movement achieved a new level of consolidation in 1973.²²⁷

In short, the KJ movement was ideologically identical to DI. The group was growing in size. In the 1980s, the New Oder administration finally began to crack down on the group through special military operations. This military operation against KJ, however, was viewed as pragmatic choice because it simply sought to protect the government's development plans. KJ was just considered as a barrier to the development process, and the government only used repressive measures against the group to maintain the development process's stability.

2.3. Indonesian fundamentalism in the Reform Era (1998 -)

The Reform Movement in 1998 marked the third stage of Indonesian fundamentalism. The Reform Era spans the years 1998 until the present. This epoch began with the dethroning of authoritarian President Suharto. Suharto was deposed from the presidency in 1998 after a deadly protest movement. This movement helped to transform

²²⁵ Temby Q. Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah. In journal Indonesia. No. 89, April 2010. Published by: Cornell University's Southeast Asia Program. P. 3.

²²⁶ *Ibid.* P. 13.

*The organization is restricted in Russian Federation.

²²⁷ *Ibid.* P. 13-14.


Indonesia into a more liberal and open democratic state. This epoch has both positive and negative aspects. Positive changes occurred in all sectors, including improved civil government, free speech, press freedom, and many more. On the other side, this era is defined by negative excesses, one of which is the uncontrollable proliferation of fundamentalist groups who take advantage of freedom in democracy. There are two key issues here.

First, the proliferation of fundamentalist groups. The fall of the authoritarian regime of the New Order is like the 'wind of liberation' for the fundamentalist groups. As Suharto was in power, the groups were active covertly. In the post-Reform democracy, the groups were like 'inbreathing the fresh air' of democracy and freely expressed their existence in the public sphere. In 2018, the Department of Empowering Bureaucratic Reform of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights reported there are 390.293 CSOs in Indonesia.²²⁸ Among those groups, there are fundamentalist groups, but few are registered. Among the many fundamentalist groups, a few are closely monitored, such as the FPI, MMI, Laskar Jihad, JAT, and JAD, as well as the KJ, HTI, and JI, which are still functioning, albeit surreptitiously.

Second, those fundamentalist groups' complicity in radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. At the local level, the biggest issue with these groups' movement is their involvement in terror attacks and bombs in various cities.

²²⁸ The data is compiled by the Department of Empowering Bureaucratic Reform of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of Indonesia, presented by the expert staff, Haru Tamtomo. Jakarta, November 14th, 2018.

Figure 3: Official terrorism Index in Indonesia (2000-2021)



According to the Institute for Economics and Peace's (IEP) Global Terrorism Database, there were approximately 654 incidents of terror in Indonesia between 2000 and 2021.²²⁹ On a worldwide scale, the key issue is their involvement with global terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The 9/11 tragedy heightened Indonesians' awareness of the rise of fundamentalist organizations and their links to extremism or terrorism, such as DI, JI, MMI, JAT, and JAD.

3. Religiously and Politically Motivated Fundamentalism in Indonesian

This section re-defines the two sorts of approaches to Indonesian fundamentalism, but on a more empirical level. The first is from those who view fundamentalism as a movement of militant piety. Some refer to this as traditional or magisterial

²²⁹Data Indonesia official website. 2023. URL: <https://dataindonesia.id/varia/detail/indonesia-alami-654-insiden-terorisme-sejak-20002021>. DataIndonesia, December 7, 2022 – 4.33 PM, reported by Monavia Ayu Rizaty. (date of access: 12.102023).

fundamentalism. As explained in the first chapter, this is known as RMF (religious-motivated fundamentalism). The second is from those who view fundamentalism as a political movement. Some refer to it as contemporary fundamentalism or neo-fundamentalism. This is referred to as PMF (political-motivated fundamentalism).

The subsections that follow will depict both RMF and PMF in the context of Indonesia. However, as stated in chapter one, this classification does not seek to demonstrate that RMF is solely a religious movement with no political motivations, or that PMF is purely a political movement with no religious motivations. On the contrary, the purpose of this classification is to demonstrate that RMF and PMF have causality and that the two should be approached from their interplayed relation. Let us examine the perspectives on fundamentalism according to a couple of Indonesian intellectuals and researchers.

3.1. Indonesian RMF and Its Main Issues

This section will give a select few of perspectives from Indonesian researchers who observe Indonesian fundamentalism through the lens of the RMF. In other words, those academics see Indonesian fundamentalism as a militant piety movement whose ideological goal is to preserve 'religious truth.' The Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) serves as a starting point for comprehending the ideological movement of Indonesia's contemporary fundamentalist religious groups.²³⁰ Ideologically, their actions are also motivated by religious aims, which is to return to Piagam Jakarta, which for them means not only returning to the notion of applying Islamic law for its adherents, but also establishing that Islamic law as the basis of the state constitution.

According to Professor Abdul Munir Mul Khan,²³¹ the emergence of fundamentalist groups is driven by multiple causes. On the one hand, religious motives drive them to firmly stand up for their aims, which is to incorporate their religious doctrines as the basis

²³⁰ Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C. *Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents*. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. pp. 117–118.

²³¹ Professor Abdul Munir Mul Khan is an Indonesian intellectual and a prominent figure of Muhammadiyah, a largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, besides NU (Nahdlatul Ulama).

of the national constitution²³². On the other hand, political motives drive them to seize power, through which they can concretize their religious goals. Mulkhan stated, “A struggle through political parties or social movement 'to take control of' various strategic positions to influence political policies, which are conducive towards the realization of the sharia regulations, is taken as a religious duty²³³. This doctrine of '*Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*,' means that whoever conducts it they are struggling in the Lord's way or '*sabilillah*,' which, in certain cases, when the person is deceased in action, then they are believed to be '*mati Syahid* (martyr), and they will get into heaven.’”²³⁴

What Mulkhan said is now becoming a reality. We can see what is happening in Aceh Province. This province applied *perda sharia* (*peraturan daerah sharia*: Sharia local regulation). That *perda* is problematic. It is problematic because its implementation is not only charged to Muslims but, in practice, also applied to non-Muslims.²³⁵

²³² Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

²³³ *Ibidem*.

²³⁴ Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C. Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. P. 122; Mulkhan A.M. Roots of Fundamentalism in Islamic Movement in Indonesia. In Journal of Wacana: A Democracy Projects, second edition. Yogyakarta, 1999. P. 152–153.

²³⁵ The implementation of Sharia law in Aceh not only applied to Muslims but also to non-Muslims, from simple matters, like dress codes, to implementation of caning punishment for those who are involved in gambling, adultery, rape, and alcohol. See: Non-Muslim citizens in Sharia Law in Aceh // Official website BBC News Indonesia. 2023. URL: https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2014/02/140207. (ind. *Warga non-Muslim dalam Syariah Islam di Aceh*). (date of access: 12.09.2023).

Picture 1: The Implementation of Sharia Law in Aceh²³⁶



Another case in point is the FPI movement. FPI frequently conducts raids on immoral establishments such as karaoke, taverns, motels, and nightclubs. FPI perceives that doing raids is a way of implementing the doctrine of “*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*,” the Arabian word that means to encourage goodness and refrain from evil. FPI is one of the tops of the lists of perpetrators of religious violence, particularly violence against Islamic sects they consider perverted, such as Ahmadiyahs, and also against non-Islamic groups, such Christians and other religious groups²³⁷. The group regards itself as the moral guardian of Muslims.²³⁸ What lies behind their claim is that they consider themselves commanded by Allah and, therefore, to have the right and authority to do raids on other groups.

They see themselves as '*polisi moral*,' which literally means 'moral police.' In a broad sense, they appoint themselves as moral guardians merely because they regard themselves as God's chosen believers. Based on that view, they believe they have the authority to conduct raids on places of worship of other religions or Islamic sects that

²³⁶ See: Sharia Aceh applies to non-Muslims // BBC News Индонезия. 2023. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2014/09/140923. BBC News Indonesia, *Syariah Aceh berlaku bagi non-Muslim* = Aceh Sharia applies to non-Muslim: September 23rd 2014. (date of access: 12.09.2023).

²³⁷ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

²³⁸ Arianti V., Mostarom T.R. Managing Religious Tensions: Indonesia's Current Dilemma. In Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2011. Published by International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. P. 4.

*The organization is restricted in Russian Federation.

they consider heretical. The FPI movement has also evolved from a local to a worldwide movement, owing to its members' involvement in global terrorist organizations. The FPI recruited fighters for the battles in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Its members are said to be affiliated with worldwide terrorist organizations like ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Another case in point is the HTI movement. HTI is an Islamic religious group with the political goal of establishing the *Khilafah Islamiyah* (Islamic caliphate or Islamic state). In Indonesia, HTI members and supporters frequently deny that their movement is political, despite the fact that their activities are political. Politically, HTI is closely associated with PKS, an Islamic political party that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. According to Ahmad Syafii Maarif, as noted in chapter one, the major political purpose of PKS is heavily influenced by the Egyptian-based *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood) movement, which aims to establish an Islamic state based on Sharia law.

Religious motives or transcendental aims are a distinguishing feature of Indonesian fundamentalist movements. They are not entirely pragmatic in the sense that they exclusively utilize religion for political advantage, whether to oppose an unfair politico-economic system or to acquire political power. However, their movement is ideologically fueled by their religious teachings and religious values²³⁹. Mulkhan's point of view is critical for grasping this ambiguous topic. Mulkhan claims that the movement of fundamentalist groups is fueled by at least six recorded ideological ideas or principles.²⁴⁰

- “They believe that *Sharia* regulations can comprehensively govern socio-political life;
- All aspects of profane worldly life, including politics, have to show how God's law, as stated in the Quran, is implemented as it has been entirely stated in the Sharia;
- The Islamic movement regeneration centers itself on the Sharia. Hence fundamentalism is related closely to this kind of movement²⁴¹;
- Fundamentalism is also apparent when it is perceived that everything stated by the *Ulama* is universal and unable to change, and this becomes the "dogma";
- Elitism in the Islamic movement makes the Sharia experts the only authorities in charge of interpreting Islamic teachings; and

²³⁹ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁴⁰ Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C. *Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents*. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. P. 159.

²⁴¹ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Dedt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

- Their psychological condition deems them as "being vulnerable and threatened" by other religious powers, local traditions (especially the Javanese), and secular movements."

Mulkan's thesis highlights two key traits of fundamentalist organizations. *Sharianism* is the first. If Biblicism existed in American Christian fundamentalism, *Sharianism* exists in Indonesian Islamic fundamentalism. *Sharianism* is defined as a doctrine in which Sharia law is regarded as the supreme authoritative law to which all other laws, constitutions, and standards must refer. Kees van Dijk accurately described the problem of Sharia in Indonesia. He realizes that establishing Sharia-based legislation affects not only Muslims but even non-Muslims²⁴². He cites *Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia, Nomor 44 Tahun 2008 tentang Pornografi* (The Act Number 44 of 2008 on Pornography of the Republic of Indonesia), which was inspired by Puritan Islamic moral standards. Fearing for their way of life, feminists, artists, Hindus, and Christians protested the draft²⁴³.

Clericalism is the second. Mulkhan also identified clericalism as one of the primary characteristics of Indonesian fundamentalism. In Indonesian fundamentalism, clericalism is defined as an obsessive devotion to religious populist leaders that often exceeds their regard for religion and its sacred scriptures, teachings, or dogmas. Clericalism is similar to a cult. Fundamentalism is a cult phenomenon, according to Nurcholish Madjid. The fifth subtheme of this chapter will exclusively expand on Madjid's perspective of fundamentalism as a cult in compared to Mulkhan's stance.

The basic issue of Indonesian fundamentalism can be deduced from Mulkhan's remarks raised above. Indonesian fundamentalist groups primarily seek to promote the application of Islamic social order, from the realm of family life to the scope of the state. In this regard, Indonesian fundamentalism and American fundamentalism are identical in my opinion. The goal of the American fundamentalist movement, as described in chapter

²⁴² *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

²⁴³ See: *Dijk van K., Kaptein N.J.G.* (ed.). Islam, Politics and Change: The Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016. P. 134. See also: The Draft of The Act Number 44 of 2008 on Pornography of the Republic of Indonesia. // DPR official website. URL: https://www.dpr.go.id/dokjdi/dokument/uu/UU_2008_44.pdf. (the date of access: 11.02.2023).

one, was also to convert and design the American people's lives into religious models. At the family level, their movement aspired to shape family life around what are usually referred to as 'biblical family values.'

While at the political level, their movement attempted to shape the state structure with the foundation of a 'Bible-based republic,' rather than secular humanism. Armstrong noted that in the 1960s and 1970s, the worldview of American fundamentalists was identified as the enemy of secular humanism. To some extent, the goal of Indonesian fundamentalist groups is similar to that of American fundamentalists. Their goal is to design family life around a 'Quranic-based value' and to construct the state constitution on a 'Quranic-based system.'

Muhammad Machasin is another Indonesian scholar who analyzes Indonesian fundamentalism through the lens of the RMF.²⁴⁴ In *Civil Islam as an Alternative to Islamic Fundamentalism*,²⁴⁵ Machasin examines Indonesian fundamentalism through the lens of the 9/11 tragedy and a series of bombing assaults in many Indonesian cities. He begins with the question, "Is it true, then, to imply that Islam is a religion of violence?"²⁴⁶ In response to this question, he emphasizes that fundamentalist extremist groups perform violent acts and bombings for ideological reasons. Their ideological movement is also motivated by transcendental goals such as upholding religious dogmas that they think are absolute truths.

Machasin states that "...what lies behind this violence, one can find the truth claim that Islam is the sole true religion, the concept of the finality of God's guidance in the form of Islam and that of the obligation for every Muslim to realize God's laws in the earth. Such concepts will prevent their bearer from seeing the possibility of truth from any other source."²⁴⁷ Machasin appears to demonstrate that fundamentalist organizations

²⁴⁴ Dr. Muhammad Machasin is a professor of history of Islamic culture at the UIN (Universitas Islam Negeri: State Islamic University) Kali Jaga. He is also a member of the Asian Council on Religion and Peace.

²⁴⁵ *Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

²⁴⁶ *Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C. Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents*. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. P. 208.

²⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

are vulnerable to becoming violent because, ideologically, they consider themselves as the chosen and righteous groups, and as such, they believe they have the right to force other groups to do whatever they want, including using violence. This conviction drives their political tactic of 'Islamization of politics.' This tactic, according to Leo Suryadinatas, is a manifestation of that belief.²⁴⁸

That 'Islamization of politics' tactic seeks to turn (secular) politics into 'Islamic politics,' ultimately producing an Islamic state based on Sharia law. Regarding this matter, Machasin states that “We also see strong campaigns in some majority Muslim countries for the implementation of Sharia (Divine Law) and the reinstallation of the caliphate as the only legitimate political system for Muslims. The saying *al-islām dīn wa dawla* (Islam is religion and state at the same time)²⁴⁹ obliges every Muslim to observe religious duties and establish an Islamic state is taught by many Muslim preachers. Some Muslims took this seriously as a fundamental teaching of Islam and did their best to bring it about. Likewise, the phrase *udkhulū fī-l-silm kāffa* is interpreted as a command to practice Islamic teaching”.²⁵⁰ On an empirical level, we can see this in the actions of Indonesian fundamentalist groups that have largely aimed at integrating religion and politics and advocating for the establishment of an Islamic state constitutionally founded on Islamic law.

Machasin's implicit goal in asking the following three questions was to highlight a few of issues with the Indonesian RMF. The questions are: “Is Islam compatible with the idea of pluralism or, in Indonesia's case, multiculturalism...? Can Muslims put aside

²⁴⁸ Leo Suryadinatas (Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute). *Islamization of Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia?* In *ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute – www.iseas.edu.sg*. January 12 of 2017. Leo took an example from the phenomena of Islamization of politics in Indonesia and Malaysia. In Indonesia, he insisted, the use of Islam for political purposes can be clearly seen in the presidential election in 2014 and the gubernatorial election of Jakarta in 2017. In two elections, the candidates and also the voters were split into two groups; Islamic and non-Islamic. The case of Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, well-known as Ahok, a non-Muslim candidate, was taken as an example. Ahok was accused of blasphemy against Islam amid the campaign season. Politics in Malaysia, according to Leo, is similar to Indonesian politics. See: <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/media/commentaries/islamization-of-politics-in-indonesia-and-malaysia-a-commentary-by-leo-suryadinata/>

²⁴⁹ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

²⁵⁰ *Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C.* Overcoming Fundamentalism. *Ethical Responses from Five Continents*. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. pp. 208–209.

their 'fundamentalistic' views in living together with people of other beliefs? Can Muslims take part in the system of democracy while holding fast to their religious belief? ”²⁵¹ Machasin uses these questions to highlight the social issues caused by RMFGs, such as anti-plurality and anti-democracy. The issue is, of course, not with Islamic teachings, because, as Machasin pointed out, Islam is a religion that celebrates diversity²⁵². The issue is that fundamentalists take scripture literally, without considering the historical context in which those sacred passages were revealed.²⁵³

3.2. Indonesian PMF and Its Main Issues

Indonesian fundamentalism is also heavily influenced by political motivations. According to some, the rise of Indonesian fundamentalist groups, particularly Islamic organizations, indicates their interest and participation in reacting to social problems like as injustice, poverty, and so on. This section gives the perspectives of only two researchers, Professor Bernard Adeney Risakotta and Professor Yahya Wijaya, which should suffice to provide a general overview of Indonesian fundamentalism as a political-motivated movement.

Rissakota saw Indonesian fundamentalism as a reactive movement of religious fundamentalist groups fighting injustice in socioeconomics and politics. He began his examination of fundamentalism by assessing the prevailing narratives about globalization and religion from the Indonesian viewpoints in the following metaphors. 1. Globalization as a fundamentalist religion. 2. Globalization as a neo-colonial conspiracy. 3. Globalization as progress and development. 4. Globalization as the capitalist world system.²⁵⁴

According to Risakotta, the emergence of Indonesian fundamentalism is a reactive movement from the religious fundamentalist groups against capitalism and modern

²⁵¹ *Ibid.* P. 209.

²⁵² *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

²⁵³ *Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C.* Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. Pp. 210-212.

²⁵⁴ *Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C.* Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. pp. 89–109.

political systems, which are not only unjust but also tend to marginalize religion. According to Risakotta, their movement seeks to reestablish religion's position in societal structures. He states, "Religions should play a part in modifying the mosaic of structures that make up globalization, especially those that tend towards idolatry, destruction of the environment, and oppression of the poor."²⁵⁵ Regarding Indonesian fundamentalism, he says that "The power of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia does not come from petrodollars but rather from a compelling counter-narrative in opposition to the determinist narrative of world systems theory."²⁵⁶ In other words, the emergence of Indonesian fundamentalism is more akin to a counter-narrative to deterministic systems, one of which is capitalism.

Risakotta sees the emergence of fundamentalism as a reactionary movement against globalization, with religion relegated to a subsidiary category or subsystem of economics and politics. Fundamentalists oppose globalization, which views religion as a tool for dominance as well as a political base or interest group. The problem is that religion, by capitalism, is treated as a commodity in the globalized system, something to be "sold" for commercial reasons. Rissakota is prone to regard religion as a resource that must be managed and not marginalized by a globalization system. Religion is neither an economic or political tool, nor a subsystem of economics.²⁵⁷ Risakotta, like Durkheim, Mendieta, Benedict Anderson, and Charles Taylor, contends that all of religion's tasks are to:

“...shape the fundamental social imaginary that makes human communities possible, including the global community...religion is a basic structure of human communities that interacts with other basic structures, including economic structures, to create and maintain our world. Religion is one of the major forces of globalization, tying people together across the globe, transcending race, nationality, culture, and class...Religion also frequently works for liberation, resistance to oppression, education, health, and human equality. Religion will never be just a subsystem of economics because people from all religions are frequently motivated by transcendent values that cannot be "tamed" by economic greed.”²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.* P. 91.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.* P. 104.

²⁵⁷ Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger. *Overcoming Fundamentalism*. P. 103.

²⁵⁸ *Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C. Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. pp. 103-104*

If we apply Rissakota's assessment to Indonesian PMF, we can see that Indonesian fundamentalism is a class struggle movement by oppressed groups, both economically and politically, notably religious groups, against the deterministic system of capitalism and the like. Religion and its doctrines are regarded as a basic structure and major force that strengthens and ideologically drives them to achieve ²⁵⁹ their goal of transforming the social system that they consider unjust or unfair in their movement, rather than as instruments that are 'sold' for economic and political motives. From this perspective, fundamentalism can be defined as a social movement that aims at transforming social system.

According to Yahya Wijaya, the rise of Indonesian fundamentalism is also understood as a reactionary movement of religious organizations against a deterministic political and economic system. ²⁶⁰ He cites the Indonesian Christian and Islamic fundamentalist movements, including the Indonesian Evangelical Church and Indonesian Bethany Church on the Christian side and HTI on the Islamic side. There is, however, a considerable distinction between the two. Indonesian Christian fundamentalism, such as the Indonesian Evangelical Church and the Indonesian Bethany Church, adheres to global capitalism in one respect, namely the concept of the primary value of the individual, which makes those Christian fundamentalists comfortable with the existing economic system and structure. In contrast, Islamic fundamentalism is inclined to focus on the evil of existing capitalism ²⁶¹.

It may be important to see a slight divergence in their points of view, as demonstrated in the conflict between the two in the Indonesian parliament over Sharia implementation. Christian fundamentalists oppose Sharia law's establishment. In contrast, Islamic fundamentalists claim that the only way to reverse Indonesia's moral decadence is to firmly execute Islamic law at all levels of public life. Its execution must be applied

²⁵⁹ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁶⁰ Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C. *Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents*. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. pp. 132-140.

²⁶¹ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* // *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

not only in Muslim society but also in the economy, politics, public service, education, and other spheres. Yahya describes it as follows:

“Fifty-six members of the Indonesian parliament recently submitted a petition protesting laws which they consider Sharia-based. Most of these members of parliament are affiliated with a political party supported by conservative-Evangelical and Pentecostal/Charismatic Christians. The petition reflects the tension between the Muslim and Christian communities, particularly their fundamentalist wings, concerning the attempt to implement Sharia more explicitly in Indonesia. The Muslims are concerned with the increasing moral problems of the country, which they believe can only be solved by implementing Sharia more comprehensively and assertively, not only in the conventional areas, such as marriage and worship within the Muslim community but also in the wider public sphere of politics, the economy, public services, the media, civil law and education.”²⁶²

Yahya initially discusses Indonesian Christian fundamentalism and its economic implications. Yahya cites the Evangelical Reformed Church of Indonesia, which was founded by Stephen Tong, a well-known fundamentalist Protestant pastor in Bandung. Tong's church is known as the Indonesian Evangelical Church. Its movement initially sought to restore religion's influence in the economic world. There is also the Indonesian Bethany Church, a Christian conservative church recognized mostly for promoting the theology of success and prosperity.²⁶³

Meanwhile, according to Yahya, the HTI movement aspired to eliminate unfairness in the political and economic fields. Ideologically, HTI thinks that applying Sharia may transform Indonesia into a prosperous and prosperous country.²⁶⁴ According to Yahya, urging the introduction of Sharia into a pluralistic society in the guise of "majority reason" only leads to the exclusion and alienation of other religion adherents. He concurred with Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, who emphasized that Sharia implementation is oversimplified and lacks a credible analysis of contemporary societal problems.²⁶⁵

Yahya adds in his subsequent essay on *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Economy* that the concept of Sharia-based economic principles is a method used by Islamic

²⁶² Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C. *Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents*. Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. P. 139.

²⁶³ *Ibid.* 131-135.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.* P. 143-144.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.* P. 140.

fundamentalists to reject the (Western) capitalist system. To support his point of view, he quoted Pradana Boy, who stated that the phenomena of the Sharia economy is linked to a rise in religious fundamentalism, which stems from the drive to Islamize all levels of societal life. Yahya also mentioned Bassam Tibi, who stated that the Sharia economy is a cultural strategy of Islamic fundamentalism to combat global (read: Western) capitalism and its cultural invasion. Sharia is viewed as a kind of local culture that must be re-established in order to de-westernize society.²⁶⁶

Yahya's research is particularly relevant in terms of the conflict between Islamic and Christian fundamentalist groups. Yahya believes that the movements of the two groups must be understood not just in terms of 'truth claims,' but also in terms of their ethical movements in response to economic difficulties. However, he claims that the friction arose as a result of the two parties' differing opinions on the present system and differing approaches to finding solutions. Yahya explains that:

“Regarding economic ethics, there is a potential conflict between the two groups. The Christian fundamentalist-neo-Pentecostal groups tend to take the current market economy for granted, feeling free to employ its strategy and culture. On the other hand, Islamic fundamentalists struggle for an alternative designed according to the system operated in the early period of the development of Islam. However, a practical confrontation between them will not easily occur since the ambition of the Islamic groups to put their concept into practice by first getting rid of the existing economic system finds it hard to gain enough support from the wider Islamic community. Even the Muslim business community, which may share the ideal of the fundamentalist groups, takes a more pragmatic way, making possible easy relations with any business actor in the marketplace, regardless of religious affiliation.”²⁶⁷

4. Indonesian Fundamentalism: Religious State vs. Secular State?

This section expands on what was briefly sketched out in chapter one on the features of Indonesian fundamentalism identified in the movement of fundamentalist groups. This section is divided into three parts. The first section will provide a brief overview of the general characteristics of Indonesian fundamentalist groups. Meanwhile, the second section especially examines the political characteristics of fundamentalist

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.* P. 143.

²⁶⁷ Hadsell H., Stuckelberger C. *Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents.* Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009. P. 147.

groups. This section's major theme is centered on the opinions of Ahmad Syafii Maarif (hereafter: ASM), one of Indonesia's leading Islamic scholars. Finally, the final section will discuss cultism as defined by Nurcholish Madjid (hereafter: NM), a prominent Indonesian Islamic scholar. Fundamentalism was defined by him as cultism. The main ideas for this part will be about Madjid's opinions.

4.1. General Characteristics of Indonesian Fundamentalist Groups

Before delving into the specifics of Indonesian fundamentalist groups, it's important to understand the key contrasts between Indonesian and American fundamentalism. First, Indonesian fundamentalism does not come from a theological movement in the same way that early American fundamentalism did, which was distinguished by a movement of conservative Protestant theologians against contemporary science, particularly the Darwinian theory of evolutionism and liberal theology.

Second, Indonesian fundamentalism has traditionally evolved alongside the dynamic conflict between two political groupings, namely the 'religious groups' and the 'secularist groups.' The former group advocates for the Indonesian government to adopt a unitary system of religion, particularly the Islamic system, and politics. The latter are the secular system's defenders in the sense that they advocate for the separation of politics and religion. In other words, Indonesian fundamentalism emerged alongside the pros and cons between the supporters of Indonesia's secular state and supporters of Indonesia's Islamic state. Their feuds began in the early days of Indonesian independence.

Third, it appears difficult not to equate Indonesian fundamentalist groups with extremist groups. It's the same as stating that fundamentalism and extremism are two sides of the same coin. Why? The majority of Indonesian extremist organizations are fundamentalist in nature²⁶⁸. Many adherents of fundamentalist movements become extremists. They are involved in terrorism on both a domestic and worldwide scale. Domestic terror has happened practically every year since a terrorist act committed by

²⁶⁸ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

Komando Jihad in 1981. In the following footnote, the author cites hundreds of terrors involving most fundamentalist groups, both individually and collectively, since 1981.²⁶⁹

Before delving deeper into the characteristics of Indonesian fundamentalism, it may be essential to recapitulate the nine general traits that were previously discussed in Chapter One. These features should be grouped into three important parts: one main political aim, four methods of their activity, and five common misbehaviours of the fundamentalists. They are as follows:

- *An Islamic state based on Sharia law.* Politically and ideologically, the movement of the vast majority of Indonesian fundamentalist groups aimed to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia constitutionally based on *Sharia* (Islamic law). To achieve this political goal, the methods they take the four following methods (de-democratization, demonizing outsiders, religious populism, and cultism);
- *De-democratization.* Indonesian fundamentalist groups attempt to delegitimize the existing system, democracy, utilizing discrediting it, then replacing it with an alternative system they will, particularly a religious system they consider fit their belief. In short, they presume that a system causes all socio-political and economic turmoil they call the *taqut* system: an unjust system. Democracy, for the fundamentalists, is considered *taqut*.
- *Demonizing other groups.* Not only through de-democratization but fundamentalist groups are also inclined to accuse other groups, particularly non-Muslims and the Chinese, whom they view as the *taqut* groups. Fundamentalist groups often make other groups scapegoats for socio-political and economic turmoil. They draw a sharp boundary

²⁶⁹ The following is the list of terror acts in Indonesia since 1981. (1) 1981: hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia air plane by the *Komando Jihad* (Jihad Command). (2) 1985: Bombing of Borobudur Temple by a jihadist group. (3) 2000: Bombing of the Philippine and Malaysian Embassies, the Jakarta Stock Exchange, and Bombing on Christmas Eve. (4) 2001: Bombing of Santa Anna Church and HKBP Church, Plaza Atrium Senen in Jakarta, bombing KFC restaurant in Makassar, and the Australian International School in Jakarta. (5) 2002: The New Year Bomb, Bali Bombing I, Homemade Bomb in Manado-North Sulawesi, Homemade Bomb at the Philippines Consulate General's office, and the McDonald's Restaurant Bombing-Makassar. (6) 2003: Bombs at the National Police Headquarters Complex, Jakarta, Bombs at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport and Bombs at JW Marriot-Jakarta. (7) 2004: Bomb Palopo, Bomb Australian Embassy, and Bomb Explosion at Immanuel Church in Palu, Central Sulawesi. (8) 2005: Two bombs exploded in Ambon, the Tentena Bombing in Poso-Central Sulawesi, Pamulang Bombing in Tangerang-Banten, the Bali Bombing II, and the Palu Market Bombing in Palu-Central Sulawesi. (9) 2009: Bomb Jakarta in JW Marriott Hotel and Ritz-Carlton Hotel. (10) 2010: Shootings of civilians in Aceh and the CIMB Niaga bank robbery. (11) 2011: Terror of Bomb against public figures of the Liberal Islam Network like Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Cirebon Bombing at the Cirebon Police Headquarters Mosque, Gading Serpong bombing with the initial target of the Christ Cathedral, and the Solo Bombing namely the suicide bombing at GBIS. (12) 2012: Solo bombing; grenade exploded at Pospam Gladak-Solo. (13) 2013: Poso Police bombing. (14) 2016: Bomb and shootout in Jakarta at Plaza Sarinah, Jalan MH Thamrin of Central Jakarta; police versus terrorists, suicide bombing at the Surakarta City at Police Headquarters, suicide bombing at Stasi Santo Yosep Catholic Church-Medan, Molotov bomb ing in front of the Ecumenical Church in Samarinda-East Kalimantan, and molotov bomb at Vihara Budi Dharma in Singkawang-West Kalimantan. (15) 2017: Bombing in Bandung in Taman Pandawa by members of *Jamaah Ansharut Daulah* (JAD) and the Jakarta Bombing in Kampung Melayu - East Jakarta. (16) 2018: Riot at the headquarters of an Indonesian police car brigade - taking the lives of a number of police members by 156 Terrorism convicts in Depok - Jakarta, the Surabaya bombing by JAD, and three bombs exploded at a house in Pogar Village, East Java. (17) 2019: Bomb Sibolga, Stabbing Menkopolkam Wiranto in Banten by suspected of being affected by radical ISIS teachings. (18) 2020: the killing of a family of Christian congregation in Sigi-Poso by Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), an Islamic extremist fundamentalist group.

between themselves and the outsider groups to substantiate the accusation. In their political propaganda, they consider themselves believers, while outsiders are infidels or perverts.²⁷⁰

- *Religious populism*. To reinforce that de-democratization process, those fundamentalist groups attempt to create populism, particularly religious populism²⁷¹. Religious populism, in the Indonesian context, is a political movement led by charismatic actors or groups that aims at forming a religious mass power.
- *Cultism*. To reinforce that religious populism, fundamentalist groups collectively appoint a charismatic leader, whom they regard as a prophet, to lead them. This process is called cultism. Cultism, in this context, can be defined as an excessive glorification of a 'religious-political' leader.
- *Moral guardian*. They commonly regarded themselves '*polisi moral*,' which literally means moral police. They appoint themselves as moral guardians only because they believe they are the pious and faithful groups. Therefore, they feel entitled to raid public places they consider 'sinful,' like karaoke places, massage parlors, nightclubs, hotels, etc.²⁷²
- *Anti-religious diversity*. Fundamentalists are inclined not to acknowledge religious diversity.
- *Religious intolerance*. Fundamentalists do not acknowledge the existence of other groups with different beliefs. For example, they banned alien religious groups from performing their rituals. A report in 2015 found that 1000 churches were burned and banned by fundamentalist and extremist groups in Indonesia from 1998 to 2015.²⁷³
- *Violent*. Fundamentalist groups, aiming for political interests and religious ends, are violent²⁷⁴. They are primarily hostile toward other groups.
- *Adjacent to extremism*. To a certain extent, the leaders of fundamentalist groups can be viewed as ideologues who play roles as the fabricators of extremist thoughts, and their incitements can turn their followers into perpetrators of violent and extremist acts. The case of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, a spiritual leader of JI in Indonesia, can be taken as an example, where he plays an important role as a fabricator of extremist ideas that drive his followers to extremism and terrorism.²⁷⁵

The following two sections further describe the two specific characteristics of the Indonesian fundamentalist groups. The first part will focus on fundamentalists' political

²⁷⁰ Amman M., Meloy R.J. Stochastic Terrorism: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis; Perspectives on Terrorism. In Terrorism Research Initiative, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 2021. P. 3.

²⁷¹ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁷² IPAC Report No. 44, 2018. *After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia*. P. 9-10.

²⁷³ Report of CNN Indonesia (Wednesday, 14.10.2015), entitled "*Pembakaran Gereja Capai 1000 Kasus pasca Reformasi* (Churches burned, reaching 1000 cases during the post-Reformation era).

²⁷⁴ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Dtdt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁷⁵ Amman M., Meloy R.J. Stochastic Terrorism: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis; Perspectives on Terrorism. In Terrorism Research Initiative, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 2021. P. 2-13. See also: Singh J. The Emir of Katibah Nusantara: Bahrumisyah. *Journal of Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* Vol. 8, No. 11, November 2016. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research of RSiS. P. 4. See also: Singh B. The Revival of Al Qaeda's Affiliate in Southeast Asia: the Jemaah Islamiyah. *Journal of Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2017. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research of RSiS. P. 5-8.

strategy, called politik identitas (identity politics). Rather than 'identity politics', the author will use the term 'religious politics', which is considered more suitable in an Indonesian context. This part mostly refers to Ahmad Syafii Maarif's analysis. Indonesian fundamentalism, according to Maarif, is mostly marked by identity politics carried out by the fundamentalist groups. The second part will focus on Nurcholish Madjid's analysis of fundamentalism. Madjid equates fundamentalism with cultism.

4.2. *Fundamentalist Groups and Their 'Religious Politics'*

Indonesian politics in the post-Reformation era were defined by the political traits of Indonesian fundamentalist groups, known colloquially as *politik identitas* (identity politics). However, the term 'religious politics' is more appropriate than 'identity politics.' The term identity politics is not utilized in this dissertation for two reasons: First, the definition of identity is broad in scope. Second, in political science and sociology, there is no clear definition of identity politics²⁷⁶. As a result, the term 'religious politics' is used in this research to stress explicitly that Indonesian fundamentalist groups employ religion for political advantage or using politics for religious benefit in their political campaigns.

Before delving farther into 'religious politics,' it may be useful to review its history. L.A. Kauffman articulated identity politics for the first time in history. Identity politics was initially associated with the American student movement known as SNCC (The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee). In the early 1960s, the SNCC was primarily preoccupied with the country's civil rights advocacy.²⁷⁷ In the 1970s, identity politics referred to a variety of social movements, including minority class movements, gender, feminism, race, skin colour, ethnicity, and many others. In American history, identity politics was a social movement of alienated minority groups,²⁷⁸ primarily African migrants, Spanish-speaking groups, and Asian minority ethnics, who are economically,

²⁷⁶ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

²⁷⁷ Maarif A.S. Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita. P. 4. See also L.A. Kauffman, The Anti-Politics of Identity. In Socialist Review, No. 1, Vol. 20 (Jan.-March 1990). P. 67-80.

²⁷⁸ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

politically, socially, and culturally dominated by white skin groups²⁷⁹. From that American perspective, ASM saw identity politics as a constructive movement.²⁸⁰

Let us return to identity politics in the Indonesian setting, which this research refers to as 'religious politics.' Though the vast majority of these groups share a shared doctrinal purpose of establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia, their movement also has a financial motive, particularly the business of their leaders. In Indonesian electoral democracy, these groupings are exploited by their leaders into what is eventually called a 'mass enterprise.' The adherents of these organisations are only employed by their clerics for electoral objectives for politicians who have commercial relationships with them. The vast majority of their adherents are uneducated religious individuals²⁸¹.

In Indonesian politics, these followers are only counted as vote-getters who benefit the politician and the political parties that their clerics perceive to be in accordance with their political interests. In other words, fundamentalist groups are utilized as “political cattle” by their leaders, benefiting both the clerics and the politicians. In their political endorsements, they also frequently support 'non-religious politicians'²⁸² as long as it benefits them economically. 'Non-religious' politicians, in Indonesian context, are the politicians that are not known in public as political clerics or religious leaders²⁸³. Let's look at the movements of FPI and HTI.

As an example, consider FPI's political support for Prabowo Subianto - Sandiaga Uno in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. Prabowo and Sandiaga were not religious figures nor even recognized as Islamic personalities, but the FPI stood in their place. The couple were dubbed “secular politicians,” but they are supported by the FPI, a well-known Islamic fundamentalist organization that vigorously promotes the application

²⁷⁹ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

²⁸⁰ *Maarif A.S.* Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita. P. 4. See also L.A. Kauffman, *The Anti-Politics of Identity*. In *Socialist Review*, No. 1, Vol. 20 (Jan.-March 1990). P. 8.

²⁸¹ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

²⁸² See: *Digital Commons* // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Ddetd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁸³ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

of Islamic law. On the contrary, FPI did not endorse Joko Widodo – Ma'ruf Amin, particularly Ma'ruf Amin, a well-known Islamic cleric. Ma'ruf was a powerful individual who fiercely supported the FPI movement during the march against Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, often known as Ahok, a non-Muslim candidate for Jakarta governor in 2017 who allegedly committed blasphemy against Islam.

Another notable example is HTI's political movement. HTI is characterized as a conservative and militant Islamic organization. HTI is not easily swayed by economic and political interests, but rather steadfastly adheres to its goal of building Indonesia's Islamic state. HTI is a transnational fundamentalist group that arose ideologically from Egypt's Ikhwanul Muslimin movement. IM's well-known chant is: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Koran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope. Allahu-Akbar! Allahu-Akbar!”

Politically, HTI's movement aimed at enforcing the implementation of *Khilafah*, a caliphate system. *Khilafah*, in short words, is defined as a government system that establishes Islam as an ideology, Sharia as the basis of all norms and laws of the state and implements the leadership methods of the Prophet Muhammad. HTI has been banned since 2017 by a constitutional pronouncement of the Indonesian government. HTI was deemed to have met the grounds for being outlawed since its vision and objective, establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia, were incompatible with Pancasila national values and the UUD 1945 national constitution.

In Indonesia, identity politics is characterized by the political movement of fundamentalist groups that utilize religion for political gains or vice versa, using politics for religious interests. In terms of traits and intent, their movement may be akin to what J. Veltselen referred to as *racial politics*. Racial politics is when the majority ethnic group portrays and frames the minority ethnic group as the wicked and threatening group, not only to instill hostility among the majority ethnic groups toward the minority, but also to justify their actions in destroying or eliminating the minority.²⁸⁴ Indonesian

²⁸⁴ Arma A. Genosida dan Modernitas: Dalam Bayang-Bayang Auschwitz (Genocide and Modernity: In the Shadow of Auschwitz). Yogyakarta: Tonggak Pustaka, 2018. P. 53-60.

fundamentalist groups frequently employ that strategy of demonization. They frame other minority religious groups as the perverted, wicked, or threatening groups²⁸⁵. They utilize this tactic, according to A. S. Maarif, to excuse their attacks on minority populations, both physically and mentally.²⁸⁶

Maarif investigates fundamentalist groups' intolerant attitude. He discovered that ideologically, they stand to defend their religious dogmas and beliefs at any costs and attempt to make them public laws. There is no room for tolerance or diversity of thought or belief. They are prone to stick to the dictum "either with us or against us."²⁸⁷ ASM referred to these fundamentalist groups as '*preman-preman berjubah*,' which translates as robed hoodlums. According to ASM, their theology is '*teologi maut*,' which means "death theology." ASM found that fundamentalist ideologues give nothing of humanist principles to their followers other than extreme doctrines that lead to intolerant and violent behavior.²⁸⁸

ASM's observation seems to be correct when compared to the social behaviors of such fundamentalist groups. They are frequently associated with violence, bigotry, criminality, and even terrorism. According to ASM, such movements are motivated by political goals, specifically the interests of their elites.²⁸⁹ He drew parallels between fundamentalist groups in Indonesia and those in Europe. He stated that, despite the fact that diaspora fundamentalist groups in Europe are few, particularly Islamist and Salafist groups, they dare to use mosques for political activities. According to ASM, this phenomenon should serve as a warning to Indonesians, particularly stakeholders. If they can do it in Europe, they can do it in Indonesia, a primarily Muslim country.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁵ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

²⁸⁶ Maarif A.S. Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita. P. 4. See also L.A. Kauffman, The Anti-Politics of Identity. In Socialist Review, No. 1, Vol. 20 (Jan.-March 1990). P. vii.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.* P. 15.

²⁸⁸ Lemanto E. Fundamentalism versus Social Injustice: Political Economic Dimension of the Indonesian Fundamentalism // Jurnal Kritis. Vol. xxx. No. 1, 2021. P. 84; Maarif A.S. Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita.

²⁸⁹ Maarif A.S. Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita. P. 4. See also L.A. Kauffman, The Anti-Politics of Identity. In Socialist Review, No. 1, Vol. 20 (Jan.-March 1990). P. 3.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.* P. 14.

ASM cited Murad Hoffman's viewpoint on fundamentalism's anti-pluralism and intolerance. According to Hoffman, those sentiments are based in a lack of intellectual tradition²⁹¹. In the same vein as Hoffman, ASM believed that the anti-pluralism and intolerance of Indonesian Islamic fundamentalists harmed Islam's image as a peaceful faith. To address this issue, ASM urged Islamic leaders to reinvigorate the intellectual tradition. ASM, like Hoffman, emphasized that intellectualism means pluralism and intolerance. The lack of pluralism means decadence. ASM believes that religious people need intellectual tradition in order to be open and self-critical. These two mindsets make them more acceptable, humanist, and tolerant.

Finally, ASM considered that Indonesian fundamentalist groups' *religious politics* threatened the country as a whole. ASM was vehemently opposed to their efforts to make Islamic law the foundation of the Indonesian constitution. According to ASM, their compulsion in establishing Islamic law as the state constitution divided Indonesia into parts. Fundamentalists are completely mistaken, according to ASM, if they believe that everyone who refuses to accept Islamic law as the basis of the state constitution is a *kafir* (infidel), *fasiq* (wicked), and *zalim* (wrongdoers).²⁹²

4.3. *Fundamentalist Groups and Cultism*

Cultism is also a feature in the movement of Indonesian fundamentalist groups. Cults and fundamentalism, according to NM, are two challenging issues in contemporary Indonesian society.²⁹³ This section will concentrate on the examination of fundamentalism by Nurcholish Madjid (hereafter: NM), a well-known Indonesian Islamic scholar. Fundamentalism, according to NM, is a cult. He claims that fundamentalism and cult are nearly identical, with the exception of a tiny difference in the domain of their movement. Cultism is a social phenomenon defined by its members' intense loyalty,

²⁹¹ Hood R. W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁹² *Ibid.* P. 22. See also: Nashir H. *Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia (The Sharia Islamic Movement: Reproduction of Ideological Salafism in Indonesia)*. Jakarta: PSAP, 2007. P. 398-400.

²⁹³ Madjid N. *Karya Lengkap Nurcholish Madjid (The Comprehensive Works of Nurcholish Madjid)*. Edited by Budhy Munawar-Rachman. Jakarta: Nurcholish Madjid Society, 2019. P. 4195-41 *Majid N. Karya Lengkap Nurcholish Madjid (The Comprehensive Works of Nurcholish Madjid)* / ed. by Budhy Munawar-Rachman. Jakarta: Nurcholish Madjid Society, 2019. P. 4195-4198.

fanaticism, and obedience to a charismatic figure in politics or religion ²⁹⁴ . Fundamentalism, on the other hand, is a social phenomenon in religious practice that is distinguished by its adherents' intense dedication, fanaticism, and allegiance to their religious leaders.²⁹⁵

NM discovered that the majority of persons who easily fall into cultism and fundamentalism are psychologically despondent. They are at risk of being indoctrinated if their soul is in emptiness. They are prone to being driven by charismatic leaders to do anything that they believe will provide peace, tranquility, welfare, or a happy life.²⁹⁶ NM cited several examples of cultism, including the mass suicide of People's Temple members in Guyana, free sex behavior among Baghwan Shri Rajneesh adherents who killed their leader due to AIDS, the self-immolation of Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, and the Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway by followers of Soko Asahara.²⁹⁷

The author identifies eight traits of cults based on NM's description. First, disoriented. Cultists are those who are hopeless and incapable of dealing with misfortune. Second, indoctrinated. Cultists are readily persuaded and instigated by charismatic leaders or ideologues. They are susceptible to being manipulated by their leaders, even to commit violence²⁹⁸. Third, excessive obedience. Cultists blindly follow the charismatic leader they believe can lead them to a better life. The fourth characteristic is self-righteousness. Cultists believe they are righteous. Fifth, exclusionary. Cultists regard themselves as an exclusive and superior group to all others.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL:

<https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3D1328%26context%3Dtdt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.* P. 4196-4197.; See also: See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL:

<https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3D1328%26context%3Dtdt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 4195.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.* P. 4195.

²⁹⁸ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL:

<https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3D1328%26context%3Dtdt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

²⁹⁹ *Madjid N. Karya Lengkap Nurcholish Madjid* (The Comprehensive Works of Nurcholish Madjid). Edited by Budhy Munawar-Rachman. Jakarta: Nurcholish Madjid Society, 2019. P. 4195-41 *Majid N. Karya Lengkap Nurcholish Madjid* (The Comprehensive Works of Nurcholish Madjid) / ed. by Budhy Munawar-Rachman. Jakarta: Nurcholish Madjid Society, 2019. P. 4197; See also: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3D1328%26context%3Dtdt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

Sixth, anti-social behaviour. Cultists frequently isolate themselves from the outer world. Seventh, think simplistically. They believe that all societal problems can be solved simply. Eight, anti-religious diversity. Among these eight traits, anti-religious diversity often turns out to be the most watchful issue in Indonesia. According to NM, the role of theologians is to proclaim the encouraging teachings of sacred books, particularly the Qur'an, that show that God protects all existing religions.³⁰⁰

³⁰⁰ *Ibidem.*

Chapter 3. A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION ON FUNDAMENTALISM

What is the significance of conducting a philosophical examination of fundamentalism while the term is still debatable? Both conceptually and empirically, the term is problematic. The term is a contentious issue at the conceptual level, both in terms of its definition and the movement's core ideas. In the first chapter, this was briefly covered. Fundamentalism, which originated in the American Protestant church, is characteristically unsuited to movements in Islam, Judaism, the Hindu religion,³⁰¹ or Buddhism.

That word is considered problematic at the empirical level for two different reasons. Fundamentalism and radical movements, on one hand, are not mutually exclusive, however, on the other hand, fundamentalists, in fact, advocate for peace. The vast majority of religious fundamentalists, such as Mennonites³⁰², Seventh-Day Adventists, the Amish, and Jehovah's Witnesses, for instance, preach messages of peace, as Hal Marcovitz points out. They are unwilling to participate in battle. However, he also acknowledges that religious fundamentalism may inspire violence and terrorism and that fundamentalists can readily turn violent.³⁰³

Fundamentalism, on the other hand, is related to violent movements. The involvement of fundamentalists in violent activities is not uncommon. Fundamentalist organizations with an intolerance for other cultures,³⁰⁴ such as those in Indonesia, are very likely to exist. Fundamentalist organizations that incite violence include Hindu extremists in India, Buddhist fundamentalists in Vietnam, and other fundamentalist groups. This fact can be found in the opinions of a few academics who distinctly indicate the ambivalence of fundamentalism. Armstrong, for example, indicates in *The Battle for God* that the vast

³⁰¹ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³⁰² Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁰³ Marcovitz H. Religious Fundamentalism. San Diego: ReferencePoint Press. 2010. P. 55.

³⁰⁴ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

majority of fundamentalists are not violent,³⁰⁵ despite her unavoidable dread that fundamentalists can also become perpetrators and even be implicated in terrorism.

Michael Barkun also mentions the ambiguity of fundamentalism. Barkun, in *Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism*, offers the ambiguous premise that fundamentalism is merely a myth³⁰⁶. He disagrees with the assumption that fundamentalism is synonymous with violent movements. He also challenges the widely held belief that fundamentalists engage in “religious violence” or “violence in the name of religion.”³⁰⁷ Interestingly, he agrees that while fundamentalists may initially eschew violence, they can eventually become violent.³⁰⁸

James Barr offers an interesting perspective on the ambivalence of fundamentalism. He avoids declaring that the fundamentalists are wrong. However, he persuades them to abandon it. Barr demonstrates his vindication in the prologue to *Escaping from Fundamentalism* by claiming that the book is not designed to be controversial, and that he does not seek to dispute with fundamentalists and convince them that they are erroneous. He even accepts their thoughts and worldviews, but he also tries to aid fundamentalists who have come to believe that fundamentalism is a prison from which they must escape.³⁰⁹

Barr, in that book, underlines the fundamentalist issues behind that courtly word, one of which is represented in the following epistemological inquiry: Is the Bible flawless theologically? Barr asserts that the Bible contains “some books that were written at times different from those maintained in traditional views, that they were the product of tradition cherished, fostered and redefined by a large number of anonymous people, that

³⁰⁵ Karen Armstrong expressed this opinion on Wednesday, February 22nd of 2012 in a discussion of the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. Karen Armstrong and Rt. Reverend John Bryson Chane, the eighth Bishop of Washington, was the source person of the discussion.

³⁰⁶ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL: <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article%3D1328%26context%3Dtdt> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁰⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁰⁸ Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur (ed.). *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism*. Portland: Frank Cass Publisher, 2004. P. 56.

³⁰⁹ Barr J. *Escaping from Fundamentalism*. London: SCM Press. 1984. P. vii.

they sometimes contain elements that are legendary, and that there are discrepancies and errors here and there in historical matter.”³¹⁰

The question is, what steps should we take to combat fundamentalism? This question is essential since fundamentalists clearly cause problems in societal life. This is the key reason why, in this philosophical examination, we should focus on the fundamentalists' cognitive and behavioral concerns. The purpose of this chapter is to examine fundamentalism philosophically. Fundamentalism, as discussed in the preceding two chapters, should be treated not only as a militant piety movement, but also as a political movement.

This chapter seeks to re-corroborate the author's conceptual perspective in understanding fundamentalism³¹¹. Fundamentalism, both as a militant piety movement and as a political movement, should be seen in light of their inextricable interdependence. Both types should be examined in terms of their causality. We cannot assume that RMF, as a purely religious movement, has no political goals, and PMF, as a purely political movement, is absolutely free of religious motives.

Departing from that idea, the author proposes a psychopolitical approach to fundamentalism. A psycho-political approach in the subject of fundamentalism is one that incorporates two types of research that are commonly used to analyze fundamentalism: psychological and political approach. A psychological approach addresses fundamentalism as a religious movement. A political approach, on the other hand, addresses fundamentalism as a political movement³¹². Fundamentalism is examined from a psychological standpoint through the following question: Why do fundamentalists confidently and firmly accept their sacred texts as absolute truths, and that they believe that all other knowledges, values, and worldviews are subject to their sacred texts?³¹³

³¹⁰ Barr J. *Escaping from Fundamentalism*. London: SCM Press. 1984. P. 110.

³¹¹ Ozzano L. *Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³¹² *Ibidem*.

³¹³ *Ibidem*.

From this approach, fundamentalism is investigated as a meaning system based on the centrality of religious texts for the fundamentalists.³¹⁴

This approach considers the importance of religious texts to fundamentalists. A psychological approach to fundamentalism investigates the importance of religious texts for the fundamentalists³¹⁵. It is stated that:

“...from a psychological perspective, we present fundamentalism as a meaning system. We believe that the meaning fundamentalists derive from their religious beliefs is what allows them to persevere in an inhospitable culture: It creates a way for them to interpret the world, as well as themselves in relation to the world. This meaning system encompasses all of life and is strongly felt, for it deals with issues of eternal importance. It also provides a framework for motivation, and in the process helps meet several personal needs for meaning, such as purpose, value, efficacy, and self-worth. Meaning, for fundamentalists, is found wholly within the pages of the sacred text³¹⁶. Thus, we propose that the primary criterion for understanding fundamentalism is its insistence that all of life be understood in relation to the text”³¹⁷

Meanwhile, fundamentalism in political methods is examined in terms of external formative elements that shape and evoke it to become a political movement. This approach sees fundamentalism as a political movement through which the fundamentalists seek to oppose any political system that they believe is incompatible with their religious system, particularly modern systems of politics, economics, and culture that they perceive have failed to bring prosperity and justice. Simply put, this political approach examines the importance of political conditions that give rise to fundamentalism³¹⁸. This approach can be defined as an extratextuality approach that considers the importance of external elements in the rise of fundamentalism.

Through these two approaches, the problems of fundamentalism could be classified into two types. From an *intratextual approach*, fundamentalism is perceived as a

³¹⁴ Wood R.W. Jr, Hill P.C., Williamson W.P. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. New York - London: The Guilford Press, 2005. P. 5; Hood R.W. Jr: The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³¹⁴ Ralph P.P. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. P. 5.

³¹⁵ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

³¹⁷ Ralph P.P. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. P. 5.

³¹⁸ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

cognitive bias³¹⁹. Cognitive bias, in the sense that fundamentalism is a form of religious cognitive error signified by basic missteps in how the religious think,³²⁰ interpret or assess their religious beliefs and sacred texts. Fundamentalism as a religious cognitive bias in this range of understanding can be identified through its manifestation, three of which are literalism, absolutism, and dogmatism. Conceptually, these issues are fundamentalism's main problems that affect fundamentalists' social conduct.

While from an *extratextual approach*, fundamentalism is considered a religious behavioural bias (RBB). RBB in the sense that fundamentalism is a form of religious misconduct the fundamentalists commit in the social sphere manifested in deviant behaviour. The key issues here relate to common problems involving fundamentalists, such as extremism, sectarianism, etc.

A *psycho-political approach* is a new concept to substantiate the epistemic grounds in examining fundamentalism, in which an *intratextual approach* is attributed to *religiously motivated fundamentalism* (RMF) and an *extratextual approach* to *politically motivated fundamentalism* (PMF). It would be necessary to reexplain here that the term '*religiously motivated*' in RMF identifies the cognitive problems in fundamentalism. In comparison, the term '*politically motivated*' in PMF is used to identify the problems of fundamentalism from behavioural approaches manifested in their biased political behaviours.

In concise words, we may say that religious cognitive bias, from an *intratextual approach*, is found in RMF. While religious behavioural bias, from an *extratextual approach*, is found in PMF. However, RMF and PMF are viewed as an interplayed relationship. Their causality better understands the two. Both would be well-comprehended from both intratextuality; cognitive factors that drive fundamentalists to

³¹⁹ Hood R. W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³²⁰ *Ibidem*.

hold their sacred texts as the absolute, infallible, and authoritative texts, and from extratextuality³²¹; political factors that give rise to religious fundamentalism.

The centre of philosophical inquiry here is: if fundamentalism is not identical with a violent movement, but the perpetrators of what is commonly called 'religious violence' (violence in the name of religion) are partly carried out by fundamentalists, then where is precisely the locus of philosophical investigation of fundamentalism? The primary focus of philosophical inquiry is on cognitive bias (the errors in religious paradigms) and behavioural bias (misbehaviours) committed by fundamentalists. In simple terms, philosophical inquiries seek to delve into fundamentalists' cognitive errancy and misconduct. Cognitive error contributes to some of human misbehaving. Fundamentalists' intolerant attitude, for example, stems from their cognitive predispositions in interpreting their faith and the doctrines they profess³²².

Fundamentalism as RCB is investigated by delving into the fundamentalists' religious paradigmatic issues and logical fallacies. There are three major issues to consider here: literalism, absolutism, and the authoritative method used by fundamentalists to approach sacred texts, religious dogmas, doctrines, and traditions³²³. Meanwhile, fundamentalism as RBB is investigated by delving into fundamentalist misconduct. Extremism, sectarianism, and intolerance are the major issues here.

It is necessary to stress that the main aim of this chapter is to identify cognitive and behavioral issues in fundamentalism. If Wittgenstein argued that the task of philosophy is not to justify or criticize religious beliefs, but to describe them as they function,³²⁴ this chapter is dedicated to demonstrate the opposite. The main task of philosophy, in author's point of view, is not only to describe religious beliefs and how they function but also to

³²¹ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³²² *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

³²³ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³²⁴ *Plant B.* Wittgenstein, Religious "Passion" and Fundamentalism // *Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Blackwell Publishing Ltd: June 2013): p. 280–281.

criticize them so as not to be entangled into 'religionism,' an ideology that treats religion and its religious teachings as a single authoritative truth that subordinates the other worldviews and knowledge.

1. Epistemological Issues in Fundamentalism: Critiques from the Western Philosophy

Wittgenstein can be correct regarding genuine religiosity, that no one restraints or impedes anybody else in holding their religious belief³²⁵. However, it is different when we encounter fundamentalism as an excessive religious movement. The task of philosophy on that issue must go beyond describing how religious beliefs function. Philosophy must also prescribe how religious beliefs should exist and perform in society, particularly in a pluralistic society. In other words, the task of philosophy is not to criticize 'how the religious should believe' but how they should behave as religious people in the public sphere.

Epistemologically, fundamentalism as cognitive bias is primarily identified from its characteristic as 'a closed worldview'. This characteristic is rooted in the fundamentalists' belief that there is no other truth than the divine truths of the commands of God written in their holy book and that these divine truths are absolute. There are three hindrances the fundamentalists face. *First*, the diversity of religion. Ideally, the diversity of religious claims should make the fundamentalists aware of other religious truths and enable them to recognize and engage in dialogue with other faiths.

Second, the diversity of interpretations of religious texts. The fundamentalist's claim is one among other claims. It means that the only way to live in harmony with other groups is to be open to dialogue. Inclusivity is the foundation for achieving constructive social interaction in a pluralistic society. *Third*, the diversity of understanding between religions.

The problem is that the fundamentalists set themselves apart from the outside worldviews. Using in Plato's parable, fundamentalists describes fundamentalists as

³²⁵ *McDonough R.* Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>. (date of access: 12.09.2023).

cavemen who grasp the world from a one-dimensional worldview. The argument against fundamentalism as a cognitive bias should be started by quoting the renowned statement of Saint Thomas Aquinas, quoted by Alberto Queiros for his forward for the book of Mateus Soares De Azevedo, *Men of a Single Book: Fundamentalism in Islam, Christianity, and Modern Thought*, saying "I fear the man of a single book" (*time hominem unius libri*). The 'man of a single book' is widely interpreted into two conceptions.

First, the man who applies himself to the thorough study of a (good) book, the knowledge that he thus acquires will serve as a basis and a key for the adequate understanding of other ideas. *Second*, the man of a single book encloses himself emotionally in a single point of view, refusing to cultivate objectivity, prioritize intelligence, or put himself in the place of another." Queiroz then ascertains the epistemic position of the writer that "Azevedo uses the expression "men of a single book" in this second sense to depict the main characteristic of militant fundamentalism directly and concretely."³²⁶

Those quotes above are critical to reaffirm the critique of fundamentalists' single point of view. Fundamentalism is trapped in its tiny, closed worldview. The fundamentalists consider their religious belief higher than human knowledge and even consider human intelligence subordinate to faith. They draw an absolute demarcation between them as the insiders from the out-groups³²⁷. They recognize themselves as 'the chosen, the blessed, and the good,' while outsiders are the 'unchosen and the evil.' At the same time, they regard themselves as superior to others.

That paradigm determines their behaviour in societal life, so they are inclined to segregate their fellow men into partitions based on religious faith. The fundamentalists regard themselves as the righteous religious, while the outsiders are the heretics and the sinful. Therefore, fundamentalism is considered problematic due to their behaviour.

³²⁶ Azevedo M.S. *Men of a Single Book: Fundamentalism in Islam, Christianity, and Modern Thought*. Индиана: World Wisdom, Inc., 2010. P. vii.

³²⁷ See: Digital Commons // Official website of University of Denver. 2023. URL:

<https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1328%26context%3Ddetd> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

Fundamentalism cannot be considered problematic regarding expressing religious passion because it is about the freedom to believe. From the author's personal standpoint, only in this sense is Wittgenstein's view of the task of philosophy, that is, only to describe how religious beliefs function,³²⁸ acceptable.

Nevertheless, religious belief is a part of the human way of thinking, and man's way of thinking determines their demeanour in their social relations, especially in their interaction with other groups and with other people in a pluralistic society. These interactions between social norms in a pluralistic society increase the chances of clashes between them, increasing the urgency to study fundamentalism using the method of epistemological investigation towards the cognitive bias within fundamentalism. The following subthemes are the philosophical arguments against fundamentalism as a cognitive bias.

1.1. Literalism and Its Main Issues

Literalism is one of the main characteristics of fundamentalism. Literalism is related to the scriptural exegesis that methodologically applies a historical-grammatical method. Literalism has been commonly identified with fundamentalism, like biblical literalism or biblicism among Christian fundamentalists, and Qur'anic Literalism or *Qu'ranism* among Muslim fundamentalists. The fundamentalists construe their holy scripture literally, and they perceive that the scripture contains God's words that must be taken imprudently as a single and absolute standard for any other moral norms, regulations, and systems.

In addition, literalism in the study of fundamentalism is a literal approach to sacred texts, in which fundamentalists assume that their sacred texts contain infallible norms because they believe that these sacred texts are the words of God that were revealed directly to man. Based on this belief, they feel entitled to insist that these sacred texts be used as parameters for other social norms. This literalist approach affects the paradigm and social behaviour, including their coercive attitude toward other groups. This trait is

³²⁸ *McDonough R.* Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>. (date of access: 12.09.2023).

one of the strongest in Indonesian fundamentalist groups. Indonesian Islamic fundamentalist groups, for example, have consistently insisted on implementing Islamic law as the basis of the state constitution for years.

Liberalists have criticized literalism. For liberalists, sacred texts methodologically should be construed from the historical-critical method. The scriptures cannot be taken literally from that historical-critical method but must be critically construed within the historical context. This subtheme of study is trying to prove that literalism is one among many epistemological issues of fundamentalism as a religious cognitive bias.

This study uses the contention between the fundamentalists and the liberalists and the dispute between the secularists and fundamentalists to elucidate the concept of *literalism as a cognitive bias* in fundamentalism. Fundamentalists reckon non-religious knowledge and worldviews as the subordination of sacred texts and religious teachings. On the contrary, secularists consider religion a superstition, obsolete, and irrational. In understanding the main features of fundamentalism in perceiving the world, this study introduced a different perspective to examine the contention between fundamentalism and secularism. However, it is essential to underline that both points of view are equally problematic.

Francesco Hardiman's approach toward the contention between secularism and religious radicalism is the closest to accurate. Hardiman considers secularism and religious radicalism as extreme worldviews. He considers these two worldviews as a 'double trap.' He claims that, for secularists, religion is irrational³²⁹; therefore, it has no right to speak to and must be discarded from the public sphere. On the other hand, religious radicals take sacred texts (religious teachings, traditions, and doctrines) for granted and insist on enacting them as public regulations.³³⁰

³²⁹ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³³⁰ Hardiman F.B. Demokrasi dan Sentimentalitas. Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2018. P. 179–180; Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023)..

In *Demokrasi dan Sentimentalitas* (Democracy and Sentimentality), Hardiman does not explicitly equate religious radicalism with fundamentalism. However, in some parts of his explanation, he denotes that religious radicalism shares similarities with fundamentalism in one respect: absolutism, which is rooted in literalism. The core point of Hardiman's idea is about emancipation from religious absolutism. Referring to the contention between religion and politics in European history two and half centuries ago, Hardiman attempts to construe the phenomenon of religious radicalism and fundamentalism in Indonesia of his time. He asserts that the solution to get out of the 'trap of secularism and from religious absolutism' is by repositioning religion and politics to their proportional position. The relation between religion and state is not contradictory but complementary. Hardiman considers the importance of Habermas' idea of a *communicative handle* to resolve the contention between the religious radicals/fundamentalists and the secularists.³³¹

However, the space for deliberation, according to Hardiman, is only possible if the fundamentalists are open to engaging in dialogue and are willing to recognize and admit the existence of other worldviews different from theirs. Dialogue only occurs when two parties are willing to communicate by reasoning. Dialogue requires reasonable arguments. In other words, communicative strategy can only be applied to 'understanding society' or 'reasoning public.' It is less applicable to 'believing society,' particularly to fundamentalists³³². Believing society, in this context, is confined to fundamentalists.

This study uses Nancey Murphy's explanation of the contention between liberalism and fundamentalism to clarify the arguments of literalism within fundamentalism. The bifurcation between the liberalists and the fundamentalists, according to Murphy, is rooted in the stereotypes created by modern and postmodern philosophy. This dissertation does not focus on those stereotypes but uses Nancey Murphy's fundamental analysis of

³³¹ *Ibid.* P. 175-181.

³³² Hood R. W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

the epistemological basis of liberalism and fundamentalism to explicate literalism within fundamentalism.

In *Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism*, Murphy examines the intellectual positions of the liberals and the conservatives, including the fundamentalists and the evangelicals, of the American Protestant Christianity.³³³ This study uses Murphy's classification of epistemological characteristics of fundamentalism to explain the critical problem of fundamentalism. Murphy explained:

(There are) "...two central aspects of modern philosophical views of knowledge. First, foundationalism is the theory of knowledge, based on the metaphor of knowledge as a building, that requires all beliefs to be justified by tracing them to a special category of beliefs that cannot be called into question. My thesis is that foundationalism has contributed to the split between liberal and conservative theologies by forcing theologians to choose scripture or experience as the source of this special, foundational class of beliefs. Conservatives have chosen scripture; liberals, characteristically, have chosen experience. A second feature of most modern philosophical theories of knowledge is their "inside-out" character. That is, they begin with the contents of the mind of the knowing subject and attempt to argue from those internal representations to conclusions about the character of the external world. We shall see that liberal theologians tend to be inside-out thinkers, while conservatives take an outside-in approach."³³⁴

This study uses Murphy's theoretical framework to criticize the epistemological errors of fundamentalism compared to liberalism. Liberalism evolves because liberalists are open to interacting with other worldviews. On the contrary, fundamentalism remains problematic because fundamentalists enclose themselves from outside worldviews and knowledge. Liberalism is an open worldview. It is dialectic, and the liberalists are open to dialogue with any other worldview. In contrast, fundamentalism is the opposite of liberalism. Fundamentalism is a closed worldview; the fundamentalists strictly and firmly hold on to their beliefs and are averse to being open to other worldviews.

Further, this study uses a psychological approach to understand why fundamentalists are literalist-scripturalists. From a psychological approach, religion and

³³³ *Murphy N.* *Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda.* Harrisburg–Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2007. P. 1.; See also: *Hood R.W. Jr.* *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³³⁴ *Murphy N.* *Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda.* Harrisburg–Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2007. P. 2.

its sacred texts are seen as a 'meaning system.'³³⁵ If the political approach centres on an inquiry of what factors lead to the emergence of fundamentalism, the psychological approach centres on why the fundamentalists strictly hold their religious doctrines or teachings without compromise and believe that those doctrines and teachings are unquestionable truths.

The psychological motives are central to this approach, with the vital question of why the fundamentalists stubbornly hold on to their sacred texts that they consider absolute truths and defend at all costs.³³⁶ From a psychological approach, fundamentalism is approached from the theory of 'meaning systems.'³³⁷ To understand fundamentalism, then, is to investigate what lies behind the literalism within it. From a psychological approach, literalism is viewed not only as a matter of religious piety of the fundamentalists but also as a 'meaning system' for them. "The primary criterion for understanding fundamentalism is its insistence that all of life be understood in relation to the text."³³⁸

This psychological approach is intratextuality and measures the critical position of sacred texts for fundamentalists. An intratextuality approach is an approach that underlines a principle of the centrality of a sacred text within its tradition.³³⁹ "From a psychological perspective, fundamentalism can best be thought of as a religious meaning system that relies exclusively upon a sacred text."³⁴⁰ It means fundamentalism is seen as an autonomous and unique way of grasping the world. The fundamentalists' paradigm belongs to a different language game.

³³⁵ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³³⁶ Murphy N. *Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda*. Harrisburg–Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2007. P. 5.

³³⁷ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³³⁸ Murphy N. *Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda*. Harrisburg–Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2007. P. 5.

³³⁹ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.* P. 6.

Our understanding of fundamentalism can be problematic if we come from non-religious viewpoints. The stereotype against fundamentalists, for example, that they are obsolete, superstitious, and irrational, can be completely different from the fundamentalist viewpoints about themselves. They regard themselves as righteous and knowledgeable of genuine truths, particularly divine truths written in their sacred texts — the fundamental concept of literalism lies in this faith³⁴¹.

Fundamentalists grasp the essence of sacred texts they hold through literalism³⁴². Their literal approach towards their sacred texts is often founded on a belief that the good experiences they have in their life are the reward of believing in them. As a consequence, whatever attributes and stereotypes given to them by outsiders, for example, naïve and irrational, do not affect their faith.

A fundamentalist who believes in charity, for example, views the act of giving as obligatory not only because it is a good act but also because the sacred texts command him to do it. Then, he can consider the experience of receiving from other people in times of adversity as proof that the act of charity he had done is now rewarded. For fundamentalists, the experience of receiving help from other people can be regarded as proof that the command of the sacred texts to do charity is true.

Their belief in the infallibility of the truth of the sacred texts is seen from that point of view. Hence, fundamentalists see negative impressions of the outsiders against them as a situation where the outsiders have little and no understanding of the meaning of the sacred texts they hold. The fundamentalists even consider outsiders as the blind, unable to grasp the positive values of their beliefs. In other words, religion and its sacred texts as an autonomous meaning system do not rely on the outsider's judgment.

It is said that “Despite an inhospitable culture that maintains these negative stereotypes, fundamentalists take the "road less popular" and insist that it will lead them to know all truth. To outsiders, this insistence appears to be stubbornly misguided and

³⁴¹ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁴² Ozzano L. *Religious Fundamentalism and democracy* // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

based on an out-moded relic; to fundamentalists, however, it is an inspired revelation that others cannot grasp.”³⁴³ Fundamentalists stand on the independent position, claiming that the 'road less popular' (read: their belief) leads them to know all the truth³⁴⁴. Although their belief is an out-model relic, they faithfully hold on to it. They consider their belief a meaning system that cannot be intervened by anyone who does not believe in it.

The questions are as follows: Is it possible to criticize fundamentalists if their religious literalism belongs to a different language system? Do fundamentalists consider sacred religious texts and their meaning systems incommensurable to any other value systems,³⁴⁵ and therefore they cannot be criticized? Criticizing them is still possible though they belong to a different language system. Literalism, a system of belief based on the premise of the infallibility of sacred texts, can still be criticized³⁴⁶. As a meaning system, religious literalism within fundamentalism relates to the effect the sacred texts bear upon its adherents. It is possible to criticize fundamentalism and its literalism from what this dissertation introduced as *effect theory*.

In literalism within fundamentalism, affect theory says that one's belief in a religious meaning system affects one's life. From this theory, though sacred texts are considered autonomous meaning systems incommensurable to other worldviews, behavioural theory can criticize them. The only way to verify religion and its religious teachings is through behavioural approaches³⁴⁷. Through this approach, literalism as a cognitive bias within fundamentalism can be examined. The simple reason is that human thinking determines how they behave in public.

³⁴³ *Ibid.* P 13.

³⁴⁴ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁴⁵ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

³⁴⁶ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023); See also: Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³⁴⁷ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

In *Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue*, Julius Lipner points out the problematic relationship between the religious claim of absolute truths and its implications on interreligious dialogue. The main question he asks is: What is religious belief? He quotes the idea of D. Z. Phillips,³⁴⁸ who refers to Wittgenstein's notion of religious belief. Lipner writes that: "...a religious belief is rather to be likened to a 'picture' (1) which kept in the forefront of the believer's mind, and the attention paid to it is directly proportionate to the influence it exercises on its adherent's lifestyle and behavior, which it regulates and directs in appropriate contexts. The unbeliever has no corresponding regulating picture, resulting in his attitude and responses to a given situation being quite different from those a believer brings to the same situation."³⁴⁹ It means that their religious cognition shapes the behaviors of the believers.

One crucial point about Phillips's idea is his understanding of the analogy of religious belief as a 'picture.' This analogy points out his understanding of the existence of God. Phillips departs from Wittgenstein's notion of religious belief³⁵⁰. In his explanation of *Philosophy, Theology, and the Reality of God*, Phillips examines the foundation of religious belief: God's existence. Following the idea of Wittgenstein, Phillips stresses: "What kind of philosophical and theological account does the concept of divine reality call for?... Because the question of divine reality can be construed as 'Is God real or not?' it has often been assumed that the dispute between the believer and the unbeliever is over *a matter of fact*... This study suggests that more can be gained if one compares the question, 'What kind of reality is divine reality?' not with the question, 'Is this physical object real or not?' but with the different question, 'What kind of reality is the reality of physical objects?'.³⁵¹

In accordance with Wittgenstein and Phillips's views on the existence of God (whether God is real or unreal), it is vital to highlight the concept of 'what kind of reality

³⁴⁸ Dewi Zephaniah Phillips was a Welsh philosopher. He was well-known as a proponent of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion.

³⁴⁹ Lipner J. *Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies*. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 218.

³⁵⁰ McDonough R. *Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique*. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>. (date of access: 12.09.2023).

³⁵¹ Phillips D. Z. *Wittgenstein and Religion*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993. P. 1-2.

of divine reality is.' The problem with fundamentalism is that their notion of religious belief is entirely different from that analogy of 'a picture', and their concept of the existence of God is about the matter of fact. The fundamentalists base their religious belief upon the ontological base that God is real and factually exists.

Unlike the '*Wittgensteinian God*' that is understood not as a matter of fact, the God of fundamentalists is a factual God that they perceive to control human beings actively³⁵². Based on that belief, the fundamentalists set their religious texts supreme and authoritative³⁵³. For the fundamentalists, their sacred texts are not only guiding or inspirational texts but authoritative texts because they are directly communicated by and descended from God.

One could argue that the main problem of literalism within fundamentalism lies in its theological realism with its three claims that; (1) God ontologically exists (ontological claim); (2) God epistemologically can be known (epistemological claim); (3) God may be spoken about truthfully (a semantic claim). In line with Don S. Levi, the ontological claim implicit in religious discourse, from the author's personal standpoint, fails the '*look-and-see*' test.³⁵⁴ Levi picks up one of the adherents of Theological Realism, like John Cook, the opponent of Wittgenstein, who "thinks that an option is not available to us when it comes to God because in Judaism and Christianity God is to be conceived in ontological term: to reject that ontology means ceasing to be a believer, whereas rejecting the ontology of material objects or minds does not mean that we have to give up or change anything."³⁵⁵

From the author's personal standpoint, fundamentalism, for whatever reasons and causes it arises, can be criticized from its religious cognitive aspect for one reason: the fundamentalists consider their sacred texts supreme authoritative texts that subordinate

³⁵² *McDonough R.* Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>. (date of access: 12.09.2023).

³⁵³ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³⁵⁴ *Levi D.S.* God, Wittgenstein, and John Cook in *Philosophy*. Vol. 84, No. 328. Cambridge University Press, April 2009. P. 267.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.* P. 267-269.

any other knowledge³⁵⁶. “What distinguishes fundamentalism from other religious profiles is its particular approach toward understanding religion³⁵⁷, which elevates the role of the sacred text to a position of supreme authority and subordinates all other potential sources of knowledge and meaning.”³⁵⁸

Two inquiries are necessary to be placed here. On what basis are the sacred religious texts considered supreme authoritative texts that subordinate any other sources of knowledge and meaning systems?³⁵⁹ Furthermore, the question related to religious diversity in a pluralistic society is: are sacred religious texts the fundamentalists consider supreme authoritative texts also applicable in their relationship with other religious beliefs?³⁶⁰

If religion and its sacred texts belong to different language systems, then religious sacred texts must also only belong to its specific adherents, and therefore they are only applicable to whom they belong. It means that in a pluralistic society, those religious texts and doctrines cannot be applied as a common standard for public norms only because every religion has its values and meaning systems incomparable³⁶¹. It is necessary to make transparent here that meaning system³⁶² “can be thought of as a group of beliefs or theories about the reality that includes both *a world theory* (beliefs about others and situations) and *a self-theory* (beliefs about the self), with connecting propositions between the two sets of beliefs that are important in terms of overall functioning.”³⁶³

As a world theory, the religious meaning system is related to how the religious perceive the world outside them and how they view other people by referring to what

³⁵⁶ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁸ Ralph P.P. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. P. 13.

³⁵⁹ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁶⁰ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³⁶¹ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁶² *Ibid*.

³⁶³ Ralph P.P. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. P. 14.

their sacred texts say to them. It means that what they perceive in their sacred texts determines what they perceive about the world outside of them. From this point of view, literalism in fundamentalism can be examined from effect theory. From a world theory, literalism as a religious meaning system determines how fundamentalists view the world outside them and influences how they act³⁶⁴. While from self-theory, literalism as a religious meaning system shapes the way the fundamentalists perceive their sacred text for their own life³⁶⁵.

Related to the problems of literalism within fundamentalism, this study suggests that sacred religious texts should only be regarded as inspirational, motivational, and transformational texts. They play a role as the 'guiding principles for the life of religious people. From my personal standpoint, literalism within fundamentalism as a religious meaning system, both as a world theory and a self-theory, is not problematic as the system is confined only to a guiding and directory function for the believers. Therefore, literalism within fundamentalism should only apply to those they belong to and should not be obligated to non-believers or other religious groups³⁶⁶.

The problem lies within literalism in fundamentalism because the fundamentalists attempt to convert sacred texts from inspirational or motivational principles into obligatory regulations. Furthermore, they are inclined to impose the values of those texts on other people only because they believe those texts are Divine, infallible laws. Sacred texts ideally function as guiding principles. Therefore, as a self-theory, religion and its sacred texts play a role in "...aid individuals in setting goals, regulating behaviour and experiences, planning activities, and sensing direction or purpose to life, and allowing them to make self-evaluations concerning all of these experiences."³⁶⁷

As a meaning system, sacred religious texts transform the lives of the religious³⁶⁸. From a social psychology standpoint, Tory Higin introduced a self-discrepancy theory to

³⁶⁴ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁶⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁶⁷ Ralph P.P. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. P. 14.

³⁶⁸ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

explain religion's position and its sacred texts as a meaning system. A self-theory, according to Higin, is constituted of three types of self; the ideal self, the ought self, and the actual self.³⁶⁹

Higin quoted, “A person's self-guides begin developmentally as representations of what that person's caretakers would like that person ideally to be (ideals) or believe that person should be (ought). When that person develops his or her standpoint, the ideals or ought for that person from the significant other's standpoint can be shared by that person from his or her standpoint. This creates a shared reality about the desired end states-identified or internalized self-guides.”³⁷⁰

The author assumes that Higin means that the ideal self is a self that one idealizes what to be like, to be an ideal or a perfect self. While the actual self is the self in reality, or one sees oneself as it is. The ought self is one whom one wishes to be or should be from who he/she is today. From my personal standpoint, a psychological approach is the best way to understand religious sacred texts. Religious texts should not be treated as absolute truths that are understood literally, but they are directories or guiding principles from which religious people gain inspiration and motivations for the transformation of their life.

In fundamentalism, sacred texts, as systems, are ideally confined to inward purposes for the fundamentalists³⁷¹. This study uses Dittmann-Kohli's definition of sacred texts as a meaning system to clarify its arguments. He states that “a personal meaning system is an individually constructed cognitive system that endows life with personal significance and consists of cognitive, motivational, and affective components.... the search for meaning and significance involves the sacred.”³⁷² The place of religious texts as meaning systems serves as motivation, inspiration, and direction for the life of

³⁶⁹ *Ralph P.P.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. P. 14. See also: *Higgins E. T.* Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect // *Psychological Review*, No. 94, 1987. P. 319–340.

³⁷⁰ *Kruglanski A.W., Higgins E.T.* (eds.). In *Social Psychology*, 2nd edition. New York-London: The Guilford Press, 2007. P. 456-457.

³⁷¹ *Hood R.W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁷² *Ralph P.P.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. P. 15.

the religious. The problem of literalism within fundamentalism is that the fundamentalists do not only treat their sacred texts as inspirational and directory principles for their life but also treat them as obligatory or compulsory norms they impose on other groups.

Religious literalism is only problematic when the fundamentalists attempt to use that concept to impose their sacred religious texts as 'obligatory public norms.' Their attempt to enact their sacred texts into obligatory norms only leads them to a dispute with other groups. This coercive action by fundamentalists could lead to what Hardiman calls 'a trap of religious radicalism'. He asserts that "the trap of religious radicalism occurs when the state takes religious teachings and dogmas for granted and makes them public regulations."³⁷³

This section provides two examples from Indonesia to make clear the implications of literalism in fundamentalism at a practical level. In the case of Indonesian fundamentalism, like in the movement of HTI that urges the implementation of Sharia Law, the fundamentalists urge to make their religious doctrines a national constitution. Ideologically, the main goal of HTI's movement is establishing an Islamic state with its three major arguments. *First* is the re-establishment of a global caliphate constitutionally based on Sharia Law. "An Islamic state is understood in the context of the implementation of Sharia...and in HTI's point of view, *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam) – which is always contrasted with *dar-al kufir* (the land of unbelievers that is allowed to be attacked) – cannot be established unless a Muslim Caliph rises to lead the state according to Sharia."³⁷⁴

Second, establishing an Islamic state that is politically based on God's sovereignty. It said that for HTI, "democracy is human-made; therefore, the implementation of Supreme Law should word-for-word follow the Koran and Hadith."³⁷⁵ *Third*, HTI's renunciation of the concept of nation-state and nationalism. For HTI, "solidarity and brotherhood should not be linked to race, blood, clan, tribe, birthplace, or language as

³⁷³ Hardiman. *Demokrasi dan Sentimentalitas*. P. 180.

*The organization is restricted in Russian Federation.

³⁷⁴ Muhtadi B. *The Quest for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia*. In *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 37, No. 4. Brill, 2009. P. 630-631.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.* P 631-632.

crucial elements of the formation of nationalism. Instead, Islamic brotherhood is beyond racial and geographic boundaries and generic ties.”³⁷⁶

Another important example from Indonesia to mention here is the pros and cons of the *Perda* (*peraturan daerah*: local regulation) in Aceh Province. Hasnil Basri Siregar, for example, found that Sharia Law has been implemented in the province under a couple of conditions, one of which is the *personality principle* and *territorial integrity*, stated in Statute number 18, 2001. This Statute stresses that "Sharia Law must apply to Muslims only and cannot regulate the behavior of Protestants, Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists in Aceh."³⁷⁷ However, on the other hand, he also found that most Aceh inhabitants disagree if the implementation of Sharia Law is only for Muslims.

Siregar states that "...it does not appear from the survey that the inhabitants of NAD (Aceh Province) would agree to implement Islamic law only for Muslim...Sixty-five percent of the respondents do not think this restriction in implementation is fair...NAD citizens expect that Islamic criminal law will be applied to NAD residents who commit crimes outside the jurisdiction, as well as to any person, Muslim or not, who commits crimes within the region of NAD."³⁷⁸

Siregar's question is: Why do most Aceh citizens agree to implement the Shariah Law on all habitants of Aceh Province, not only Muslims? He assumes that "perhaps Aceh's citizens believe that a uniform implementation of Sharia law will bind citizens together in solidarity, or that religious law is supreme over state law."³⁷⁹ If that is so, there possibly occurred compulsion by the proponents of it to non-Muslim groups, and indeed, it leads to social conflicts.

It might be necessary to note that not all fundamentalist groups attempt to make religious doctrines a public norm in a pluralistic society is driven by genuine religious

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.* P. 632-633.

³⁷⁷ Siregar H.B. Lessons Learned from the Implementation of Islamic Shariah Criminal Law in Aceh, Indonesia. In *Journal of Law and Religion*, Vol. 24, No. 1. Cambridge University Press, 2008/2009. P. 165.

³⁷⁸ Siregar H.B. Lessons Learned from the Implementation of Islamic Shariah Criminal Law in Aceh, Indonesia. In *Journal of Law and Religion*, Vol. 24, No. 1. Cambridge University Press, 2008/2009. P. 167-168.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.* P. 168.

intention. In Indonesian fundamentalism, political motives often integrate with religious motives. A conviction of 'Islam is the solution: *al-Islam huwa al-hal*' held by almost all Islamist fundamentalist groups in Indonesia, for example, cannot be easily conceived that it only contains political conviction without any religious conviction at all³⁸⁰.

For example, the case of Aceh Province denotes that we cannot simply say that establishing and implementing Sharia law in that province is merely political. It would be more reasonable to reckon that the establishment of Islamic law in Aceh Province is driven not only by the political interests of the local elites, but it is also founded upon their belief that the implementation of Islamic teachings in that region can lead the citizens and the province as a whole to advancement. The centrality of Quranic-based local regulations could not simply be counted only as a 'political curtain' to cover the political motives of the local elites, but it also indicates their transcendental objectives.

Let us return to the issue of literalism. Literalism is rooted in the fundamentalists' belief that God ontologically exists and actively plays a role as an 'authoritative being.' "The fundamentalist will identify the sacred as quite simply what has been ordained by the Divine Being through the sacred text. Protestant fundamentalists, for example, quickly claim that the Bible alone is God's direct and literal revelation and that it is an excellent source of meaning and purpose to life. Islam asserts the Quran's centrality as Allah's direct revelation."³⁸¹ The fundamentalists take a literal approach to their sacred texts simply because they believe God directly ordained and revealed those texts.

The literalism approach within fundamentalism is a derivative of the ontological approach the fundamentalists use in understanding God's existence as the object of their faith. Based on that approach, the fundamentalists consider their sacred texts unquestionable for whatever reason because they believe that the Divine commands are revealed by God itself directly to human beings. This approach results in an undialectical

³⁸⁰ *Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society.* Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

³⁸¹ Ralph-Peter-Paul. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism.* P. 15.

characteristic for fundamentalists in that they only recognize norms, truths, and values that originate from their sacred texts.

Literalism approach within fundamentalism is also a derivative of the traditional approach the fundamentalists take toward their religious texts, saying that God is a complete source of knowledge, values, and moral norms. “Subordinating all else to a supreme authoritative text is an important defining characteristic of fundamentalism.”³⁸² As they regard their sacred text as the only supreme authoritative text, the fundamentalists consequently can only be open to alien worldviews or knowledge confirmatory to their sacred text. The view that “fundamentalists are not "closed-minded" and rather seek to search for their sacred text for all knowledge” is a fallacy...fundamentalists will use their sacred text as the framework and justification for all thought and action... Fundamentalists support other forms of knowledge, including science and historical criticism.”³⁸³

Though fundamentalists are open to alien knowledge, the problem remains because they consider that knowledge has no authority in any range and should word-for-word follow the sacred text they regard as the supreme authoritative text. “What makes fundamentalists unique is their insistence that whatever peripheral beliefs emerge, they must be ultimately judged and seen as harmonious with what is contained within the bold circle—the interrelation between absolute truths and the sacred text maintained by the principle of intratextuality.”³⁸⁴ It means that fundamentalists only acknowledge any knowledge compatible and affirmative to their sacred text.

The principle of intratextuality within fundamentalism denotes an essential premise that if fundamentalists are not considered 'closed-minded' people, they must also recognize other worldviews or knowledge and consider another alternative principle: 'intertextuality. This principle maintains that “no single text speaks for itself. All texts are

³⁸² Ralph-Peter-Paul. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*. P. 16.; See also: *Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

³⁸³ Ralph-Peter-Paul. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*. P. 25.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.* P. 25.

authoritative and interrelated and may be consulted in deriving truth, which is more properly understood as relative truth.”³⁸⁵

The principle of intertextuality has two critical positions: *First*, from the principle of intertextuality, sacred texts, which the fundamentalists consider supreme authoritative texts,³⁸⁶ are acknowledged but only apply to the intra-group fundamentalists. *Second*, the principle of intertextuality is a basis for a dialectical approach. From this principle, fundamentalists are encouraged to engage in dialogue and recognize the existence of other people and their worldviews.

The basic assumption of the intertextuality principle³⁸⁷: “...a plurality of authoritative texts and relative truth claims is inevitable when a single text no longer defines truth...even an authoritative text claiming to be absolute falters when placed alongside other texts making similar claims. A sacred text is uniquely authoritative only when it is viewed intra-textually. Otherwise, it becomes, at best, only another authoritative text. This principle is to some the basic insight of fundamentalism and to others its fatal flaw.”³⁸⁸

A critical question is necessary to be placed here. Is there any religion that allows its doctrines and dogmas to be approached intertextually? Religious doctrines are fundamental to religion and its adherents. In the context of literalism within fundamentalism, the fundamentalists' religious truths are unquestionable from any relativistic approach³⁸⁹. The relativistic perspective cannot be applied to a religious credo. From this premise, an approach toward literalism within fundamentalism should go beyond the two approaches. From my personal standpoint, the concept of awareness based on a humanitarian approach is an alternative to surpass this problem, in the sense

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.* P. 26-28.

³⁸⁶ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³⁸⁷ Hood R. W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁸⁸ Ralph-Peter-Paul. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*. P. 26.

³⁸⁹ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

that religions should promote the concept of awareness to their adherents of the existence of other religious groups³⁹⁰.

The Gandhian doctrine of *ahimsa* (love) is one of the alternatives. Ahimsa is a religious doctrine that contains two concepts of value, namely *anekantavad* (many sides) and *Yadav* (qualified certainty). According to Gandhi, the two values, *anekavantavad* and *syadavad*, are the fundamental values that lead religious people to *ahimsa* (love), and the manifestation of that love are pictured in the attitude of 'respecting all.' That doctrine comprises three values: *First*, humans cannot understand reality comprehensively because of only certain parts. Reality is multidimensional and complex. *Second*, there is no absolute certainty, as all perspectives are partial in both possible senses, which is incomplete and from a personal point of view. *Third*, what is partial is not false; it is incomplete, limited by the specifications of time, place, and actor (*Kala, Sthana, Patra*).³⁹¹

This study uses Gandhi's doctrine to scrutinize literalism that, to a certain extent, is considered a cognitive bias. *First*, religious diversity is a fact that is undoubtedly visible to fundamentalists. They know other religious groups that hold the same principle as the fundamentalists,³⁹² that their sacred texts are also authoritative. It means that the literalism approach only applies to internal groups, and the religious truths they hold also apply only to themselves, without having to be acknowledged by other groups.

Second, faith and religious truths are incommensurable to each other³⁹³. This study described the Fundamentalists' obsession with assigning their sacred texts as 'inspiration and motivation' for their groups and as 'compulsory norms' to society as cognitive bias.

³⁹⁰ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁹¹ Madan T. N. Religious Pluralism: Perspectives from Gandhi and Indian Islam. In India International Centre Quarterly. Vol. 41, No. 1. Published by India International Centre: summer 2014. P. 155.

³⁹² Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

³⁹³ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

Religious texts are contingent; therefore, their implementation as public norms should be studied and remain adaptive to other groups' social norms.

1.2. Absolutism and Its Main Issues

Absolutism is one of the critical attributes of religious fundamentalism. What is religious absolutism, and on what grounds is it justified and maintained? Religious absolutism is a worldview that claims that there is only one objective cognition about reality and that cognition is derived only from the Bible or holy texts. This study starts the argument against religious absolutism within fundamentalism with the critical premise of Caputo, which states that religion is contingent. Caputo opposes and lambasts fundamentalists for not recognizing that all religions are 'woven from the cloth of contingency.' Religion and its religious texts should thereby be kept open-ended and revisable.³⁹⁴

In the same tone as Caputo, this study argues that religious absolutism in fundamentalism is a cognitive bias. The premise of religious absolutism is founded on a belief that God's commands written in sacred religious texts are originated and directly communicated by God the Absolute Being. Since those sacred texts are regarded as God's words directly communicated to humanity, they must be entirely implemented as absolute norms. Upon the infallibility and inerrancy principle, those sacred texts, by fundamentalists,³⁹⁵ are taken as the supreme authoritative texts that subordinate other norms. Within that claim, there are two premises necessary to be examined. First, for the fundamentalists, God's existence is understood ontologically. Second, God directly communicates with human beings. In short, fundamentalists attempt to set the ontological foundation for their religious truth claims.

To identify the cognitive bias in fundamentalism is to find out the dilemmas of its ontological foundation the fundamentalists use for their religious premises. The ontological foundation is related to two main points: regarding the existence of God and

³⁹⁴ Plant B. Wittgenstein, Religious "Passion" and Fundamentalism. P. 295.

³⁹⁵ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

the model of communication between God and human beings. The fundamentalists implicitly base their religious claims on an ontological and objective foundation by saying they claim to be absolute truths only because they believe those truths originated from and are directly revealed by God. Fundamentalism remains a cognitive bias because God's existence cannot be proven ontologically and objectively. By basing their claims on an ontological foundation, the fundamentalists unavoidably have to prove that God is an objective entity, and that God ontologically must exist.

Since the fundamentalists base their religious claims on an ontological basis, they must encounter some epistemological inquiries. They inescapably must face at least four elementary inquiries. First, how does God communicate and deliver Its commands to human beings? Second, is communication either direct or indirect? Third, how do human beings receive and recognize God's commands? Fourth, as commonly believed in many religions that God's commands are conveyed through dream, vision, and revelation, then to what extent can those ways be taken to prove God's existence? These ontological queries weaken fundamentalists' position, and those elementary questions are uneasy about being overcome for one main reason: God's existence cannot be grasped ontologically. This study would use Wittgenstein's concept of God and Kierkegaard's concept of faith to examine and scrutinize religious absolutism within fundamentalism.

First, the concept of *Wittgensteinian God* is a critique against absolutism in fundamentalism. As mentioned in the previous part, religious absolutism in fundamentalism is founded on a belief that God ontologically exists. Since the fundamentalists believe that God ontologically exists³⁹⁶, God is a matter of fact. Upon this belief, the fundamentalists firmly believe that the sacred texts written in their holy scripture are descended and directly communicated by God to human beings and that these sacred texts must be considered infallible and absolute truths³⁹⁷. The infallibility or

³⁹⁶ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

³⁹⁷ *Ibidem*.

the inerrancy of sacred texts stems from the foundation of the fundamentalist belief that God ontologically exists and actively guides and controls human beings.

One simple reason to say that basing religious belief on an ontological foundation is a kind of religious cognitive bias is because God, as an Infinite Being, cannot be comprehensible by man as a finite being. Placing ontological proof to maintain religious belief and its truths cannot be defended. In accordance with Wittgenstein's concept of God: God is not a matter of fact. *Wittgensteinian God* is founded upon the question 'What kind of reality is a divine reality,' not upon the question of 'Is God real or unreal.'

His analogy of 'picture' can be taken to make clear his concept of God. He portrays God with the analogy of the significance of a picture for two people of different positions, one a believer and the other an unbeliever. For Wittgenstein, as Julius writes, "The difference between a man who does and a man who does not believe in God is like the difference between a man who does and a man who does not believe in a picture...Believing in the picture means, for example, putting one's trust in it, sacrificing for it, letting it regulate one's life, and so on. Not believing in the picture means that the picture plays no part in one's thinking."³⁹⁸

If we closely look at Wittgenstein's concept of God, we can find that God is an unidentifiable and incomprehensible entity but influences the believers' lives. Like a 'picture,' God is a 'guiding principle' that directs the believers to cope with the world. It is the same as saying that God is not a matter of truth but inspiration, motivation, and direction. It would be apt to use this concept of *Wittgensteinian God* to scrutinize fundamentalism.

This study uses Julius' interpretation of Wittgenstein's and Phillips' idea of religious belief that "...religious beliefs acting not so much as truth-claims, viz. as assertions of fact valid for all, but as having meaning for the author in a particular situation."³⁹⁹ In other words, religious belief is about 'meaning for me' in the author's situation. Religious

³⁹⁸ Lipner J. Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 218.

³⁹⁹ *Ibidem*.

belief is a matter of meaning for personal life. If a religious belief is personal, its significance should be a matter of a 'religious meaning for me,' not a matter of truth claims. It means that religious belief is a world of meaning, not a world of truth.

Regarding 'truth claims' in religion, Phillips sees it from the 'personal dimension,' not the 'interpersonal dimension.' According to Phillips, truth claims in religious belief are about 'personal guidance,' from which a believer gains inspiration, vision, and motivation for his/her life as a religious person. To understand that idea, let us look at Phillips' analogy of a 'generous act.' Phillips, as Julius describes, states that: "To say that 'It is true that it is better to give than to receive' (which need not be a religious truth-claim, of course) would not be to make a factual assertion about or decision in favor of generous act as, for example, in the case of a dispute between business partners over whether a proposed venture will, materialize in profit."⁴⁰⁰

Generosity for a believer, according to Phillips, is not a matter of benefit the believer gains from that act. A believer sees it in a particular way that the meaning of a generous act lies in the beauty of that act.⁴⁰¹ From that analogy, Phillips seems to say that religious belief is about a world of meaning and beauty for a religious believer. Using that analogy, Phillips emphasizes Wittgenstein's view of a religious belief. According to Wittgenstein, faith in God and a belief in sacred texts are immeasurable by any other measures outside of religion.

A generous act is understood differently by a believer and a business person. Businessman sees generosity from a principle of reciprocity; they expect to gain the same/more in return for what they give. A believer sees generosity as a command of the sacred texts, and the reward of that act cannot be measured through material reward. Religious belief has a meaning that cannot be measured or compared by any other views.

⁴⁰⁰ Lipner J. Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 218.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibidem.*

As Phillips states, "the criteria of meaningfulness cannot be found outside religion, since they are given by religious discourse itself."⁴⁰²

Any other criterion outside of religion cannot measure the criterion for religious values. Religious belief is confined to the 'personal dimension.' It directs, motivates, and regulates one's attitude. Julius presents an example of a man's belief in the Last Judgment, saying that it "shows itself in a way a man has this before his mind when he takes any decision of importance, in the way it determines his attitude to his aspirations and failures, or to the fortunes or misfortunes which befall him...It does not involve the weighing of evidence or reasoning to a conclusion. It involves seeing how the belief regulates a person's life."⁴⁰³ An essential point of this example is that religious belief is a matter of a function of religious belief in a believer. It is about how a religious belief determines the attitude of religious people.

The leading idea of Wittgenstein's approach to religious belief lies in his assertion that a religious belief is not a matter of fact-asserting. According to Wittgenstein, Julius writes, "...religious beliefs have an absolute, non-testable character, and that the truth-claims that flow from them do not say anything about an actual state of affairs; they are not fact-asserting."⁴⁰⁴ The primary problem within fundamentalism is that the fundamentalists regard their sacred texts and religious truths as fact-asserting and that those truths, according to them, cannot be questioned because they believe that those truths are God's given commands.

Wittgenstein pointed out that sacred texts should be viewed as texts containing religious exhortations and guidance for believers to live good lives. The significance of religious texts lies in their meaningfulness for the believers personally. The essence of

⁴⁰² *Lipner J.* Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 219.

⁴⁰³ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibidem.*

religious belief is in its meaningfulness, not in religious truths regarded by fundamentalists as unquestionable or untestable truths.⁴⁰⁵

Absolutism within fundamentalism is rooted in a belief that God's commands written in holy texts are factual truths because the fundamentalists believe that God directly communicated those commands to human beings. Religious truths should, at best, be viewed as prescriptive statements, not descriptive statements, because those truths are guiding principles that provide believers direction, inspiration, or motivation. This study will examine and compare two opposite arguments. One is from Phillips, a proponent of Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion, and another is from John Hick, an opponent of Wittgenstein.⁴⁰⁶

Religious truth claims, according to Phillips, are not 'fact-asserting.' While Hick argues that religious truth claims are 'fact-asserting.' "Hick holds," Julius explains, "that religious truth-claims are indeed fact-asserting and therefore that they ought to be verifiable in some way or other...verifiable in this context, he means that it must be possible for an individual to have 'not a demonstration of the logical impossibility of the proposition being false..., but such weight of evidence as suffices, in the type of case in question, to exclude rational doubt...If, however, the entire range of religious beliefs were regarded as non-factual, none of them could possess the kind of significance which depends upon a connection with objectivity reality".⁴⁰⁷

There is a problematic idea in Hick's argument, as he places an ontological foundation on the existence of God. Hick maintains that "...for the believer...in the context of a dispute as to whether God exists, the question about the reality of God is not only a conceptual question but also a question of fact and existence."⁴⁰⁸ In Hick's idea, 'factual' refers to the 'effects' a religious belief engenders on believers. His ontological approach is based on the premise that believing in the existence of a Transcendental Being

⁴⁰⁵ *Lipner J.* Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 219.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.* P. 219-220.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.* P. 220.

⁴⁰⁸ *Lipner J.* Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 220.

makes some difference in the life of the believers. He describes his idea in the analogy of the two types of travellers. He states, "The universe as envisaged by the theist, then, differs as a totality from the universe as envisaged by the atheist...Furthermore, although this does not affect the situation's logic, it should be added that the alternative interpretations are more than theoretical, for they render different practical plans and policies appropriate now."⁴⁰⁹

Hick's concept of 'fact' in religious belief is related to the 'theory of effect,' that one's faith can change how one thinks and acts. Considering Julius' interpretation, Phillips and Hick stand on the picture theory of religious belief. When Hick places an example of two types of travellers, he means 'fact-asserting' is the 'effects' of faith on one's life. The theist who believes in God's existence sets and plans his life very differently from the atheist who has no religion. Hick's idea of religious truths as 'fact-asserting' only relates to the theory of effect. In contrast to what Hicks means by spiritual truth claims as 'fact-assertion' by definition of the term 'fact' as an objective reality, from my personal standpoint, religion is contingent. Phillips and Wittgenstein emphasize that the concept of 'fact' in religious belief differs from the concept of fact in 'science.' The 'fact' in religious belief belongs to a different language that can only be grasped from the spiritual perspective.

A problematic concept in Hick's idea is that he does not elucidate further what he means by the term 'fact' regarding his approach toward the 'existence of God.' Hick's idea could be made clear by what Phillip stresses, that the 'fact' in religious belief must be different from the 'fact' in science. Phillips stresses that "God is not a fact like other facts in our world; he is not a being on a par with the sort of beings we are – but wholly other... Seeing that there is a God is not like seeing that another being exists. If it were, there would be an extension of one's knowledge of facts, but no extension of one's

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.* P. 221.

understanding...If God is a thing. He is finite, and a finite God satisfies the needs neither of religion nor theology.”⁴¹⁰

Another critical question to be analysed is: Are all sacred texts utterly devoid of historical facts? Religious scriptures, in some cases, contain historical facts of the time of their writers. They contain historical facts the writers recorded during their time, and some parts contain literary art such as myths, parables, stories, and the like relevant to their time. The Christian Bible, for example, is not entirely regarded as God's given words that are directly descended to human beings through the prophets, but it is also considered a historical book, even a book that contains political facts. The church sorted through several Councils (from Rome Council in 382, Hippo Council in 393, Carthage Council in 397, Florence Council in 419, Trent Council in 1546 to Vatican Council in 1869), out of which writings were included in scripture from writings that were excluded. That sorting process was not free from political, cultural, and other considerations. That sorting process to a specific range implicitly underlines that the Bible is a religious book written by humans.

This section will reemphasize fundamentalism's epistemic problem: fundamentalists believe their sacred texts are texts descended from God without any human process⁴¹¹. The foundation of their epistemic stance is that sacred texts are the supreme authoritative texts only because they believe they are God's words directly descended on human beings. Against their view, this study uses Phillips' view of religious claims. Phillips describes that the religious truth claims within fundamentalism should, at best, not be based on the criterion of 'truth or falsity' but on the criterion of intelligibility.⁴¹²

Intelligibility, according to Phillips, is not a matter of 'truth or falsity' but a matter of how the religious find the relevance of the sacred texts they hold with the contexts and

⁴¹⁰ *Lipner J.* Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 220.

⁴¹¹ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁴¹² *Lipner J.* Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 219.

traditions they are in and what they believe is confined to their particular perspective, that might be irrelevant for the believers of the alien faiths. In the context of the problem of absolutism in fundamentalism, hard to disagree if "Each believer belonging to a different religious tradition would presumably employ a different overall picture or framework of constituent pictures which more or less harmoniously gathers up the truth-claims constituting his worldview, but often cannot absorb compatibly the strands that make up the truth-claims of alien faiths."⁴¹³ The point is that the existence of alien faiths must be taken into consideration.

In addition, the existence of alien faiths is one of the unavoidable challenges the fundamentalists face. One's religious truth claims coexist with other claims, each having a particular place, and they are equal. Their distinctions are not in conflict with each other. Religious diversity is just a matter of diversity of points of view. Phillips's analogy of 'two separate tapestries' can be taken to support this study's argument. Phillips says that "Divergent claims, therefore, such as from the Christian viewpoint, 'Only Jesus is the Son of God,' and from the Hindu point of view, 'Krishna is God incarnate,' do not conflict as conflicting empirical statements do, for example, 'This business venture is raking in a fat profit' and 'This business venture is heading for total failure,' but they conflict as the different colors and patterns of two separate tapestries do – and this is no conflict at all. To understand their nature correctly is not to expect or attempt empirical arbitration on matters of fact."⁴¹⁴

This study uses Phillips' analogy of two separate tapestries to criticize fundamentalists' position and their attempt to set their religious truths as compulsory public regulations. By enacting religious truths as compulsory public regulations, the fundamentalists deliberately ignore the existence of other religious beliefs. The anti-plurality in fundamentalism stems from the fundamentalists' belief that their religious belief is superior to any other belief, and the religious truths they hold are the supreme truths that subordinate any truth claims of the alien faiths. The fundamental character of

⁴¹³ *Ibid.* P. 220.

⁴¹⁴ *Lipner J.* Truth-Claims and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Religious Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2. Cambridge University Press: June 1976. P. 220.

religious absolutism is a 'win-lose' type of relationship, an eliminative relationship in which the fundamentalists consider themselves the righteous, while outsiders are unrighteous that must be excluded or even terminated.

From Wittgenstein's idea and his proponent, Phillips, we could find that fundamentalists are inclined to see interreligious relationships from a 'truth-falsity' point of view. The fundamentalists consider their faith the only truth and consider alien faiths erroneous. Ideally, the divergence between religious beliefs should be seen as a matter of divergent ways of perceiving God as the Infinite Being. The divergence of religious beliefs does not denote that they are the opposite. Their differences ideally should be seen from their particular or unique existence, in which they stand in different colours and patterns, like two separate tapestries.

Second, *Kierkegaardian concept of religious faith* criticizes religious absolutism within fundamentalism. Kierkegaard's concept of religious faith would also be fit to make clear why basing religious belief on ontological grounds is problematic. Kierkegaard was also a religious fundamentalist, but he avoided fundamentalist absolutism. Kierkegaard avoided it because he objected to any attempt to rationalize religious beliefs based on objective reasoning. In this case, objective reasoning is a set of logical and objective standards. Kierkegaard's argument against objective reasoning in religious belief stems from his existentialist viewpoint of religion that religion is a world of 'meaning for me,' and religious beliefs must be viewed from existential experience.

Kierkegaard writes his philosophical approach to religion and religious beliefs in a concept of three levels of human existence: aesthetic, ethical, and religious.⁴¹⁵ Further, this section will not elaborate on the first two points but directly focus on his concept of religious existence. Kierkegaard believes that a relationship with a transcendent God enables man to face adversity. That relationship is a personal relationship based upon existential experience. Kierkegaard believes a strong passion for God is vital to religious

⁴¹⁵ Schroeder W.R. *Continental Philosophy; A Critical Approach*. USA-UK-Australia: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. P. 212.

life.⁴¹⁶ This relationship cannot be reduced, generalized, and rationalized by objective reasoning because it is personal. To say that religious experience is an existential experience is understanding that religious belief cannot be generalized or reasoned objectively.

Kierkegaard corroborated his objection to objective reasoning in religious beliefs through his three philosophical arguments. *First* is the *approximation argument*. The main question of this argument is: Is it possible to base religious belief on historical knowledge? For Kierkegaard, it is impossible. Religious belief cannot be founded on objective reasoning of historical facts.⁴¹⁷ Kierkegaard stressed that a Christian should not base his faith on objective reasoning. Though Kierkegaard regarded the importance of historical facts for the Christian faith, he objected to the attempt to base religious faith on objective historical facts.⁴¹⁸ If faith cannot be based on objective historical facts, then faith must rightly be based on what foundation? Kierkegaard proposed the 'argument of approximation.'

From this argument, faith must be persistent though it contains uncertainty. Belief is not a matter of resolution or solution. Faith in God ignores doubt. A faith decision is a decision that ignores the possibility of error. However, for Kierkegaard, ignoring the possibility of error does not mean not being aware of that error. Kierkegaard stresses that believers should be fully aware of the risk of such an error. He adds that we must hold on to objective uncertainty to persist in faith. The approximation argument's core aim is to emphasize that religious truth is not a matter of objective truth but of a religious experience of the Human-Divine Being relationship. Religious experiences are not founded upon religious truth claims constituted in religious institutions. Faith is

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 214. Quote: "...only a relationship with a transcendent Deity will provide the strength to endure such suffering. This personal and passionate relationship to God is the core element of the religious way of life."

⁴¹⁷ *Adam R.M.* Kierkegaard's Arguments Against Objective Reasoning in Religion. In *The Monist, Philosophy and Religion in the 19th Century*, Vol. 60 No 2. Oxford University Press, April 1977. P. 229.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.* P. 229. Adam writes that "It assumed that some belief about historical facts is an essential part of Christian Faith, so that if religious faith cannot be based on objective historical reasoning, then Christian faith cannot be based on objective reasoning at all."

subjective and about existential experiences that cannot be generalized and reduced to religious dogmas or doctrines.

Second, the postponements argument. If, in the approximation argument, the objective reasoning cannot reach a complete certainty, in the postponement argument, Kierkegaard underlined that objective historical inquiry is never entirely resolved. According to Kierkegaard, one who bases his/her faith on objective historical inquiry will postpone his religious commitments forever. If faith is based upon historical documents to justify the truth of (Christian) faith, we are de facto trapped in a proposition "forever perspective" because we place our religious commitment forever in the future. This argument shows Kierkegaard's objection to basing religious faith on empirical reasoning. Concisely, he disagreed with those who apply empirical evidence as the basis for religious faith.

Robert Adam critically comments on Kierkegaard's second argument: First, authentic religious faith is founded upon total commitment, and empirical matters must not determine that total commitment. This premise is related to the human attempt to compare the image of God as a perfect being and the worldly life of a human being as an imperfect reality. Though one is living in imperfection, one should persist in faith, and that reality of human imperfection should not make one doubt God's perfection. According to Adam's commentary, Kierkegaard asserted that a total commitment to religious faith is essential even though faith cannot be proven and verified. The essence of religious faith is commitment itself.

Second, a religious person cannot base their beliefs on empirical investigation because if the result differs from what he previously believed, his faith must be revised. Consequently, his religious commitment will be postponed as well.

Third, the passion argument. Third, the passion argument. This argument is based on the premise that faith is the highest passion in man and that passion is driven not by certainty but by uncertainty. In this argument, Kierkegaard stressed that religious faith requires objective improbability. Kierkegaard stated, "Anything that is almost probable, or probable, or extremely and emphatically probable, is something (one) can almost know

– but it is impossible to believe.”⁴¹⁹ Kierkegaard intended to point out the improbability of knowing the object of faith. Therefore, religious faith requires objective improbability. Religious faith, for Kierkegaard, must be founded only upon a passion for knowing God. As he said, “Faith is the highest passion in man.” Therefore, the essence of faith is the passion for knowing God. It is the same as saying that religious faith is not founded upon 'objective probability' but upon 'objective improbability' of knowing God as the object of faith.

Religious passion is the essence of faith. That passion is infinite and requires an objective improbability to keep faith alive. Adam explains why religious faith requires not an objective probability but objective improbability. He stresses that “there is nothing to be said...except that it is good which is attained by venturing everything”.⁴²⁰ By saying faith requires objective improbability, Kierkegaard stressed that the essence of religious faith lies in one's awareness of the uncertainty and improbability of his/her faith that drives him/her as a religious man to achieve the ultimate good. This conclusion refers to Kierkegaard's definition of life as a persistent striving.⁴²¹

This study uses Kierkegaard's three arguments to criticize fundamentalism. Religious absolutism in fundamentalism stems from the fundamentalists'⁴²² claim that their religious truths have an ontological ground. They consider their sacred texts to contain absolute truths only because they believe that God directly gives Its commands and directly communicates with human beings. By that consideration, the fundamentalists base their beliefs on objective and historical grounds. In other words, the ontological basis of faith has roots in their belief that God ontologically exists and communicates Its words

⁴¹⁹ Adam R.M. Kierkegaard's Arguments Against Objective Reasoning in Religion. P. 235. Adam writes that “Anything that is almost probable, or probable, or extremely and emphatically probable, is something (one) can almost know – but it is impossible to believe.”

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.* P. 237.

⁴²¹ Adam R.M. Kierkegaard's Arguments Against Objective Reasoning in Religion. P. 238.

⁴²² Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

directly to human beings. The fundamentalists confidently base their faith on objective reasoning on this ontological ground⁴²³.

In this section, Kierkegaard's objection is faced against 'objective reasoning' on faith in the problem of fundamentalism⁴²⁴. The aim of basing the foundation of faith on objective reasoning in fundamentalism has roots in fundamentalists'⁴²⁵ attempts to prove the existence of God and, at the same time, objectively to ensure that their claims of religious truths can also be objectively verified. The problem is that any approach cannot prove God's existence ontologically.

If God's existence can be objectively proven, God is finite. The ontological approach toward the existence of God is an inconsistency within fundamentalism. If fundamentalists consider God the Infinite Being, but to sustain their belief, they attempt to prove God's existence ontologically and objectively, then God is a Finite Being. This epistemological inconsistency is one of the cognitive biases within fundamentalism.

Absolutism within fundamentalism can also be criticized from Kierkegaard's *passion argument*. The essence of faith is religious passion. Religious passion is not a matter of knowing the object of faith objectively. Religious passion is based on objective improbability, not on objective probability or objective reasoning. The object of faith, God, is incomprehensible. If God is incomprehensible, religious passion should be viewed as a human effort to be close to God. Being close to God does not mean knowing God objectively, but it enables a believer to transform his/her life better⁴²⁶.

⁴²³ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁴²⁴ McDonough R. Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. Religious Studies. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press.

⁴²⁵ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴²⁶ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

Divine truths, or religious truths, are not the centre of religiosity⁴²⁷. The centre of religiosity is the human passion for transforming the lives of believers through total obedience. It is the man who wants to live, preserve, and strive for a better life. Kierkegaard's idea of genuine religiosity is the opposite of the fundamentalists who place religious doctrines beyond religious passion⁴²⁸. According to Kierkegaard, Genuine religiosity is not a matter of religious truths but human passion for obtaining the good. The essence of religiosity, if we relate it to Kierkegaard's concept of subjectivity, is self-authority and self-consciousness.⁴²⁹

If fundamentalism is passionate religiosity, then fundamentalists must not base their faith on an ontological foundation. Intense religiosity presupposes that the object of their faith should be uncertainty. Kierkegaard could be right in saying that religious faith should be based on objective uncertainty or improbability⁴³⁰. According to that principle, God is an Infinite Being. However, if we base religious faith on objective certainty or objective probability, God must be identified as a finite Being, and consequently, God is not a Supreme Being.

Richard MacDonough, in *Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique*, rejects the ontological approach to religious belief. On fundamentalism, he wrote that:

“...religious fundamentalism, understood, roughly, as the view that people must obey God's commands unconditionally, is conceptually incoherent because such religious fundamentalists inevitably must substitute human judgment for God's judgment. The article argues, first, that fundamentalism, founded upon the normal sort of indirect communication from God, is indefensible. Second, the article considers the crucial case in which God is said to communicate directly to human beings and argues that the fundamentalist interpretation of such communications is also incoherent and, on this basis, argues that religious fundamentalism is an extreme form of irreligiousness. Finally, the article considers Kierkegaard's prima facie defense of unconditional religious faith and argues that, despite some similarity with the fundamentalists, Kierkegaard's appreciation of human finitude leads him to a profoundly anti-fundamentalist stance.”⁴³¹

⁴²⁷ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴²⁸ McDonough R. *Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique*. Religious Studies. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>.

⁴²⁹ Kierkegaard S. *The Present Age*. London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1962. P. 17.

⁴³⁰ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴³¹ McDonough R. *Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique*. P. 561.

MacDonough emphasizes three reasons for his rejection of religious absolutism and ontological approach to religious faith. *First*, direct communication is indefensible only because the fundamentalists must face an ontological inquiry into how God communicates with man. Conceptually, God must be knowable and finite if God directly communicates with man. *Second*, indirect communication between God and man is also indefensible because there are probabilities of human error in receiving and interpreting God's commands. *Third*, human errors can occur because of diverse languages, interpretations, and comprehension of God's commands.

In addition, there are two infirmities or inconsistencies in fundamentalism. *First*, they believe that God directly communicates with man to maintain their belief in the infallibility of their sacred texts, though they consider God an Infinite Being⁴³². If God can be known, then God is a finite being. *Second*, the fundamentalists consider man a finite being, but on the contrary, they believe that man can know God's existence and claim to have comprehensive knowledge of God. These fundamentalists' inconsistencies of thinking outline the difference between Kierkegaard and them; Kierkegaard acknowledged the human finitude that led him to a deep anti-fundamentalism,⁴³³ while the fundamentalists did not.

Kierkegaardian religiosity is an undogmatic religiosity. It is a religiosity that does not attach importance to religious truth. The principium of 'unconditional obedience', in Kierkegaardian religiosity⁴³⁴, also does not mean that man possesses a comprehensive knowledge of God. In brief, Kierkegaardian religiosity neither accentuates the truth claims nor the ontological ground of faith. Unlike Kierkegaard, the fundamentalists disregard the fact of human finitude, that man, as a finite being, cannot know God, and the existence of God, as an Infinite Being, cannot be grasped ontologically.

⁴³² Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁴³³ McDonough R. Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. Religious Studies. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. P. 561. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>

⁴³⁴ *Ibidem*.

On those two elementary principles, the infinity of God and the finitude of man, this study propounds that the fundamentalists should revise their religious stance, not regarding their religious belief, but their efforts to make their religious teachings authoritative norms that subordinate other norms. The fundamentalists ideally should place their religious teachings as motivational and inspirational teachings, not compulsory norms imposed on other groups in public space⁴³⁵. Richard Rorty's appraisal of fundamentalists could precisely critique this issue. Rorty "criticizes fundamentalists for erroneously seeing their own 'private way' of giving meaning to life as something "obligatory for the general public." ⁴³⁶ It is tantamount to saying that the problem within fundamentalism is the coercive attitude of the fundamentalists who impose their 'private way' of giving meaning to life, including their private exegesis to their religious texts, as something obligatory for other groups.

Finally, to a certain extent, absolutism within fundamentalism should be reviewed for several reasons. *First*, if fundamentalists ground their religious belief on an ontological argument to maintain their claim of religious truths as absolute truths, they consequently consider God the Finite Being. God's existence cannot be ontologically proven. Using the ontological argument that God directly communicated and descended Its divine command to humanity, only to maintain the absolutism of their religious truths, is considered a cognitive bias.

Second, as religion and its sacred texts are contingent, their attempt to make their religious doctrines obligatory norms for the public, only because they perceive them to be God's infallible commands, is a cognitive bias. Again, it would be more reasonable to count religious teachings as directories or guiding inspirations applicable to believers. *Third*, if fundamentalists admit that God, the giver of divine commands, is infallible, were the recipients of God's commands, the prophets, totally error-free?

⁴³⁵ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁴³⁶ Plant B. Wittgenstein, Religious "Passion" and Fundamentalism. P. 295

Fundamentalism is seen as a cognitive bias only if the fundamentalists, in their movement, step outside of the borders of their action as an expression of religious passion for reviving genuine religiosity. They should treat their religious dogmas, as in Wittgenstein's terms, as the guiding values.⁴³⁷

In his *Lectures on Religious Belief and Culture and Values*⁴³⁸, Wittgenstein asserted that fundamentalists have no right to impose and make their religious dogmas obligatory norms, particularly in a multicultural society. Religious terms like “belief, knowledge, evidence, and proof” belong to a different language⁴³⁹. The clear distinction between believers and non-believers does not lie in their different position that one believes, and the others disbelieve but in their fundamental differences in seeing and experiencing faith. Believers and non-believers are not contradictory or opposite. They only stand on different ways of thinking. Their different positions are, according to Wittgenstein, only a matter of disparity between “theorizing about religion and active religious faith. Religious belief is a practical act, implementing religious teachings and taking them⁴⁴⁰ as “guidance for his life.”⁴⁴¹

1.3. Authoritative Method and Its Problem

Another feature of fundamentalism is the authoritative method of approaching sacred religious texts. This method is one of the epistemological issues within fundamentalism. One way to understand this method and its problems is by comparing it with the experimental or scientific method used by Deweyan thinkers in their philosophy of religion or with the 'method of reconstruction or rational interpretation' in the

⁴³⁷ McDonough R. Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. P. 561. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>.

⁴³⁸ Plant B. Wittgenstein, Religious “Passion” and Fundamentalism. P. 285-286.

⁴³⁹ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁴⁰ McDonough R. Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. P. 561. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>.

⁴⁴¹ Plant B. Wittgenstein, Religious “Passion” and Fundamentalism. P. 288.

Habermasian approach.⁴⁴² Regarding fundamentalism, Larry Hickman, a proponent of the Deweyan concept of religion, writes:

“Ideas and hypothesis are treated not as truths to be defended at all costs, but as tools that may be altered as they are applied to the materials of concrete experience. This is why the Pragmatic method rejects "absolute" or "timeless" truths. Dewey wanted to make the point in all this that the Pragmatic notion of truth-as-method can embrace a wide variety of viewpoints and activities, including religious outlooks and practices. I recalled the metaphor of the Pragmatic method as a hotel corridor. A number of rooms would open onto it, and inside those rooms, there would be a wide variety of persons and activities. There would be many differences in culture, interest, and temperament among the people in the rooms at the Pragmatic Hotel. There would be Buddhists, Roman Catholics, Baptists, Muslims, Confucians, and even atheists. Even though you would find religious people and secularists in the hotel, for example, you would not find humanists and religious fundamentalists there. The reason that you would not find fundamentalists there is that the primary method of fundamentalism is not experimental. It is the method of authority. In the absence of experimentalism, religious and other types of fundamentalists must fall back on the application of psychological, physical, or political power rather than the application of intelligence.”⁴⁴³

There are three leading points of Hickman's assertion of fundamentalism. *First*, ideas and hypotheses are treated not as truths to be defended at all costs. Those ideas and hypotheses refer to religious ideas written in sacred religious texts. Ideally, those religious ideas and hypotheses should not be treated as absolute truths but as guiding and inspirational principles for their adherents. In the Deweyan philosophy of religion, God's commands in the holy scriptures are hypothetical. *Second*, (religious) ideas and hypotheses are tools that 'may themselves be altered as they are applied to the materials of concrete experience.' Religious ideas and hypotheses should be interpreted within and through the social context of the religious adherents. *Third*, a pragmatic method rejects absolute or timeless truths⁴⁴⁴.

If fundamentalism expresses religious passion like in Kierkegaard's point of view, fundamentalists should not focus on religious truth claims. As an expression of religious passion, the fundamentalists are likely to concentrate on faith experience, and the

⁴⁴² Martensson U., Bailey J., Ringrose P., Dyrendal A. Fundamentalism in the Modern World. Volume 2. Fundamentalism and Communication: Culture, Media and the Public Sphere. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011. P. 49.

⁴⁴³ Hickman L. Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007. P. 195-197.

⁴⁴⁴ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

movement aims to transform believers' lives. However, if fundamentalism expresses a religious doctrinal movement, fundamentalists concentrate on truth claims. Let us examine Dewey's idea of religion to clarify this point.

In *Cultivating a Common Faith: Dewey's Religion*,⁴⁴⁵ Larry Hickman elucidates the essence of religion. He refers to John Dewey's idea in his work, *A Common Faith*. The book presents Dewey's idea of religion. The essence of religion, for Dewey, is the religious experience from which norms are formed⁴⁴⁶. Hickman states, "Our experience does not have to conform to putative supernatural, ideological, or transcendental ideal or norms; experience itself – our experience in and of our cultural and historical context – is capable of generating the norms and ideals that allow it to grow and develop."⁴⁴⁷

There are two elementary propositions in Dewey's philosophy of religion. *First*, transcendental ideals or norms are putative. The term 'putative transcendental norms' means that those ideals and norms are conjectural or hypothetical. This proposition implicitly emphasizes that religious teachings in sacred texts should not be treated as truths because they are presumptive. Sacred texts should not be treated as truths, but raw materials verified within the experience. *Second*, human experience can generate norms and ideals that allow it to grow and develop. If we place this proposition on the problem of the authoritative method within fundamentalism, we may find that Dewey intends to say that the (religious) ideals and norms can stem from human experience,⁴⁴⁸ and they evolve and grow within human context and experience. Ideals and norms are not outside of human experience.

Absolute or timeless truths only apply to intra-religious groups and are fundamental to believers. Dewey could be right; religious ideas and hypotheses should be

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid* P. 191-205.

⁴⁴⁶ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁴⁷ *Hickman L.* Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007. P. 193; See also: Fesmire J. John Dewey and Moral Imagination. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003. P. 35; Dewey J. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910. P. 95.

⁴⁴⁸ *McDonough R.* Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. Religious Studies. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. P. 561. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>.

treated as tools or raw materials evaluated in experience, not as absolute or authoritative truth. The essence of Dewey's idea is that religiosity is not a matter of truth claim or preserving religious truths at all costs, but it is about the religious experience that gives values and inspiration to the believers.

In addition, Dewey stresses that religious experience should be allowed to develop without external constraints.⁴⁴⁹ The term 'external constraints' refers to institutional constraints. Dewey aimed to assert his view of religion that the significance of religiosity is religious experience developed through and within a historical context⁴⁵⁰. He may emphasize that religion is not about and not confined to religious dogmas or doctrines established by religious institutions, but importantly, it is about the religious experience that provides inspiration, motivation,⁴⁵¹ and valuable guidance to believers. His refusal of authoritative methods within fundamentalism can be found in his emphasis on the centrality of religious experience. By emphasizing religious experience, Dewey stressed that religion should not be dogmatic because the essence of religiosity does not stem from dogmas but faith and religious experience⁴⁵².

Religiosity is a matter of values for inspiration and motivation. They function, as Michael Eldridge wrote, as "action-guiding possibilities."⁴⁵³ Eldridge stated, as Hickman quoted, that "They arise, guide action, and are revised in an ongoing reconstructive process...However, as generalized ends-in-view, they never escape their origins in temporal conditions. They are not outside of experience."⁴⁵⁴ Eldridge's treatment of religious teachings as action-guiding possibilities can be used to critique fundamentalists inclined to count their religious dogmas as '*compulsory norms*.' As guiding values, religious teachings are open to being revised through a reconstructive process within a human historical context.

⁴⁴⁹ Hickman L. Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007. P 193.

⁴⁵⁰ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵³ Eldridge is an American Deweyan interpreter.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid* P. 193.

Regarding the problem of the authoritative method within fundamentalism, let us measure Dewey's two crucial concepts of '*a religion*' and '*the religious*.'⁴⁵⁵ His concept of 'the religious,' Hickman explains, "It does not denote any specifiable entity, whether institutional or doctrinal. It does not denote anything that can exist or be organized into a particular and distinctive form of existence. It does denote "attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal."⁴⁵⁶ While a religion' refers to an institutional entity. Hickman furtherly adds that "there is no such thing as religion in general or religion in *per se*... Because one cannot be adherent to religion in general, one must choose among the world's religions to be a member of one: some particular religion must be chosen from all the rest. Dewey makes a move demonstrating the extent to which his treatment of religious experience is integrated into his wider philosophy.⁴⁵⁷

The two concepts can be used to uncover the problem of authoritative methods within fundamentalism. In Dewey's concept, religiosity is defined as something beyond religion as an institution⁴⁵⁸. The essence of religiosity is a specific religious experience that does not denote any specific entity⁴⁵⁹, including a religious institution. If religious experience is the essence of religiosity, why do fundamentalists insist on making their religious teachings authoritative truths they defend at all costs? Dewey's philosophy of religion appears to offer two key notions, namely the essence of religion and the position of religious truths. *First*, according to Dewey, the essence of religion is religiosity founded on religious experience. Religiosity is not a matter of 'truth' or 'a world of truth,' but a matter of 'fruit' and 'a world of meaning,' in the sense that the essence of religion is the meaning of religious experience and the 'fruity' of religious teachings for the lives of the religious people. In other words, the importance of religion is determined by religious

⁴⁵⁵ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁵⁶ *Hickman L.* Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007. 194.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.* P. 193-194.

⁴⁵⁸ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁵⁹ *Hood R. W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).P

experiences rather than religious dogmas⁴⁶⁰. By emphasizing the concept of 'common experience as the standard of judgment and value', Dewey intends to assert that religious values or teachings are produced from the religious experience of believers. He questions fundamentalists' authoritative method, in which they regard their sacred texts as 'a collection of truths.' He asserts that "common experience is capable of developing from within itself methods which will secure direction for itself and will create inherent standards of judgment and value."⁴⁶¹

Dewey's concept of 'the religious' can be taken as a critique against the fundamentalists who attempt to make their religious doctrines obligatory norms that they impose on other groups. The authoritative method within fundamentalism, both epistemologically and ideologically, is weak since sacred religious texts are contingent and conjectural. As conjectural, they should not be treated as truths, much less as absolute truths. Their proper functions are limited to inspiration, motivation, and guiding principles.

The problem with authoritative methods in fundamentalism is that the fundamentalists focus on truth claims rather than bearing out spirituality. Dewey's concept of 'the religious' is similar to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's concept of religiosity. Religiosity, according to Gandhi, is not a matter of truth but of practicing love and humanity.⁴⁶² However, neither Dewey nor Gandhi aimed to replace religion with humanity. They only prompt to restore the essence of religion, called religiosity. They seemed to revive the significance of spirituality, long neglected and faded by religious institutionalism. From this aspect, fundamentalism, to a specific range, can be viewed as a form of 'erosion of religiosity'⁴⁶³ because the fundamentalists only concentrate on religious doctrines rather than on the importance of spirituality.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁴⁶¹ *Dewey J.* *Experience and Nature*. London: George Allen & Unwin, LTD., 1929. P. 38.

⁴⁶² *Madan T. N.* *Religious Pluralism: Perspectives from Gandhi and Indian Islam*. P. 154.

⁴⁶³ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

Another top point of Dewey's experimental method in his philosophy of religion is his refusal of infallible or timeless truths. Dewey, as Hickman explains, "thought that truth claims of religious institutions could be tested, and that the effects of their various claims could be adjudicated."⁴⁶⁴ Dewey seemed to view religious truths as dynamic truths rather than relative truths. Relative truth can end in incommensurability, that truth can be valid for a person or a group of people and untrue for others, or that truth is considered incommensurable. In comparison, religious truths emanate from the dynamic cogitation upon religious experiences and must be open to a historical context through continual and constructive exegesis.

An essential contribution of Deweyan pragmatism and its experimental method to this study lies in its profound investigation of authoritative methods within fundamentalism. Pragmatism is a philosophy that stresses the relation of theory to praxis and takes the continuity of experience and nature as revealed through the outcome of directed action as the starting point for reflection. Since the reality of objects cannot be known prior to experience, truth claims can be justified only as the fulfillment of conditions that are experimentally determined, i.e., the outcome of the inquiry.⁴⁶⁵ Experimental methods underline the significance of the relationship between theory and praxis. The theory relates to religious doctrines, while praxis is to experience and their outcome for the religious people.

Rather than on 'religious truth claims,' Dewey's pragmatic religion centres on the 'fruits of religious belief' for the religious people⁴⁶⁶. What Dewey meant by religious ideas or hypotheses as raw materials is religious doctrines that their function should be correlated to the values in the empirical life of the religious people. Those ideas are tested experimentally, in the sense that they are implemented in social life by the believers. It

⁴⁶⁴ *Hickman L.* Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007 P. 194.

⁴⁶⁵ *Hickman L.* Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007 P. 194; See also: *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁶⁶ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

means religious teachings play roles as guiding principles rather than authoritative truths. Regarding religious doctrines, Deweyan's pragmatic views, as Hickman writes, stress that:

“Truth is the result of an inquiry into the materials of human experience; it does not spring from any other source. Dreams, insights, revelations, visions, and other such supposed sources of directly communicated truths are, for the Pragmatists, not so many final truths but starting places for determining what is true. They are the raw materials that must be tested, like a geologist would test a sample of ore to determine whether it contains a rare mineral. Despite their appearances, they do not carry the truth on their faces. Their truth must be established experimentally and publicly.”⁴⁶⁷

However, Deweyan's experimental methods in religious studies cannot be equated with experimental science methods. The experimental method in religious studies may be a '*reflective method*.' Let us see the comparison between the reflective method and the scientific method. Experimental or scientific methods in science aim to achieve objective truths. However, objective truth in science is not a given truth like in authoritative methods in fundamentalism.

According to Dewey, truth in science is “*truth as warranted assertability*.”⁴⁶⁸ In addition, according to William James, “truth is not otiose, but something that happens to an idea as it is constructed and reconstructed within human cognition.”⁴⁶⁹ From their experimental method, truth does not stem from outside of human cognition. Truth stems from human cognition through constructing and reconstructing ideas through trial and error. In other words, truth in the scientific method is obtained through falsification,⁴⁷⁰ like in Popperian epistemology, in the sense that the truth one holds today is not a final truth because that truth has continued to be evaluated.

Though religious truths belong to a different language and field, incomparable to scientific truths, they can be tested in a reflective method. Unlike the authoritative method, the reflective method is characterized by deep measures toward religious truths.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.* P. 194-195.

⁴⁶⁸ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.* P. 195.

⁴⁷⁰ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

The centre point of the reflective method is not on absolute or authoritative religious doctrine but on how those doctrines are tested continuously in the empirical life of the believers. Methodologically the reflective method and experimental method are the same. Though methodologically experimental and authoritative methods are incomparable, both, in the end, should serve as solutions to human existential affairs⁴⁷¹.

Unlike other methods, including those sometimes used by religious institutions, experimental methods produce results that are subject to public review and able to meet the demands of concrete, existential affairs.⁴⁷² Instead of obtaining objective truths, reflective methods aim at achieving useful religious ideas. When the experimental method is undertaken through the method of *repeatability-falsifiability-transparency-objectivity*⁴⁷³, the reflective method is undertaken through *retrospection, reflection, and projection*, construing the relevance and the contextuality of religious ideas to be able to meet and respond to existential affairs in the past, present and their projection in the future.

Sacred texts and their religious ideas cannot be objectively verified but can be contextually verified. They are not objective standards of knowledge, but they can inspire religious people's lives. Their essence is not lying in their objectivity,⁴⁷⁴ but in a way, the religious people practice their values in public affairs. Herein lies the relevance of experimental methods of pragmatism, which is that if religious beliefs have consequences, they unavoidably must be evaluated. About Dewey's viewpoint of this, Hickman writes that "the point Dewey wanted to make in all this is that the Pragmatic notion of truth-as-method can embrace a wide variety of viewpoints and activities, including religious outlooks and practices. However, the pragmatists would not just

⁴⁷¹ Ozzano L. Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁴⁷² Hickman L. Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007 P. 195.

⁴⁷³ Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibidem*.

accept any outlook or practice that claims to be religious. Religious beliefs have consequences so that they can be evaluated.”⁴⁷⁵

Hickman's metaphor of a hotel corridor would make that point clear. He points out that we would not find religious fundamentalists passing through the corridor just because they have their specific methods. The authoritative method is a final method that cannot be changed for any reason. Hickman writes that:

“The reason you would not find fundamentalists there is that the primary method of fundamentalism is not experimental. It is the method of authority. Christian, Muslim, and other forms of fundamentalism, for example, rest on appeals to direct divine revelation and textual literalism in ways that close down inquiry rather than opening it up for participation by all concerned. And if the method of authority fails to achieve its goals, what then? In the absence of experimentalism, religious and other types of fundamentalists must fall back on the application of psychological, physical, or political power rather than the application of intelligence.”⁴⁷⁶

Authoritative methods shape the attitude of fundamentalists. It leads them to an exclusionary life. They enclose themselves from other worldviews and are inclined to set a sharp boundary with outsiders not in line with their beliefs. Because they feel they have authoritative religious doctrines, they distinguish themselves from alien groups.⁴⁷⁷ This particular stance is rooted in their belief that God ontologically exists and plays a total role in controlling human beings, and God's commands written in the scriptures are absolute truths. We can no longer find any other reason why fundamentalists strictly hold the method of authority in approaching their sacred texts other than this ontological basis.

The cognitive bias of fundamentalists lies in their negation of human intelligence. If they believe God creates that man, then the task of beings is to foster all the faculties, including intelligence, given by God. Man is born to be free, not only free to believe but also free to think. Cognition is a crucial faculty that distinguishes man from any other living beings. The authoritative method within fundamentalism seems to signify fundamentalists' worldview that they perceive 'man as dolls' controlled by God.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.* P. 195-196.

⁴⁷⁶ *Hickman L.* Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007. P 196-197.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

Hickman's critique is partly reasonable in that the fundamentalists' authoritative method to maintain their religious texts denotes their falling back on the application of psychological, physical, or political power rather than the application of intelligence⁴⁷⁸. The fundamentalists' insistence on the implementation of Sharia law in the multicultural state of Indonesia, for example, is ideologically shaped by their method of approach toward religious belief, and that method is the authoritative method⁴⁷⁹. Politically, the fundamentalists, in fact, only use religion for the political interests of their leaders.

Another important locus of criticism of fundamentalism, in respect of the problem of authoritative method, is religious institutions. The question is: Besides their belief in an authoritative God, what moves the fundamentalists into compelling their sacred texts into authoritative texts?⁴⁸⁰ To address this question, let us return to Dewey's concept of religion and 'the religious.' The problem is that to strengthen their movement, fundamentalists use authoritative methods, through which they place their ideology as an authoritarian ideology which they force other groups to accept. Therefore, if a traditional method is dominantly related to religious institutional affairs, the locus of investigation of fundamentalism must be on religious institutions.

Regarding that issue, William James' assessment is noteworthy to be raised here. James emphasized the role of religious institutions and their impact on their congregation rather than on the criteria of dogmas.⁴⁸¹ The religious institution is determined by a system of the leadership of a group of religious elites who set religious doctrines and teachings. It is, in this sense, the authoritative method that can be adjudicated because

⁴⁷⁸ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁴⁷⁹ *Hood R. W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁴⁸⁰ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁴⁸¹ *Hickman L.* Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. Fordham University Press, 2007. P 197-198.

religious doctrines are human-made⁴⁸². Religion, then, is a pedagogical entity within which there are the religious leaders and the congregation, including fundamentalists.

In elite class theory, the minority class (elite or ruling class), in any group, always leads the majority class (the followers or the ruled class). Let us place this theory in a pedagogical relationship between the religious leaders and the congregation, particularly the fundamentalists. Religious leaders, at all levels, establish religious teachings for their adherents, including the clerics of fundamentalist groups. This minority class indeed determines authoritative methods in fundamentalism. Fundamentalism exists or does not exist, depending on the will of that ruling class. Concerning this class, Dewey suggests that “educators must be ready to devote their life to drive the education system into a humanistic culture.”⁴⁸³

The problem is that fundamentalism is at risk of being penetrated by demagogues who use religion and employ the authoritative method to instigate the fundamentalists for their political preferences. The clash between Fazlur Rahman and Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalist groups can be an example of how authoritative methods often turn out to be the authoritarian attitude of the fundamentalists in their politics. In his introduction to Rahman's work on *Revival and Reform in Islam*, Ebrahim Moosa describes the case, "As a person who held strong convictions and the author of provocative ideas, Fazlur Rahman was maligned and castigated by the Muslim clerical establishment, neo-revivalist political activists, and political conservatives in Pakistan...Demagogues of both religious and political stripes orchestrated mass hysteria and protests against him on the pretext that they ostensibly found some of his views and interpretations offensive.”⁴⁸⁴

Another example is from the case of Nurcholish Madjid, an Indonesian Islamic intellectual who was maligned by the fundamentalist demagogues for his progressive ideas in approaching Islamic teachings and traditions. One of his ideas which

⁴⁸² McDonough R. Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. Religious Studies. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. P. 561. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.* P. 198.

⁴⁸⁴ Rahman F. Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalism. Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2000. P. 15.

fundamentalist groups oppose, is “Open Islam: Inclusive Islam.” They presumed that Madjid attempted to insert liberalism into Islam, including liberal theology. Madjid only encouraged Islamic leaders and clerics to be open to social change. He advocated for a more inclusive interpretation of Islamic sacred teachings. The two cases show that authoritative methods within fundamentalism often lead the fundamentalists to an authoritarian attitude and turn them out to be coercive, aggressive, and even impulsive.

2. Conceptual Flaws in Fundamentalism: Critiques from the Russian Philosophy

In addition to the philosophical investigation of the major problems of religious fundamentalism from Western religious philosophy ranging from Wittgenstein,⁴⁸⁵ Kierkegaard, to Dewey, the author also employs the philosophical ideas of the three prominent Russian philosophers, such as Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolai Berdyaev, and Lev Shestov. The key concepts of their religious philosophy and metaphysics will be used to investigate the shortcomings of religious fundamentalism. The main issues within it involve the fundamentalists' epistemology and metaphysics, as well as their approach to sacred books, religious doctrines and traditions.⁴⁸⁶

To begin this section, it is necessary to identify the primary concerns of religious fundamentalism and why they must be examined through the lens of the religious philosophy of the three Russian philosophers. Apart from being a social movement with political motives, the rise of religious fundamentalism as a 'militant piety movement' is a reaction to scientism, rationalism, and positivism that seek to marginalize and overpower the function of religion in society⁴⁸⁷. Religion is considered superstition by science and hence it ranks lower than science. Because science employs experimental methods, objective reasoning, and empirical proof, it is believed to be superior than religion.

⁴⁸⁵ *McDonough R.* Religious Fundamentalism: A Conceptual Critique. *Religious Studies*. 2013. Vol. 49, No. 4. Cambridge University Press. P. 561. URL: <https://philpapers.org/s/Richard%20McDonough>.

⁴⁸⁶ *Hood R.W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁴⁸⁷ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

In response, fundamentalists in their movement set the same standards as science, including claims of absolute truth (absolutism), claims of authority and centrality of sacred texts (literalism), and ontological claim of the existence of God as the first object of human intelligence and knowledge⁴⁸⁸. Fundamentalists conceptually ended in objectivism as well, in that they use authoritative methods to defend the superiority of religion and the authority of religious doctrine. This authoritative method is founded on the 'faith argument,' which holds that God exists ontologically and serves as the only source of objective truths. Fundamentalists are prone to making 'objective reasonings' for their faith in order to retain the centrality of religion and religious teachings⁴⁸⁹. They believe that religion and sacred texts contain objective data because they believe that such texts come from God, the source of absolute truths.

To put it briefly, fundamentalism is a militant piety movement opposed to scientism. To compete with science, which is epistemologically founded on 'empirical proofs,' fundamentalists established a belief system in which 'God and divine ideas' are embraced as the 'objective parameter' for human intelligence and intellectual knowledge. This is why fundamentalism, as a militant piety movement against 'scientific objectivism,' leads to 'religious objectivism.' To provide an overview of the core problems of fundamentalism, the author leverages the key viewpoints of religious philosophy of three Russian philosophers. Rather than contending with 'scientific objectivism,' the three Russian philosophers restored religion to the realms of 'mystic, speculative, conjectural, and hypothetical'.

2.1. *The general concepts of Russian religious philosophy*

The Russian religious philosophers generally articulated identical views in that they distanced religion from scientism or from the '*scientification of religion.*' *Scientification of religion* comprises of two definitions. First, from the contemporary studies of the relationship between science and religion that has a positive tone, in which

⁴⁸⁸ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁴⁸⁹ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

religion and science are viewed from their complimentary relationship⁴⁹⁰. Science and its secular ideas are not considered to bring religion to an end.⁴⁹¹ Second, from the author's definition. In the discussions concerning religious fundamentalism, *scientification of religion* has a negative tone, in which science and religion are considered diametrically opposed. Religion is regarded as a superstition in a 'scientific and secular world', and therefore urged to become more scientific in order to survive. Sacred texts and religious doctrine can only be considered legitimate and objective, and thus relevant, if they are founded on objective reasoning.

They reverted religion to the realm of “mysticism.” In other words, the emphasis on 'mystic experience' characterizes the Russian religious philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Numerous Russian religious philosophers, including Solovyov, Florensky, Berdyaev, Bulgakov, Shestov, and others, underlined the centrality of “mystic experience” in their religious philosophy.⁴⁹² The term 'mystical experience' or 'religious experience' became important to their philosophical thoughts on religion, to their approach to sacred texts, and to their understanding of religious teachings and traditions⁴⁹³. Their religious philosophy serves as their metaphysics. The author consciously incorporates the viewpoints of the three Russian philosophers, given that their views are comparable to the religious philosophical ideas of the Western religious philosophers, particularly Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard⁴⁹⁴.

The following is the brief comparison between the three Russian religious philosophers' and the fundamentalists' concepts of religion, sacred texts and religious teachings.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹¹ *Stuckrad K.* The Scientification of Religion: An Historical Study of Discursive Change, 1800-2000. Boston/Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Inc., 2014. P. 179. (Hereinafter: *Kocku von Stuckrad*. The Scientification of Religion).

⁴⁹² *Grekov I* and *Orlenko O.* Description of Mystic Experience in Russian Religious Philosophy of the 19th-20th Centuries. SHS Web of Conferences 72, 02009 (2019) (APPSCONF-2019). P. 1. (Hereinafter: *Grekov and Orlenko*. Description of Mystic Experience in Russian Religious Philosophy).

⁴⁹³ *Hood R.W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁴⁹⁴ *Ozzano L.* Religious Fundamentalism and democracy // Politics and Religion. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

- *Regarding the essence of religion.* While fundamentalists place a greater emphasis on religious dogmas/doctrines, philosophers ground their religious perspectives on mystic or religious experience.
- *Concerning sacred texts and religious teachings.* While fundamentalists accentuate the 'objectivity' of religious dogmas, philosophers concentrate on the 'subjectivity of religious experience,' as in the idea of N.O. Losskiy.⁴⁹⁵
- *Concerning the existence of God.* While fundamentalists perceive God through an ontological approach, the Russian philosophers use a mystical approach. God is mystic in nature, according to Russian thinkers, hence its existence is hypothetical, conjectural or putative, and speculative. God is only accessible through religious or mystical experience⁴⁹⁶.
- *Concerning the 'gnostic doctrine' in Russian religious philosophy.* Religious knowledge is obtained through mystical experience. That knowledge, however, cannot be treated as accumulated information because it is irrational in nature. True knowledge about the nature of the universe and the human cannot be obtained through rational thinking, according to gnostic knowledge. It is an intuitive process that includes self-understanding and knowledge of divine reality.⁴⁹⁷
- *Regarding the 'doctrine of deification' in Russian religious philosophy.* Deification is characterized as the acquiring of a mystic experience of human union with God. The essence of this spiritual experience is the transfer of divine energy to human beings. It has several characteristics, including being difficult to express in language, short in time, and it is logically incomplete.⁴⁹⁸

2.2. *Between Russian Philosophers' mysticism and fundamentalists' dogmatism*

The disparities between the two points of view can be seen in the previous important points described above. The Russian philosophers appear to distance religion from 'dogmatism' by emphasizing the centrality of 'mystic experience' and 'gnostic doctrine' in their religious philosophy. They believe religion is mystical in nature, and religious teachings are hypothetical,⁴⁹⁹ uncertain, and presumptive. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, place a greater emphasis on "dogmatic doctrine." Fundamentalists claim that religious teachings contain objective and verifiable truths because they believe that God, whom they see as the Supreme Authoritative Being, exists ontologically, and controls human beings. Because God is regarded as the Supreme Authoritative Being,

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.* P. 2.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.* P. 3.

⁴⁹⁸ *Grekov and Orlenko.* Description of Mystic Experience in Russian Religious Philosophy. P. 4-5.

⁴⁹⁹ *Hood R. W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

fundamentalists consider religious truths as obligatory norms to which all non-religious norms must refer.

These philosophers could be classified as being ‘radical religious,’ but they are not ‘radical dogmatists.’ The endpoint of their religious existentialism appears to be to restore religion to the realm of ‘mysticism, mystery, intuition, uncertainty, and religious passion,’ rather than ‘objective or scientific reasoning.’ Through their philosophy of religion, the author will examine the fundamentalist outlook, which simplifies religion to ‘claims of dogmatic truths’ with several major drawbacks. First, consider an ontological approach to God's existence. They believe in the ontological existence of God. The second issue is religious absolutism. They believe that their sacred scriptures contain absolute truths, and hence any non-religious knowledge must be submitted to these sacred texts⁵⁰⁰. The third issue is the authoritative method. They believe that God is the only source of infallible truths. As a consequence, they regard their sacred books as authoritative texts solely because they presume those texts are directly derived from God through revelation.

Before delving into their respective philosophical ideas, it is necessary to briefly describe the key ideas of the three Russian philosophers. Their religious existentialism is essentially a ‘responsive philosophy’⁵⁰¹ to Western theoretical philosophy, and also to scientism and positivism. Nikolai Berdyaev's response, for example, demonstrates the problem. Berdyaev, in *The Destiny of Man*, attacks Western epistemology in his consideration of ‘*the problem of ethical knowledge*,’ notably the relationship between philosophy, science, and religion⁵⁰². Berdyaev states that:

“I do not intend to begin, in accordance with the German tradition, with an epistemological justification. I want to begin with an epistemological accusation, or, rather, with an accusation against epistemology. Epistemology is an expression of doubt in the power of the validity of philosophical knowledge. It implies a division which undermines the possibility of knowledge. Thinkers who devote themselves to epistemology seldom arrive at ontology...Man has lost the power of knowing real being, has lost access to reality and been reduced to studying knowledge. And, so in his pursuit of knowledge he is face throughout with knowledge and not with being...In using the term ‘being’ I am not referring to any

⁵⁰⁰ Hood R. W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵⁰¹ Ozzano L. *Religious Fundamentalism and democracy* // *Politics and Religion*. 2017. Vol. 3 №1. URL: <http://politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php/prj/article/view/226> (date of access: 12.10.2023).

⁵⁰² *Ibidem*.

particular system of ontology...All I mean is that we must turn to reality itself, to actual life, and overcome the duality which undermines the value of cognitive activity.”⁵⁰³

Like Berdyaev, Shestov's critique of science and Western theoretical philosophy, particularly their views on religion, is intriguing. His main criticism centered around the issue of the 'objectivity principle.' Science and theoretical philosophy hold that knowledge is what justifies human existence. Meanwhile, Shestov believes that knowledge must derive from human existence and all of its experiences. It is said that “for traditional philosophy and science...their assumption that knowledge justifies human existence, the existential philosophy which takes its rise from the Bible will insist that it is from man's living existence and experience that knowledge must obtain whatever justification it may have.”⁵⁰⁴ Similarly, Solovyov's emphasis on 'mysticism' in his religious philosophy demonstrates his critique of scientism, positivism, and secularism. His critique was shown in his master's thesis entitled *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (Кризис западной философии) and in his work on “*Lectures on Godmanhood*”. Through the works he expressed his opposition to the positivists.⁵⁰⁵

Their objections to the infiltration of the 'spirit of scientism' into religion, notably the 'objectivity principle,' is the key concept the author employs for this analysis. As previously pointed out, the advent of fundamentalism is a response to it. The fundamentalist dilemma is that, in opposing scientific objectivism, they establish religious dogmas as objective truths. Although they use different methodologies, both seek "objective truths." Scientists and positivists employ experimental methods. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, use authoritative methods. Fundamentalists also rely on their belief in 'religious objectivism'⁵⁰⁶ and on the 'authoritative method' in approaching religious texts and traditions. They claim that the religious teachings worded

⁵⁰³ Berdyaev N. *The Destiny of Man*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. P. 1.

⁵⁰⁴ Shestov L. *Athens and Jerusalem*. Edited and translated by Bernard Martin. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966. P. xxviii

⁵⁰⁵ Sutton J. *The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov: Toward a Reassessment*. USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. P. 19-21. (Hereinafter: Sutton J. *The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov*).

⁵⁰⁶ Hood R. W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

in their sacred books are objective truths mainly because they believe that those truths originate from God, the solitary source of all truths.

Three Russian philosophers' religious philosophy are relevant in this context, notably in critiquing epistemological and cognitive issues within religious fundamentalism. They are on the same page as Soren Kierkegaard's religious thought, which also sought to reject 'objective reasonings' in religion, because the heart of religious faith is religious passion and spirit. The “spirit is inwardness; inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity in its essential passion, at its maximum an infinitely, personally interested passion for one’s eternal happiness.”⁵⁰⁷ Similarly, Wittgenstein's religious metaphysics is equivalent to Russian philosophers' religious philosophy. According to Wittgenstein, the 'world of religion' and the 'world of science' are two different languages that belong to two different realms.

Furthermore, Dewey's efforts to restore the importance of religion in the modern world are noteworthy. Dewey underlines that the heart of religion resides on 'religious experience'⁵⁰⁸ rather than on the dogmas the religious institutions generate. He asserts that “religious experience is the ultimate basis of religion itself.”⁵⁰⁹ Dewey further adds that “the actual religious quality in the experience described is the effect produced.”⁵¹⁰ To put it succinctly, the Russian philosophers' religious philosophy sought to purge religion of that *scientification of religion*; a phenomenon in the modern world that considers religion as irrational, and hence it is regarded as the subordination of science. As a result, in order to remain relevant in modern culture, religion should, if not must, be scientific.⁵¹¹

In the context of religious fundamentalism, *scientification of religion* is defined as a circumstance in which fundamentalists believe that religion and its religious ideas,

⁵⁰⁷ Kierkegaard S. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs. Edited and translated by Alastair Hannay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. P. 29.

⁵⁰⁸ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵⁰⁹ Dewey J. A Common Faith. USA: Yale University Press, 1934. P. 10.

⁵¹⁰ Dewey J. A Common Faith. P. 14.

⁵¹¹ Stuckrad K. The Scientification of Religion. P. vii.

doctrines, or dogmas consist of objective truths that can be established scientifically⁵¹². The 'spirit of scientism' has a huge influence on absolutism and on the authoritative method within fundamentalism. To maintain religion's significance, fundamentalists claim that their 'religious ideas' are 'objective truths' and that their objectivity can be proven. This issue will be investigated using the key philosophic concepts of 'mysticism and religious experience' by three Russian philosophers. With a greater emphasis on 'mysticism and religious experience', they strive to return religion to its 'realm of mystery'. Like Kierkegaard's emphasis on 'objective improbability', the Russian philosopher's emphasis on 'mysticism and religious experience' aims at maintaining the 'intangibility' of religious faith⁵¹³. Their primary ideas will be applied to evaluate fundamentalism in the sections that follow.

1. Examining fundamentalism through Vladimir Solovyov's religious philosophy

Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyov's (Russian: Владимир Сергеевич Соловьёв) philosophy has been said to have influenced Nikolai Berdyaev's philosophic thoughts.⁵¹⁴ In this section the author will use Solovyov's religious philosophical concepts in criticizing the epistemological flaws of religious fundamentalism. In the preface to the book about Solovyov's religious philosophy, Jonathan Sutton alludes to the great challenges global inhabitants face after the philosopher's death, one of which is religious fundamentalism, which makes Solovyov's works seen more relevant. The manifestation of it is the systematic imposition of militant ideology⁵¹⁵. Sutton cites Solovyov's desire to promote a more tolerant faith and religious attitude toward other (religious) people.⁵¹⁶

The author uses it as a starting point from which to investigate religious fundamentalism through Solovyov's religious philosophy. We may start from the major premises of his religious philosophy. (1) Faith cannot be replaced by reason or science.

⁵¹² Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵¹³ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹⁴ Sutton J. *The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov: Toward a Reassessment*. USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. P. viii.

⁵¹⁵ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid*. P. x.

(2) God's existence cannot be proven ontologically. (3) The existence of God can only be proven through a leap of faith. (4) The content of divine principles is given only in religious experience. (5) Religious experiences are not a completed knowledge of divine objects. (6) Love is ontological principle. These premises are applied as evaluative ideas toward absolutism, literalism, religious ontologism, and authoritarianism within religious fundamentalism. The author will only present several key premises as follows.

First, faith cannot be replaced by reason or science. ⁵¹⁷ This premise implies that religious faith is not scientific knowledge. It does not require 'objective reasoning.' As a religious existentialist, Solovyov opposed the incorporation of rationalism, positivism, and empiricism's 'objectivity principles' into religion. Solovyov's religious metaphysics is his philosophy of religion. ⁵¹⁸ For many scholars, Solovyov's metaphysics was comparable to Soren Kierkegaard's religious philosophy. The centre of the two philosophers' metaphysics is God. Like Kierkegaard, Solovyov, shown in his work of *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (*Кризис западной философии*), devotes his "criticism of the extreme forms of empiricism and rationalism."⁵¹⁹ Both Solovyov and Kierkegaard perceive that religious faith does not require 'empirical evidence' because it is uncertain and conjectural in nature.

This premise implies that religious beliefs should not be considered scientific knowledge. Religious belief and teachings do not necessitate 'objective reasoning.' In the author's opinion, this premise could be considered to be a critique of fundamentalism. Fundamentalists are prone to asserting that religious ideas and teachings are 'objective truths'⁵²⁰ simply because they believe those ideas have their roots in God. This is a way of maintaining religion, faith, religious teachings, and traditions central in the secular world⁵²¹.

⁵¹⁷ Grillaert N. What the God-seekers found in Nietzsche: The Reception of Nietzsche's *Übermensch* by the Philosophers of the Russian Religious Renaissance. Amsterdam – New York: 2008. P. 86.

⁵¹⁸ Kojève A. The Religious Metaphysics of Vladimir Solovyov. Translated by Ilya Merlin and Mikhail Pozdniakov. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. P. 18.

⁵¹⁹ Sutton J. The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov. P. 44.

⁵²⁰ Hood R.W. Jr. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵²¹ *Ibidem*.

Fundamentalism is, to a certain extent, a militant religious movement in which fundamentalists strive to set up an objective foundation for their religious beliefs. To safeguard religion from scientism's marginalization while concurrently contending with 'scientific objectivism,' fundamentalists strive to establish an objective foundation for their beliefs⁵²². In other words, just as science is founded on 'scientific objectivity of knowledge,' fundamentalists seek an 'objective foundation' for their faith. In simple terms, one of the epistemological concerns within fundamentalism that may be evaluated by this premise is that fundamentalists are prone to setting up their sacred books as texts containing "objective historical truths." In other words, they strive to categorize religion and religious beliefs as scientific knowledge. As a result, they establish religious ideas as objective truths that must be defended by whatever means, including coercion.

Second, the existence of God can only be proven through a leap of faith, not through ontological proof. This premise has vital significance in addressing fundamentalists' ontological approach to God's existence. It is the foundation of fundamentalist absolutism and authoritarianism⁵²³. Fundamentalists believe that God exists, and Its existence can be proven ontologically. They believe that God revealed Itself and delivered Its sacred words to humanity through revelations. Given that God exists and has revealed Itself through revelations, sacred texts are deemed to contain objective, absolute, and infallible truths. As a result, religious principles and values triumph over non-religious norms. This is the root cause of absolutism and authoritarianism within fundamentalism.

On the existence of God, Solovyov perceived that God's existence can only be proven through a leap of faith.⁵²⁴ However, the existence of God is understood differently than the 'visible objects' observed by science. The existence of God, according to Solovyov, can only be grasped through 'mystical experience'.⁵²⁵ Mystical or religious

⁵²² *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁵²³ *Hood R.W. Jr.* The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵²⁴ *Kojève A.* The Religious Metaphysics of Vladimir Solovyov. P. 18.

⁵²⁵ *Ibidem.*

experiences are not regarded as ‘objective data containing objective truths’⁵²⁶, but rather as ‘isolated data’ concerning divine objects. These data do not constitute “complete knowledge of divine objects.”⁵²⁷ Solovyov appears to reaffirm the prevalent position of religious existentialists, one of whom he frequently cites as Kierkegaard's, that the existence of God is mysterious and hidden. Human observation is unable to determine its existence. God’s existence can only be ‘sensed and experienced’ through ‘mystical experiences.’

However, these mystical or religious experiences are only ‘isolated data’ that cannot be deemed ‘complete knowledge’⁵²⁸ concerning the existence of divine objects, let alone ‘objective truths.’ Only through the lens of religious perspective can Solovyov's perspective on God be properly comprehended. His standpoint is parallel to Wittgenstein's, in that God and its existence, religious ideas and doctrines belong to a different language and a different realm than scientific language. Solovyov disagrees with the ontological approach by emphasizing the idea that the existence of God can only be proven by a ‘leap of faith’ and mystical intuitions.⁵²⁹ Solovyev perceives that it is possible to know God but only if God wills to reveal to a person through revelation. Man is not able to get the knowledge about God without divine will.⁵³⁰

Absolutism, literalism, and authoritarianism within fundamentalism are predicated on the ontological approach of God, which is deemed to be a source of all ‘truths’. Instead of opposing ‘scientific objectivism,’ fundamentalists seek to base their religious faith on ‘religious objectivism’ through ‘*religious ontologism*,’ in the sense that they establish God as a ‘definite parameter’ for any truths and values. Similarly, dogmatism within fundamentalism appears to be a dismissal of faith's ‘mystical trait’ and ‘uncertainty.’ According to Kierkegaard, religious faith should be grounded on ‘objective

⁵²⁶ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵²⁷ Kojève A. *The Religious Metaphysics of Vladimir Solovyov*. P. 18.

⁵²⁸ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* // *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.* P. 19.

⁵³⁰ Grekov and Orlenko. *Description of Mystic Experience in Russian Religious Philosophy*. P. 3.

improbability', not 'objective probability.' Kierkegaard maintained in his 'passion argument' that religion is the highest passion in man. That passion is driven not by the 'principle of certainty,' but by 'uncertainty,' in the sense that what keeps man in religious faith is the never-ending search for a Divine Being. Solovyov's greater emphasis on 'mysticism' appears to underpin his theological viewpoint that religious experience is the only way to grasp God. Thus, religion or religious faith is a spiritual matter involving 'mystical experience' rather than 'dogmas.'

The content of divine principles, according to Solovyov, is given only in religious experience or mystical experience. It is said that "the content of divine principles...is given only in experience. That God *is*, we believe, but *what* He is, we experience [*испытываем*] and learn."⁵³¹ It implies that the substance of religion and faith resides in 'religious experience' rather than religious dogmas/doctrines. Solovyov is opposed to dogmatism or doctrinism' since it tends to shackle faith. He perceives that "the tendency of dogmatism to first shackle and then abuse faith."⁵³² Solovyov criticized dogmatism in religions. Dogmatism, according to him, is coercive. His critique addressed dogmatic disputes between Eastern and Western churches which undermine religious freedom. Solovyov believed that to achieve a peaceful life and common good, 'a noncoercive Christian ethic' must be realized.⁵³³

Solovyov, unlike fundamentalists, does not regard 'religious experience' as complete knowledge of divine objects. Man could never possibly understand the entirety of the Divine Being. Religious experience is merely a means to human understanding of God, the Transcendental Being. We may ask: what is the significance of religious dogmas or doctrines? Could they be called a system of knowledge about divine objects? For Solovyov, "such knowledge is achieved only through the organization of religious knowledge into a complete and logically coherent system. Therefore, in addition to

⁵³¹ *Kojève A.* The Religious Metaphysics of Vladimir Solovyov. P. 18.

⁵³² *Wozniuk V.* (editor and translator). Freedom, Faith, and Dogma: Essay by V.S. Soloviev on Christianity and Judaism. USA: State University of New York Press, 2008. P. 2. (Hereinafter: *Wozniuk V.* Freedom, Faith, and Dogma).

⁵³³ *Ibid.* P.3

religious faith and religious experience, there is also a need for a religious thought, the result of which is a philosophy of religion.”⁵³⁴

Solovyov appears to argue that mystical experience lies at the centre of religious faith and has nothing to do with religious truth claims. Religious experience can develop a system of religious knowledge. However, this knowledge is a human knowledge of Divine objects that should not be treated as absolute truths. That knowledge is not complete knowledge of God's existence. As a result, sacred texts and the religious teachings contained within them are nothing more than collections and compilations of religious and mystical experiences organized by a system of religious knowledge distinct from the system of scientific knowledge.

Third, Solovyov's concept of 'Godmanhood' and the ontology of love.⁵³⁵

Solovyov also incorporates his metaphysics of love into his religious philosophy. He begins by referring to Schopenhauer's concept of 'will to life' and Nietzsche's concept of 'will to power'. According to Soloviev, will to power is “merely a corollary of self-love”, and therefore “the solution is not the substitution of ‘will to power’ with ‘will to love’, but rather the rejection of ‘will’ as the true ground of human agency and its replacement by ‘love’ itself as ontological principle.” It is said that “If Nietzsche and Dostoevsky begin with the same ontological premise of a fundamental will as the dynamic source of substantive existence, Solovyov posits a similar dynamism in love.”⁵³⁶

In his 'ontology of love', he believes that only through 'love' can humans transcend themselves, from 'human' to 'superhuman.' It is said that “the idea that humanity should strive toward its own self-transcendence: the human should become superhuman. Yet notice Soloviev's careful use of words: he talks not of an extraordinary effort of will but of the 'conditions' in which the human condition is transcended.”⁵³⁷ This ontology of love also becomes a critical idea in Solovyov's religious philosophy toward the severe dualism of Deism and Pantheism. Solovyov's notion of 'Godmanhood (*Богочеловек*)'

⁵³⁴ Kojève A. *The Religious Metaphysics of Vladimir Solovyov*. P. 18.

⁵³⁵ Smith O. *Vladimir Soloviev and the Spiritualization of Matter*. Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018. P. 173.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid* P. 174-175.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid* P. 176.

accentuates his religious metaphysics of the unity of the human and divine dimensions in man.⁵³⁸ It is said that “Solovyov juxtaposes the viewpoints of Deism and Pantheism and criticises both of these as one-sided and deficient accounts of the nature of God. The Deists stress the transcendent aspect of God, and their account fully excludes God's immanence in the created world; the Pantheists perceive God's immanence in the world but deny His transcendent aspect. The Deist and the Pantheist views are, then, mutually exclusive, each valuable in what they perceive about the nature of God but misleading in their exclusive affirmation of what they have perceived.”⁵³⁹

Solovyov's metaphysics of love and his criticism of Deism and Pantheism can be used to criticize fundamentalists who perceive that God is a Supreme Authoritative Being that controls human beings merely because they believe man is a creation living apart from and under the rule of God. God, viewed as the Creator, is defined as an entirely different entity from humans, Its creation. God is seen as the authoritative source for all non-religious norms, doctrines, and value systems. Solovyov's concept of ‘*Godmanhood*’ can be a ‘middle way’ between Deism and Pantheism. In the context of fundamentalists’ absolutism, this concept appears to accommodate both the ‘revelatory’ and the ‘historical’ dimension of faith and religious teachings. The primary issue of absolutism within fundamentalism is that fundamentalists regard their religious teachings solely as divine commands, since they believe that those teachings are created and directly given by God to humanity through revelation. As a result, they believe that religious commands are authoritative norms that triumph over all non-religious norms. In other words, Solovyov's concept of ‘*Godmanhood*’ offers a more accommodating approach to the historical-anthropological process as well as the revelatory-transcendental process of religious teachings.

⁵³⁸ Kojève A. *The Religious Metaphysics of Vladimir Solovyov*. P. 4.

⁵³⁹ Sutton J. *The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov*. P. 42-43.

2. *Examining Fundamentalism through Nikolai Berdyaev's religious philosophy.*⁵⁴⁰

Berdyaev's religious philosophy and metaphysics are additionally intriguing for this analysis of religious fundamentalism. Berdyaev, like Solovyov, opposed the intrusion of positivism into religion. His religious worldview places a heavy emphasis on “mystical experience” or “religious experience.” Berdyaev, like Wittgenstein, regards ‘religious knowledge’ as a distinct knowledge that cannot be equated or compared to ‘scientific knowledge.’ Furthermore, like Kierkegaard, Berdyaev objects to ‘objective reasoning’ into religion. His religious point of view is intriguing because of his objections to religious epistemology. He begins his work of *The Destiny of Man* by saying that the book is an ‘epistemological accusation or an accusation against epistemology’.

While praising Bergson, M. Scheler and Heidegger who are little concerned with epistemology, Berdyaev stressed that “epistemology is an expression of doubt in the power of and the validity of philosophical knowledge. Man has lost the power of knowing real being, has lost access to reality, and been reduced to studying knowledge. And so, in his pursuit of knowledge he is face throughout with knowledge and not with being”.⁵⁴¹ ‘Being’, according to Berdyaev, is not referring to any particular system of ontology, but “turning to reality itself, to actual life, and overcome the duality which undermines the value of cognitive activity.”⁵⁴² The key premises of his religious philosophy will be used for examining fundamentalism as the following.

First, God is the infinite mystery. According to Berdyaev, God, as an object of faith, cannot be known. Humans cannot have a complete knowledge of It. He even believes that human life, in all its complexities, is a mystery. Berdyaev underlines “The whole meaning, importance and value of life are determined by the mystery behind it, by an infinity which cannot be rationalized but can only be expressed in myths and symbols. God is the infinite mystery that underlies existence...We come to God not because rational thought demands His existence but because the world is founded by a mystery in

⁵⁴⁰ Berdyaev N. *The Destiny of Man*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. P.1

⁵⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁴² *Ibidem*.

which rational thought end.”⁵⁴³ Furthermore, Berdyaev views that "God is not being in the sense of substance.”⁵⁴⁴

According to the author's understanding, because God's existence is not understood in the sense of a substance, God can only be grasped and sensed through 'existential experience,' a subjective experience that cannot be objectively explained. That experience is a mystical or religious experience. The ontological claim of fundamentalists to the existence of God can be criticized from this premise. They claim that God exists ontologically and that It is the Supreme Authoritative Being who creates and watches over the lives of Its creation, as well as the source of truths. God speaks and sends down orders through revelations. Because God's existence is perceived to be 'a Being in substance' that directly communicates with humans through revelations, fundamentalists implicitly claim to know God in the sense of a substance, and they also claim that their sacred texts perceived to be originated from God contain absolute truths.

Second, religious belief is a matter of ‘creationism’, not ‘dogmatism’. This idea can be observed in Berdyaev's ‘ethics of creativeness’⁵⁴⁵ and his concept of ‘creative theology’.⁵⁴⁶ His theology of creativity is concerned with the creative values of religious belief rather than with dogmas of salvation or perdition. Berdyaev underlines that “Creative genius is not concerned with salvation or perdition...Creative activity always involves sacrifice. It means self-transcendence, overstepping the confines of one’s own limited personal being. A creator forgets about salvation; he is concerned with values that are above man.”⁵⁴⁷

Berdyaev appears to be demonstrating that religious ethics is beyond being concerned with the concepts or ideas of ‘salvation, punishment, or perdition,’ as portrayed in religious teachings. Religious ethics, on the other hand, is more concerned with man's

⁵⁴³ Berdyaev N. The Destiny of Man. P. 24.

⁵⁴⁴ Tsonchev T. Person and Communion: The Political Theology of Nikolai Berdyaev. Published: June 2021; www.themontrealreview.com. Montreal, 2021. This book has been composed in Sitka Display. P. 140. Date modified: 31/08/2023: 3:08 AM.

⁵⁴⁵ Berdyaev N. The Destiny of Man. P. 126.

⁵⁴⁶ Hughes RA. Nikolai Berdyaev’s Theology of Creativity. International Journal of Orthodox Theology 7:2 (2016): P. 119-141.

⁵⁴⁷ Berdyaev N. The Destiny of Man. P. 130.

“creative action” in his or her position as the “image of God.” Man is God's co-creator in creating a better world through religious values. To put it another way, Berdyaev's creative theology is more concerned with creative action than with religious truths, dogmas, or doctrines. The notion underlying it can be found in his comparison between “a religion of creativity” and “a religion of salvation.” According to Berdyaev, Richard Hughes writes, “a religion of salvation is a self-centered faith that worships on Sundays, prays on Feast Days.” He adds that “A religion of creativity seeks deification based upon the incarnation and is consummated in the coming age of the Holy Spirit.”⁵⁴⁸

We can use Berdyaev's concept of 'theology of creativity' to oppose 'dogmatism' within fundamentalism. According to the author, dogmatism is closely related to 'religious normativism' in a restricted meaning. In the context of fundamentalist dogmatism, religious normativism is defined as the designation of one's actions and outcomes as good, desirable, or permissible, and others as bad, undesirable, or impermissible by religious dogmas or doctrine generated by religious institutions. It implies that religious dogmas or doctrine are elevated to the centre of religious faith, rather than mystical or transcendental experience.

The problem with fundamentalism is that one's religiosity is mainly measured by religious dogmas established by religious institutions. In addition, one's religiosity is measured by ritualism, which includes worship, prayer, and other religious ceremonies. The fundamentalists place an excessive emphasis on religious rites or ceremonies. In other words, the fundamentalists prioritize 'religious ritualism', rather than 'religious experience.' In this context, religious ritualism is defined as religious behavior characterized by excessive adherence to norms set by religious institutions, which leads fundamentalists to place a heavy emphasis on doctrines rather than religious or mystical experience that enables them to transcend themselves to be a better religious believer.

The essence of religion is not determined by religious truth claims. According to Berdyaev “the aim of every creative act is to create another type of being, another kind

⁵⁴⁸ Hughes RA. Nikolai Berdyaev's Theology of Creativity. P. 119.

of life, to break out through ‘this world’ to another world, out of the chaotic, cumbersome and deformed world into the free and beautiful cosmos.”⁵⁴⁹ Berdyaev critiques fundamentalists' emphasis on dogmatism rather than spirituality. He seeks to restore the essence of religion to ‘religious experiences’ and ‘creative activities,’ in which man is considered as a free God's co-creator in the world in the creation of goodness. Man is not a being who is bound or imprisoned by doctrines he has created.

Third, religious dogmas are irrational. The nature of religious ideas and teachings is irrational, and therefore they are not determined by reason or logic, but by the inner sense and faith.⁵⁵⁰ Berdyaev, like Kierkegaard and Solovyov, opposes objective reasoning in religious faith. God as Truth, according to Berdyaev, remains unknown. It is spiritual and hidden.⁵⁵¹ Religious beliefs and religious teachings are not about ‘objective truths’ since God, as Truth, is unknowable, spiritual, and hidden. In Berdyaev's notion, ‘God as Truth’ with the capital letter ‘T’ is interpreted spiritually, in the sense that ‘Truth’ does not mean ‘authority, coercion, and power’ as ‘truth’ with the small letter ‘t’ in science. Truth in science is characterized by the ‘objectivity principle,’ which makes it authoritative and coercive. Truth in religion is characterized by the ‘subjectivity principle,’ and hence the emphasis is on ‘spiritual experience’ and ‘meaning for me personally.’ Berdyaev perceives that “we cannot understand the Gospel, the revelation and truth, except in the light of our spiritual experiences.”⁵⁵²

According to Berdyaev, religious revelations do not need to be regarded as knowledge, nor do they count as truths. These revelations, on the other hand, have the potential to enrich knowledge. Berdyaev underlines that “Revelation cannot force upon philosophy any theories or ideal constructions, but it may give it facts and experiences which enrich knowledges...Religious revelations means that being reveals itself to the knower”⁵⁵³ Berdyaev appears to place religious belief in a ‘grey area,’ in the sense that revelation should not be treated as the foundation for any religious truth claims. Religious

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.* P. 122.

⁵⁵⁰ *Tsonchev T.* Person and Communion. P. 132.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.* P. 134.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.* P. 134-135.

⁵⁵³ *Berdyaev N.* The Destiny of Man. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. P. 4.

revelation should not be viewed as a process in which the Divine Being reveals the 'religious truths' or 'religious ideas'⁵⁵⁴. Revelation is an event in which the Divine Being exposes Itself to humans in a way that can only be understood spiritually.

Berdyaev's emphasis on the irrationality of religious revelations could imply his conviction that the sacred texts and the religious ideas contained therein do not require 'objectivity, proof or evidence'. Therefore, we cannot establish these revelations as the foundation for religious truth claims. The following interpretation of Berdyaev's ideas on religious revelations is pertinent to present here. It is said that:

“The revelation is a "Divine-Human process," the meeting of two natures, “which are inwardly allied to one another." It is a "free spiritual act," where the search for proofs is unnecessary. When the spirit of man meets the Spirit of God, man does not need proof that he has met Him. Why? Because the spirit of man is from the Spirit of God, and the two are in agreement. There is no antithesis in the Spirit. There is unity, *sobornost* that rests on absolute, undeterred agreement. This is a fellowship devoid of all coercion, legalism, domination, argument, and division. In other words, it is a "freedom unconstrained by the outward and objective.”⁵⁵⁵

This interpretation appears to emphasize that a religious revelation is a mystical encounter between humanity and the Supreme Being, rather than a revealing or transferring of religious truths from God to humans. It is said that in that revelation there is a fellowship devoid of any coercion, legalism and argument. This can also be found in Berdyaev's assessment of Dostoyevsky's views. He states that “Dostoyevsky, inspired by the Scriptures, exerts all his strength in order to break away from the power of knowledge. Like Kierkegaard, he desperately struggles against speculative truth and the human dialectic that reduces ‘revelation’ to knowledge.”⁵⁵⁶

In short, it can be said that Berdyaev refuses to equate 'religious ideas' with 'objective truths'. The dilemma within fundamentalism is that the fundamentalists regard 'religious teachings' as objective truths revealed through revelation. They see religious revelation as an event in which God reveals Its commands and teachings to humans

⁵⁵⁴ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder // Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2023. URL: <https://www.degruyter.com/443/document/doi/10.1525/9780520929753-001/pdf>.

⁵⁵⁵ *Tsonchev T.* Person and Communion. P. 135.

⁵⁵⁶ *Berdyaev N.* The Destiny of Man. P. 22.

through the prophets, rather than as a mystical encounter. Berdyaev makes more sense, according to the author, when he defines revelation as a mystical or religious experience that does not require 'objective evidence,' and thus he perceives religious ideas to be irrational in nature⁵⁵⁷. Berdyaev states that “God does not create ‘world order,’ God rather creates ‘persons’ that are an image and likeness of Him. And man is ‘confronted not by abstract truth, but by the Truth, as the way and the life.’”⁵⁵⁸ However, that Truth is not in the sense of ‘objective truth’ as in science.

3. Examining religious fundamentalism through Lev Shestov’s religious philosophy.

Shestov's religious philosophy, like Kierkegaard's, also intended to contend with the infiltration of scientism, rationalism, and positivism into religion.⁵⁵⁹ Shestov’s rebellion against rationalism and scientism “was a clearing of the way for his bold and fervent affirmation...of the truth of the biblical message. Only a reappropriation of the faith of Scripture could, Shestov came to believe, liberate contemporary humanity from the horrors of existence.”⁵⁶⁰ He was a religious radical who believed in the 'truths' of the Holy Bible. However, he believes that the truths of the Holy Bible cannot be equated with those of science or theoretical and rationalist philosophy. Shestov’s existentialism philosophy was to criticize scientism and philosophic rationalism.⁵⁶¹ Shestov, like Kierkegaard, was a passionate opponent of rationalism and totalism. And, like Levinas, he "shares the desire to escape ontology" and is an ardent defender of "individual relations with God."⁵⁶² In short, Shestov categorically rejects the use of logic in religious faith.⁵⁶³

⁵⁵⁷ Hood R.W. Jr. *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* // Guilford Publications official website. 2023. URL: <https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/hood.pdf?t=1> (date of access: 12.11.2023).

⁵⁵⁸ Tsonchev T. *Person and Communion*. P. 143.

⁵⁵⁹ Shestov L. *Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy*. USA: Ohio University Press, 1969. P. 282

⁵⁶⁰ Shestov L. *Athens and Jerusalem*. P. iv.

⁵⁶¹ Shestov L. *Athens and Jerusalem*. P. iii.

⁵⁶² Mclachlan J. Translation of Levinas’s Review of Lev Shestov’s *Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy*. *Levinas Studies*, Vol. 11 (2016), pp. 237-244.

⁵⁶³ Evans C.S. *Kierkegaard and the Limits of Reason: Can There Be a Responsible Fideism?* *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*. T. 64, Fasc. 2/4, *Horizontes Existenciários da Filosofia / Søren Kierkegaard and Philosophy Today* (Apr. - Dec., 2008), pp. 1021-1035.

In the following paragraphs, the author will present numerous key concepts from Shestov that can be utilized to challenge fundamentalism.

First, the essence of faith is mystical experience, not religious dogmas. Shestov's religious philosophy underlines that the realm of religious faith is mystical. Religious ideas, teachings or doctrine do not necessarily require objective parameters. Faith is a matter of personal relationship with God, the object of faith. Faith cannot be understood by logic or objective reasoning. This premise has derivative meaning, one of which is that faith is not about 'truth', but about 'meaning'. Truth, according to Shestov, is coercive even in cruel ways. Meanwhile, 'meaning' is not, because it concerns the 'value for me', which does not require objective assessment.

Shestov demonstrate the fundamental difference between '*God as an object of faith*' and '*God as an object of human knowledge*' by paraphrasing and recognizing Kierkegaard's ideas on the distinction between 'God' and 'knowledge of God'. Shestov stresses that “God, Kierkegaard has told us, never coerces, but knowledge, with its truths, clearly does not resemble God and has wish to; it coerces, it is maintained only by coercion, and the grossest, most repellent coercion at that...”⁵⁶⁴ The essence of religious faith, according to Shestov, is 'personal encounter' with God, the Transcendental Being. Faith is neither a matter of 'knowledge of God' nor 'knowledge of faith'.

He also appears to articulate his religious epistemology by rephrasing Kierkegaard's conviction that "God never coerces, but knowledge does." He may perceive that religious ideas originate from 'human knowledge of God' produced by religious institutions. Religious ideas evolve into dogmas after religious institutions establish them. The problem is that these religious institutions enforce objectivity requirements on these dogmas, and hence they are coercive as scientific truths are. In this regard, Shestov cited Nietzsche's viewpoint of the coercive trait of religious truth claims. Nietzsche talked “of the ‘great pain’ which ‘truth’ uses to humble man, and of how truth cuts its way into us like a knife.”⁵⁶⁵ Shestov also cited Kierkegaard's views, which confronted "how truth

⁵⁶⁴ Shestov L. Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy. P. 279.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibidem*.

seized power over God" as a result of the utilization of objective reasoning in religious truth claims. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, considered reason as a "monstrous device."⁵⁶⁶

Shestov, like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, rejected objective claims to religious teachings. Religious truth claims are akin to the act of "seizing power over God." In other words, Shestov opposes dogmatism in religion since it is coercive and a matter of power. As a religious existentialist, Shestov placed a large emphasis on 'religious experience' or 'mystical experience' as the essence of religious faith. Religious experience, he claimed, is personal because it involves the relationship between a religious individual and "the Transcendental Being." In other words, the realms of religion and faith are not scientific. It does not necessitate objective reasoning. What is wrong with fundamentalism is that, by 'dogmatization of religious doctrines,' fundamentalists drag religion into the realm of objective science. This is the root cause of fundamentalists' coercive mentality, as they place great importance on religious dogmas or doctrine and defend them at any cost. Religion or faith is a personal relationship and mystical experience between man and the Transcendental Being that does not necessitate verification or objective evidence.

Second, truths are not created by God, hence God cannot be equated with truth.⁵⁶⁷ God, according to Shestov, can and must be placed above the truths. In addition, he stressed that God can be sought and found in our world⁵⁶⁸ through mystical encounter. Shestov reviewed Leibniz's viewpoint on God and ideal truths in the topic "*God and Coercive Truth.*"⁵⁶⁹ He wrote that:

"Even the devout Leibniz, who always spoke in the name of Christianity, was thoroughly convinced that *les verites eternelles sont dans Ventendement de Dieu independamment de sa volonte*⁵⁷⁰...It seemed to Leibniz that only a pagan... could take for granted the existence of matter which is uncreated and independent of God. But to place ideal truths side by side with and above God, to assume that ideal truths are not created, but eternal, means to "exalt" God, to glorify Him, to do Him honor. True, he himself admits that all evil in the world arose because uncreated truths, heedless of the will of God, worked their way into His mind—and one would think that this must have troubled him. But not at all: his entire *Theodicee*, i.e.,

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.* P. 280-281.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.* P. 283.

⁵⁶⁸ *Shestov L.* Athens and Jerusalem. P. Iv.

⁵⁶⁹ *Shestov L.* Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy. P. 277.

⁵⁷⁰ The phrase is translated as: "The eternal truths are in the mind of God independently of His will".

his “justification of God,” is based on the idea that God has no power to overcome truths which He did not create.”⁵⁷¹

Shestov seems to underline that God cannot be associated with 'truth' by challenging Leibniz's notion of religious truths. Similarly, religious faith is not based on truth. He cited Leibniz's own conviction that ‘all evil in the world arose because uncreated truth’. The author uses this assertion to criticize fundamentalists who prioritize religious dogmas or doctrines and over religious experience. The problem with fundamentalism is when fundamentalists disregard the importance of mystical experience and personal relationship with God, the object of faith, and concentrate only on defending the religious teachings at all costs.

Shestov's key claim is that God cannot be equated with truth. Religious institutions generate religious truths. Their character is one of coercion. God, according to him, cannot be expressed or understood using conceptions of truth. Shestov underlined that “...theoretical philosophy..., Its main concern is to preserve truth – and what happens to man and God is none of its affair. Or worse still: the very essence of theoretical philosophy lies in its absolute rejection of the idea that the power of truth is in any sense limited.”⁵⁷² The main flaw in fundamentalism that can be addressed in light of this premise is that fundamentalists believe God is the source of truth. For them, Revelation is the event of God sending down His commands to humans, which are regarded to be absolute truths. As a result, they perceive what is written in the sacred texts as absolute truths.

Third, the Biblical revelation devoid of support either from logical argument or scientific knowledge.⁵⁷³ Shestov asserted that “...to find God, one must tear oneself away from the seductions of reason, with all its physical and moral constraints, and go to another source of truth,”⁵⁷⁴ Does Shestov negate reasoning altogether in religion? For Shestov, there are two types of truths; 'truth of science or logic and personal or subjective

⁵⁷¹ Shestov L. Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy. P. 282.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.* P. 282-283.

⁵⁷³ Shestov L. Athens and Jerusalem. P. xxix.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.* P. xxxi.

truths.' Scientific truths require and can be verified with a scientific approach. Meanwhile, personal or subjective truths, especially regarding 'the biblical affirmations concerning God and human freedom',⁵⁷⁵ cannot be verified. This does not mean that reason is not important. According to Shestov, "Reason and its by product, scientific method, have their proper use and their rightful place in obtaining knowledge concerning empirical phenomena, but they cannot and must not be allowed to determine the directions of man's metaphysical quest or to decide on the ultimate issues - issues such as the reality of God, human freedom and immortality."⁵⁷⁶

Fourth, Shestovian God is 'Deus absconditus'. According to Shestov, "It is impossible to prove the existence of God."⁵⁷⁷ It implies that God cannot be equated with anything. Shestov disagreed with philosophers who perceived God as both 'material' and 'ideal principles.' As has been mentioned, he also criticized the juxtaposition of God and truth or ideal truths set by a system of knowledge. According to Shestov, such an understanding has both 'restraining' and 'coercive' attributes. In *Athens and Jerusalem*, he contended about the pretensions of the possession of truth that human reason or speculative philosophy makes. According to Shestov, knowledge is not the goal of man, but being with all kinds of experience. Man's being with all of his/her experiences is from which the justifications obtain. In other words, knowledge does not justify being.⁵⁷⁸

This implicitly underlines that the equation of God with truth or ideal principles is only a product of human speculative knowledge. That doesn't explain the existence of God at all. This means that the religious truths produced by human knowledge do not represent what or who God is. Thus, human knowledge about God cannot prove anything about Its existence. It only introduces 'truths' according to the standards of the knowledge system, and those standards are restraining and coercive. He asserts that "The constraining truths of knowledge subdue and persuade men, while the free truth of revelation, which has not and does not seek any "sufficient reason," irritates men, just as

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.* P. xxxvi-xxxvii

⁵⁷⁶ *Shestov L. Athens and Jerusalem.* P. xxv.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.* P. liii.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.* P. lxviii.

experience irritates them.”⁵⁷⁹ Shestov’s view of God is different from the God of Spinoza, Kant or Hegel. He stresses that “We would speak, as did Pascal, of the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, and not of the God of the philosophers. The God of the philosophers, whether He be conceived as a material or ideal principle, carries with Him the triumph of constraint, of brutal force.”⁵⁸⁰

The author discovers that Shestov seeks to underline his radical metaphysical idea that God cannot be used as 'objective criteria' for a system of religious truth constructed by man. We can find this in the thesis of the position of God in his religious philosophy. He said that “The God of the Bible is not to be found as the conclusion of a syllogism. His existence cannot be proved by rational argument or inferred from historical evidence. “One cannot demonstrate God. One cannot seek Him in history. God is 'caprice' incarnate, who rejects all guarantees. He is outside history.”⁵⁸¹ He even believes that even if all humans are convinced that God does not exist or if one demonstrates that God does not exist, all of this has no importance. Such variables, according to Shestov, do not determine God's existence or human faith in him. God is *'Deus obsconditus'*; the hidden One, who does not demand proof and does not require people to be sure or not sure of it.⁵⁸²

The main argument from this assumption that can be used to challenge fundamentalism is the concept of “faith that liberates, not constrains”. ‘Faith that constraining’ derives from the glorification of ‘dogmas’ rather than ‘religious experience’ or ‘mystical experience.’ Shestov's religious existential philosophy, according to the author, strives to liberate religion from ‘truth claims’ and return it to the realm of ‘mysticism’ He stressed that existential philosophy “must be a continuous and agonizing struggle against constraint, against the immoderate pretensions of the logically self-evident, against the deliverances of common consciousness.”⁵⁸³ After all, faith should

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.* P. lxvii.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.* P. xxxii.

⁵⁸¹ *Shestov L.* Athens and Jerusalem. P. xxxiii.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.* P. xxxiii.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.* P. xxxviii.

not be restrained by 'moral constraints'. Faith is not determined by 'good-bad' boundaries established by institutions of religion.

In other words, the quality of religious belief does not need to be standardized by dogmas. Shestov underlines that “faith...results in the liberation of man not only from all physical compulsion but also from moral constraint. In faith man...moves “beyond good and evil.”⁵⁸⁴ Fundamentalists' coercive traits could originate from their understanding of faith, which prioritizes 'moral boundaries' set forth by religious institutions. Fundamentalists' claims to religious truth have their foundation in their perspective on religion and religious teachings. They claim that moral ideals established by religious institutions are 'absolute truths' that must be safeguarded and defended at all costs. This derives from their conviction that God, as the object of faith, is seen as 'the Truth,' and hence Its commands, which they believe are given through revelation, contain 'absolute truths' to which every norm must conform.

3. Fundamentalism as Religious and Epistemological Bias

This segment demonstrates fundamentalists' behavioural bias. Investigating the misconduct or misbehaviour that fundamentalists inherit and commit in the public domain is an excellent way to gauge their qualities. Their religious cognition should also be judged by their behaviour in society because their behaviour is the manifestation of what they have in mind. It implies that their theological worldview should be examined from a consequentialist perspective, in the sense that their social behaviour is an important basis for judging what they have in mind.

This section demonstrates Deweyan pragmatism and psychological behaviorism's approach to fundamentalism as religious behavioral bias (RBB). According to this perspective, fundamentalists' social behavior is a continuation or representation of what and how they think. For example, in the Deweyan pragmatist view of religion, deeds are viewed as the fruits of faith. Fundamentalism is evaluated in this way by behaviorism. However, it is important to note that the scope of this topic is limited to Indonesian

⁵⁸⁴ *Shestov L.* Athens and Jerusalem. P. xliii

fundamentalism, even though it may be applicable to fundamentalism abroad. Several fundamentalist issues, including as extremism and sectarianism, will be discussed in the following sections.

4.1. *Fundamentalism and Its Adjacency to Extremism*

One of the central issues of fundamentalism, at least in the Indonesian context, is its adjacency to extremism. Related to the issue, we should recall Tibi's conviction, saying that "...fundamentalists are far more dangerous as ideologues of power than as extremists who kill, cut throats, and throw bombs."⁵⁸⁵ Tibi believes that fundamentalists are more dangerous than extremists. Why is this so? Fundamentalists are ideologues who fabricate radical ideas. Fundamentalist leaders play a critical role in forming or fashioning the paradigm of their followers. To answer the topic of why fundamentalists rigidly adhere to and defend their religious views at any costs, one must look at the crucial role of fundamentalist leaders who incite their followers, whether for religious or political reasons. Fundamentalism coincides with extremism, in this perspective.

To further comprehend this, consider the following examination of stochastic terrorism. In *Stochastic Terrorism: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis*, Molly Amman and Reid Meloy assert that terrorism is dominantly stirred up by a certain worldview that encourages the extremist fundamentalists to be terrorists. Etymologically, stochastic comes from the Greek word, *stochasticos* (στοχαστικός), which means unknowable not random. In English, *stochastic* means: randomly determined; has a random probability pattern that can be analysed statistically but cannot be predicted precisely.⁵⁸⁶

The following is an overview of stochastic terrorism (hereafter: ST) and of how it relates to fundamentalism. ST is understood from its three determining features. *First*, ST is closely related to incitement by demagogues to someone or groups of people who are easily fooled and incited. That incitement is usually an ideological incitement built on the

⁵⁸⁵ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1998. p. xxvii.

⁵⁸⁶ Amman M., Meloy R.J. *Stochastic Terrorism: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis; Perspectives on Terrorism*. In *Terrorism Research Initiative*, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 2021. P. 2-13.

sentiment of identity. It is conducted through the process of demonizing someone else or other groups to justify violent acts of the doers. *Second*, ST is a random act of violence by extremists, driven by political incitement. *Third*, ST is a particular act of terrorism that cannot be predicted accurately but it can be analysed statistically. In short, it can be said that ST is a terror action against a demonized individual or group of people by the incited terrorist actors.

ST, as Molly and Reid explain, is “defined as the incitement of a violent act through public demonization of a group or individual...by random extremists, triggered by political demagoguery...its pattern cannot be predicted precisely but can be analysed statistically...In other words, a specific act against the demonized person or group cannot be forecast, but the probability of an act occurring has increased due to the rhetoric of a public figure.”⁵⁸⁷ Demonization has several meanings. First, it is a process to portray (someone or something) as evil or as worthy of contempt or blame,⁵⁸⁸ or try to make someone or a group of people seem as if they are evil. For example, the Nazis used racist propaganda in an attempt to demonize the Jews.⁵⁸⁹

It is also possible to define demonization as the act of not just describing but also labelling someone or a group of people as the devil, and hence deserving of being humiliated, blamed, and even destroyed. Let us examine the relationship between fundamentalism and extremism through the lens of ST. Fundamentalists, particularly fundamentalist demagogues, play an important role in the fabrication of extremist ideas for extremists. This role is so important that, at times, extremism and fundamentalism cannot be comprehended independently.

In terms of their position as political demagogues, fundamentalists frequently stir their supporters with extremist views in their political movements. The ultimate recipients of their agitations can randomly turn out to be extremists. In many cases, particularly in an Indonesian context, their extremist thoughts often support the existing extremist


⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid* P. 3.

⁵⁸⁸ Demonize // Merriam-Webster dictionary. 2022. URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/demonize> (дата обращения: 12.04.2023).

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibidem*.

groups. These fundamentalist demagogues are not necessarily acquainted with extremists. However, their thoughts and incitement are often taken for granted as supportive ideas by extremist groups. The table below illustrates the point.

Table 2. Table of transferring process of fundamentalist and extremist ideas



There are four cases from Indonesia that can be used to understand the nexus between fundamentalism and extremism. *First*, the case of Ali Imron. Imron was a Bali bomber in 2002. What drove him to be a terrorist? His admission that instigators and extremist ideologues played a role in his violent activities reveals a link between fundamentalism and extremism. Imron admitted that he and the gang dare to be terrorists because he was taught that groups they are fighting are heretics or perverts and that modern systems are incompatible with their beliefs. He also admitted that they were taught to kill the outsiders they considered infidels.⁵⁹⁰ Whether or not his violent activity is politically motivated, there is a cognitive underpinning that pushes him to act in this manner. We must not overlook the role of an extremist idea that drives him to disrespect humanity.

The second case is that of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the spiritual leader of JI (Jamaah Islamiyah: Islamic Congregation). Though he denied any involvement with the group, Indonesian security services and intelligence identified numerous indicators of his involvement, and Ba'asyir served as the group's spiritual leader. His incitements had a

⁵⁹⁰ Interviewed by *TVNU Televisi Nahdlatul Ulama*: Nahdlatul Ulama Television in 2020, with the description: "Ali Imron is a person who has been involved in the Bali Bombings. He participated in the campaign of deradicalization led by NU.

significant impact and influence on the organization.⁵⁹¹ JI is an Indonesian extremist and militant group that is affiliated with al-Qaeda, a transnational terrorist group.⁵⁹²

Ba'asyir was sentenced to prison after being found guilty of his involvement in the JI terrorist network. Though he did not personally participate in terrorist acts, Ba'asyir had a critical ideological role in delivering extremist doctrine to his followers. He was the group's instigator. Ba'asyir was well-known for his unwavering opposition to any ideology or governing system other than Islam. For him, Islam must serve as the foundation of the state constitution. He fully adheres to the *Hakimiyyah* system. His role as an ideologue and motivator in JI charged him with being the mastermind of a series of terrorist acts.

Third, consider the instance of Munarman, one of the top leaders appointed as general secretary of the FPI (Front Pembela Islam: Front of Islamic Defender). FPI was one of the Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Though FPI was not known as a terrorist organization, some of its members were involved in terrorist activities. Munarman was a member of LBHI (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*: Indonesian Legal Aid Institute) before joining FPI. His political ties to Rizieq Shihab, the FPI's chief leader, represented his transition into a religious fundamentalist. Rizieq is well-known for his role as a fundamentalist cleric. Munarman was detained for his involvement in the activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a transnational terrorist organization.⁵⁹³

Fourth, the involvement of 19 FPI members in terrorist acts. They joined and became active in JAD's (*Jamaah Ansharut Daulah*) terror operations. JAD is an Indonesian extremist and terrorist group linked with ISIS. These FPI members were also charged as a result of their allegiance to ISIS. This instance demonstrates an essential

⁵⁹¹ Singh J. The Emir of Katibah Nusantara: BahrumSyah, in *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, Vol. 8, No. 11. Published by International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. November 2016. P. 4.

⁵⁹² Bilveer Singh. *The Revival of Al Qaeda's Affiliate in Southeast Asia: the Jamaah Islamiyah*. In *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* Vol. 9, No. 5. Published by International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. May 2017. P. 5-8.

⁵⁹³ Munarman was arrested for allegedly being involved in the act of allegiance at UIN (*Universitas Islam Negeri Jakarta*: State Islamic University of Jakarta), Medan and Makassar. He is also said to have played an important role in establishing the JAD (*Jamaah Ansharut Daulah*), an extremist terrorist group that is affiliated to ISIS, and also ISIS networks in Indonesia. Munarman was arrested by *Densus-88 Anti-Teror* (Special Anti-Terror Detachment of Indonesian Police) in 2021.

point: while fundamentalism is not always associated with extremism, its connection to extremism should not be overlooked. The link between fundamentalism and extremism is frequently obvious, as demonstrated by the four examples above.

From the four cases, extremism and fundamentalism are difficult to distinguish. Extremism is like the 'rotten fruits' of extremist ideas. Fundamentalists act as ideologues, leading their followers to extremism. Extreme ideologies or beliefs are generated from a superficial interpretation of religious dogmas, which they then employ for political and transcendental purposes. Fundamentalists take religion for granted in their political activity, and they advocate for their religious ideas to be an 'obligatory alternative' to replace the present system they consider ungodly.

To attain their political and transcendental goals, fundamentalists first attempt to modify their members' paradigms by introducing their exclusive ideology while denouncing any alien ideologies they consider incompatible with it. The next step is to develop a strategy for differentiation, in which they distinguish themselves from outsiders. They regard themselves to be the devout and the faithful group, while the outsiders are the perverted ones. Their goal is not simply to transform the system, but also to convert those groups they consider to be perverted or infidel. Their movement is often carried out in two ways: violent deeds and a lifestyle. Indonesian fundamentalism combines these two approaches; fundamentalists want to achieve their goals through coercive and violent means, while simultaneously attempting to modify the current system through their social lifestyle.

The adjacency between fundamentalism and extremism also can be found in their organizational characteristics. Both fundamentalist and extremist groups are mostly characterized by the total obedience of their adherents to a charismatic cleric, as shown in FPI, JI, HTI, JAD, and other fundamentalist extremist groups in Indonesia. Their leaders spread radical views that inspire their followers to use violence. Their radical ideologies frequently support existing terrorists. Based on Ali Imron's confession, we can conclude that a terrorist can be viewed as a victim of fundamentalist demagoguery. They spread their aggressive rhetoric against outsiders through political agitation.

The common pattern of the adjacency between fundamentalism and extremism is simple; incite first, then do violence. The leaders of the fundamentalist groups play a role as providers of extremist ideologies or doctrines. We may take an example from Imron's case, who acknowledged the huge role of extremist ideologues. He realized that their instigation emboldened him to become a terrorist. He said that: "In fifth grade of elementary school I became undaunted. I fearlessly removed and took down the pictures of the president-vice president from our classroom, because I was taught that the elected leaders in a democracy are *taqut* (Arabic, *thaghut*: perverted). Democracy is *taqut*. The Western system is *kafir* (infidel)." ⁵⁹⁴

Imron persuaded the audience that what motivated him to be a fearless terrorist was the religious belief instilled in him by the instigators. In the instance of Imron, fundamentalists served as the source of radical ideas that drove a person or a group of individuals to courageously commit violence against someone or other groups they regarded as *kafir* or *taqut*. Fundamentalists spread their radical ideas through a psychopolitical process in which fundamentalists incite their adherents to violence against the vilified targeted groups.

This process of propagating or transferring hostile speech should be observed from a psychological standpoint. Molly and Reid divide it into two steps. ⁵⁹⁵ *First*, the recipients, who are not in the same psychological state as the message creators, absorb the hostile rhetoric of their fundamentalist instigators with anger. Even though they do not know each other, the recipients frequently replicate the emotional condition of their instigators. To retain their authority and power, fundamentalist instigators purposefully instil fear in their followers. The instigators foster hostile feelings in their followers while also encouraging them to hate the out-groups. This procedure is repeated several times. When their followers reach a psychological tipping point of rage, these instigators easily push them to perpetrate violence against the demonized targeted groups. Public

⁵⁹⁴ His testimony was expressed in an interview with *TVNU Televisi Nahdlatul Ulama*: Nahdlatul Ulama Television in 2020, with the description: "Ali Imron is a person who has been involved in the Bali Bombings." He participated in the campaign of deradicalization led by NU.

⁵⁹⁵ Amman M., Meloy R.J. Stochastic Terrorism: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis; Perspectives on Terrorism. In *Terrorism Research Initiative*, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 2021. P. 3-4.

campaigns, mass rallies or demonstrations, and aggressive sermons are used to broadcast their hostile rhetoric.

Second, they use mass media to disseminate their propaganda. The media function as loudspeakers to make their voices heard. The importance of the mass media is huge along the process of demonizing out-groups. This process leads to verbal and physical attacks on the vilified groups. Verbal attack takes the form of an accusation directed at certain groups, with the end result that those specific groups are seen as devils. This process aims at elevating sentiments and hatred to the targeted groups. Psychologically, once the recipients of that hostile rhetoric reach the critical level of anger, they can easily launch a physical attack on the targeted groups. Interestingly, after the attack occurred, the fundamentalists instigators pretended to condemn the violence and declared their position as a pro-law group, and denied the violence to be related to them.

A linguistic approach provides another key indication of the nexus between fundamentalism and extremism. In *linguistic pragmatics*, Molly and Reid identify the importance of a ‘language game’ in ST.⁵⁹⁶ As ideologues, the fundamentalists produce extremist ideas to be disseminated as massively as possible. They employ the ‘*threat-fear-solution*’ concept in their public communication. Molly and Reid take an example from the strategy of ISIS. ISIS continuously blames the West as *anti-Islam* (threat), and that the West attempt to annihilate Islam-Muslim (fear), therefore the whole *Muslims all over the world are obligated to exterminate the Westerns* (solution). Indonesian fundamentalist groups use the same method in their public speech. They regard democracy an anti-Islam system (*threat*) and tend to erode the Islamic values (*fear*), and therefore that system must be replaced by a caliphate system (*solution*).

4.2. *Fundamentalism and Its Adjacency to Sectarianism and Intolerance*

Fundamentalism has a distinctive vision that shapes its political trait. Because fundamentalists base their politics on religious beliefs, their politics are bound to become sectarian. Sectarianism is essentially a political attitude defined by animosity and

⁵⁹⁶ Amman M., Meloy R.J. Stochastic Terrorism: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis; Perspectives on Terrorism. In Terrorism Research Initiative, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 2021. P. 4-5.

discrimination toward other groups and it is an excessive loyalty to a specific sect or party, especially to religion. Strong religious and sectarian commitment is a common indicator of sectarianism, and the politics of this ideology are typically regressive, obsessive, uncritical, anti-dialogue, discriminatory, hostile, and wrathful against outsiders. Separating people based on their religious identification is another political tendency of sectarianism.

In Indonesian politics, sectarianism is commonly undertaken by fundamentalist groups. Their goal is not only to obtain political power, but also to promote their transcendental ends, which is to replace the existing system with their religious system. What I mean by sectarian politics is a politics that is defined by a deep-seated conflict between two religious groups and whose political behaviour is founded on prejudice, discrimination, and hatred. In the Indonesian setting, sectarian politics are primarily referred to as politics of identity. Identity politics in the context of fundamentalism refers to the New Social Movement (NSM) and an identity-based movement.⁵⁹⁷ Politics of identity is defined as "politics in which members of a particular gender, religion, race, social background, social class, or other identifying factors develop political agendas that are based upon these identities." The use of religious identification in the fundamentalists' sectarian politics is more common than other factors.

When one group tries to rule over another, sectarianism results. The fundamentalist organizations in Indonesia are well known for their sectarian politics. Fundamentalists in Indonesia share coercive and aggressive political traits in common. To convert out-groups to their political viewpoint is typically what they do. They typically employ two strategies. First, they exterminate other groups that aren't like them. Second, they force the outgroups to adhere to their beliefs. Regarding this, S. N. Eisenstadt could be right in saying that fundamentalism shares characteristics with the Jacobin Club, a left-wing political movement during the French Revolution, that the fundamentalists aspire to transform the current system through a revolutionary movement.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁷ Mary Bernstein. *Identity Politics*. In *Annual Review of Sociology*. Annual Reviews, 2005. P. 49-55.

⁵⁹⁸ S. N. Eisenstadt is Rose Isaacs Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

However, their movement, according to Eisenstadt, is similar to that of the right-wing political movement, which is authoritarian and conservative by nature. Fundamentalism is founded on religious ideology that is, by nature, authoritative. Eisenstadt, however, does not downplay the transcendental aspect of fundamentalism, which distinctly characterizes its particular stance in the realm of religious politics.⁵⁹⁹ Eisenstadt appears to stress that basing politics on religious doctrines only leads to sectarianism.

Eisenstadt's view seems to challenge Tibi's view which totally rejects the connection between fundamentalism and religion. Tibi views fundamentalism, particularly Islamic fundamentalism, as purely a political movement. He adamantly maintains that the faith of Islam has nothing to do with (Islamic) fundamentalism. Fundamentalism in Islam is what he refers to as "Islamism," or political Islam. For Tibi, Islamism is not the same as Islam. Tibi states that "Islamic fundamentalism – Islamism – should not be equated with Islam, but it would be an eyewash to deny the fact that political Islam is a major stream within contemporary Islamic civilization. Overlooking this fact is not only misleading, but also results in two opposed extremes: either one fully decouples Islamism from Islam in all terms or one identifies fundamentalism with Islam and ends up spreading Islamophobia."⁶⁰⁰

Islam, according to Tibi, is a great tolerant faith, while Islamism is as a militant ideology.⁶⁰¹ Tibi seems to underline that neither Islam nor the Koran include any erroneous doctrines, such as intolerance, anti-pluralism, or any other negative characteristics. Similar to other holy texts, the Koran primarily upholds humanitarian principles and values. Their interpretation of the sacred scriptures distinguishes fundamentalists from more moderate religious people. If moderates and fundamentalists share the same holy text but differ in how they conceptualize and behave, showing that the former are tolerant and the latter are intolerant, then there must be a difference in how

⁵⁹⁹ Eisenstadt S. N. *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999. P. 2.

⁶⁰⁰ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. P. ix.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid* P. xiv.

they interpret their respective texts that causes them to adopt different approaches and behaviours.

However, if the issue is the difference in interpretations between the moderate and the fundamentalist, we cannot dismiss fundamentalism's religious visions. In this context, Eisenstadt's point of view, in which he accepts the transcendental visions in fundamentalism, is significantly more acceptable. He sees that the fundamentalist political movement is aggressive and coercive precisely because they are spirited by transcendental visions. This means that fundamentalism cannot be viewed solely through a political lens but also through a religious lens. Their rigid adherence to their sacred scriptures shapes the way they behave in politics. It is possible to say that their political actions are dictated by their religious goals.

Eisenstadt asserts that “fundamentalist movements do not constitute...an eruption of traditional or traditionalistic “pre-modern” forces which were repressed...by modern regimes and by the cultural program of modernity, nor are they simply cases of reactionary anti-modern movements. Rather, it is here contended that modern fundamentalist movements constitute a distinctive form of modern political movement, namely a special type that demonstrates strong Jacobin tendencies.”⁶⁰²

It appears suitable to place Eisenstadt's perspective on the Indonesian fundamentalist groups, for instance, HTI and FPI. Their political actions cannot be reduced to only a reactionary movement against contemporary systems they view as irreligious, such as democracy. Their movement comprises a transcendental vision, according to which they hold a religious system in their hands to replace democracy, which they view as a failing system. They perceive that the caliphate system is the answer to democracy's shortcomings. Their motivations are more complex than just being a political movement with the sole objective of gaining power. Additionally, we cannot merely assert that the caliphate system they advocate is a tool for gaining political influence. Their movement is also motivated by a particular conviction that is imbued

⁶⁰² Eisenstadt S. N. *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999. P. 2.

with a transcendental vision or religious goals; specifically, they hold that the failure of the worldly order of democracy requires the replacement of that system with a "divine order" of caliphate rule.

Even if this is mere rhetoric, we can't rule out the fact that what drives them to act this way is their belief. Unlike Tibi, Eisenstadt's viewpoint accommodates both internal and external factors for the emergence of fundamentalism. Tibi only admits the external factors that give rise to fundamentalism, that is, political factors. The issue here is that neither Tibi nor Eisenstadt allude to the importance of exegesis. I take an example from Christian fundamentalism in America. Both American Christian fundamentalists and the moderates hold the same Bible, but they have different interpretations of it.

If it is said that Islamic fundamentalism as political Islam or Islamism is totally disjunct from Islam as a religion, then we cannot simply say that political Islam is completely unrelated to Islam as a religion. In the same words, they also apply to any kinds of fundamentalism in other religions. What makes sense is that in every religion there are two types of believers; the moderates and the fundamentalists. It is important to place these two categories only because it determines our understanding of the types of religious fundamentalists. The moderates have an open worldview only because they construe their sacred texts in a dialectical way. While the fundamentalists have a closed worldview only because they construe their sacred texts in an authoritative way.

The differences between the moderates and the fundamentalists lie in the way they treat their holy book, and also in their hermeneutics upon it. If their discrepancy is only in their interpretation, then the fundamentalists cannot be viewed merely as politicians who use religion for political ends. In respect of sectarianism, we cannot simply say that the fundamentalists make use of religion and its sacred texts only as method, means and strategy to obtain political power. We cannot think little of transcendental elements in their movement that shape their political attitude and their social conduct.

Regarding this, there is an example from Indonesia, which is the case of HTI. Politically, HTI's movement aims at establishing an Islamic state of Indonesia that is constitutionally based on Islamic law. In the case of HTI, if it is said that its movement is

totally political and has nothing to do with religious objectives at all, then what drives its members zealously standing and defending religious doctrines at all cost? Isn't it possible that, after seizing political power, they will also attempt to establish their religious doctrines as obligatory public laws? In the case of Indonesian fundamentalist groups, fundamentalism cannot be viewed only as a political movement, but also as a religious movement with transcendental ends.

Eisenstadt may be true when he claims that fundamentalism is a political movement that seeks not just political power in and of itself, but also religious purposes, even though it ultimately leads to utopianism. Additionally, they think that this planet is the scene of a cosmic battle between the transcendental order and the mundane order. This conflict is what they refer to as the "transcendental order vs. mundane order conflict." This can be found in early imperial China, ancient Greece, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and subsequently in Islam. It is also seen in ancient Israel, Judaism, and Christianity.⁶⁰³

It is assumed that the urge to reinstate the mundane order, which fundamentalists may view as failing or undesirable, is what gave rise to the idea of transcendental order. Eisenstadt furtherly writes that:

“The development and institutionalization of such conceptions of a basic tension between the transcendental and the mundane order entailed the perception of the given mundane order as incomplete, inferior – oftentimes as evil or polluted, and as in need of reconstruction. Such reconstruction was to be affected according to the basic transcendental ontological conceptions prevalent in these societies; especially according to the conception of bridging the chasm between the transcendental and the mundane orders, according to the precepts of a higher ethical or metaphysical order or vision.”⁶⁰⁴

Eisenstadt appears to be arguing that religious fundamentalism is neither solely a political movement nor just an extreme instance of politicizing religion. It is not entirely devoid of religious motivations, given that it is a political movement. Fundamentalists believe that mundane order is undesirable and must be changed or even completely replaced by transcendental order. The notion that transcendental order has a greater ethical or metaphysical vision than mundane order underlies fundamentalism politically. He stresses that “these civilizations to attempts to reconstruct the mundane

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.* P. 3-4.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.* P. 4.

world, from the human personality to the socio-political and economic order, according to the appropriate transcendental vision, to the principles of the higher ontological or ethical order.”⁶⁰⁵

Modern fundamentalism, whether it be Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Buddha, or any other, is unquestionably motivated by transcendental vision. For instance, Indonesian fundamentalism is characterized by the fundamentalists' conviction that their religion and sacred scriptures offer a greater ethical and metaphysical perspective than the worldly order, such as democracy or other socio-political structures. Fundamentalists view divine order as a superior ethical order that ought to take the place of the mundane order, which they view as bad.

It is said that “these fundamentalists are united in a key sense: they pursue what they unwaveringly believe to be an altruistic, morally mandated cause, guided by an ostensibly "irreducible" faith in a higher power.”⁶⁰⁶ We cannot separate the two key reasons that contributed to the growth of religious fundamentalism as a reactionary movement against contemporary systems and as a religious movement that used politics to advance its transcendental goals. HTI's movement in Indonesia, for instance, cannot be seen as just a political response to democracy or against other contemporary systems they regard to be “westernized systems,” but is also strongly influenced by their conviction in their Islamic transcendental vision.

Related to this, Tibi could be mistaken in saying that “religious fundamentalism—as a political phenomenon not restricted to the World of Islam—is an aggressive politicization of religion undertaken in the pursuit of nonreligious ends”.⁶⁰⁷ As examples, let's look at the Taliban movement or any of the other radical, fundamentalist organizations. How can we determine whether their movement is just a political one that is aggressive and lacking in any spiritual or transcendental vision? The fact that after

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁶⁰⁶ *Lim M.* The Sanity of Faith: What Religious Fundamentalism Teaches About the Insanity Defense and the First Amendment. In *New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal*. Vol. 17, No. 2. University of California Press, Spring 2014. P. 254.

⁶⁰⁷ *Tibi B.* *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. P. xxv.

gaining political control, the Taliban leadership impose Sharia law as the nation's compulsory regulation.

Similarly, the NII movement (*Negara Islam Indonesia*: Indonesian Islamic State) in Indonesia employed religious ideas as its political ideology. The NII group's political goal was not simply to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. However, ideologically, its movement advocated for Sharia law to be implemented as the state constitution. Fundamentalism, as it relates to the NII movement, should not be seen solely as an aggressive political movement that employs religion for nonreligious purposes. Fundamentalism, on the other hand, is an aggressive religious movement that uses politics to further its religious goals.

In addition, it is true that fundamentalism cannot be equated with extremism, but its harmfulness lies in its sectarian politics. Tibi might be right saying that “fundamentalism, Islamic or otherwise, is only superficially a form of terrorism or extremism.” He adds that we “do not-and should not-use the terms *usuliyya* / fundamentalism and *tatarruf* / extremism interchangeably.”⁶⁰⁸ However, completely separating fundamentalism from extremism is also wrong. The fact that fundamentalism is not equivalent to extremism does not imply that fundamentalism is harmless. Fundamentalists engage in sectarian politics in the social domain because they believe that the religious vision and ideals, they espouse, are the aims of politics for which they strive. Fundamentalists believe that religious values must be translated into political action. In this regard, Tibi may be correct in claiming that the danger of fundamentalism rests in its infiltration into legal systems and state constitutions.

Tibi takes up the issue of Nasr Hamid Abu-Zaid, an Egyptian university professor and Muslim scholar who was accused of apostasy by Islamic fundamentalist groups because of academic papers considered derogatory to Islam. Tibi defended Nasr Hamid's academic position, which urges Muslims to learn how to distinguish between religion and human interpretation of religion, and also advocates religion as dialectical with scientific

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

knowledge.⁶⁰⁹ Tibi employs this story to demonstrate the primary dangers of fundamentalism. He claims that, while fundamentalism cannot be compared with extremism or terrorism, it is more noxious than terrorism. Why? Fundamentalism has broader consequences. Take a look at Tibi's account of the situation. Tibi describes that:

“For this seemingly innocuous statement the Cairo professor must pay dearly: he has been declared a *murtad* / apostate by Islamic fundamentalists who, in this case, were not terrorists. Among them, in fact, were distinguished lawyers who went to court to divorce Abu-Zaid from his wife Younes against the will of both, on grounds that he had been shown to be a heretic. The Cairo judges endorsed the plea of the fundamentalist lawyers, for according to the sharia / Islamic law, a Muslim woman cannot be married to an "apostate."⁶¹⁰ (In an interview with German weekly *Der Spiegel*, the professor, as quoted by Tibi, says that) “the strength of the Islamic fundamentalists lies not in their pursuit of terrorism and bloodshed. They can bring this country nearer to [the] abyss through their infiltration of the legal system and the state. These attempts are much more dangerous than the slayings and use of explosives. In fact, the Egyptian government has been able to contain fundamentalist terrorism.... I advise the president [of Egypt] to push forward the intellectual battle (against the fundamentalists) Their power in the schools and universities is already disastrous.”⁶¹¹

Fundamentalism, for Tibi, is more harmful only because it is like “a *Weltanschauung*, or worldview, that seeks to establish its own order, and thus to separate the peoples of Islamic civilization from the rest of humanity while claiming for their worldview a universal standing.”⁶¹² Fundamentalists have a distinct order, which they call transcendental order. They see that order as superior to all others because they believe it descended and was revealed from God as the supreme authority. As a result, in public, they tend to draw a clear line between themselves and other groups. They consider themselves to be the virtuous, while outsiders are the evil.

To some extent, fundamentalists are anti-diversity and anti-social. They distinguish people into two groups: *kafir* (infidels) and *beriman* (believers). In Indonesia, their political traits are similar to those of a 'prophetic politics,' which seeks to abolish any existing modern system that they consider impious and replace it with their

⁶⁰⁹ Tibi B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. P. xxvi.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.* P. xxvi.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.* P. xxvi-xxvii.

⁶¹² *Ibid.* P. xxvii.

transcendental order. Their politics are similar to what Armstrong refers to as the fundamentalists "cosmic war" against mundane order. Tibi believes that Islamic fundamentalists seek to replace the secular order of the body politic with a divine order, known as *hakimiyyat Allah* (Divine order). Tibi, on the other hand, contends that divine order is inapplicable. He regards it as just a rhetoric because they will be unable to carry it out, instead of causing widespread chaos.⁶¹³

That chaos stems from their authoritarian position, since they are likely to coerce outsiders to obey what they think is the correct order. This claim stems from their conviction that the Divine order is an absolute order, owing to the fact that they think that order originated with God. They appear to fall into a logical error, because the Divine order has never been established and carried out by God, other than by man.

It is the human being's responsibility as the executor to make that order actual and factual, and man's judgments and choices determine whether this order succeeds or fails. Fundamentalism, as a political movement, should primarily act as an emendation to the existing system that is acceptable to all parties. Because the transcendental order is exclusive by nature, it enlarges the social contention only because it ignores the existence of other groups. That transcendental order, which by definition excludes other groups, will never be a solution; it will only create difficulties.

Though the fundamentalists are successful in acquiring political power and enforcing their divine order, another issue arises when the fundamentalists must push other groups to obey the system they desire. It simply contributes to societal fragmentation. Fundamentalists divide people into groups depending on their religious beliefs. Their politics are divisive, with them seeing themselves as the good and righteous, and the out-group as the wicked. One of their characteristics is that they are anti-secular. Tibi writes that "Islamic civilization has its own views, along with a claim to universality...Political Islam is both a claim and a duty to rally Islamic civilization against the West while also contesting the Western institution of the nation-state."⁶¹⁴

⁶¹³ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹⁴ *Tibi B. The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. P. 7.*

Fundamentalists regard the Western institution of the nation-state system as *hulul mustawrada* (imported solutions). They strive to delegitimize it. They use the inadequacies of the Western system and using them to justify their goal of replacing it, one of which is democracy, with the system they prefer. Tibi discovers that fundamentalists utilize the failures of democracy in encouraging economic growth and establishing good institutions to justify their goal of delegitimizing the nation-state system. As an alternative to the order of the nation-state, they preach *nizam Islami* (Islamic order).⁶¹⁵

Aside from the fact that the *nizam Islami* is inapplicable in a pluralistic state, their alternative system is likewise not a viable option. Any system is dependent on the quality of its ruling elites. Tibi is sceptical that they will be able to achieve their goal. On the contrary, he claims that "even while they are dismissing the nation-state as an expression of a Western understanding of order that is alien to Islam, and in its place seeking their own authentic order."⁶¹⁶ It appears that their endeavour to replace secular order with supernatural order does not provide better results, but rather creates disorder. Fundamentalists are unable to offer a better system to replace the current one. Fundamentalists' ideals are utopian.

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.* P. 7-8.

⁶¹⁶ *Tibi B.* The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. P. 8.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study is to analyze the socio-philosophical aspect of Indonesian religious and political fundamentalism. The author's research was founded on the hypothesis that fundamentalism can be categorized into religiously motivated fundamentalism and politically motivated fundamentalism, exhibiting distinct goals and objectives in society. Furthermore, the author posited that fundamentalism, in general, has the capacity to manifest as either a peaceful phenomenon or a radicalized one, contingent upon the internal motivations of its proponents.

The author equates these forms of fundamentalism in terms of their impact on public safety, as it suggested that both options can give rise to violence among fundamentalist movements. It is also important to note the extreme closeness of these two ways to each other, since religious fundamentalism is often inseparable from the political goals of its movements, and similarly, from a political movement of this type it is impossible to remove the religious basis, which, as a dogmatic foundation, accompanying any political and ideological derivative.

The author also sees a research problem, identified in the works of predecessors, which consisted in the one-dimensional approach to fundamentalism within the framework of religious or philosophical discourse. Due to this particular issue, the author proposes that the field of fundamentalism studies should consider embracing a novel approach in interpreting fundamentalism, namely the psychopolitical approach.

For Indonesian society, this problem is especially important today, since there is a widespread politicization of religious discourse in the country, as well as the fact that religious rhetoric is often increasingly found in the statements of major politicians, which has also a significant philosophical and ideological impact on the perception of fundamentalism in society.

The distinctiveness and singularity of the Indonesian fundamentalism framework also stems from the fact that the Indonesian statehood has cultivated indigenous ethnocultural and philosophical concepts of worldview, which continue to underpin the Indonesian society's way of life.

The sociocultural characteristics of Indonesian society are based on the historical dominance of a complex syncretic philosophical tradition capable of adapting borrowed value elements. The contemporary political culture of Indonesia is also characterized by the preservation of such social attitudes as hierarchy, collectivism, religiosity and religious tolerance. Traditional worldview and ideological concepts have a significant influence on the modern development of Indonesian society conceptual framework.

The following conclusions have been drawn from the study's findings.

The author conducted a detailed examination of fundamentalism in its historical and hermeneutical transformation. The problem itself was examined in four main sections: the origin of fundamentalism, existing definitions and characteristics, as well as the interpretation of fundamentalism proposed by the author. The examination concludes that fundamentalism is problematic both conceptually and empirically. The diverse range of perspectives surrounding this issue at the conceptual level, encompassing historical, definitional, and movement-related characteristics, exemplify the manifold elements or circumstances from which it emerges within human civilization.

Likewise, the different traits and goals of fundamentalist groups empirically reveal the forces that drive them. However, one of the distinctive elements of this movement that sets it apart from other social movements is that it is ideologically inspired by religious ideas and goals.

The thesis also identifies the main features and definition of fundamentalism according to outstanding Indonesian scholars in this field and shows the transformation and dynamics of the religious fundamentalism development as a social phenomenon since the mid-20th century.

The author also examined in detail the origins of fundamentalist groups, their characteristics and their distribution in Indonesian society. Indonesian fundamentalism has been shown to demonstrate the validity of the author's psychopolitical approach to the topic, showing the interconnection of religious and political goals. The author identified three primary distinguishing characteristics of Indonesian fundamentalism: the politicization of religion (the utilization of religion for political purposes), the religiosity of politics (the utilization of politics or political parties for religious purposes), and the

strong association between fundamentalist groups and extremist and terrorist groups. These fundamentalists employ various methods, including physical force and political violence, to accomplish their objectives.

The author, also, based on research objectives, makes an attempt at a philosophical understanding of Indonesian fundamentalism. He observes the reasons for the growth of the fundamentalist sentiments in Indonesia regarding the growth of fundamentalist groups as well as the number of their supporters, factors of formation and characteristics of Indonesian fundamentalism. The identified problems specific to Indonesian fundamentalism exhibit characteristics commonly found in the development of fundamentalism in other countries. Fundamentalism is characterized as a cognitive and religious bias, potentially deviating from the socio-behavioral norms of Indonesian society or manifesting as a collective prejudice.

The study of fundamentalism, according to the author, should also go beyond approaches that explore only the external factors of its occurrence and focus more on the internal reasons for its formation as a social phenomenon. There are also prominent epistemological and cognitive problems within fundamentalism. Particular emphasis also needs to be placed on the characteristics of absolutism and authoritarianism that lead fundamentalists to behavioral biases, some of which are intolerance, extremism and sectarianism. From the analysis of these phenomena also comes the answer to the question why fundamentalism is unacceptable, reprehensible and, therefore, inapplicable in a multicultural society. It follows that fundamentalism has epistemological problems, in particular the claims of fundamentalists to religious truths, which they make the standard for all other systems and norms. Also, these organizations and movements often seek to obtain the right to subsequent interpretation of these truths, their comprehension and transmission.

It should be noted that they believe that their religious traditions and sacred texts contain infallible truths and should therefore be accepted as authoritative. This statement forms and determines such features of their social behavior as authoritarianism, intolerance, extremeness, and coercion.

It follows, among other things, that fundamentalism should be considered as an ideology if fundamentalist principles define policy goals, formulate guidelines for political activity, offer a choice of means of their implementation and mobilize certain segments of the population to participate in the political process. Fundamentalism has a certain ideological essence when it offers its own vision of the existing world order, constructs its own idea of the “correct” society and puts forward models according to which political changes should occur. The principles of fundamentalist thinking divide the world into “us” and “strangers” and justify the possibility of transforming it by any radical means.

As an illustration, it has been determined that fundamentalists perceive the Western institution of the nation-state system as an adopted and foreign concept to the principles of a religious community's way of life. In their wide-ranging polemics with the state, intellectuals of diverse traditions and public figures strive to delegitimize the current order and dismantle its platform, on which the state's moral authority is built to define what is morally right and wrong for society. Fundamentalists additionally manipulate the deficiencies of the Western system to rationalize their objective of altering this conventionally imposed order, wherein democracy is one manifestation. Hence, one could assert that fundamentalists leverage the drawbacks of democracy to endorse economic growth and the formation of strong institutions as a means to legitimize their objective of delegitimizing the nation-state system. Islamist fundamentalists, for instance, advocate for "nizam Islami" (Islamic order) as an alternative to the nation-state. They believe that the knowledge within sacred religious texts is adequate to establish a functional and righteous society.

Simultaneously, the thesis acknowledged the existence of alternative approaches towards the actions of fundamentalists, specifically in their practical application of ideological principles and religious convictions. In relation to the aforementioned phenomenon of confrontation and criticism from Islamist fundamentalists towards the nation-state, it is noteworthy to consider the significant presence of moderate fundamentalism. This stance encompasses the outright rejection of violent methods to attain its objectives. Organizations subscribing to this ideology condemn confrontational

approaches and, alternatively, hold the belief that Indonesian society is not yet prepared to establish a religiously based societal structure. Proponents of this approach deem it imperative to give due consideration to Islamic education and gradually integrate their discourse into the public consciousness.

However, this does not negate the fact that another feature of Indonesian fundamentalism identified in this study is syncretic thinking and perception of socio-philosophical reality, when a religious fundamentalist does not think of himself outside the context of politics, as the most important component of social life.

Thus, religious fundamentalism in Indonesia appears to be complex and multifaceted phenomenon based on a system of original conceptual foundations formed as a result of the historical development of Indonesian statehood and society, however, this system also includes borrowed elements of fundamentalist ideology from other countries. In this regard, it seems important to analyze the internal prerequisites of fundamentalism as a phenomenon, the motivation of its followers, their attitude to politics and methods of society changing and political struggle. The dichotomy of religious fundamentalism/political fundamentalism today is no longer effective in determining the motivation of such groups and their beliefs, since these vectors of fundamentalism development intersect with each other and are characterized by a deep degree of interpenetration. Innovative approaches such as the psychopolitical one allows us to more deeply and without losing crucial elements of the system observe the fundamentalism components, its impact on society and how this phenomenon adapts to changes in public life, modernization and even the globalization of religious communities around the world. It follows that in the context of the political and social life of Indonesia, we can talk about the increasing importance of research on fundamentalism in connection with its direct threat to public well-being, the risks of violent conflict and social contradictions.

Considering the intricacy and multidimensionality of the matter, philosophical approaches appear to hold utmost importance in analyzing this phenomenon. Moreover, the incorporation of diverse philosophical schools from various countries, as demonstrated in this thesis, can greatly assist global actors in formulating collective

strategies to comprehend fundamentalism and mitigate its adverse effects in order to uphold public safety and religious equilibrium.

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