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## THE STRATEGIC USE OF 'SOFT' AND 'HARD' POWER APPROACHES IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF NIGERIA

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# СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ ПОДХОДОВ «МЯГКОЙ» И «ЖЕСТКОЙ» СИЛЫ В АФРИКЕ: НА ПРИМЕРЕ НИГЕРИИ

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на соискание ученой степени кандидата исторических наук

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### **Table of Contents**

INTRODUCTION	3
Chapter One NIGERIA, 'THE BIG BROTHER OF AFRICA': HARD AND SOFT POWER PERSPECTIVE	28
1.1. Hard and Soft Power: A Conceptual Discussion	29
1.2. ECOWAS: Nigeria's Principal Hard Power Conduit	47
1.3 Nigeria's Strategic application of Soft Power in the African Union	57
Chapter Two ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS 'SOFT POWER' TOOLS IN NIGERIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS	75
2.1. Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy as Soft Power	75
2.2. Nigeria's Bilateral/Multilateral Economic Relations with African Neighbors:  South Africa in Perspective	79
2.3. The Technical Aid Corps as a Soft Power Attraction	86
2.4. Cultural Diplomacy as a Soft Power Tool	95
2.5. The Entertainment Industry: A Principal Soft Power Conduit in Nigeria	106
2.6. Education as a Soft Power Potential	120
Chapter Three STRATEGIC USE OF HARD AND SOFT POWER:	
LIMITATIONS AND PROSPECTS	129
3.1. Limitations to Nigeria Power Status in Africa	130
3.2. Nigeria's Hard Power and the Dilemma of Recurrent Insurgency	139
3.3. Implications for Nigeria Power Status within Africa	144
CONCLUSION	147
LIST OF SOURCES AND LITERATURE	153

#### INTRODUCTION

The relevance of the study has been determined primarily by the growing importance of Africa as a key element in the emerging model of global development owing to its huge resource, human and economic potential. The research problem is further actualized by the nature of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which is one of the leading states of the continent and the key power in the West African region. Positioning itself as a regional power and defender of the interests of Tropical Africa and the global African diaspora since the late 1990s, Nigeria has successfully been overcoming the difficulties associated with the long stay of military regimes in power. Playing a key role in multilateral regional and sub-regional institutions such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Gulf of Guinea Commission, etc., Nigeria has made significant progress in resolving a number of regional problems.

The research topic is also of high degree of relevance owing to the complication of international relations due to intensifying geopolitical competition. In the modern world, states are increasingly aware that the most important factor in international influence is the balance between hard power, which is expressed in a combination of military and economic potentials, and soft power. The latter has a complex character, the study and understanding of which allows states to effectively compete in the global arena and achieve their interests without resorting to violence.

In the context of globalization and the strengthening of the ties of the international community, soft power is becoming a means of interaction and dialogue between cultures. The study of soft power helps understand how different countries can effectively communicate and build partnerships based on common values and cultural aspects. Soft power is becoming an important tool for diplomacy and conflict resolution, helps to attract investment, develop tourism, facilitates scientific and cultural exchange, which has a positive effect on the economic development of any

state. In addition, soft power allows states to form and improve their image and reputation in the international arena, which raises the importance of issues touched upon in this study.

Countries of the world have begun to mobilize their soft power capabilities to influence foreign policies of other states. Nowadays, both global powers such as the United States (US), China, the United Kingdom (UK) and others, as well as regional ones, including Brazil, India, South Africa, effectively use soft power to achieve foreign policy goals. Many African countries, including Nigeria, are gradually adjusting to the general pattern and use what J. Nye called smart power in modern international relations; smart power entails combining military and economic potentials (hard power) with national culture, traditions and values (soft power) to strengthen a country's image and its position at the regional and global levels. The study of the features of the use of hard and soft power of an African state on the example of Nigeria is of great scientific and practical importance in the context of the emerging multipolar world.

Literature review. The problem of the use of soft and hard power by states is of steady interest to the expert and scientific community, mass media, and politicians. In preparing the thesis, works of Russian and foreign researchers devoted to the study and assessment of the features of the use of soft and hard power in Nigeria's foreign policy in Africa were explored and referred to. It is appropriate to divide the scientific literature studied by the author into five groups according to the focus fields.

The first group includes complex works that touch upon topical issues of the theory and history of international relations, the foreign policy of states, soft and hard power tools, as well as problems of national, regional and global security. Among the

studies in this area, the works of such authors as T.A. Alekseeva<sup>1</sup>, A.D. Bogaturov<sup>2</sup>, V.N. Konyshev<sup>3</sup>, M.M. Lebedeva<sup>4</sup>, P.A. Tsygankov<sup>5</sup> should be mentioned.

It is worth noting the importance of the fundamental works of a well-known specialist in the field of theory and sociology of international relations, world politics and Russian foreign policy, P.A. Tsygankov, which are devoted to modern international relations. Of particular value to the author is a detailed description of the hierarchy of resources of states in the struggle for leading positions in global political arena, where attention is paid to both hard and soft power.

An important contribution to the study are the works of the political scientist M.M. Lebedeva, who analyzed the current problems of global politics and the main trends in world development.<sup>6</sup> All of the above allowed the present author to more thoroughly explore this issue from a theoretical and practical point of view.

In *the second group*, the author singled out works that study the phenomenon of "soft power" and identify features that are different from the tools of "hard power". This group primarily includes the works of the author of the term "soft power" J. Nye.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Алексеева Т.А. Агент-структурные отношения: методология конструктивизма // Polis: Journal of Political Studies. 2022. №. 4. С. 43-51; Алексеева Т.А. Будущее России глазами политолога // Вестник МГИМО Университета. 2022. Т. 15. №. 3. С. 250-261.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> *Богатуров А.Д.* Попытка перестроить мир «по-американски» // Вестник МГИМО Университета. 2021. Т. 14. № 5. С. 49-64; *Богатуров А.Д.* Анализ и теория в международных отношениях // Сравнительная политика. 2021. Т. 12. № 1. С. 5-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Конышев В.Н. Изучая природу войны: взгляд из России и Европы // Полис. Политические исследования. 2022. № 6. С. 182-188.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Лебедева М.М. «Мягкая сила»: понятие и подходы // Вестник МГИМО университета. 2017. № 3 (54). С. 212-223; Лебедева М.М., Кузнецов Д.А. Трансрегионализм-новый феномен мировой политики // Полис. Политические исследования. 2019. № 5. С. 71-84; Лебедева М.М., Кузнецов Д.А. Глобальное управление в вопросах противодействия биогенным угрозам // Вестник МГИМО Университета. 2021. Т. 14. № 2. С. 7-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *Цыганков П.А., Слуцкий Л.Э.* Дискурс о борьбе демократий против автократий как новое издание теории демократического мира 1 // Гражданин. Выборы. Власть. 2023. № 1. С. 117-125; *Цыганков А.П., Цыганков П.А.* Глобальность и самобытность в теории международных отношений // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22. № 1. С. 7-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Лебедева М.М. Политическая организация мира в условиях современных мегатрендов: сценарии развития //Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4: История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 26. № 3. С. 10-2.

Among the cited works of this researcher, we should mention, in particular, *Soft Power:* the Means to Success in World Politics<sup>7</sup>, Soft Power and the Struggle Against Terrorism<sup>8</sup>, South Korea's growing soft power<sup>9</sup>. Indeed, J. Nye authored the term in the early 1990s in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. J. Nye, a former Assistant US Secretary of Defense as well as Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, coined the term to illustrate the different characteristics of power that are used to influence others' behavior. J. Nye published a substantial number of books and papers devoted to various aspects of the theory of soft power.<sup>10</sup> A number of other scholarly studies either criticized or supported Nye's concept, or applied it to analyze soft power strategies in different countries. The first wave of books and papers on soft power were mostly devoted to the USA. For instance, John Weinbrenner in his work emphasized that the concept and usage of soft, hard and smart power is not new to America. J. Weinbrenner unveiled in his research that US foreign policy was replete with the persistent combined use of both hard and soft strategies, which also often did not advance America's national goals.<sup>11</sup>

This group also includes the works of the followers of J. Nye – E. J. Wilson with his work *Hard Power*, *Soft Power*, *Smart Power* $^{12}$  and N. Wesley with the work *Successes of Soft Power in International Relations* $^{13}$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Nye Jr J. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. 2004. 257 p.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> *Nye Jr J.* Soft power and the struggle against terrorism // Project Syndicat. 2004. Vol. 24. P. 67-81. <sup>9</sup> *Nye J. S.* South Korea's growing soft power // The Korea Times. 2009. Vol. 11. P. 34-51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Wang H., Nye Jr J. S. Power Shifts in the Twenty-First Century: A Dialogue with Joseph S. Nye Jr // Understanding Globalization, Global Gaps, and Power Shifts in the 21st Century: CCG Global

Dialogues. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. 2022. P. 131-145.

11 Weinbrenner J. Soft Power and Hard Power Approaches in US Foreign Policy: A Case Study Comparison in Latin America: дис. — University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida, 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Wilson III E. J. Hard power, soft power, smart power // The annals of the American academy of Political and Social Science. 2008. Vol. 616. № 1. P. 110-124.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Wesley N. The successes of soft power in international relation / A thesis submitted to the Univerzita Karlova V Praze Fakulta Sociálních Věd Institut mezinárodních studií. 2015. C. 7-8.

The author also included in this group works devoted to the practical application of soft power in countries such as the United States. William Rugh argued that the effectiveness of US soft power came from the ability to attract foreign governments and peoples who found America's political, social and cultural achievements, principles and foreign policies worth emulating. As soft power stood in contrast with hard power that derived from global military and economic advantages, America's soft power enhanced US national interests abroad.<sup>14</sup>

Robert Los in his work affirmed that the US global leadership was not based on military power alone, but in practice it was largely the military aspects that defined the pre-eminent position of the United States. America's advantage was strengthened even further by additional economic factors such as raw material resources, technological skills, the size of territory and population. However, more recently, J. Nye observed that President Donald Trump's administration showed little interest in public diplomacy and the use of soft power. The later waves of academic research on soft power were predominantly devoted to China and Japan.

Russia's stance on soft and hard power tools has also become a subject of study. In their work *Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy* Alexander Sergunin and Leonid Karabeshkin pointed out that soft power as a policy strategy was a relatively new theme in Russian academic literature and remained noticeably under-researched.<sup>17</sup> However, with time an increasing number of works by Russian scholars has been emerging in this area of academic research, and foreign policy practitioners have also

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Rugh W.A. President Trump and America's Soft Power. – Palgrave Macmillan. – n.d. Available at: https://www.palgrave.com/gp/palgrave/campaigns/us-elections-and-politics/president-trump-and-america-s-softpower/11996866 (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Los R. et al. US and China: Hard and Soft Power Potential // International Studies: Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal (IS). 2018. T. 22. № 1. P. 39-50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> *Nye J.* American soft power in the age of Trump // 2019 Project-Syndicate. – 2019. Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/american-soft-power-decline-under-trump-by-joseph-s-nye-2019-05 (accessed: 01.10.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Sergunin A., Karabeshkin L. Understanding Russia's soft power strategy // Politics. 2015. T. 35. № 3-4. Pp. 347-363.

come to employ the corresponding terminology. For example, Konstantin Kosachev, former head (2012-2014) of Russia's key soft power agency *Rossotrudnichestvo* and still a key figure in Russia's public diplomacy circles, has emphasized on several occasions the need for Russia to learn to effectively utilize instruments of soft power: "if we want to see (Russia) among the world's most powerful nations". <sup>18</sup>

As pointed out in papers by Yelena Osipova<sup>19</sup>, Yulia Kiseleva<sup>20</sup>, Anna Kosyakina<sup>21</sup>, Russians became engaged in an increasingly energetic discussion of soft power in official and academic circles, as well as in mass media, focusing both on the concept itself and its applicability in Russia. Indeed, the Russian government may now be considered to be among the eager adopters of soft power and has, over time, reconceptualized and transformed the concept to make it fit the Russian worldview and specific foreign policy objectives. Y. Osipova, for instance, reiterated that it became imperative for Russia to adopt the soft power approach due to the fact that the Russian Federation had suffered several major blows during the 1990s, particularly due to the political and economic chaos that followed the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the wars in which the country was involved domestically and abroad.<sup>22</sup> Alexey Dolinskiy<sup>23</sup>, Valentina Feklyunina<sup>24</sup>, and Vladimir Lebedenko<sup>25</sup> claimed as far

 $<sup>^{18}</sup>$  Косачев К.И. Россотрудничество как инструмент «мягкой силы» // Федеральный справочник. Информационно-аналитический сборник [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: Federalbook.ru. 2012. Дата обращения: 08.07. 2022.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Osipova Y. "Russification" of "soft power": transformation of a concept // Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy. 2014. T. 5. № 1. P. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> *Kiseleva Y.* Russia's soft power discourse: identity, status and the attraction of power // Politics. 2015. T. 35. № 3-4. P. 316-329.

 $<sup>^{21}</sup>$  Косякина А.С. Российский подход к концепции "мягкой силы" // Анализ и прогноз. Журнал ИМЭМО РАН. 2022. №. 2. С. 63-75.

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>$  Osipova Y. "Russification" of "soft power": transformation of a concept // Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy. 2014. T. 5. № 1. C. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> *Dolinskiy A.* Russian Soft Power 2.0 (Vol. 1) // Russia Direct. – 2013. Available at: https://russia-direct.org/russian-media/september-quarterly-russian-soft-power-20 (accessed: 05.10.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Feklyunina V. Battle for perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West // Europe-Asia Studies. 2008. T. 60. № 4. C. 605-629.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Lebedenko V. Russia's national identity and image-building // International Affairs. 2004. T. 50.  $N_{\odot}$  4. P. 71-77.

back as 2004 that the crisis of identity made it extremely difficult for Russia to engage in the rapidly converging global political and economic processes. However, by the time Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, Russia had recognized that it had had having a major image crisis abroad, not only because of what had been happening inside the country, but also because it had been suffering from a damaging identity crisis and the glaring lack of a national idea on which public diplomacy and soft power efforts could be centered.

Moldavian scholar Nicu Popescu in his 2006 paper wrote that the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as the rapid rapprochement of other former Soviet states with the West – and that at the expense of Russia's interests – accentuated the urgency of the development of soft power instruments for the Putin administration.<sup>26</sup> In this regard, Y. Kiseleva pointed out that Russian students of soft power were mostly preoccupied with two major themes, namely (a) the use of Russian soft power in the post-Soviet space, and (b) an overall assessment of the effectiveness of Russia's soft power as a tool of its foreign policy.<sup>27</sup>

Russia scholar Sergey Kostelyanets noted in his papers on Russia's Africa policy that as Moscow aspires to develop its relations with Africa, it may increasingly rely on soft power tools such as conflict mediation, while the financial and security costs of the use of hard power are poised to grow.<sup>28</sup> Peace initiatives have already greatly bolstered Russia's image in the region and opened various new channels of communication.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> *Popescu N.* Russia's Soft Power Ambitions // Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 2006. Vol. 115.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Osipova Y. "Russification" of "soft power": transformation of a concept // Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy. 2014. T. 5. № 1. P. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Костелянец С.В. Russia's Peace Mediation in Africa: an Assessment // Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность. 2020. № 6. С. 96-106.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Kostelyanets S.V. Russia's Peace Initiatives in the MENA Region: Evaluation and Prospects // Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. 2019. T. 13. № 4. P. 534-555.

Though, admittedly, power politics still remains an important asset in Africa for major powers, including Russia.<sup>30</sup>

The third group includes studies that examine the fundamental principles and mechanisms of Nigeria's foreign policy, as well as investigate the dynamics of its development, taking into account such factors as the role of key decision-making centers, the role of Western countries in shaping foreign policy orientation, and so on. This group, first of all, includes the works of Russian scientists who have studied the issue both in the theoretical and methodological domain, or from an empirical perspective. This issue has found detailed coverage in the works of such Russian scholars as S.B. Gorbachev<sup>31</sup>, A.P. Elokhin<sup>32</sup>, A.L. Emelyanov<sup>33</sup>, A.N. Zelinskaya<sup>34</sup>,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Kostelyanets S.V., Okeke O.A.A. Russia and the global competition for Africa: the military dimension // Vostok. Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost. 2018. № 6. P. 184-198.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> *Горбачев С.Б.* Реализация геостратегии Запада на Ближнем Востоке как политика двойных стандартов // Экономика и управление: научно-практический журнал. 2021. № 3. С. 187-190.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> *Орумо Б.К., Елохин А.П., Ксенофонтов А.И.* Некоторые аспекты международного сотрудничества по Экологическим вопросам в Нигерии // Глобальная ядерная безопасность. 2021. № 2. С. 25-34.

 $<sup>^{33}</sup>$  *Емельянов А.Л.* Имитационная демократия: африканский вариант // Новая и новейшая история. 2015. № 5. С. 35-41.

 $<sup>^{34}</sup>$  Зелинская А.Н. и др. Интеграция Африки в современную систему товарооборота // Актуальные проблемы авиации и космонавтики. Красноярск: СибГУ им. М. Ф. Решетнева. 2020. С. 531-533.

E.E. Lebedeva<sup>35</sup>, V.A. Melyantsev<sup>36</sup>, I.P. Konovalov<sup>37</sup>, E.N. Korendyasov<sup>38</sup>, L.L. Fituni<sup>39</sup>, Kostelyanets S.V.<sup>40</sup> etc.

In particular, the monograph by A.A. Shvedov contains a deep analysis of the formation of the foreign policy process and the development of bilateral interaction between independent Nigeria and Western countries and OAU member countries.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the author pays attention to the peculiarities of Nigeria's foreign policy in the context of the creation of multilateral institutions on the African continent.

The fourth group is represented by literature that highlights the features and trends in the use of soft power in African countries and, in particular, in the foreign policy of Nigeria as a country with the potential for regional leadership. It should be noted, however, that the number of scholarly works on hard and soft power strategies and instruments of specific African states has been rather limited in English-language literature and is practically non-existent in Russian one. The only paper on Nigeria's soft power by Daria Tarasova offers a brief review of the country's main foreign policy tools on the regional level with the focus on cultural exchanges, peacekeeping and volunteer activities.<sup>42</sup>

 $<sup>^{35}</sup>$  Лебедева Э.Е. Африка южнее Сахары в перипетиях мировой политики // Азия и Африка в современной мировой политике. Сборник статей / Отв. ред. д.п.н. Д.Б. Малышева, к.э.н. А.А. Рогожин. М.: ИМЭМО РАН, 2012. С. 96-101.

 $<sup>^{36}</sup>$  *Мельянцев В.А.* Развивающиеся страны: рост, эффективность, противоречия и перспективы // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2014. № 6. С. 130-146.

 $<sup>^{37}</sup>$  Коновалов И.П., Шубин Г.В. Современная Африка: войны и оружие. М.: Социально-политическая мысль. 2012. 476 с.

 $<sup>^{38}</sup>$  Давидчук А.С., Дегтерев Д.А., Корендясов Е.Н. Советская структурная помощь Республике Мали в 1960-1968 гг. // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22. № 4. С. 714-727.

 $<sup>^{39}</sup>$  Фитуни Л.Л. Африка: Ресурсные войны XXI века. М. 2012. 243 с.; Фитуни Л.Л. Развивающиеся страны в новом уравнении посткризисного мироустройства // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2022. № 11. С. 34-44.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Костелянец С.В., Океке О.А.Э. Динамика африканской политики Нигерии в постколониальный период // Ученые записки Института Африки РАН. 2021. № 4. С. 56-71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> *Шведов А.А.* Независимая Африка: внешнеполитические проблемы, дипломатическая борьба. / Под общ.ред. и с предисл. Ан. А. Громыко. М. 1983. 321 с.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> *Тарасова Д.А.* Потенциал «мягкой силы» Нигерии как региональной державы // Вестник Омского университета. Серия «Исторические науки». 2019. № 3. С. 206-211.

Finally, the fifth group includes a number of works on Nigeria's foreign policy, which have touched upon the notions of soft and hard power and which have regarded Nigeria as subject rather than object of international relations, has been published by scholars of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Of greatest relevance to the present research are works by Tatyana Denisova and her coauthors<sup>43</sup>. T. Denisova, for instance, acknowledged the importance of "African giant's" hard power in raising its attractiveness for the "Asian giant" - China.44 Acknowledging the role of hard power of Nigeria in international relations, T. Denisova also stressed the fact that Nigeria was the most populous country on the African continent and in recent years became the largest African economy which sought to enter the list of the 20 largest economies in the world. Although, as T. Denisova explains, the main reason for China's growing presence in Nigeria were the huge reserves of hydrocarbons that China's national economy desperately needed and Nigeria's vast consumer market that Chinese manufacturers were actively penetrating, strategic concerns also played their role. Accordingly, unlike the relations of the Celestial Empire with many other African countries, the relations of China with Nigeria over the last two decades have taken a shape of a strong political union supported by close cultural ties.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Денисова Т.С. Тропическая Африка: эволюция политического лидерства // Ин-т Африки РАН. М., 2016. 594 с; *Денисова Т.С.* Нигерия 2015: смена руководства // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2015, № 8. С. 12-17; *Денисова Т.С.* Нигерия: итоги первого срока президентства Мохаммаду Бухари и всеобщие выборы // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2019. № 8. С. 37-42; *Gavrilova N., Denisova T.S.* Nigeria's Food Security Challenge and the Response of International Organizations // Азіа and Africa today. 2019. № 7. С. 54-58; *Денисова Т.С.* Инвестиционный климат Нигерии // Ученые записки Института Африки РАН. 2017. № 4. С. 40-58; *Денисова Т.С.* Нигерия и ЮАР: фактор политического лидерства в формировании двусторонних отношений // Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность. 2017. № 6. С. 29-40; *Денисова Т.С., Костелянец С.В.* СОVID-19 в Нигерии: вызовы и прогнозы // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2020. № 8. С. 26-30; *Денисова Т.С.* Нигерия: от Майтацине до Боко Харам // Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность. 2014. № 4. С. 70-82, etc.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Денисова Т.С. Нигерия и Китай: проблемы экономического и политического сотрудничества // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения. – 2018. Т. 18. № 3. С. 673-685.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Ibid.

This group also includes monographs and scientific works by Nigerian scholars who study the foreign policy of Nigeria through the prism of its foreign policy tools. Such authors include O. Tella<sup>46</sup>, A. Akinola<sup>47</sup>, O. Ogunnubi<sup>48</sup>, K. Isike<sup>49</sup>, M. Aleyomi<sup>50</sup>, M. Ihembe<sup>51</sup> and A. Osondu-Oti<sup>52</sup>.

However, while there exists abundant literature on soft and hard power tools and strategies in different international contexts, and considerable research has been conducted on Nigeria's political, cultural and economic international relations, there indeed remains a major gap to be filled – and especially in Russian African Studies – with regard to the analysis of Abuja's foreign policy, its evolution, achievements and failures through the theoretical prism of the concepts of soft and hard power.

The object of the study is foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The subject of the study is soft and hard power approaches and instruments of strategic consequence employed by Nigeria in the course of the implementation of its foreign policy.

The **purpose of the study** is to determine the peculiarities, assess the outcomes, and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategic use of soft and hard power approaches and tools by Nigeria on the regional, continental and global levels.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Tella O. Is Nigeria a soft power state? // Social Dynamics. 2018. Vol. 44. № 2. P. 376-394.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Akinola A.E., Ogunnubi O. Soft power or wasteful entertainment? Interrogating the prospect of 'Big Brother Naija' // The Round Table. 2020. Vol. 109. №. 1. P. 71-85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Okunade S.K., Ogunnubi O. The African Union Protocol on Free Movement: A panacea to end border porosity? // Journal of African Union Studies. 2019. Vol. 8. № 1. P. 73-91; Ogunnubi O., Idowu D.L. Nollywood, the orange economy and the appropriation of Nigeria's soft power // Recentering Cultural Performance and Orange Economy in Post-colonial Africa: Policy, Soft Power, and Sustainability. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. 2022. P. 141-158

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> *Ogunnubi O., Isike C.* Nigeria's soft power sources: Between potential and illusion? // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 2018. Vol. 31. № 1. P. 49-67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Aleyomi M.B. Nigeria's image crisis: drivers, efforts and prospects // African Identities. 2020. Vol. 18. № 1-2. P. 217-232.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> *Isike C., Ihembe M.* COVID-19 and the Decline of the Social State in Nigeria's Federal Democracy // African and Asian Studies. 2021. Vol. 20. № 4. P. 375-400.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Osondu-Oti A. COVID-19 Pandemic and the Politics of China's Soft Power Diplomacy: Analysis of China's COVID-19 Aid to Nigeria // Journal of Contemporary International Relations and Diplomacy. 2020. Vol. 1. № 1. P. 1-24.

This purpose is to be achieved through the execution of the following **research** tasks:

- explore the concepts of soft power and hard power;
- determine hard and soft power elements of Nigeria's foreign policy;
- assess the strategic use of hard and soft power approaches in the course of the implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy;
- evaluate the effectiveness of Nigeria's soft and hard power approaches in sustaining its status as Africa's regional power and in achieving other national foreign policy goals;
- identify the key impediments to raising the effectiveness of the use of soft and hard power approaches by Nigeria.

The chronological scope of the study covers the entire period since the attainment of independence by Nigeria in 1960 and as far as March 2020, which is justifiable due to the continuous and evolving nature of political, economic, military, cultural, humanitarian and other contacts between the country in focus and the rest of the world; the period of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, has remained outside the scope of the present study due to the still ambiguous and obscure effects of the global health crisis on the world order and international relations.

**Main sources of data.** To achieve the goals identified by the author and solve the problems of the study, a set of sources was found, analyzed and systematized, which can be divided into several groups according to the specifics.

The *first group of sources* mainly consists of normative and legal sources such as official documents of Nigeria that are related to foreign and domestic policy. In particular, these include the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria<sup>53</sup> and

Nigeria Independence Bill, 15 July 1960. URL: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1960/jul/15/nigeria-independence-bill (accessed: 25.09.20); Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. URL: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ng/ng014en.pdf (accessed: 01.01.2021).

documents of various agencies of the Government of Nigeria<sup>54</sup>, as well as US doctrinal acts relating to African issues, primarily the 2006 National Security Strategy of George W. Bush Jr. <sup>55</sup> and the 2010 strategy adopted under the presidency of B. Obama<sup>56</sup>, as well as the "New African Strategy" adopted by the administration of President D. Trump in 2018<sup>57</sup>. Official documents of the African Union (AU)<sup>58</sup>, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)<sup>59</sup> and other international organizations form the bulk of the remaining sources of information in this group.

The second group of sources includes office and business sources, above all, from various departments of Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Of particular value for the study were reports and memos from such departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the Department of the African Union<sup>60</sup> and the Departments for Bilateral

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> The Nigeria Handbook: 25 years of progress. Lagos, 1985; Annual Conferences of NSIA. Papers and Documents. Lagos, 1990-1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> National Security Strategy of the USA 2006. / The White House URL: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ (accessed: 01.01.2021).

National Security Strategy 2010. / The White House URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss\_viewer/national\_security\_strategy.pdf (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> A New Africa Strategy // US Department of State. December 13, 2018 URL: https://www.state.gov/a-new-africa-strategy/ (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup>African Union Handbook 2020. URL: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Africa/African-Union-Handbook-2020-ENGLISH-web.pdf (accessed: 03.08.2020); Decisions of the 12th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly / African Union. July 07, 2019. URL:https://au.int/en/decisions/decisions-12th-extraordin (accessed: 01.01.2021).

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Documentation. URL:https://www.ecowas.int/documentation/ (accessed: 03.08.2020); The Integrated Maritime Regional Division of ECOWAS / Security (RSD). 28.10.2019. https://edup.ecowas.int/allevents/categories/key-resources/eims/ (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Official document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Union Division, 13 November 2016. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.gov.ng/ (accessed: 01.01.2021).

Relations with the USA<sup>61</sup>, Russia<sup>62</sup>, China<sup>63</sup>, UK<sup>64</sup> and sub-regional organizations<sup>65</sup>. In addition, documents of international governmental organizations are of importance. In particular, the ACP/EEC<sup>66</sup>, UNCLOS<sup>67</sup>, OAU/AU<sup>68</sup>, the Charter of the OAU<sup>69</sup>. These documents give an objective idea of the mechanisms of multilateral diplomacy that have developed in the region, as well as of the institutional and legal framework in which independent Nigeria pursued its foreign policy objectives. Documents of ECOWAS<sup>70</sup>, GGC<sup>71</sup>, NBA<sup>72</sup>, LCBC<sup>73</sup> allow a more comprehensive consideration of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Official document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja on Nigeria-U.S Relations, American and Caribbean Affairs Division, 9<sup>th</sup> January 2019. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.gov.ng/(accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Official document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja on the Nigeria-Russia Bilateral Relations, European Affairs Division, 20 February 2015. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.gov.ng/(accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Official document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja on Nigeria-China Bilateral Relations, Asia and Pacific Division, 5 January 2019. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.gov.ng/ (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> The Policy Paper of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, Nigeria prepared by the European Affairs Division, 7 March 2019. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.gov.ng/ (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>65</sup> Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Gulf of Guinea Commission, African Sub-Regional Organization (ASROD) Division, 14th September 2018. URL: https://www.foreign.govmu.org (accessed: 23.07.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup>The Lomé Convention. 1975. / The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States. URL: http://www.acp.int/content/lome-convention (accessed: 01.01.2021).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982. URL: https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos\_e.pdf (accessed: 23.07.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> The OAU Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980, Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies. 23 p.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Charter of Organization of African Unity. 1963. URL: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20479/volume-479-I-6947-English.pdf (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> An ECOWAS Compendium on Free Movement, Right of Residence and Establishment, Abuja: ECOWAS Executive Secretariat 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Document of the Executive Secretariat of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, Luanda, August 2016. URL: https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ASB30EN-Combating-Piracy-in-the-Gulf-of-Guinea.pdf (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Convention Creating the Niger Basin Authority. No. 22675. Registered by the Niger on 13 January 1984. URL: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201346/volume-1346-A-22675-English.pdf (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Lake Chad Basin Commission, Basic Documents (Revised) Convention and Statute and Rules of Procedures, N'Djamena, December 1990.

the "Afrocentric" policy of Nigeria at the sub-regional level. EU<sup>74</sup> and USAID<sup>75</sup> documents are needed for a comprehensive analysis of the bilateral agenda of Nigeria's relations with leading countries.

*The third group* includes journalistic sources, which are represented by official statements and speeches by the heads of state and government, Nigerian politicians and diplomats, and their works containing conclusions regarding Nigeria's foreign policy. Various aspects of Nigerian domestic and foreign policy are devoted, in particular, to the speeches and works of the former presidents of the country I. Babangida and O. Obasanjo, foreign ministers, as well as former representatives of Nigeria to the UN. <sup>76</sup> Of great value is the speech of Nigerian President Mohammad Buhari on the results of Nigeria 's foreign policy strategy. <sup>77</sup>

The fourth group of sources comprises statistical materials, including those prepared by various international institutions. Among them are FAO<sup>78</sup>, International Institute for Peace<sup>79</sup>, World Bank (WB)<sup>80</sup>, etc.

Thus, the presented source base is representative and allows one to explore the chosen topic in detail and comprehensively.

The theoretical framework for the research was supplied, above all, by J. Nye's soft power theory, as well as by other conceptual, comparative and historical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Text of the Special Meeting of the European Council Article 50 (3) TEU Agreeing to 31 October 2019 to allow the United Kingdom to ratify the Withdrawal Agreement EUCO XT 20015/19 1 EN.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup>Nigeria. Education Fact Sheet. / USAID URL: https://www.usaid.gov/nigeria/education (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Obasanjo O. My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War. 1967-1970. Ibadan. 1980; Hope for Africa. Selected speeches of Olusegun Obasanjo. A.L.F. Publications, 1993; *Babangida J.B.* Imperatives of Nigeria: National Interest in Liberia. – Lagos. 1995.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Buhari to Xi Jinping: I am happy with Nigeria/China cooperation // The Guardian. URL: https://guardian.ng/news/buhari-to-xi-jinping-i-am-happy-with-nigeriachina-cooperation/ (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> The Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations. URL: http://www.fao.org/about/en/(accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> The International Peace Institute. URL: https://www.ipinst.org/category/publications (accessed: 01.01.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> The World Bank in Nigeria. URL: https://www.worldbank.org/en /country/nigeria/overview (accessed: 01.01.2021).

discussions and models of hard, soft and smart power authored by J. Nye and other prominent scholars.

As J. Nye argued, having the ability and capacity to control or influence others, their behavior, induce them to make decisions, is a phenomenon of universal concern to mankind and nations of the world. 81 Matteo Pallaver puts it succinctly that, 'Power is an essential element of human existence and we can find signs and manifestations of power in every dimension of social life, from interpersonal relations through economic transactions, to religious and political disputes.'82 In its assessment of a nation's power, the realist school of thought in international relations links it with the possession of certain tangible resources, including population, territory, natural resources, economic and military strength, etc. 83 For example, the USA, which invaded Iraq in 2003, was the most powerful state in world history, while Iraq had been weakened by two costly wars and a decade of sanctions. The power disparity was striking: in terms of GDP, the USA held an advantage of more than a hundred to one; in population terms, more than ten to one. US forces were larger and much more capable technologically.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, for centuries, nations of the world have been assessing the extent of their power in term of the size of their population, the extent of their territorial control, the abundance of their natural resources, the strength of their economy, their military might and social stability.85

More recently, however, and as expounded by J. Nye, a nation's power has been aptly categorized into hard, soft, or smart one. Correspondingly, nations adopted hard, soft, or smart power approaches to make other state entities dance to their policy tune. Hard power as a conceptual term indicates the application of military and economic

<sup>81</sup> Nye Jr. J. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> *Pallaver M.* Power and its forms: Hard, soft, smart: дис. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011. P. 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Goldstein J.S., Pevehouse J.C. International Relations. Pearson Longman, 2012. P. 42.

<sup>84</sup> Goldstein J.S., Pevehouse J.C. International Relations. Pearson Longman, 2012. P. 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> *Pallaver M.* Power and its forms: Hard, soft, smart: дис. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2011. P. 12.

instruments to change the behavior or aims of other political actors. <sup>86</sup> This form of political influence may entail the use of aggression (coercion), whereby one political actor imposes its will upon another one that possesses less military and/or economic power. <sup>87</sup> In a discussion of main differences between the types of power in the context of the implementation of foreign policy, J. Nye employed the *carrot* and *stick* analogy: Nye considered "hard power as the ability to use the *carrots* and *sticks* of economic and military might to make others follow one's will". <sup>88</sup> "*Carrots*" stood for incentives such as a decrease in trade barriers, an offer of an alliance, or a promise of a security umbrella. "*Sticks*", in turn, stood for threats such as the implementation of coercive diplomacy, the threat of military intervention, or the imposition of economic sanctions. <sup>89</sup> Thus the term "hard power" may be defined as "the capacity to coerce another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise."

Hard power has been the most common type of power for thousands of years. It is closely related to the dialectic of "master and servant." In fact, it has been emphasized that hard power is the focal point of any state, nation or entity, which is because for them it is the main means of defining and defending themselves. From times immemorial, hard power has therefore been a crucial factor in the strength of any nation and has therefore also been considered a key element in a nation's survival and expansion. Nathaniel Wesley in his analysis argued that countries with strong armies were always seen as capable of defending their business interests, which in turn boosted their economic power. He, for instance, provided the example of the British navy, which was able to ensure markets for British goods in China in the 19th century, or the case

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Copeland D. Hard power vs. soft power // The Mark News. 2010. T. 2. URL: http://www.themarknews.com/articles/895-hard-power-vs-soft-power (accessed: 04.04.2021). <sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> *Nye J. S.* Propaganda isn't the way: Soft power // The International Herald Tribune. 2003. T. 10. <sup>89</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Wilson III E. J. Hard power, soft power, smart power // The annals of the American academy of Political and Social Science. 2008. T. 616. № 1. P. 110-124.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Wesley N. The successes of soft power in international relation. – A thesis submitted to the Univerzita Karlova V Praze Fakulta Sociálních Věd Institut mezinárodních studií. 2015. C. 7.

of America's military participation in the First World War, which was in part due to fear that the USA would not be able to recover its debts from the UK.<sup>92</sup>

On the other hand, soft power, according to the Oxford Dictionary, is "a persuasive approach to international relations, typically involving the use of economic or cultural influence." According to J. Nye, it is the ability to get what one wants by attracting and persuading others to adopt one's goals. Soft power as a policy term is sometimes also referred to as public diplomacy depending on the context and the way in which it is applied. This type of power differs drastically from the aforementioned ability to use the *carrots* and *sticks* of economic and military might to force other political actors to follow one's will – i.e., from hard power. According to N. Wesley, "soft power" is a relatively new term which was propounded and expounded by J. Nye in his 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*.

From a theoretical perspective, J. Nye explains that the assets of a country which enhance the use of soft power include its government policies, if they are perceived as legitimate and fair; its culture, when it is deemed attractive or appealing by the target audience; and its general values, if they correspond with those of the intended audience. A good illustration of the use of soft power in the context of the Cold War has been provided by J. Nye: the prominent scholar argued that the freedom of political expression along with American popular culture caused many Russians to strive for what the USA had. While soft power attracted the Russian people to the free market system, simultaneously hard power in the form of America's nuclear arsenal prevented

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Ibid. P. 6-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> "Soft Power" // Dictionaries O. British & World English. — Oxford University Press. 2018. URL: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com (accessed: 04.05.2021).

Nye Jr. J. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. – New York: Public Affairs. 2004.
 Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Wesley N. The successes of soft power in international relation. A thesis submitted to the Univerzita Karlova V Praze Fakulta Sociálních Věd Institut mezinárodních studií. 2015. P. 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Nye Jr.J. The US Can Reclaim Smart Power // Los Angeles Times, 2009. URL: https://www.latimes.com/la-oe-nye21-2009jan21-story.html (accessed: 04.05.2021).

the Soviets from intruding too far into the American sphere of influence.<sup>98</sup> It is thus safe to conclude that policy responses which rely on soft power have the capacity to affect the levels of socioeconomic and political cohesion, and they are often designed to work alongside existing coercive measures.<sup>99</sup>

Many of modern-day nations of the world have made the strategic decision to adopt a mix of hard and soft power instruments. African countries, among them Nigeria, have also strategically used soft and hard power tools in their foreign policy approaches. The corresponding J. Nye's concept of smart power presupposes that governments can best achieve their policy objectives by supplementing hard power (coercion, threats and inducements) with soft power. The persuasive aspect of this J. Nye's theory is that he recognizes a range of tensions, problems and complexities that underlie the concepts of hard and soft power. However, he largely dismisses these more complex issues in recommending that governments develop smart power strategies. John Nye suggests that any meaningful assessment of states' national power status must necessarily include both hard and soft power competences, which in fact would constitute an analysis of a nation's "smart power."

Furthermore, in the present work, the author applied a systematic approach, which made it possible to identify the key components and tools of soft and hard power of Nigeria. Thanks to a comparative analysis, it became possible not only to compare soft power policies of Nigeria in various African countries, but also to compare it with Russian, Chinese and American soft power policies in the region under study.

During the research, the author proceeded from the principles of historicism, reliability, consistency. *The principle of historicism* made it possible to consider the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Nye Jr.J. The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone. Oxford University Press, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> *Hardy K.* Ruthlessness and Sympathy: Smart Power Thinking in Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency: PhD thesis, UNSW, 2014. P. iv.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Nye Jr. J. The powers to lead. Oxford University Press, 2008.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Nye Jr.J. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. 2004.

current state of Nigerian foreign policy, establish cause-and-effect relationships, identify trends and patterns in the development of issues, come to appropriate conclusions and develop forecasts for the further development of soft power tools of Nigeria's foreign policy in interaction with African countries. In accordance with *the principle of reliability*, the author relied solely on proven facts, studied each phenomenon in the aggregate of its positive and negative sides.

A number of different **methods of study** were employed to carry out the present research within the general academic approach that rests on the aforementioned pillars of historicism, reliability and consistency. A number of general scientific and special-historical research methods were applied in the work. General scientific methods are a set of methods of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, the unity of the historical and the logical. Thanks to these methods, the development and current position of soft power and hard power tools in Nigeria's foreign policy was studied. A number of sections of the study were carried out on the basis of a comparative analysis with elements of a systematic approach. This made it possible to present a comprehensive picture of the policy on the formation of attractiveness and persuasion to follow one's own example and to compare individual stages of the implementation of the Nigerian policy of soft power in Africa.

### The scientific novelty of the work is due to the following:

- The author aimed at developing a new understanding of the effectiveness of foreign policy of African countries, in particular Nigeria, via an analysis of the two main categories of foreign policy instruments soft power and hard power ones;
- The author explored Africa's hard and soft power potentials on the example of the continent's leading country Nigeria and examined their strategic and symbiotic application in the context of implementation of the country's national interests;
- The author systematized the resources and sources of soft power used in the foreign policy of the government of Nigeria, in particular, identified the following

groups of Nigerian soft power resources: cultural heritage, education and academic exchange, public diplomacy and humanitarian aid;

- The author identified national specificity of understanding and application of the concept of soft power in Nigeria, which made it possible to identify the most effective areas for the application of the country's foreign policy resources. The thesis demonstrated that the specifics of understanding and using soft power in Nigeria are associated with an emphasis on respect for cultural traditions, art, music and literature as a means of interaction and attraction of other countries. This allows Nigeria to use its soft power potential to maintain regional stability through mediation efforts;
- The author revealed that the state most effectively uses soft power when it formulates strategic tasks for its implementation and forms conceptual understanding in official documents besides actively using its tools;
- The author used a wide range of sources in Russian and English, many of which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time, which made it possible to comprehensively study the approaches of soft and hard power and the instruments of strategic influence used by Nigeria in the course of implementing foreign policy in Africa.

#### The main provisions for the defense:

1. Nigeria in the modern system of international relations acts as a guarantor of regional stability and economic stability in the African region. Its important position is evidenced by the fact that Nigeria was one of the founders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU, since 2002 - the African Union) and often initiated through this organization political decisions of importance to the entire region. Most of the relations with other African states took place outside the framework of the OAU, but were guided by the principles of its activities. Since 1976, relations with African countries have become the central direction of the foreign policy of Nigeriar leadership, as evidenced by the active support of national liberation movements and fighters against apartheid. Since this period, foreign policy has been transformed into an Afrocentric one, which

required defining a set of foreign policy instruments to consolidate the role of a regional leader. In this situation, Nigeria began to more actively introduce soft power instruments into its foreign policy activities.

- 2. Regionally, since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria's efforts have been geared towards engendering an enduring peace, security, unity, brotherhood and brotherliness towards Africa and the entire black race. As the largest military power in the region, Nigeria has strategically used this hard power endowment to play a central role in the ECOWAS efforts to end the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
- 3. Nigeria's hard and soft power endowments have allowed it to participate in various ECOWAS regional programs and promote the West African regional integration process, which has led to the signing of numerous ECOWAS laws, treaties, protocol agreements and conventions to advance the development and economic growth of the region.
- 4. On the continental level, Nigeria has also been at the forefront in the struggle for African unity and decolonization of the African continent. Indeed, it is the Nigeria's view which was incorporated in Lagos Charter that was subsequently adopted as the OAU Charter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 25 May, 1963. As a matter of fact, many have argued that Nigeria still has great influence on the AU after transformation from OAU due to its substantial commitment in its formation and maintenance, which contributes to Nigeria's soft power in a large way.
- 5. Nigeria has deployed a soft power approach to influence decisions made in the AU. Importantly, Nigeria has closely engaged with peace and security issues on the continent, including the pursuit of integration and development in Africa. Correspondingly, Nigeria has played host to several important AU meetings, including the 4th AU summit held in 2005 in Abuja and the 44th session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) that took place in Abuja in November 2008.

- 6. In August 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) headed by Nigerian President O. Obasanjo held peace talks in Abuja between the government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur in order to preempt UN sanctions on Sudan. This round of talks, which involved Nigeria in several dimensions, led to the adoption of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5th May, 2006. In general, Nigeria has been actively involved in the implementation of Africa's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Nigeria also takes part in the AU Capacity building exercise for the military, police and civilian components of the African Standby Force (ASF) which is an integral part of APSA. Nigeria's National Defense College in Abuja remains AU's centre of excellence in the training of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) at the strategic level. The exercises and training remain vital in terms of the pursuit of the AU's objectives in the sphere of peace and security in Africa and consequently form another pillar of Nigeria's power on the continent, in fact representing a mix of its hard and soft power instruments.
- 7. Nigeria also employs its culture as a diplomatic platform to project its soft power globally. A notable cultural festival the global Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) was held in Nigeria in 1977 and brought together all black peoples of the world, who came to Nigeria to celebrate black culture. In recent years, cultural festivals, such as *Argungu* fishing festival, *Osun Oshogbo* festival, *Durbar* festival, *Eyo* festival, Black heritage festival and *Igue* festival, among others, have attract participants and spectators, including tourists, from most parts of the world. The *Calabar* carnival is another interesting novelty in the way Nigeria's culture is projected abroad. This carnival is regarded as the biggest street party in Africa.
- 8. The entertainment sector in Nigeria is a major attraction that the country takes advantage of in its relations with the African continent and the world at large. In recent years, in recognition of the soft power potential of entertainment, the Nigerian government has taken significant steps to develop the media and entertainment industry. The most prominent corresponding program has been the Creative Industry Financing Initiative (CIFI), developed in the collaboration between the Central Bank

of Nigeria and the Bankers' Committee, which also serves the purpose of boosting job creation in Nigeria, particularly among the youth, in the spheres of fashion, music, movies, and information technology.

9. Education is another key soft power instrument of Nigeria. Thousands of educated Nigerian professionals work in other African countries, in particular as doctors, university lecturers, architects, clergymen, etc. On the other hand, many Nigerians study abroad: they in fact top the list of foreign African students in both the UK and USA. Nigerians also occupy prominent positions in key international organizations, with the most recent example of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who has been elected the Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Nigerians educated both at home and abroad who work in foreign countries in respected professions in effect become soft power ambassadors of their country.

Theoretical and methodological significance of the study. The present study examines the use of soft and hard power approaches to international relations in Africa, with Nigeria's foreign policy serving as an object of a case study. Thereby the study aims at enriching scholarly understanding of the concepts of hard and soft power, especially in the African setting, and may serve as a convenient starting point for future research both on Nigeria's soft and hard power foreign policy instruments and such of other African states. The study also contributes to the development of theory and history of international relations, since it facilitates further use of the knowledge of the history of Nigerian soft power policies in Africa in the 1960s–2020s by concentrating it in one fundamental study. The theoretical significance also lies in the fact that the present findings make it possible to systematize Nigeria's approach to the conceptualization of soft power, to compare Nigeria's soft power policies with those of various other African countries, and identify the main features and the degree of its effectiveness in African states.

**Practical significance of the study.** First and foremost, the present thesis may serve as a guide to the policy makers of African nations in their quest to make effective

strategic decisions that further their country's national interest. The study will also be important for African leaders and decision-makers responsible for conducting regional cooperation and diplomacy. In addition, the work will help in identifying obstacles to the use of soft and hard power by African countries. Finally, the thesis can help Russian foreign policy agencies in determining the optimal mechanisms for cooperation with Nigeria and other African countries, including in the field of public diplomacy. The results of the study can be used to prepare courses on the theory and history of international relations and foreign policy of African countries and Nigeria in particular relations and foreign policy of Nigeria and other African countries.

The reliability and validity of the conclusions of the present research is ensured by a rich and representative source and information base, a systemic approach to the description and analysis of the posed problem and the implementation of research tasks, and the application of different scientific research methods. This enabled the author to ensure the validity and reliability of scientific results. The present work is based on verifiable data and facts, which are also consistent with the papers previously published by the author on the topic of the thesis.

Approbation of the thesis. The main provisions of the research were presented in 7 scientific publications, including two papers published in leading peer-reviewed scholarly journals included in the RUDN University List – *Asia and Africa Today* and *Vestnik RUDN. Series: International Relations*, and one paper in the journal *Reports Scientific Society*, which is indexed in the Web of Science (WoS) database. The author also contributed to a collective monograph by the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and presented various elements of the thesis at a number of scientific conferences.

**Structure of the thesis.** The thesis consists of an introduction, three chapters, conclusion, and the list of used sources and literature.

## Chapter One NIGERIA, 'THE BIG BROTHER OF AFRICA': HARD AND SOFT POWER PERSPECTIVE

#### Introduction

That Nigeria has the capacity to effectively influence decisions of regional consequence is indubitable. Internationally, Nigeria's endowments of human and natural resources, the deeply asymmetrical interactions with neighboring states and the active engagement of successive regimes in the affairs of the continent have called for the country's treatment as a regional power and a pivotal state in West Africa. Without mincing word, O. Tella emphasizes that Nigeria is a force to be reckoned with Africa. Neither can Nigeria be ignored in the global scene. Nigeria's status in the international arena, according to Tella, largely hinges on its economic endowment and military muscle; in other words, its hard power currencies. 104

It is thus argued in this chapter that in the first years of independent development, Nigeria took advantage of its power endowments strategically to facilitate the decolonization of Africa, consolidate Africa's democracy and promote peace and security on the continent. However, policy makers and academics were placing much emphasis on Nigeria's hard power and its role in promoting the country's regional leadership of Africa, while soft power endowments were not paid adequate attention. <sup>105</sup> In this chapter, the present author will examine Nigeria's both hard and soft power capabilities, and also how they were strategically employed in sustaining the country's leading status in Africa yet were not fully and effectively tapped by successive administrations in Abuja.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> Bach D.C. Nigeria's' manifest destiny'in West Africa: Dominance without power // Africa Spectrum. 2007. P. 301-321.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Tella O. Is Nigeria a soft power state? // Social Dynamics. 2018. T. 44. № 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Ibid.

#### 1.1. Hard and Soft Power: A Conceptual Discussion

As Collins Gray puts it, power is one of the most contestable concepts in political theory. 106 It is conventional and convenient to define it as "the ability to effect the outcomes you want and, if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen." In political parlance, as J. Nye specifies, power could be hard or soft. 107 Indeed, literatures are abound on Nigeria's natural, economic, human, military and cultural endowments, its foreign policy and regional influence. <sup>108</sup> Many of these note that Nigeria has significant hard power capabilities and thus exerts considerable regional influence; arguably, Sierra Leone presents a case of using hard power to reinforce soft power. At that instance, the Nigerian military government mobilized the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force to fight Johnny Paul Koromah's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and restored the democratically elected Ahmad Tejan Kabbah government. 109 In other words, Nigeria used coercion to promote globally admired democratic values through a multilateral platform, which constitutes an important example of how hard power reinforces soft power in interstate relations. Even though it sounds ironical for a military government to seek to promote democracy, it is argued here that Nigeria strategically employed hard power during the military dispensation and contributed to the promotion of democracy in African states. The Abacha administration restored Sierra Leonean democratically elected President Kabbah to power after he was toppled in a military coup orchestrated by Major Koromah. 110

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> *Gray C.S.* Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century. Strategic Studies Institute, 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> Nye Jr. J. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. – New York: Public Affairs. 2004. <sup>108</sup> Tella O. Is Nigeria a soft power state? // Social Dynamics. – 2018. – T. 44. –  $N_{\odot}$ . 2.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Obi C. I. Economic community of West African states on the ground: Comparing peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire // African Security. 2009. T. 2. №. 2-3. P. 119-135.

Furthermore, the democratic dispensation of President Obasanjo was instrumental in the reinstatement of President Fradique de Menezes in Sao Tome and Principe after he was removed from office in a coup whilst attending a summit in Nigeria. However, even though Nigeria's soft power endowment should not be underestimated, it has often been neglected by scholars. The present study thus offers a review of hard and soft power instruments and how these have been strategically employed in interstate relations in Africa with Nigeria as a case study. Before the study delves into detail, it is pertinent that we clarify the concept of power and how Nigeria assumes the leading role in Africa due to its hard and soft power endowments.

Hard power as a concept in political theory is used to describe a nation's or political body's ability to use economic incentives or military strength to influence other actors' behaviors. Contemporary scholars in the fields of international relations and public diplomacy, such as J. Nye, identify it explicitly as "the ability to use the *carrots* and *sticks* of economic and military might to make others follow your will." Also, Ernest Wilson describes hard power as the capacity to coerce "another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise." Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon in their work *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security* aptly explain hard power to mean "the application of military power to meet national ends – that is, the deployment of ground troops, naval assets, and precision munitions to secure a vital national objective." 114

The concept of hard power relies on a measure of power propounded by the realist school in international relations theory. The realist school links power with the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> *Odigbo J., Udaw J.E., Igwe A.F.* Regional Hegemony and Leadership Space in Africa: Assessing Nigeria's Prospects and Challenges // Review of History and Political Science. 2014. T. 2. № 1. P. 89-105.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Nye Jr. J. Power in the global information age: From realism to globalization. – Routledge, 2004. <sup>113</sup> Wilson III E. J. Hard power, soft power, smart power // The annals of the American academy of Political and Social Science. 2008. T. 616. № 1. P. 110-124.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> Campbell K.M., O'Hanlon M.E. Hard power: The new politics of national security. Basic Books (AZ), 2006. P. 7.

possession of certain tangible resources, including population, territory, natural resources, economic and military strength, among others.<sup>115</sup> Hard power is thus defined by a nation's use of such resources to spur the behavior of other entities.

Historically, the concept of hard power seems to have been introduced in Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince*, where he states that "the principal foundations of all states ... are good laws and good armies." A prince, thus, to Machiavelli, must not have "any other object nor any other thought ... but war, its institutions, and its discipline." Several other scholars and statesmen in history expanded this concept as a strategic policy approach. For example, Hans Morgenthau emphasizes the use of coercive force in enumerating political power: "In international politics in particular, armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation." While Henry Kissinger suggests that "what is possible (for a state) depends on its resources, geographic position and determination, and on the resources, determination and domestic structure of other states." 118

It is infer from the above definitions that hard power strategies include a wide range of measures geared toward coercing or threatening other entities into compliance. These measures, as explained by J. Nye above, include the use of "sticks" such as the threat of a military assault or the implementation of an economic embargo; they might also include the use of "carrots" such as the promise of military protection or the reduction of trade barriers.

However, critics have objected that it is the former which is often stressed; in other words, the "stick" is preferred over the "carrot." Thus, according to Campbell and O'Hanlon, hard power tactics tend to overemphasize military intervention, economic

 $<sup>^{115}</sup>$  Nye Jr.J. The changing nature of world power // Political Science Quarterly. 1990. T. 105. № 2. P. 177-192.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Cahn S.M. Classics of modern political theory: Machiavelli to Mill. 1997. P. 22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> *Morgenthau H.J.* Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Kaplan R.D. Kissinger, Metternich, and realism // Atlantic Monthly. 1999. T. 283. № 6. P. 72-80.

sanctions, and coercive diplomacy.<sup>119</sup> While the use of hard power may serve to induce compliance, it also presents some glaring shortcomings with regard to its wielder's legitimacy and credibility. J. Nye was quick to point out that hard power strategies that do not take into account a country's international image may have serious consequences.<sup>120</sup> He states further that if a country's credibility abroad deteriorates there is the tendency for the attitude of mistrust creep in. Hence excessive usage of the hard power approach can diminish international cooperation to the extent that the country's capacity to reach its objectives is damaged. A good illustration of this case is the consequences of American reliance on hard power in removing Saddam Hussein from power and the handling of the subsequent crisis in Iraq, which provide an unfortunate example.<sup>121</sup> Polling data reveal growing anti-Americanism and disillusionment with U.S. foreign policy. Worldwide opinion has mobilized against the United States and its exercise of hard power in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has in turn inhibited the U.S.'s capacity to attain its policy goals on many fronts.<sup>122</sup>

Hard power, as we have seen, is achieved through military threat or use, and by means of economic menace or reward. In recent years, however, such coercive methods have gradually and partly been substituted with the power of attraction and admiration, which entail soft power. O. Ogunnubi and C. Isike<sup>123</sup> emphasize the fact that a major requirement for regional power status in the modern global order is the location and deployment of soft power attributes, which may range from culture, political ideology and diplomacy to sporting achievements, foreign policy articulation, tourism, media exports and language. Soft power as drawn from the above inference is the ability to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Kaplan R.D. Kissinger, Metternich, and realism // Atlantic Monthly. 1999. T. 283. № 6. P. 72-80.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> Nye Jr.J. The Decline of America's Soft Power // Council of Foreign Affairs, May/June. 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> Global Unease with Major World Powers // Pew Research Center, 27 June 2007. URL: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2007/06/27/global-unease-with-major-world-powers (accessed: 01.04.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> *Ogunnubi O., Isike C.* Nigeria's soft power sources: Between potential and illusion? // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 2018. T. 31. № 1. P. 49-67.

have influence by co-opting others to share some of one's values and, as a consequence, to share some key elements on one's agenda for international order and security. Soft power involves those tools in a state's arsenal that do not punish, reward, or threaten other actors into the preferred course of action but rather attract them so that they are more likely to act in accordance with the wishes of the state.

The Oxford Dictionary defines soft power as "a persuasive approach to international relations, typically involving the use of economic or cultural influence." <sup>124</sup> Indeed, the concept of soft power is centuries old. The concept of the use of culture, literature, language and other forms of non-military propagation to bolster one's public image with his neighbors goes back hundreds if not thousands of years. The famous Chinese strategist Sun Tzu's seminal work, *Art of War*, considers it a fundamental objective to win through utilizing statecraft but not using force. Confucius maintained that soft power is a best paradigm of attraction and particularly depends on leaders. Franklin D. Roosevelt advocated for a new dimension of foreign policy to focus on promoting freedom of speech, religion and other freedoms to gain influence in the international arena, which re-echoes the concept of soft power.

Joseph Nye is credited with the introduction of the theoretical concept of soft power into the theory of International Relations. He described soft power as a power of persuasion and co-option which is exercised to wield influence (i.e. attract) on others with the help of appealing ideas such as democracy, human rights and certain cultural norms. <sup>125</sup> J. Nye linked successes of the French government since as early as the 17th century to the propagation of French culture and, especially, language to such an extent that French became a language of culture and diplomacy. <sup>126</sup> According to J. Nye, during the French Revolution, France sought to appeal over the heads of governments directly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> "Soft Power" // Dictionaries O. British & World English. – Oxford University Press. 2018. URL: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com (accessed: 04.05.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> Farwa U., Garewal G.A. An Analysis of UN Peacekeeping as Pakistan's Soft Power Asset // NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability (NJIPS). 2018. T. 1. № 2. P. 91-102.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> Nye Jr. J. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. 2004.

to foreign populations by promoting its revolutionary ideology. After its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, the French government sought to repair the nation's shattered prestige by promoting its language and literature through the Alliance Française, which was created in 1883." Today, popular culture, media, educational and cultural exchanges are the key sources of soft power.

N. Wesley explains the term soft power as *public diplomacy*. <sup>128</sup> He links the term to international diplomacy as propagated by the U.S., which dates back to the end of the World War II. The U.S. during this period found itself catapulted into a new position on the scene of international diplomacy. The U.S. therefore decided to use the philosophy of soft power as a way of maintaining and expanding its influence. Soft power was used as a kind of "preventive tool" to spread a good image of America in places where it had never before ventured. In parallel or maybe in unison, the USSR also began to consider the idea of indirect non-military influence as an effective form of diplomacy. The U.S. and its archrival, the USSR, were therefore not only competing in the world geopolitically and militarily, but also on a "soft" or cultural level. Nowhere was this battle more intense than in the Third World – a term also developed after the WWII to signify countries that were "less developed" than the U.S. and most countries in Europe. <sup>129</sup>

Whereas hard power obliges its addressees to consider their interests in terms mainly of calculable costs and benefits, but principally the former, soft power works through the persuasive potency of ideas that foreigners find attractive. <sup>130</sup> The concept of soft power, that is the influence attained through the co-option of foreigners by the attractiveness of our values, ideas, and practices, understandably has great appeal in a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> Wesley N. The successes of soft power in international relation. A thesis submitted to the Univerzita Karlova V Praze Fakulta Sociálních Věd Institut mezinárodních studií. 2015. P. 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> *Gray C.S.* Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century. Strategic Studies Institute, 2011.

nation's foreign policy. Soft power is typically much cheaper than the use of military force, and its use is more compatible with many cultures. In analyzing hard and soft power of a state, its human potential, economic status and cultural values cannot be overemphasized.

#### Nigeria's Hard and Soft Power Arsenal

Nigeria, as B.I. Abiodun aptly put it, is a Federal constitutional republic born out of colonialism in 1914.<sup>131</sup> Prior to this date, as historical reports reveal, there was no country called "Nigeria"; what is now known as "Nigeria," according to S.E. Liolio, consisted of 4 different "empires", some of them stretching into parts that are not part of current-day Nigeria, like parts of present-day Ghana, and present-day Cameroon. <sup>132</sup> On Nigeria's territory in the past there were four major political entities, which were The Northern (Hausa) Empire, The Calabar Kingdom, the Yoruba Empire and the Kingdom of Benin. With the scramble for the continent and its subsequent partition by the Europeans in the later part of the 19th century, these empires were destroyed. In 1914, Lord Lugard, the then British High Commissioner, amalgamated the Southern and Northern Protectorates to form what his wife, Flora Shaw, named Nigeria. <sup>133</sup>

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is commonly described as the "Giant of Africa", with one out of every four Africans being Nigerian and with predictions that it will overtake the U.S. in population size by 2050.<sup>134</sup> It is also the largest economy in Africa, having recently overtaken South Africa, driven by its rich supplies of natural resources

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> Abiodun B.I. Activities Of Boko Haram Movement/Terrorist Group As A Threat To Regional Security In West Africa (2009-2016): дис. Moscow: People's Friendship University (RUDN), 2016. P. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> *Liolio S.E.* Rethinking counterinsurgency: A case study of Boko Haram in Nigeria // Unpublished Masters thesis, European Peace University, Austria. 2013.

<sup>133</sup> Abiodun B.I. Activities Of Boko Haram Movement/Terrorist Group As A Threat To Regional Security In West Africa (2009-2016): дис. Moscow: People's Friendship University (RUDN), 2016. P. 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Walker T., Eddington D. Getting to know the giant of Africa: opportunities for brands in Nigeria // TNS, n.d. URL: https://www.slideshare.net/TNSGlobal/getting-to-know-the-giant-of-africa-aw (accessed: 02.04.2021).

and, more recently, its growing retail, telecoms and financial services industries. A large part of West African economic activity is concentrated in Nigeria. Cross-border activities closely link southern Niger to the Hausa economy; Benin and Togo benefit from the major economic activity between Lagos and Ibadan; Cameroon and Chad's economies are also strongly oriented towards the Nigerian market. Nigeria has an important economic influence on the entire region, including the Franc Zone, where it has increasingly been making investments (and particularly in the banking sector). The stock exchange in Lagos is the only large-scale financial trading centre in the region. Nigeria is also the largest cereal and meat producer in West Africa. Agriculture accounts for almost one third of GDP and about two-thirds of employment, but the oil industry remains the key economic sector. While the country possesses great industrial potential, Nigeria remains highly dependent on oil exports and struggles to develop sufficient refining and production capacities to meet its domestic energy needs.

The activities of Nigerian multinational corporations are also worth noting. Companies such as Dangote Group, Globacom Telecommunications, First Bank, and Zenith banks are not only amongst the most valuable, but also amongst the most admired companies in Africa. For example, according to the 2020 Brand Africa Ranking, Nigerian services were well-represented in the list of top financial brands, with Nigeria's GTB and First Bank taking the number one and two spots correspondingly. Nigeria's Glo telecom, as well as Dangote, a leading multinational corporation with sugar, flour, and oil & gas subsidiaries, came in on top as the highest-ranking African entry. The Chairman of Dangote Group, Aliko Dangote, is the richest person in Africa and has become a powerful figure in the international arena. He was ranked the 41st most influential individual in the world in the Bloomberg Market 50 Most Influential, a list that includes names like Xi Jinping, Barrack Obama,

 $<sup>^{135}</sup>$  *Liolio S.E.* Rethinking counterinsurgency: A case study of Boko Haram in Nigeria // Unpublished Masters thesis, European Peace University, Austria. 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> Brand Africa, 2021. URL: https://www.brandafrica.org (accessed: 02.04.2021).

Angela Merkel and Christine Largade.<sup>137</sup> It should be recalled also that in the 2015 Brand Africa survey, Dangote was described as the "Brand Builder of the Year", while First Bank was the most admired company in the financial sector. With 11% of the 100 most admired world brands in Africa, Nigeria was ranked second after the U.S. (21%), ahead of the UK, Japan, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. Its closest rivals on the continent were South Africa and Kenya, which significantly lagged behind, with each accounting for 4%.<sup>138</sup>

It is thus not surprising that the country surged ahead of South Africa as the largest economy in Africa in mid-2014, following the recalibration of its GDP. These companies significantly contributed to this status. Aside from the fact that these transnational corporations appeal to consumers who communicate through Nigerian mobile telecommunications networks, drink Nigerian-made beer, transact via Nigerian banks, consume food made in the country, and construct buildings with Nigerian cement, their economic gains guarantee Nigeria's high economic status. In light of its dwindling oil revenue, the activities of these companies are critical to the sustenance of Nigeria's newly found status.

As the largest military power in the region, Nigeria strategically uses this hard power endowment to play a central role in the ECOWAS efforts to end the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS headquarters are based in Abuja. Accordingly, Nigeria possesses all attributes of a hard power state and simply can't be ignored in any serious discussion about the future of Africa. This is because in so many ways, what happens in Nigeria and what happens in Africa are interchangeable.

Contemporary analysis of Nigeria's regional and continental power profile is almost entirely focused on economic and military aspects. However, an objective

The Bloomberg 50 // Bloomberg, 2020. URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020-bloomberg-50 (accessed: 02.04.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> Brand Africa, 2021. URL: https://www.brandafrica.org (accessed: 02.04.2021).

Nigeria // OECD, n.d. URL: https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/Nigeria\_e-version\_en\_light.pdf

account of Nigeria's power portfolio would be incomplete without a careful estimation of its soft power potential and influence. <sup>140</sup> Indeed, an assessment of the country's soft power resources in the form of culture, political values and foreign policy reveals that Nigeria can indeed use these co-optive platforms to mitigate the negative contradictions that dampen its regional power status in Africa.

When it comes to arts and entertainment, Nigeria is claimed to be unequalled in achievements. 141 Nigeria's Wole Soyinka was the first African Nobel Laureate in Literature. Also, Chinua Achebe's book, *Things Fall Apart*, has been described as Africa's most popular and bestselling literary piece. Nigeria can also boast of other literary giants such as J.P. Clark, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie and Femi Osofisan. Nigeria's movie industry, Nollywood, is the second largest producer of movies in the world. The achievements of the Nigerian music, fashion and comedy industry cannot be overstated. The country has produced world renowned artistes such as Fela Anikulapo Kuti, Femi Kuti, King Sunny Ade, Asa, Tu Face, P Square, D Banj and, more recently, WizKid and Davido.

Many popular U.S. and British artists are of Nigerian origin, including such movie stars as Chiwetel Ejiofor, Hakeem Kae-Kazim, Adewale Akinnuoye-Agbaje and others. Musicians like Seal, Sade Adu, Simon Webbe (Blue) Tunde Baiyewu (Lighthouse Family), etc., have earned tremendous acclaim the West. Some of these artists have used their influence to promote Nigerian culture. For instance, Simon Webbe has used Yoruba (a Nigerian language) lines in its lyrics, while Jidenna wore African traditional clothes and employed Nigerian Pidgin English. 142 Such personalities thus challenge the negative stereotypes of drug dealers and criminals that are often associated with Nigerians.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> *Ogunnubi O., Isike C.* Nigeria's soft power sources: Between potential and illusion? // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 2018. T. 31. № 1. P. 49-67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> Is Nigeria still the 'giant of Africa'? // Guardian, 11.09.2017. URL: https://guardian.ng/opinion/is-nigeria-still-the-giant-of-africa (accessed: 03.04.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> Tella O. Is Nigeria a soft power state? // Social Dynamics. 2018. T. 44. № 2.

Nigeria's rich and diverse cultural history further augments its soft power attractiveness as it appeals to Africans' sense of pride and self-belief. Between 500 BC and 200 AD, people from the Southern Zaria and Benue areas of central Nigeria achieved a high degree of cultural sophistication via their knowledge of iron smelting, wherein they adorned themselves with tin and stone beads, earrings, nose rings and bracelets, which became known as the Nok culture; the Igbo-Ukwu people instituted bronze casting of staff heads, crowns, breastplates, pendants, ornaments, anklets, wristlets and chains in a small village near Awka dating from 19th century AD; and at about the same time the Igbo-Ukwu were casting bronze, the Ife were producing works in bronze, copper, and terracotta, which created a great stir among Eurocentric art critics and historians who had been unaccustomed to such naturalism in African art – such as that found among the Benin antiquities. <sup>143</sup> In sum, Nigeria's soft power assets have the potential to reinforce the country's regional leadership status.

#### Foreign Policy: The Foundation of Nigeria's Hard Power Strategy

Nigeria's foreign policy is anchored on Africa as its centerpiece. Nigeria has strategically used its hard power to accomplish the goal of becoming the "Big Brother" of Africa at least on the regional level. 144 Nigeria in its foreign policy strategy since 1960 emphasizes its quest to employ it hard and soft power to take up the leading role of Africa. It is stressed here, as inferred from the theory of political realism, that the primary role of national interest cannot be ruled out. According to S. Folarin, every role a nation plays or does not play in international politics is galvanized by well-articulated national interests. 145 In any case, successive Nigerian governments, especially under military rule, strove to assume or claim such a leadership position through foreign policy declarations and actions and other modes of international engagements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> Zulu I. M. Nigeria: The Giant of Africa // Journal of Pan African Studies. 2009. T. 3. № 3. P. 1-3. <sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> Folarin S.F. National role conceptions and Nigeria's African policy, 1985-2007: дис. Covenant University, 2010.

Renowned and leading scholars in the field of international relations have in their works provided helpful and usable clarification of the concept of Foreign Policy. O. Adeniji, for example, sees it as a projection of the country's national interest into the trans-national arena, and the consequent interaction of one with the other. To S. Tyoden, it is the measures consciously designed and put in place by a government for the attainment of specific goals and objectives in the international system. A. Rizwan's opinion, foreign policy of a nation is the various ways in which the central governments of sovereign states relate to each other and to the global system in order to achieve various goals or objectives.

The foundation of Nigeria's Big Brother role in Africa was expressly and officially laid in the addresses of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria's first Prime Minister and Head of Government between October 1960 and January 1966. These include: Balewa's address in the House of Representative on 20th August, 1960; his Independence Day address on 1st October, 1960, as well as his acceptance speech on the occasion of Nigeria's accession to membership of the United Nations in New York on 8th October, 1960. These various addresses fundamentally point out the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy, which are basically anchored on the promotion of Nigeria's national interests. Importantly, at independence, Prime Minster Balewa enunciated four broad principles that would underpin Nigeria's foreign policy and external relations. 149 These include that:

a) It is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all nations and to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organization;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Adeniji O. Essays on Nigerian foreign policy, governance, and international security. Dokun Publishing House, 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> Tyoden S.G. Nigeria, Political Economy and Foreign Policy, 1960-1983. Jos University Press, 1989. C. 59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> Rizwan A. (Ed.) An Introduction to Foreign Policy: Definition, Nature & Determinants. 2009. URL: http://amerrizwan.blogspot.com/2009/08/introduction-to-foreign-policy.html (accessed: 02.05.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> Fawole W.A. Nigeria's external relations and foreign policy under military rule, 1966-1999. Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003.

- b) Nigeria, a large and populous country of over thirty five millions (as at then), has absolutely no territorial or expansionist intentions;
- c) Nigeria shall not forget its old friends and is proud to have been accepted as a member of the Commonwealth, but, nevertheless, Nigeria does not intend to align itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. Nigeria is committed to the principles upon which the United Nations Organization is founded; and lastly,
- d) Nigeria hopes to work with other African states for the progress of Africa and to assist in bringing all African territories to a state of responsible independence. <sup>150</sup>

The fourth principle as enunciated above expressly indicates the willingness of Nigeria to take a lead role in Africa's development. Indeed, this is where the concept of African policy in Nigeria's foreign relations stems from. Successive administrations have ever since regarded Africa as the focus of Nigeria's foreign policy.

Commenting on Nigeria's foreign policy, D. Omo-Ogbebor maintains that the main features of the policy towards the West African region are anchored on the three doctrinal concepts, namely:

- 1. African center-piece perspective;
- 2. the concentric circle model which outlines the following: anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid, and anti-racism principles;
- 3. cooperation with immediate neighbors and with other ECOWAS member states and promotion of peace.<sup>151</sup>

From the above foreign policy breakdown, it is argued that Nigeria undertakes right from the onset to assume the leadership role of Africa by making use of its hard and soft power endowment.

Leadership is a universal phenomenon. It involves the attainment of societal or group objectives. For groups or states to achieve their set objectives, there is the need

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> Fawole W.A. Nigeria's external relations and foreign policy under military rule, 1966-1999. Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> *Omo-Ogbebor D.O.* Nigerian foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS // Journal of Human Sciences. 2017. T. 14. № 4. P. 4016.

to believe in the leader. This means that leadership as a concept is vital to organizations and societies. A leader ordinarily is perceived as one that has primary authority and responsibility to plan, guide, control persons or institutions in a way to execute and achieve the societal or organizational goals. A leader harnesses, combines and manages men and resources to achieve specified goals. He or she is the protagonist in the chain of the organizational activities. Leadership motivates, but it does not rely on coercive measures. Any leader, be he an individual or an entity, occupies the primary place in the activities, operations and actions of groups, societies or states. Leadership is a relationship between the leader and the led. <sup>152</sup> Thus, the leader influences the behavior of the followers. In effect, leadership is an act of getting things done by others. A leader thus must possess the power and charisma to influence the actions of the led.

In international diplomacy, a leading state must not only have the requisite hard or soft power assets, but it must also be able to strategically apply these soft and hard power resources to influence and/or control the actions of other entities. To have an indepth understanding of the driving force that propels Nigeria's assumption of the leadership role in Africa's affair, it is imperative in this study to briefly address the interrelationship between state's role conception and foreign policy as analyzed by scholars.

### Nigeria's Role Conception as the 'Big Brother' of Africa

According to S. Folarin, a state's role conception in international relation is considered as the moving force of foreign policy.<sup>153</sup> Some scholars have even tagged it as the "foreign policy makers" perception of their nation positions in the international

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> Adigbuo E.R. Nigeria's Leadership Role Quests: The Race of the Crippled // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 155-156.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> Folarin S.F. National role conceptions and Nigeria's African policy, 1985-2007: дис. – Covenant University, 2010.

system.<sup>154</sup> Leadership role conception includes perceptions of the general kinds of decisions, rules, commitments, and long-term functions associated with these international positions. It provides norms, standards and guidelines which affect many aspects of decision making.<sup>155</sup> Holsti, as cited by E. Adigbuo, sees state's leadership role conception as duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relations with states in a particular region.<sup>156</sup> The inference from the foregoing is that role conceptions are guiding principles which are then translated into policies.

It is part of the United States' policy for example, to constantly checkmate what it has designated as "Axis of Evil" because it has conceived and assumed the role of the leader of the "Allies for Good". The international system is characterized by its unpredictability, keen competition and anarchy. National leaders thus tend to carefully and clearly identify the roles of its state in such an unpredictable and competitive global scene. According to S. Folarin, the role policies of every state are always sharply anchored on their national ideology (if they have one), their state's natural resources, industrial capacity, etc. 157

How does the above narrative apply to Nigeria? For Nigeria, national role conceptions vary over time and across borders. Each regime comes up with its own rhetoric of "unique roles" Nigeria would occupy in Africa. Nigeria's struggle, perception cum assumption of the 'Big Brother' role in Africa is not unconnected with the perceptions of the founding fathers from the eve of independence, and a product of certain other geographical factors. <sup>158</sup> The nationalists which include Nnamdi Azikiwe,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> Wish N.B. Foreign policy makers and their national role conceptions // International Studies Quarterly. 1980. T. 24. № 4. P. 532.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>155</sup> Folarin S.F. National role conceptions and Nigeria's African policy, 1985-2007: дис. – Covenant University, 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> Adigbuo E.R. Nigeria's Leadership Role Quests: The Race of the Crippled // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 156.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> Folarin S.F. National role conceptions and Nigeria's African policy, 1985-2007: дис. – Covenant University, 2010.

158 Ibid.

Herbert Macaulay, Obafemi Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro, Aminu Kano, Ahmadu Bello, and Tafawa Balewa, to mention a few, viewed Nigeria as a nation naturally created to fill the roles of leadership in Africa and the world. O. Ikimi observes that the foreign policy outlooks of these nationalists, which characterized their basis for independence movement, in the first place were premised on the historical factors of the making of Nigeria itself. This factor was the merger of the great nations and empires of the Western Sudan and the Forest Region of the pre-colonial era, including Kanem Bornu, Benin, Oyo, Nupe, Kano, Kororofa, Sakwatto, Itsekiri, and Ijaw. 159 Other factors included the civility, maturity, and political wisdom in struggling for and earning independence. This was considered to have served as a model for other nations under colonial rule. Other factors that informed the Nigeria's Big Brother (leadership) role conceptions by these founding fathers included Nigeria's huge population (as of 2021 – of over two hundred and nine million persons 160, but also relatively large at the independence); its wealth (indeed, Nigeria has huge gas reserves and is supposedly the seventh largest oil producing country in the world. Nigeria is also the biggest economic and trading partner to the West and Asian countries like China); and its rich cultural heritage. The perceptions of the past have been strengthened by the increasing population, making Nigeria the most populous black nation in the world, and by its oil fortunes, which place it as one of the richest countries of the world in terms of export revenues. The first instinct of Nigeria was therefore to occupy the centre of African affairs: use its resources, influence, and power to reach great bargains and further its interests, assume leadership positions and become the voice of the continent, and assist needy nations of the entire black world. These three-prong roles have underlined the foreign policy towards Africa and earned for Nigeria the international label of a champion of Afrocentrism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> *Ikimi. O.* In Search of Nigerians. – Presidential Address of the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN), Benin, Nigeria, 1985.

Nigeria // World Population Review, 2021. URL: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population (accessed: 02.04.2021).

Nigeria's quest for leadership in Africa is based on certain criteria: its hard and soft power – economic potential, sprawling demographics in human and material resources, and the use of soft power, particularly to help decolonize Africa's dependent territories and settle its conflicts. Nigeria's Afrocentrism has been the kernel of its foreign policy since independence. African as used here means the focus on African values. It is the conception that the people of African descent need to develop an appreciation of the achievements of traditional African civilizations; indeed, they need to articulate their own history and their own system of values. To achieve its national interest couched in Afrocentric terms, Nigeria developed the doctrine of concentric circle that begins with safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the innermost circle, followed by its interests towards the immediate West African neighbors in the second circle, and its interests in other African states and the world at the third and fourth circles.

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria's efforts have been geared towards engendering an enduring peace, security, unity, brotherhood and brotherliness towards Africa and the entire black race, 163 and lately good governance, poverty reduction, diseases control and development in the region, with the focus on Africa underlining its foreign policy. The concentric doctrine enables Nigeria to pursue its leadership position in the continent and the entire world. It is in recognition of Nigeria's potentials that immediately after its 1960 independence, Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations Secretary-General, appointed a Nigerian, General Aguiyi Ironsi as the African to command the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo. Nigeria also chaired for over two decades the United Nations Special committee against Apartheid. Nigeria implemented its role in championing the cause of the black race as it stood against the French

Nigeria // World Population Review, 2021. URL: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population (accessed: 02.04.2021).

Afrocentrism // Britannica, 2021. URL: https://www.britannica.com/event/Afrocentrism (accessed: 02.02.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> King M. C. Basic currents of Nigerian foreign policy. – Howard University Press, 1996.

government's atomic test in the Sahara desert, even when such a position was at odds with its economic survival as an emergent nation.<sup>164</sup>

State leaders with an ideological orientation are more likely to often come up with clearly defined national roles. This is because ideology, as S. Folarin rightly explains, represents a set of principles that are governing sociability and decision making. This means that a state without an ideology could still have its national roles, but they may not be as clearly defined because the policymakers would not have a framework with which to conceive state's roles. <sup>165</sup> The process of figuring out national roles would be described as the conception, which involves how they are identified and who identifies them. National ideology may thus enable conception of national roles as national roles complement national interest accomplishment. From the analyses of other scholars, Folarin highlights factors that promote a nation's perception of its national role in the international scene to include:

- a) National interest a set of rationally thought out and articulated objectives a state seeks to actualize in the international system. National interest also accommodates expectations of the domestic public;
- a) National capabilities (hard power) the calculated strengths a state has, which give it an edge over others and favorably position it in a bargaining situation;
- b) Attitudes and values (soft power) a set of national cultural traits, ethnic and religious values, which shape a state's foreign policy;
- c) Personality needs the subjective perceptions of policy makers of what a national role should be based on, including domestic needs, critical international needs and personal desires of the leaders;
- d) Systemic prescriptions and expectations of other governments the compelling forces from outside a domestic environment, including international law,

 $<sup>^{164}</sup>$  Folarin S.F. National role conceptions and Nigeria's African policy, 1985-2007: дис. — Covenant University, 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> Ibid.

critical events or trends in the external environment, including nuclear proliferation and conflicts.<sup>166</sup>

All of these constitute the core of a nation's hard and soft power. The role conception idea as examined here is germane to this study because it gives insight into the driving force that foster Nigeria's quest for the Big Brother leadership role in Africa's affairs. O. Iweala's aptly captures this multifaceted assistance Nigeria renders as a Big Brother to other African States as follows:

When there are crises, the (African) countries have looked up to Nigeria to be an arbitrator. If you are the older brother, the stronger brother or sister, you have to help those who come after you. It is engraved in our cultural approach to the pursuit of our foreign [policy] objectives.<sup>167</sup>

#### 1.2. ECOWAS: Nigeria's Principal Hard Power Conduit

The signing of the ECOWAS treaty took place on 28 May 1975 in Lagos by the Heads of State and Government of 15 founding member countries, namely Nigeria, Liberia, Togo, Ghana, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Ivory Coast, Guinea, Gambia, Benin, Niger, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Mali. Following the signing of the Treaty, Republic of Cape Verde joined as the 16th member state in 1977, while Mauritania left the organization in 2000 to rejoin it in 2017 as an associate member, but nevertheless bringing the total back down to 15. 168

The formation of ECOWAS is another demonstration of the quest for regional leadership on the part of Nigeria. As J.H. Price puts it, the foreign policy of a state

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> Folarin S.F. National role conceptions and Nigeria's African policy, 1985-2007: дис. – Covenant University, 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> As cited in: Adigbuo E. R. Nigeria's Leadership Role Quests: The Race of the Crippled // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 156.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> Onyia F.O. Nigeria and ECOWAS: A Study of the Obstacles to Nigeria's Implementation of ECOWAS Protocols. Master's thesis, University of Nigeria, January 1993.

reflects its personality. <sup>169</sup> As an inter-governmental regional organization, the role of ECOWAS as a facilitator of Nigeria's foreign policy cannot be overemphasized. Nigeria's effort in this regard was to prove its ability to play a larger role in the international community beyond the West African region. Indeed, the end of the bipolar world in the 1990s created the platform for regional state actors to play more active role in regional affairs. <sup>170</sup> This can be said to also promote Nigeria's influence in West African regional affairs. Nigeria's foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS, as scholars have observed, is basically through its bilateral and multilateral diplomatic dealing with state actors in regional affairs. <sup>171</sup> This aligns with the definition of foreign policy as given by Business Dictionary, which sets it out as a plan of action adopted by one nation regarding its diplomatic dealings with other countries. <sup>172</sup>

Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy approach was aptly demonstrated and consolidated during and after the creation of ECOWAS. This accounts for why Nigeria was determined to play the lead role in the newly formed organization and to preserve its supposed Big Brother status in the West African subregion. D. Omo-Ogbebor notes that the prevailing circumstances in West Africa also influenced the kind of foreign policy Nigerian adopted towards ECOWAS. Indeed, Nigeria had to actively respond to the frequent political instabilities across the West African region because of incessant military coups, religious intolerance and lack of social-economic development. These were compounded by the struggle for supremacy between Anglophone and Francophone countries in the region due to their colonial experience.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> Price J.H. Political Institutions in West Africa. Hutchinson of London, 1975. P. 181.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> Ogu S. et al. An Assessment of Nigeria's Foreign Policy under the Administration Goodluck Jonathan in Relation with ECOWAS. – A B.Sc research project submitted to the Department of International Relations/Political Science, Godfrey Okoye University, 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> *Omo-Ogbebor D.O.* Nigerian foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS // Journal of Human Sciences. 2017. T. 14. № 4. P. 4017-4018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> As cited in: Omo-Ogbebor D. O. Nigerian foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS // Journal of Human Sciences. 2017. T. 14. № 4. P. 4018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> Ogu S. et al. An Assessment of Nigeria's Foreign Policy under the Administration Goodluck Jonathan in Relation with ECOWAS. A B. Sc research project submitted to the Department of International Relations/Political Science, Godfrey Okoye University, 2018.

The long years of military rule in Nigeria also contributed to Nigeria's active involvement in pursuing its goal as the Big Brother of the region through the ECOWAS treaty. Nigeria was governed by military rulers throughout almost all formative years of ECOWAS. During these military era, Nigeria's status as a non-democratic country under military regime dictated its foreign policy directions towards ECOWAS and the West African regional integration process.<sup>174</sup>

The constant unconstitutional change of government was the hallmark of ECOWAS member states during its formative years. This was worsening the political and security situation in the region. According to D. Omo-Ogbebor, this is why the issue of political stability and security became the major matter that dominated the activities of ECOWAS in the 1980s and 1990s instead of economic integration and the primary reason ECOWAS was formed. Nigerian foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS during this period – under the military rule – placed emphasis on security in the region rather than economic advancement. According to T. Danjuma, this form of policy direction can also be said to have an economic undertone. In his opinion, the assumption that Nigeria believed West African instability is a function of poverty and underdevelopment cannot be ruled out. <sup>175</sup> In solving what appeared purely a political problem, the economic dimension of the issues was also addressed. It should be noted once again that Nigeria's approach towards ECOWAS regional agenda has been guided by its foreign policy directions formulated by the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In Omo-Ogbebor's assessment, the doctrine of "Reciprocity in Nigerian Foreign Policy", formulated during Ibrahim Babangida' rule, was Nigeria's initial step towards having a well-designed foreign policy template. <sup>176</sup> According to it, various components

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>174</sup> *Omo-Ogbebor D.O.* Nigerian foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS // Journal of Human Sciences. 2017. T. 14. № 4. P. 4018-4020.

Danjuma T.Y. Nigeria's Security Role in West Africa. 2003. URL: http://www.onlinenigeria.com/finance/?blurb=44 (accessed: 02.04.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> Akinyemi A.B. et al. Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1989.

of a country's national security interests have a systemic relationship. A nation which does not have economic security can thus, at best, only provide temporary relief from internal subversion and external aggression. Similarly, a nation without political stability cannot provide the framework for sustained economic growth and development. The doctrine of "Reciprocity in Nigerian Foreign Policy" was the first serious effort made in identifying and defining Nigeria's national interest in political, economic, social and security terms. The doctrine further formulated strategies and instruments for realizing the goals.

Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy objectives have allowed it to participate in various ECOWAS regional programs to give credence to the West African regional integration process, which has led to the signing of many ECOWAS laws, treaties, protocol agreements and conventions to advance the development and economic growth of the region. Nigeria's active role in ECOWAS is a direct response to its foreign policy plans to accommodate the burden of its West African neighbors, to support ECOWAS specific fields of regional initiatives, and to advance the developmental goal of the region which is also in line with the UN call for countries to get involved in regional cooperation and promote free trade, common market, political stability, security of lives and properties, humanitarian and cultural cooperation.

Nevertheless, during the military regime of Muhammadu Buhari in 1983-1985, Nigeria made an attempt to create a synergy with its three neighbors to the West – Benin, Ghana, and Togo – with whom a multilateral agreement was signed to promote cooperation among the four countries in the areas of economic, security and culture in line with ECOWAS topmost regional agenda of integrating the member states. According to J. Wachuku, at the time Nigerian foreign policy was characterized by a focus on Africa and by the attachment to several fundamental principles – African unity and independence, capability to exercise hegemonic influence in the region, peaceful

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> Akinyemi A.B. et al. Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1989. P. 5.

settlement of disputes, non-alignment and non-intentional interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and regional economic cooperation and development.<sup>178</sup>

On May 29, 1999 Nigeria successfully returned to civil rule. The election of Olusegun Obasanjo as President of Nigeria kick started the fourth republic following thirty-five years of military rule. At that point, the 1999 constitution outlined Nigeria's priorities within ECOWAS regional agenda. The Constitution in section 19 projects a dynamic foreign policy for Nigeria through the promotion of economic development, integration and unity, peace and security in West Africa, Africa, and the world. This brought hope and relieve to Nigerians and international community, especially ECOWAS member states, because as an assumed regional leader, it is supposed to lead by example, so the fact that Nigeria returned to democratic rule gave credibility and legal ground to ECOWAS' protocols on democracy and good governance.

O. Obasanjo's tenure as President of Nigeria witnessed a proactive response to foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS. President Olusegun Obasanjo in his inaugural speech in 1999 reiterated that the country's position as Africa's regional power should be sustained and extended. He emphasized the need for Nigeria to remain active at the center stage of international affairs; correspondingly, he said as follows;

"We shall pursue a dynamic foreign policy to promote friendly relations with all nations and will continue to play a constructive role in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and other international bodies. We shall continue to honor existing agreements between Nigeria and other countries. It is our determination

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> Wachukwu A. Establishing Nigeria's Foreign Policy Identity // Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria. – 1961. – C. 20; Document on the Establishment of the Nigerian Foreign Policy Identity. – Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria, February 24, 1961.

Federal Republic of Nigeria. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. – 1999.

ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy. – ECOWAS, 2001. URL: http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350\_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20 Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf (accessed: 02.04.2020).

to restore Nigeria fully to her previous prestigious position in the community of nations." 181

The contents of Obasanjo's inaugural speech imply that Africa continued to attract the attention of Nigeria's foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the promotion of ECOWAS' regional agenda, development, peace and security. His administration made frantic efforts to project Nigerian image abroad through its various foreign policy initiatives, particularly in its participation in ECOWAS programs and decision making. 182 Obasanjo's administration, especially in his first term in office, was determined to translate the country's soft power advantages into practical rewards and benefits both for the country and for Africa at large. Apart from Nigerian foreign policy quest of promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts in the West African subregion, President Obasanjo saw the need to use Nigeria's newfound democratic credentials to promote democratic values in ECOWAS member states and beyond. Through this foreign policy initiative, Nigeria actively resisted all forms of military encroachment into the politics of ECOWAS member states, particularly so in the cases of Guinea, Niger, Burkina Faso, and even the one of Sao Tome and Principe (though not a member of ECOWAS). 183 Indeed, Obasanjo administration restored confidence and credibility in West Africa by promoting democratic agenda and pursuing Peace Philosophy in Africa.

## Nigeria's Hard Power Strategy towards Regional Security through ECOWAS

As has been highlighted earlier in the present study, Nigeria's role conception as the continental Big Brother of Africa has become the defining paradigm for its foreign

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> Obasanjo's Inaugural Speech, 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup> *Omo-Ogbebor D.O.* Nigerian foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS // Journal of Human Sciences. 2017. T. 14. № 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>183</sup> Ajetunmobi R.O., Osunkoya O.A., Omotere T.F. Impact of president Olusegun Obasanjo's personality on Nigerian foreign policy, 1999-2007 // Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences. 2011. T. 8. № 6. P. 308-315.

policy engagement. This is influenced by its utilization of its hard and soft power strategies to establish itself as the natural leader of Africa with a manifest destiny and even with the responsibility to promote and protect the interests of Africa and black people everywhere and in all ramifications. For example, with the total area of 923,768 square kilometers, Nigeria is nearly four times the size of Ghana, thirteen times the size of Sierra Leone and eighty-nine times the size of Gambia. In 1975, when ECOWAS was established, Nigeria had a population of 70 million, while the total population of ECOWAS stood at 125 million, making the country a natural dominant force in the region both geographically and demographically.<sup>184</sup>

Economically, Nigeria has also established itself as a leading economic giant in comparison to its West African neighbors. According J. Bassey, Nigeria is naturally endowed over and above its regional counterparts. Indeed, Nigeria's crude oil was a source of economic boom during the formative years of ECOWAS. In fact, ECOWAS was created during the oil boom period in the world, which provided Nigeria with a huge oil revenue to attend to the myriad of problems that confronted the region and sustain the survival of ECOWAS during the turbulent years. Nigeria is also naturally blessed with iron ore, tin, gold, manganese, coal, limestone, zinc, lead, columbite, natural gas and hydropower. Nigeria's industries have also expanded during this period. In 1975, Nigeria already had car and truck plant assemblies, oil refineries, iron, steel and aluminum industries, as well as chemical and pharmaceutical industries, among others. Indeed, it is the opinion of some scholars that Nigeria's interest in championing the establishment of a pan-West African body (ECOWAS) "was to be sustained through a functional economic co-operation that would not only strengthen national economies but that would also see Nigeria secure a ready market for her

Alli W.O. The role of Nigeria in regional security policy // FES, 2012. URL: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10253.pdf (accessed: 02.04.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> Bassey J. R. Assessment of Nigeria's Role in the Development of Economic Laws in ECOWAS // International Affairs and Global Strategy. 2015. T. 35.
<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

manufactures". <sup>187</sup> Like its regional neighbors, agriculture also played a major role in the Nigerian economy during this period. Nigeria's main agricultural exports included cocoa, rubber, palm oil and kernel, groundnuts and cashew nuts. From late 1960s, oil emerged as the dominant revenue earner for the country <sup>188</sup>.

With its economic (hard power) endowment, Nigeria began a foreign policy that involved economic expansion into neighboring African states. This invariably lead to the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975, which came to involve fifteen West African countries. 189

G. Yoroms adds that Nigeria's strategic application of its hard power in quest for regional security through ECOWAS is tied to that of other African states because of cultural and historical experiences, and because of transnational security issues which are defined by the way in which the security of a nation is affected by what happens in contiguous countries around its neighborhood. <sup>190</sup> In the assessment of Bassey, Nigeria, through its endowments, must treat this subregion as a natural base from which to project its national interests and regional influence through its soft and hard power strategies. <sup>191</sup> This perspective has propelled Nigeria to the centre stage of African affairs generally and in West African security matters in particular.

For example, ECOWAS under the leadership of Nigeria at the First Session of its Standing Committee in Banjul from 7th to 8th August, 1990, discussed the Liberian crisis – a bloody insurgency which degenerated into a vicious civil war. Nigeria's

 $<sup>^{187}</sup>$  *Udoka I.A.* A Critical Appraisal of Nigeria's Role in the ECOWAS // Ibom Journal of History and International Studies. -2002.-T. 10. -C. 66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> *Edozien E.C., Osagie E.* (ed.). The Economic Integration of West Africa. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1982. P. 44.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup> Nigeria's Foreign Policy, 1960-1976. Nigerian Army Information Briefs, IV (1) // Institute of Army Education, 1977. P. 11-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> Yoroms G. Nigeria and the Challenges of Transnational Security in West Africa // In: Bassey C. O., Oshita O. O. (ed.). Governance and border security in Africa. African Books Collective, 2010. P. 273-294.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> Ate B.E. Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbours: A security-political analysis // In: Ate B.E. and Akinterinwa B.A. (eds). Selected readings on Nigeria's foreign policy and international relations. 2011. P. 85-94.

military president, General I. B. Babangida, proposed intervention in the Liberian crisis. It was resolved that a Cease-fire Monitoring Group should be established to stem the tide of violence and pave the way for normalcy to return to the country. Thus, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was put together, not only to bring the conflict under control and prevent its spread to other neighboring states, but eventually to resolve it. 192 Again and again Nigeria under the umbrella of ECOWAS had to intervene to promote peace and security in other member states. The instances of such interventions included Sierra Leone in 1997-2000, Guinea Bissau in 1999, and Côte d'Ivoire since 2002. In addition, the crises that engulfed the entire Mano River Basin (Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone), the military seizure of power in Niger in 2010, the military coup d'états in Mali and Guinea-Bissau in 2012, and several other more recent security challenges have imposed a new dynamics on ECOWAS.

The approach ECOWAS adopted to stem the tide of crises, according to A. Abubakar, was for member states to contribute troops on an able and willing basis, as there was no central financing of ECOMOG operations. A corresponding protocol was adopted by ECOWAS to regulate these arrangements. Each state financed the upkeep and operations of its troops, and this did not augur well for the harmony of the command and control structures. To this end, Nigeria could appropriately be described a trailblazer of security policy in West Africa. The loose structure of the regional security system, in which only Nigeria has the adequate number of troops, combat

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> *Alli W.O.* The role of Nigeria in regional security policy // FES, 2012. URL: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10253.pdf (accessed: 02.04.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> Abubakar A.A. Peacekeeping in West Africa: the Nigerian experience // Peace Support Operations in the New Global Environment: The Nigerian Perspective. Abuja: National Defence College. 2009; *Adebajo A.* Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Mechanism, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. – ECOWAS, 1999. URL: http://www.zifberlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/ECOWAS\_Protocol\_ConflictPrevention.pdf (accessed: 02.04.2020).

experience and logistic resources which it deploys for the promotion of stability in the region, serves as an eloquent testimony of the above fact. 195

Having said this, it remains a fact that cannot be rebutted that Nigeria's foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS is not just about the role conception of Nigeria as the regional Big Brother, but about the national interest and promotion of peace and security in the West African subregion. O. Alli puts it succinctly that:

"There is no doubt that Nigeria plays a critical role in the making of sub-regional security policy and in its implementation: any time Nigeria does not participate or support a particular security policy initiative, this policy is bound to fail. This is due to the considerable leverage Nigeria brings to the table in terms of military capabilities, strategic clarity and focus, material resources, as well as enormous political and diplomatic clout." <sup>196</sup>

It also has to be emphasized at this junction that if Nigeria had not used its military and economic might to promote peace in insurgency- and crisis-prone West African states, there would have been a tendency for instability to have proliferated in neighboring states. The influx of refugees and arms into neighboring states would have also been uncontrollable, which by extension would amount to a major security risk for the whole West African subregion. Hence, it could be said that the promotion of peace and security in Liberia and other crisis states in West Africa invariably means promoting peace and security in Africa as well. To this end, Nigeria's leadership role in Africa, as Alli reiterates, is a clear statement about the capability of African states to resolve African problems. This leadership role is so fundamental as it both determines the direction of security policy and provides the backbone for its implementation. The successful interventions of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone under Nigerian

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> Adedeji A.G. (2007), Nigerian Military and National Interests in the 21st Century // In: Akinterinwa B. A. (ed.). Nigerias National Interests in a Globalising World: Further Reflections on Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism, Volume Two: Foreign Policy in the Innermost Circle. C. 176-207.

<sup>196</sup> Alli W.O. The role of Nigeria in regional security policy // FES, 2012. URL: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10253.pdf (accessed: 02.04.2020).

leadership have shown that, given the necessary political support, African states could successfully manage their security challenges.

In addition to the above, Nigeria's concern for the well-being of its African neighbors has motivated an exceptionally benevolent foreign policy posture that prioritizes the progress of the African people. This act of benevolence scholars have characterized as a viable soft power endowment that Nigeria has used effectively to promote it role conception as a leader of Africa. Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy, as the study has highlighted above, is premised on the underlying principles of a total commitment to advancing the spirit of African unity. Nigeria's foreign policy prioritizes Africa — a principle that has largely remained the same over several administrations. As a result, Nigeria has made an unrivalled contribution to the growth and development of its African neighbors since it attained formal independence in 1960. Nigeria has also been able to use numerous economic incentives alongside bilateral and multilateral treaties and commissions with other countries to attract international benefits and goodwill.

# 1.3 Nigeria's Strategic application of Soft Power in the African Union

The African Union is an upgrade of the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU, the precursor of the AU, came into existence in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The core purposes of the OAU were inter alia: 'to promote the unity and solidarity' of states in the continent, 'to intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa,' 'to defend their sovereignty,' to fight

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> Osuntokun A. Gulliver and lilliputians: Nigeria and its neighbours // In: Adekeye A., Mustapha R. (eds.). Gulliver's troubles: Nigeria's foreign policy after the cold war. – Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 2008. P. 141159.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> *Ogunnubi O., Isike C.* Nigeria's soft power sources: Between potential and illusion? // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 2018. T. 31. № 1. P. 49-67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>199</sup> Akinyemi A.B. et al. Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1989.

against 'all forms of colonialism' and 'to promote international cooperation' in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>200</sup> Hence, the OAU Charter required Member States to 'coordinate and harmonise their general policies' on political, diplomatic, transport, communications, education, culture, health, science, and defence and security matters.<sup>201</sup>

Nigeria through its Afrocentric policy has been in the forefront in the struggle for African unity and decolonization of the African continent. Prior to the formation of the OAU, three major groups existed in Africa which held different views on what the continental organization should resemble. The first, the Casablanca bloc, was a radical group that demanded an immediate political union of African states and advanced the idea of putting in place an African High Command with responsibility to execute decolonization in Africa. Then there was the somewhat conservative Brazzaville bloc, comprising mostly of former French colonies. This group's ideology promoted the furtherance of French legacy and influence. Nigeria believed that such ideological division was unhealthy for Africans' hopes and aspirations for prosperity and for the pursuit of African unity. It thus organized the Monrovia Conference of six African States, considered as moderate, on 8th May 1961, which led to the birth of the Monrovia bloc.<sup>202</sup>

Even though the Conference was boycotted by the radical Casablanca bloc, Nigeria did not give up but made another effort in Lagos in January 1962 towards uniting the conflicting blocs. The Lagos meeting became the reconciliation forum for these divergent views on the continental unity and soon led to the adoption of the Lagos

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> Yihdego Z. The African Union: Founding principles, frameworks and prospects // European Law Journal. 2011. T. 17.  $\mathbb{N}$  5. P. 568-594.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> OAU Charter 1963, Art ii (1) (a) (b) (c) (d) and (e). 1963. URL: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/ Documents/Treaties/text/OAU\_Charter\_1963.pdf (accessed: 02.04.2021); see also Červenka Z. The Organisation of African Unity and its charter. New York: FA Praeger, 1969. T. 71. <sup>202</sup> Gusau A.S. Littering the landscape: An analysis of the Role of Nigeria in the transition of OAU to the African Union // European Scientific Journal. 2013. T. 9. № 8.

Charter.<sup>203</sup> Interestingly, it was the Lagos Charter that subsequently defined the OAU agenda as the promotion of African unity and solidarity among African states, the removal of all forms of colonialism and the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. The Nigeria's view incorporated in the Lagos Charter was subsequently adopted as the OAU Charter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 25th May 1963.<sup>204</sup>

Therefore, Nigeria vastly influenced the agenda for the then young OAU. As a matter of fact, many have argued that Nigeria still has great influence on the AU after its transformation from the OAU because of its huge commitment to its formation and maintenance. However, there is also another angle that captures the disconnection between Nigeria's contribution and influence at the AU level, especially as Nigeria has failed since independence to become an affluent state that is viable in the international socio-political economy.<sup>205</sup>

It could be recalled that Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya in 1999 proposed a concept of the African Union that he envisaged would be a replica of the United States of America; it would include such continental institutions as African presidency, a continental parliament, one army, and one central bank. What this meant was that the proposed African Union would entail the eventual elimination of boundaries and state sovereignty. Ghaddafi's proposal received full support from Togo and Burkina Faso. Nigeria, on the other hand, expressed some reservations. Nigeria's response to Ghaddafi's proposal did not come as a surprise either, given his past relations with Nigeria. It was Nigeria that threatened Ghaddafi with military action when he wanted to annex part of Chadian territory to Libya. Hence, instead of Ghaddafi's idealistic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> *Temple N.* Making and keeping the peace: An analysis of African Union efficacy. Unpublished Thesis, submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences, University of South Florida, USA. 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>205</sup> Onuoha J. I. Nigeria and the Politics of African Union: Challenges and Opportunities // In: Briggs D. A. (ed). Nigeria in World Politics. Trends and Challenges Essays in Honour of Maj. Joseph Nanven Garba. Kuru, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy & Studies. 2005.

notion of the United States of Africa, Nigeria took a principled stand that helped to steer the debate to concentrate on a pragmatic and realistic African Union. Nigeria, therefore, worked tirelessly with other like-minded countries to ensure that Africa entered into a commitment that were realizable.<sup>206</sup>

S. Wapmuk<sup>207</sup> reiterates that Nigeria's position on the establishment of the AU clearly reechoes its moderate stance during the formation of the OAU. In his intervention during the OAU Ministerial Conference between 30<sup>th</sup> May and 1<sup>st</sup> June 2000 in Tripoli, Libya, Nigeria's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sule Lamido, told his colleagues that:

"Nigeria favours the establishment of a strong African Union, one which would replace, over a period of time, existing continental organisations – the OAU and AEC. This needs not be a replica of the United States of America, given the realities in our continent and the political experiences of our nation states. but it should be of such character, content and form which does justice to the cherished vision of the founding fathers of the OAU and satisfies the dreams and aspirations of the peoples of our continent... Let me emphasise that in our quest to achieve our objectives of establishing a Union, we must bear in mind the elements that make for a strong ... and lasting union. These include trust, recognition, of the realities of the units making up the Union; tolerance; understanding and compromise. A union is very much like a marriage... For marriage to last and to be fruitful, both partners must be willing to make necessary sacrifices. For our Union to endure we must have trust between ourselves; we must have confidence in each other; we must understand each other well; we must accept the realities of each member state's peculiar situation; and there must be mutual respect. Nigeria fully supports a process that takes into account all these elements because that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> Shinkaye K. Nigeria and the African Union // In: Akinterinwa B A. (ed). Nigeria and the Development of the African Union. – Vintage Publishers, 2005. P. 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> Wapmuk S. Nigeria and the Establishment of the OAU and its Transformation to the AU // Organisation of African Unity/African Union at 50. 2014. T. 50. P. 53-96.

is what can lead to a United States of Africa, which will endure and which will make Africa strong and ready for the future."<sup>208</sup>

In this regard, Nigeria once again opted for what it called a gradual incrementalism towards the formation of the continental regional integration project through persuasive argument. This persuasive argument put forward by Nigeria was more than convincing to other member states of the OAU. For example, in 1999, President Obasanjo in the home town of Ghaddafi, Sirte (Libya), persuaded to accept the Nigerian concept of the African Union at a critical time when African leaders were divided over the idea of a United States of Africa. Obasanjo also persuaded his colleagues to move forward by beginning to implement the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) as a lead up to the African Union. J. Shinkaye notes that the first draft of the Heads of States' decision was handwritten by President Obasanjo and handed over to Nigerian representatives at the drafting committee meeting.<sup>209</sup> Obasanjo also participated actively in the preparatory meetings as a member of the inner cycle with countries such as South Africa, Libya, Mali, and Algeria. Also noteworthy was the fact that Nigeria in collaboration with South Africa played very critical roles in the passage of the Constitutive Act at the 2000 Lome AU Summit. This Nigeria achieved by calling for it to be adopted through acclamation. As agreed by African leaders at the Sirte meeting in 1999, the Constitutive Act was to be tabled for further discussion in 2001. During the 36th OAU summit in Lomé (Togo) in July 2000, the draft AU Constitutive Act was ratified.<sup>210</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> Lamido Sule's Intervention during Extra-Ordinary Session of OAU Council of Ministers, Tripoli, Libya, May 2000, as cited in Shinkaye K. Nigeria and the African Union // In: Akinterinwa B A. (ed). Nigeria and the Development of the African Union. – Vintage Publishers, 2005. – C. 90-91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> Shinkaye K. Nigeria's Role in Shaping the African Union // In: The African Union and The Challenges of Cooperation and Integration, Proceedings of the National Seminar organised by the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa, Abuja, 14-15 May 2001. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2002. P. 17-18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> The countries that ratified the Draft Constitutive Act of the African Union at the Lome Summit of July 2000 include Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Senegal, Sierra

The provisions of Article 28 of the Act stipulated that the AU will come into effect exactly 30 days after the 36th instrument of ratification (representing two-thirds of OAU member states) has been deposited at the OAU secretariat. It was the submission of Nigeria's instrument of ratification that brought the AU to being. The public launch of the AU as the successor to the OAU occurred on 9th July 2002 at the summit of OAU Heads of State and Government held in Durban, South Africa. A confirmation of Nigeria's role in shaping the AU was that its views were clearly reflected in the Constitutive Act, which the Heads of State and Government adopted in Lome in July 2000, and the Rules of Procedure and Statutes of the Key Organs of the African Union, which were adopted at Durban in 2002.

Nigeria, as we has seen through its foreign policy, has always been at the forefront of maintenance of its pan-African ideology. The role and activity of Nigeria in the formation and the promotion of the AU goals cannot be overemphasized. It should be reiterated here that Nigerian foreign policy has structural influence on the principles and objectives that guide its relations with OAU/AU.<sup>212</sup> The foreign policy of Nigeria, as crafted by its policy-makers, has influence on the behavior of the Nigerian state towards other actors, including non-state actors and international organizations in the global system.<sup>213</sup> The one core principle inherent in Nigerian foreign policy is its choice to oppose colonization in support of self-determination and self-rule

Leone, Sudan, Togo and Zambia. The countries that did not ratify the document are Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Republic of Guinea, Mauritius, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> Shinkaye K. Nigeria's Role in Shaping the African Union // In: The African Union and The Challenges of Cooperation and Integration, Proceedings of the National Seminar organised by the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa, Abuja, 14-15 May 2001. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2002. P. 17-18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> Yihdego Z. The African Union: Founding principles, frameworks and prospects // European Law Journal. 2011. T. 17. № 5. C. 568-594.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> *Chidozie F.* Dependency or Cooperation?: Nigeria-South Africa Relations (1960-2007): дис. – Covenant University, 2014.

(independence).<sup>214</sup> It is thus emphasized here that the best approach in understanding Nigeria's contribution to OAU/AU is to appreciate its adoption of Africa as the centerpiece of its foreign policy.<sup>215</sup>

Nigeria has been an active member of the Union since its inception and as such has been actively involved in the formulation, implementation and guidance of the Union's policies. The basic goal is to promote unity and solidarity of African states, to spur economic development, and to promote international cooperation.<sup>216</sup>

It is a continental union made up of 55 independent African states.<sup>217</sup> The formation AU stems from the unanimous agreement of African leaders to upgrade the OAU to become the AU in July 2001 at the Lusaka Summit, but officially it was launched on 8th July 2002 in South Africa.<sup>218</sup> The highest decision-making body of the Union is the Assembly of the African Union, which is made up of all the Heads of State or Government of member countries of the AU. The Union has several specialized institutions, including a representative body, the Pan-African Parliament, which is made up of 265 members elected by the national legislatures of the AU member states.<sup>219</sup>

Nigeria's contribution to the AU is enormous. Nigeria since its return to civil rule has stood up against unconstitutional changes of government in all countries of Africa. These actions have been in line with and in protection of Article 4 of the Constitutive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> Briggs D.A. The Africa Union: Between Nationalism and Supranationalism // In: Briggs D.A. (ed). Nigeria in World Politics. Trends and Challenges Essays in Honour of Maj. Joseph Nanven Garba. – Kuru, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy & Studies. 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> Gusau A.S. Littering the landscape: An analysis of the Role of Nigeria in the transition of OAU to the African Union // European Scientific Journal. 2013. T. 9. № 8.

African Union // Britannica, 2021. URL: https://www.britannica.com/event/ African-Union (accessed: 02.02.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> *Umezurike S.A.* et al. Re-examining Nigeria's Contributions to the African Union and the Domestic Socio-Economic Ramifications // Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies. − 2017. − T. 9. № 1. P. 17-26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> *Udombana N.J.* The institutional structure of the African Union: A legal analysis // California Western International Law Journal. 2002. T. 33. P. 1-67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> See: Gottschalk K. The African Union and its sub-regional Structures // Journal of African Union Studies. 2012. T. 1. № 1. P. 9-39.

Act of the AU, which seeks to put an end to unconstitutional changes of power in the African continent. Nigeria is resolute in its protection of the AU Declaration which proclaims Africa's commitment to democracy in the framework of the idea of consolidating this commitment by formulating common values and principles for desirable democratic governance in African states.<sup>220</sup> N. Udombana reiterates that such unconstitutional changes are seen by the AU as contradicting the continent's commitment to enhancing democratic governance and the necessary conditions for growth in Africa. Nigeria's desires to enhance democracy, good governance and human rights in Africa cannot be overemphasized. A major step toward this end was Nigeria's ratification of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which it deposited with the AU.<sup>221</sup> Nigeria went further by providing material and other support to democratic and electoral processes in Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Niger and other African countries. Internally, the Nigerian government undertook electoral reforms in 2002, 2006 and 2010 with the aim to restore the integrity of the country's electoral process so as to strengthen its democracy, which it hoped would also serve African interests. According to S. Umezurike, the effort of Nigeria in the direction of democracy and good governance stood clearly in solidarity with Article 3(g) of the AU Constitutive Act.<sup>222</sup>

The Nigerian gesture during the outbreak of Ebola disease in Africa in 2015 is also worthy of note and falls in line with the policy goals of the AU. It is on record that Nigeria deployed 250 volunteers to the countries affected by the deadly virus. These countries were Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Nigeria, working collectively with the AU, World Health Organization, African Development Bank, Aliko Dangote Group

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> Okereke C. N. E. Nigeria and the African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts. Lecture series on African security. – Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic African Institute. 2012.
<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> *Umezurike S. A.* et al. Re-examining Nigeria's Contributions to the African Union and the Domestic Socio-Economic Ramifications // Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies. 2017. T. 9. № 1. P. 17-26.

of Companies and other development partners interested in Africa trained health personnel.<sup>223</sup> S. Umezurike writes that Nigeria's Minister of Health, Dr Khaliru Alhassan, noted that the 250 workers deployed had acquired practical experience during the outbreak in Nigeria as they were trained by the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC).<sup>224</sup> This Nigerian gesture was commended by the AU Chairperson Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who also lauded Nigeria for sending volunteers who worked under the auspices of the African Union Support to Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, ASEOWA.<sup>225</sup>

It is worthy of note also that Nigeria remains one of the five major financiers of the AU operating budget.<sup>226</sup> These 'Big Five' countries – five bigger economies – regarded as the first tier (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa) contributed 75% of the organization's operating budget. However, with the Arab Spring, the overthrow of the Ghaddafi regime and major unrest in Egypt, two main backers dropped out of this top league. Meanwhile, there were revisions of the basic algorithm for the 2016-2018 periods: Egypt rejoined the group of 'Big Five', and Morocco reentered the AU in 2017.<sup>227</sup> As of 2021, the 'Big Five' are Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. According to C. Okereke, in 2011 each of the 'Big Five' contributed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> Nigeria Deploys 250 Volunteers as AU Launches Africa against Ebola // Federal Ministry of Health, 2015. URL: http://www.health.gov.ng/index.php/about-us/9-uncategorised/207-nigeria-deploys-250- volunteers-as-aulaunches-africaagainstebola (accessed: 02.04.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>224</sup> *Umezurike S.A.* et al. Re-examining Nigeria's Contributions to the African Union and the Domestic Socio-Economic Ramifications // Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies. 2017. T. 9. № 1. P. 17-26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> Nigeria Deploys 250 Volunteers as AU Launches Africa against Ebola // Federal Ministry of Health, 2015. URL: http://www.health.gov.ng/index.php/about-us/9-uncategorised/207-nigeria-deploys-250- volunteers-as-aulaunches-africaagainstebola (accessed: 02.04.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> Okereke C. N. E. Nigeria and the African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts. Lecture series on African security. – Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic African Institute. 2012.

Pharatlhatlhe K., Vanheukelom J. Financing the African Union: On mindsets and money. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management. 2019. T. 240. URL: https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP240-Financing-the-African-Union-on-mindsets-and-money.pdf (accessed: 03.04.2020).

US\$14.4 million towards the organization's operating budget. By 2012, these contributions were put at \$16.7 million.<sup>228</sup>

From the inception of the OAU and through its subsequent transformation to the AU, it has been observed that Nigeria has been one of the largest contributors to the annual budgets of the organization.<sup>229</sup> Nigeria's top contribution to Africa's agenda of decolonization and anti-racism was greatly enhanced with the formation of the OAU. This status as a major financier of AU operating budget gives Nigeria full AU voting rights and has also enabled its nationals to occupy strategic positions in various international organizations due to the AU support. Overall, Nigeria's position was to focus on finding sound but common ground in resolving African problems.

In pursuant of its policy of African solidarity, and through the strategic application of its hard power, Nigeria led Africa's first ever collective peacemaking mission in Chad in 1982 under the OAU umbrella; the mission was headed by a Nigerian Major General.<sup>230</sup> Nigeria also took upon itself to pay the bill for the peace mission christened the OAU Peace Keeping Force (OAUPKF). Indeed, in that mission, as has been recorded, Nigeria spent an estimated \$40 million on search of peace in that country.<sup>231</sup> However, the initial idea was for Nigeria to be reimbursed later, but this has never happened. In the long run, the bill went along as one of those Big Brother projects Nigeria has carried out in Africa for Africa.<sup>232</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup> Okereke C. N. E. Nigeria and the African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts. Lecture series on African security. – Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic African Institute. – 2012.

Nigeria and the Organization of African Unity/African Union: Fifty Years Journey // The Nigerian Voice, 24.05.2013. URL: https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/114515/1/nigeriaand-theorganisation-of african-unity-afri.html (accessed: 03.09.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>230</sup> Osimen G.U., Akinwunmi A.A., Adetula S.L. Peace Keeping Role of Nigeria in Sub-Sahara Africa // International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies. 2015. T. 2. № 10. P. 26-33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>231</sup> Nigeria and the Organization of African Unity/African Union: Fifty Years Journey // The Nigerian Voice, 24.05.2013. URL: https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/114515/1/nigeriaand-theorganisation-of african-unity-afri.html (accessed: 03.09.2020).

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

A Nigerian, O. Obasanjo, became the first Chairman of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in December 2003.<sup>233</sup> Obasanjo during his tenure as both AU and PSC chairman mediated the Darfur crisis in western Sudan. Peace talks related to the crisis were held in Abuja, Addis Ababa and Tripoli consequently.<sup>234</sup> It is on record also that Obasanjo took further steps by appointing his predecessor, Abdulsalaam Abubakar, as his peace envoy to Sudan and Chad.<sup>235</sup> Further, Nigeria produced the draft Protocol on Peace and Security, the initial draft Rules of Procedure of the Executive Council, the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Statute of the AU Commission, among other important documents, which were adopted with minor changes.

It remains a fact that cannot be rebutted that Nigeria has always been a frontline member of the AU Commissions on Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration, charged with dealing with other disputes on the African continent. These contributions were in pursuit of the dreams of the founding fathers of the OAU.<sup>236</sup> This also illustrates the fact that Nigeria has steadily committed itself to Articles 3 and 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, which contain the objectives and principles of the organization respectively.

Nigeria has also deployed its soft power in its ability to influence decisions made in the AU. Nigeria has engaged with peace and security issues on the continent, including the pursuit of integration and development in Africa.<sup>237</sup> As a result of this, Nigeria has played host to several important AU meetings. Some of these important AU meetings are the 4th AU summit, held in 2005 in Abuja, and the 44th session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), which took place in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>233</sup> Okereke C. N. E. Nigeria and the African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts. Lecture series on African security. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic African Institute. 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> Костелянец С. В. Конфликт в суданском регионе Дарфур: региональный аспект // Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность. 2015. № 1. Р. 76-86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>235</sup> Osimen G. U., Akinwunmi A. A., Adetula S. L. Peace Keeping Role of Nigeria in Sub-Sahara Africa // International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies. 2015. T. 2. № 10. P. 26-33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>236</sup> Nigeria and the Organization of African Unity/African Union: Fifty Years Journey // The Nigerian Voice, 24.05.2013. URL: https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/114515/1/nigeriaand-theorganisation-of african-unity-afri.html (accessed: 03.09.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> Okereke C. N. E. Nigeria and the African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts. Lecture series on African security. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic African Institute. 2012.

Abuja in November 2008. In August 2004, the AU PSC headed by Obasanjo held peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria between the government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur in order to prevent the imposition of UN sanctions on Sudan.<sup>238</sup> This round of talks, which involved Nigeria in several dimensions, led to the adoption of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5th May 2006.<sup>239</sup>

Nigeria has also been actively involved in the implementation of Africa's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Nigeria takes part in the AU Capacity building exercise for the military, police and civilian components of the African Standby Force (ASF), which is an integral part of APSA. Nigeria's National Defense College in Abuja remains the AU's centre of excellence in the training of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) at the strategic level. The exercises and training remain vital in the pursuit of one of the key AU's objectives – peace and security in Africa.<sup>240</sup>

Nigeria also actively contributed to the formation of the AU project christened New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is an AU strategic policy framework for eradicating poverty in Africa and putting the continent on the road to sustainable socio-economic growth and development. To bring this organ of the AU into existence, Nigeria and South Africa worked together tirelessly with other countries to develop the initiative which was adopted at the OAU Summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001. It has even been speculated that the adopted name (NEPAD) was suggested by Nigeria. A. Gusau explains in this regard that the name NEPAD derives its sustenance from the trio of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) (1980), the Final Act of Lagos (1980), and the Abuja Treaty (1991). These 3 continental documents were drafted and finalized in Nigeria using Nigeria's human and material

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>238</sup> Abdulwaheed I.A. Nigeria and peacekeeping process in Africa: The Darfur peace process in Sudan // International Journal of Politics and Good Governance. 2012. T. 3. № 3.1. P. 1-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>239</sup> Okereke C.N.E. Nigeria and the African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts. Lecture series on African security. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic African Institute. 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>240</sup> Ebegbulem J. C. Nigeria and conflict resolution in Africa: the Darfur experience // Civilizar Ciencias Sociales y Humanas. 2011. T. 11. № 21. P. 69-76.

resources.<sup>241</sup> F. Chidozie emphasizes this when he states that Nigeria was instrumental in the formation of Africa's new development initiative, NEPAD, in 2001, and of its governance tool, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), in 2003.<sup>242</sup>

Nigeria's pivotal role is evident from the commitment it has demonstrated in implementing the NEPAD agenda in the form of sectoral reforms at the domestic level. Nigeria has not only provided the needed leadership for the purpose of mobilizing the rest of Africa at the continental level, but has collaborated with other leading countries of the continent and facilitated the engagement of the larger international community to partner with Africa under the NEPAD arrangement.

Nigeria also played pivotal role in the conceptualization and adoption of the APRM. Nigeria was among the first five countries to accede to the APRM at the sixth meeting of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee held in Abuja on 9th March 2003. The adoption of the MOU establishing the APRM in Abuja was a reflection of Nigeria's leading role. Nigeria was the 8th country to be peer reviewed. The report of the African peer review panel on Nigeria was launched on 17th December 2009. As of 2008, Nigeria had contributed \$2,350,000 to the continental Mechanism.

Nigeria's commitment to the AU has also been demonstrated in the maturity with which it handles the big power politics at the Union. A case in point was the struggle for the Chair of the AU Commission between Jean Ping of Gabon and former Home Affairs Minister of South Africa, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma. Nigeria opposed South Africa's nomination of its home affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> Gusau A.S. Littering the landscape: An analysis of the Role of Nigeria in the transition of OAU to the African Union // European Scientific Journal. 2013. T. 9. № 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup> *Chidozie F.* Dependency or Cooperation?: Nigeria-South Africa Relations (1960-2007): дис. – Covenant University, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>243</sup> Jinadu A. The African peer review process in Nigeria. – Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP), 2008. P. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>244</sup> Wapmuk S. Nigeria and the Establishment of the OAU and its Transformation to the AU // Organisation of African Unity/African Union at 50. 2014. T. 50. P. 80.

Chair of the AU Commission at the 19th Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa held on 15-16 July 2012. This followed the electoral deadlock experienced during the 18th Summit of the AU held on January 23-30, 2012. Ms. Dlamini-Zuma won the post in the fourth round with 37 votes, and replaced Mr. Ping of Gabon. Nigeria maintained that its opposition of the South African candidate was based on a principle long established that major funders of the Union should not aspire to this position. It appears that South Africa jettisoned this 'gentleman's agreement', implying that South Africa has now moved its leadership aspirations in the continent to the next level. However, some viewed the elections rather as a power contestation between Nigeria and South Africa. Whilst South Africa argued that it did not act against the AU rules, Nigeria and several other countries thought otherwise. Nigeria argued that the divergence of views at that time was neither a rivalry between major powers in Africa nor was the election outcome a failure of Nigeria's diplomacy. Nigeria maintains that in strengthening the unity of the members of the AU, the big powers should avoid actions that could be interpreted by smaller and medium states in the continent as domineering.

The commitment to, as well as extra burden borne by Nigeria towards the continental unity project, may not be shared officially by all African states. Nigeria, for reasons of history, geography and resource endowments, both material and human, has always seen its destiny as inextricably linked to that of the African continent. With a population of over 209 million<sup>245</sup>, one out of every 5 Africans is a Nigerian. The 2019 Bloomberg financial report reveals that Nigeria is the biggest economy in Africa in terms of nominal GDP. Also, Prinesha Naidoo Projections of 2021 shows that Nigeria's economy will continue to grow faster than South Africa's. While the International Monetary Fund cut its forecast for Nigeria's 2020 growth to 2% from 2.5% due to lower

<sup>245</sup> // World **Population** URL: Review, 2021. https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population (accessed: 02.04.2021).

oil prices, South Africa's GDP was forecast to expand only by 0.8%.<sup>246</sup> Consequently, despite much criticism and even reviews and considerations of the country's foreign policy positions in the past, it has never fully separated its national interests from its role within the continent. Nigeria has indeed remained committed to ensuring the future of African unity and freedom

It has been noted that while Nigeria contributes money, troops and manpower towards the continental project, the impression that Nigeria sometimes gets is that it is only recognized when it is required to make such contributions. When decisions are made, it is the principle of one-man, one-vote that prevails and the equality of smaller nations is insisted upon.<sup>247</sup> What this sometimes amounts to is the tyranny of small states, which plays out in decision making at the AU fora, and Nigeria does not always get what it deserves. Even though the principle of one-man, one-vote is the norm in organizations such as the AU, such organizations have other ways of compensating members that bear the additional burden. What is however clear is that there will never be such a time when Nigeria will be adequately rewarded for its contributions and roles. It is in Nigeria's overall interest that in making African more united, free, stronger and secured it is also acting to its own benefit. The future of the AU certainly depends on the commitment of all member states to the continental unity project, but at the same it entails all members states working together to overcome the contradictions and challenges carried over by the AU from the OAU.

Some scholars have also described Nigeria's role in West Africa as hegemonic. This has been questioned again and again by other members of ECOWAS states including even those which have benefitted from its generosity, <sup>248</sup> most of whom only

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> Nigeria Tops South Africa as the Continent's Biggest Economy // Bloomberg, 03.03.2020. URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-03/nigeria-now-tops-south-africa-as-the-continent-s-biggest-economy (accessed: 02.11.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>247</sup> Shinkaye K. Nigeria and the African Union // In: Akinterinwa B A. (ed). Nigeria and the Development of the African Union. – Vintage Publishers. – 2005. – C. 93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> *Adebajo A.* Prophets of Africa's Renaissance: Nigeria and South Africa as Regional Hegemons. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2006. №. 3.

grudgingly accept Nigeria's leadership.<sup>249</sup> O. Alli observed that even though from time to time Nigeria projects the image of a hegemonic power, in reality it is a statistical hegemon. Some of these scholars argue that Nigeria's influence derives more from the statistics in its favor relative to other members of ECOWAS than any proactive strategic engagement of security policy. The critical housekeeping challenges that Nigeria faces restrict its ability to employ its obvious hegemonic advantages effectively.<sup>250</sup> To this end, it is emphasized that Nigeria, which has not succeeded in providing leadership and sustainable development at home, cannot effectively assume the subregional leadership in Africa.

C. Nwoke claims that the collective self-reliance which regional integration aims to attain will be ridiculed if the regional leader is suffering from external dependence. While J. Sanda contends that Nigeria, though a regional hegemon owing to its hard and soft power endowments, lacks what it takes to be called so because it cannot effectively provide leadership at home. And this does not allow it to be seen as a deliberate leader in West Africa. W. Fawole quoted General Ibrahim Babangida (a Nigerian Head of State) as saying that Nigeria was one country every other country in West Africa and Africa in general looks up to provide the necessary leadership. But how this plays out in Nigeria's internal leadership quest is yet to be ascertained because the greatest burden militating against growth and sustainable development in Nigeria is the problem of leadership.

 $<sup>^{249}</sup>$  *Adebajo A.* Pax Nigeriana and the responsibility to protect // Global Responsibility to Protect. 2010. T. 2. N 4. P. 414-435.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> As cited in: Alli W. O. The role of Nigeria in regional security policy // FES, 2012. URL: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10253.pdf (accessed: 02.04.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> Nwoke C.N. Nigeria and ECOWAS // In: Ogwu U. J. (ed.). New Horizons for Nigeria in World Affairs. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. 2005. P. 138.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>252</sup> As cited in: Alli W. O. The role of Nigeria in regional security policy // FES, 2012. URL: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10253.pdf (accessed: 02.04.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>253</sup> Fawole W.A. Nigeria's external relations and foreign policy under military rule, 1966-1999. Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003.

#### Conclusion

It is argued in this chapter that Nigeria has in a commendable measure used its hard power resources to establish its leadership role and power in Africa. This is illustrated in its activities in the formation and promotion of the goals of the AU and ECOWAS. It is also emphasized in this chapter that ever since the 1960s, messianic references in conducting the affairs of the African continent have been ingrained in the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy and external relations. One can aptly consider the establishment of ECOWAS, for example, as an opportunity to build up Nigeria's hard structural power through military assistance, trade and investment.

However, its impressive soft power capabilities have also been considerably and strategically applied, and especially so in its activities at the AU. The increasing use of soft power in foreign policy by great powers such as the US (prior to Donald Trump's administration) and China has sparked interest among African policymakers and academics. Soft power, as has been explained above, is the opposite of coercive capability or hard power, such as the use of economic pressure and military might. Soft power involves trying to influence other countries using culture, values and policies. South Africa is one of the African countries that has taken advantage of the opportunity that the use of soft power presents. It has successfully hosted international summits and sporting events such as the 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference and the 2010 World Cup football tournament.<sup>254</sup>

According to O. Tella and as has been corroborated in this study, there are three key ways in which Nigeria exercises some degree of soft power. These are culture, business and foreign policy programs that send Nigerians abroad to help with peacekeeping and skills training. Despite having remarkable soft power resources, there has not been much coordination of efforts to harness their numerous potentials in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>254</sup> Nigeria is punching below its weight despite massive soft power capacity // News24, 06.02.2019. URL: https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/nigeria-is-punching-below-its-weight-despite-massive-soft-power-capacity-20190206 (accessed: 02.04.2020).

effectively establishing its stance as Africa's Big Brother. Compare this to China, Russia and the United States, which have used their soft power assets to extend influence across the world. China for example is building Confucius Institutes, exporting cheap products and offering development assistance. These have shaped the preferences of other states and consequently helped it to emerge as a global power. 255 It should, however, be noted also that Nigeria has demonstrated it soft power potentials in the realm of foreign policy. Its roles in leading multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping missions undoubtedly constitute a soft power approach towards expressing its regional leadership. This supplements its contributions to regional integration in West Africa and liberation struggles in Southern Africa.

<sup>255</sup> Nigeria is punching below its weight despite massive soft power capacity // News24, 06.02.2019. URL: https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/nigeria-is-punching-below-its-weight-despite-massive-soft-power-capacity-20190206 (accessed: 02.04.2020).

## Chapter Two ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS 'SOFT POWER' TOOLS IN NIGERIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

#### Introduction

Reaffirming the time-honored aphorism that "nobody (including state) is an island", C. Nwangwu and K. Okoye reiterated that in the contemporary reality it is impossible for states to survive in isolation.<sup>256</sup> They posit in this regard that it is not possible or practicable for any state to recoil into its shell and have nothing to do with the outside world, given the growing interdependence of nations economically, socioculturally and militarily.<sup>257</sup> O. Okolie adds that "in an increasingly inter-dependent and globalized world, foreign policy actions, inactions and reactions are basically contrasting and converging responses to the needs of the citizens and means of addressing these needs via bilateral and multilateral relations with other states or actors".<sup>258</sup>

### 2.1. Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy as Soft Power

A country's soft power, as U. Ude observes, may be evaluated on the basis of bilateral and multilateral economic relations with neighboring countries.<sup>259</sup> Historically, a state's economic diplomacy, according to C. Nwangwu and K. Okoye, is traceable to antiquity when people began to employ economic principles as an instrument of relations with other peoples. In the case of Nigeria, economic diplomacy as the underlying plank that drives the Nigerian external economic relations is as old as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>256</sup> Nwangwu C., Okoye K. Management of external economic relations and the crisis of development in Nigeria // Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences. 2014. T. 2. № 9. P. 32. <sup>257</sup> Ibid. P. 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>258</sup> Okolie A.M. Fundamental Issues in Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria // In: A.M. Okolie (ed.). Contemporary Readings on Nigeria's External Relations: Issues, Perspectives and Challenges. Abakaliki: Willyrose & Appleseed Publishing Co. 2009. P. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>259</sup> *Ude U.* Nigeria's Father-Figure Role in Africa: The OAU-AU Example. Abakaliki: Smile Printing Printing. 2008.

the country itself.<sup>260</sup> It has constituted a cardinal feature of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence. For instance, issues of foreign trade, foreign economic assistance, external aid, the size and complexity of Nigeria's foreign loans, the rescheduling of these loans, debt-equity swaps, external grants, regional and subregional economic groupings, the quest for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), relations with the Group of 77 poor nations (G-77), relations with the European Economic Community (EEC, now the European Union, EU) and the Group of 7 industrialized nations (G-7), etc. have featured in the country's external economic relations since independence.<sup>261</sup>

Nigeria's economic diplomacy, according to U. Ogwu and A. Olukoshi, was given accelerated and unmatchable attention in 1988 under the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. Major-General Ike Nwachukwu, the then Minister of External Affairs, emphasized during this regime that economic diplomacy had consciously been articulated, codified and elevated as the objective basis upon which Nigeria's external relations were conducted. In a speech, Nwachukwu, as cited in Ogwu and Olukoshi, noted inter alia that "the Federal Military Government had decided to make 'economic diplomacy' a new, additional plank of Nigeria's foreign policy". Nwachukwu further argued that "a deliberate effort would be made to shift the gear of Nigeria's international relations from what seems exclusively political in focus to a 'new' orientation in which an attempt will be made to use foreign policy instruments for the attainment of domestic economic objectives". Political in focus to a 'new' orientation in which an attempt will be made to use foreign policy instruments for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>260</sup> Nwangwu C., Okoye K. Management of external economic relations and the crisis of development in Nigeria // Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences. 2014. T. 2. № 9. P. 32-33. <sup>261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>262</sup> Ogwu U. J., Olukoshi A. Economics and Diplomacy in the World System: Some Perspectives. // Nigerian Journal of International Studies. 1991. T. 15. № 1-2. P. 3–14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>263</sup> As cited in Ogwu U. J., Olukoshi A. Economics and Diplomacy in the World System: Some Perspectives. // Nigerian Journal of International Studies. 1991. T. 15. № 1-2. C. 3–14. <sup>264</sup> Ibid.

N. Okonjo-Iweala points out in this regard that Nigeria's economic diplomatic drive led to the cancellation of \$18 billion worth of external debt by the Paris Club. <sup>265</sup> The debt relief wiped off about 60 percent of national debt, which resulted in the utilization of \$6 billion of savings from the excess crude account (ECA) to buyback the rest of the debt at 25 cents on the dollar, after paying off accumulated interest arrears. Hence, the total Paris Club debt of \$30 billion was wiped off. <sup>266</sup> Moreover, between 2003 and now, Nigeria's external economic relations have been shaped and determined by the implementation of the Bretton Woods-inspired National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) of President Obasanjo, President Umaru Yar'Adua (in particular, his 7-Point Agenda) and President Goodluck Jonathan.

We have seen from the foregoing that Africa has remained at the forefront of Nigeria's foreign policy. This nucleus of its foreign policy, as the study has revealed in the preceding chapter, has seen the country commit itself fanatically to the decolonization of the African continent and eradication of racial discrimination and domination. C. Nwangwu and K. Okoye in their work emphasize the importance of economic diplomacy as an essential factor in international politics. Indeed, in times past, statesmen resorted to economic diplomacy as a measure for achieving economic prosperity and avoiding unnecessary and wasteful wars. <sup>267</sup> From a general perspective, B. Badejo defines diplomacy as the process of conducting relations between and amongst states. <sup>268</sup> It is the management of international relations by negotiation or, in other words, a process of bargaining among states in bilateral and multilateral engagements in order to narrow areas of disagreement and widen areas of mutual cooperation. It is noteworthy that the emphasis on negotiation and bargaining does not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> Okonjo-Iweala N. Responses to the 50 Questions on Nigeria's Economy Posed by the House of Representatives' Committee on Finance. Abuja: Federal Ministry of Finance. 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>267</sup> Nwangwu C., Okoye K. Management of external economic relations and the crisis of development in Nigeria // Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences. 2014. T. 2. № 9. P. 34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>268</sup> Badejo B. Economic Diplomacy in a Trapped Economy: Assumptions and Prospects of the Nigerian Experience // Nigerian Journal of International Studies. 1991. T. 15. № 1-2. C. 98.

imply the irrelevance of veiled threat of force or some other power capabilities in the arsenal of states once the diplomatic option is embarked upon.<sup>269</sup> More often than not, diplomacy, according to Nwangwu and Okoye, is now majorly interspersed with a country's soft power, which to an extend determines its level of association with the target state. Thus, power capabilities in terms of economic and other soft power endowments now constitute the arsenals in the armory of a diplomat who strives to extract favorable agreements from other states.<sup>270</sup>

According to R. Akindele, economic diplomacy as applied in this study is a type of diplomacy that focuses on the economic variables of international relations. Economic diplomacy is expressed in a nation's resource and bargaining power and how it reconciles the economic interests of a state with those of other states.<sup>271</sup> B. Akinterinwa adds that economic diplomacy is the management of international relations in a manner that emphasizes the economic dimension of a country's external relations. In other words, it is the conduct of foreign policy in a manner that gives topmost priority to the economic objectives of a nation.<sup>272</sup> It involves the appreciation of economic instruments in negotiation and bargaining; and, as Ogwu and Olukoshi posit, it encompasses a set of strategies and practices formulated and applied for the achievement of a fundamental restructuring of the existing international economic order.<sup>273</sup>

Arising from the foregoing, the broad agreement about the organic interconnection between economy and diplomacy is reflected in the implicit assumption

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>269</sup> Badejo B. Economic Diplomacy in a Trapped Economy: Assumptions and Prospects of the Nigerian Experience // Nigerian Journal of International Studies. 1991. T. 15. № 1-2. C. 98.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>270</sup> Nwangwu C., Okoye K. Management of external economic relations and the crisis of development in Nigeria // Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences. 2014. T. 2. № 9. P. 35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> Akindele R.A. Nigeria's External Economic Relations, 1960-1985 // Africa Spectrum. 1986. P. 5-34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> Akinterinwa B.A. External Response to Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy // Nigerian Journal of International Studies. 1991. T. 15. № 1-2. P. 112-135.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>273</sup> Ogwu U.J., Olukoshi A. Economics and Diplomacy in the World System: Some Perspectives. // Nigerian Journal of International Studies. 1991. T. 15. № 1-2. P. 3–14.

that economic motives often underlie diplomatic actions, deliberate inactions and reactions. Nonetheless, a difference of emphasis exists between those who see a mechanical, one-to-one relationship between economy and diplomacy and those who locate the linkage in the broad framework of the logic of accumulation without submitting to the one-to-one, mechanical treatment of the relationship.

Accordingly, while the economic sphere provides the broad framework within which a country exhibits it power conduit, it is important to recognize that diplomacy could and does also have a reciprocal impact on the economy and a country's status in the committee of nations. The linkage between them is therefore not only organic but also dialectical. This implies that the relationship between power, economic and diplomacy is both complementary and contradictory – the diplomatic action or posture of a state complements the state's domestic economic base at the same time as the economic base shapes the diplomatic options available to the state; these work together to indicate the level of control a nation wields over other nations.<sup>274</sup> However, the diplomatic action of a state over a given issue could deviate from or even occasionally contradict the logic of the economic base of the state.

# 2.2. Nigeria's Bilateral/Multilateral Economic Relations with African Neighbors: South Africa in Perspective

The study has emphasized in the preceding chapter that Nigeria is a force to be reckoned with regionally and the country that cannot also be ignored on the global stage. Nigeria's status in the international arena, according to F. Alade, is largely hinges on its economic endowment and military muscle, in other words, its hard power currencies. This perhaps explains why policy makers and academics have not paid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>274</sup> Ogwu U.J., Olukoshi A. Economics and Diplomacy in the World System: Some Perspectives. // Nigerian Journal of International Studies. 1991. T. 15. № 1-2. P. 3–14.

adequate attention to the soft power of this state despite it being significant in its foreign policy since independence.<sup>275</sup>

Nigeria has striven to promote a positive image across Africa and beyond through its bilateral and multilateral soft power attributes. The regional power has constructed the identity of a peace builder. To pursue the economic interests through foreign relations within West Africa, Nigeria, as the study has revealed, championed the formation of ECOWAS and, in spite of competing allegiances to rival organizations within the subcontinent, continued to support the organization's objectives. Strengthening ECOWAS not only promotes Nigeria's national interests but also reemphasizes the country's power to influence its regional neighbors in economic affairs. This is illustrated in its encouragement of development of the region's economy and discouraging its neighbors' reliance on extra-African countries for military, political, and economic survival. Nigeria thus serves such economic and security interests as weakening colonial divisions within West Africa, ending border disputes, contributing to African unity, as well as helping to a large extent in strengthening West Africa's economic bargaining positions vis-à-vis the EEC/EU.<sup>276</sup>

In evaluating the soft power base of Nigeria-South Africa bilateral economic relations, J. Ebegbulem reiterates that since the inception of democratic rule in Nigeria, South Africa and Nigeria have had encouraging bilateral economic relations. As Ebegbulem points out, in terms of technology and infrastructure, South Africa has an edge over Nigeria, while Nigeria has an advantage of large market potentials for investments over South Africa.<sup>277</sup> Nigeria's large market potential for investment is a huge power factor that attracts a lot of South African companies, which make

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>275</sup> Fawole W.A. Nigeria's external relations and foreign policy under military rule, 1966-1999. – Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> Onyia F.O. Nigeria and ECOWAS: A Study of the Obstacles to Nigeria's Implementation of ECOWAS Protocols. – Master's thesis, University of Nigeria, January 1993.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 32-40.

considerable investments in Nigeria. B. Sifingo asserts that the South African and Nigerian governments signed bilateral agreements on trade and investment, which amongst other things aimed at increasing the amount of trade and investment between South Africa and Nigeria.<sup>278</sup> The signing of these agreements witnessed, inter-alia:

- (a) improved trade relations between South Africa and Nigeria; and
- (b) South African corporations becoming big players in the Nigerian economy.

The need for improved bilateral economic relations between the two countries gave birth to the South Africa – Nigeria Bi-National Commission (BNC).<sup>279</sup> In October 1999, the BNC was established by the South African and Nigerian governments to consolidate and strengthen bilateral political, economic and trade relations between Nigeria and South Africa. It has a mandate to review cooperation between the two countries on foreign affairs, public enterprises and infrastructure, agriculture, minerals and energy, trade, industry and finance, among others.<sup>280</sup> The BNC has been meeting twice a year ever since and aims to increase the amount of trade and investment between South Africa and Nigeria. The Deputy Presidents of both countries head the commission. At the meetings, trade and investment opportunities in Nigeria and South Africa are identified and plans are put in place so that they can be realized. In this way, many deals that have proved lucrative for South African and Nigerian companies and parastatals have been facilitated through the BNC. The broad objectives of the Commission are:

1. to provide a framework for collaborative and cooperative efforts in the common endeavor to bring Africa into the mainstream of global political, social and economic developments;

 $<sup>^{278}</sup>$  Sifingo B. South African high commissioner to Nigeria comments on business relations // African Business Journal Issue. -2003. - T. 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>279</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>280</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 32-40.

- 2. to provide the basis for the governments and private sectors of both countries to consult each other on their respective economies and investment climates with a view to promoting trade and industry;
- 3. to improve bilateral relations between the two countries in the field of technology, education, health, culture, youth and sports;
- 4. to utilize the generous endowments of both countries in human and natural resources to maximize socio-economic development, through economies of scale, global competitiveness and specialization based on comparative advantage;
- 5. To establish the mechanisms for putting the benefits of economic cooperation to the service of peace, stability, social integration and economic development in other parts of the continent.<sup>281</sup>

The cooperation of both countries through the South Africa – Nigeria Bi-National Commission seeks to create a climate conducive for the creation of a better quality of life for all. The commission is also seen as a platform in which both countries can jointly as partners impact positively, in conjunction with other African countries, on regional peace and security; socioeconomic development; poverty alleviation; and the prevention of crime and corruption. Nigeria and South Africa have in recent times sought to advance their mutual interests by intensifying their bilateral relationship through cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, infrastructure development, science and technology, agriculture, minerals and energy, transport and communication etc. Both countries have been on regular consultations to find ways of establishing common positions on efforts to bring the continent into the mainstream of global economic development.

The Commission has facilitated cooperation between the two countries in areas such as defense and security, science and technology, education and culture. The benefit

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>281</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 32-40.
<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

of this commission to both countries can be seen from the fact that between 1999 and 2002, there was approximately a 540 percent increase in the volume of South Africa's export to Nigeria. J. Lutchman and J. Daniel noted in this regard that, in 2003, two-way trade flows between South African and Nigeria amounted to R5.3 billion (approximately \$700 million).<sup>283</sup> Further evidence has shown that out of that amount, South Africa's exports were valued at R2.3 billion and imports at R3 billion, of which oil imports amounted to R2.7 billion.

According to Ebegbulem, as of mid-April 2003, an estimated 55 South African companies were doing business in Nigeria. The South Africa-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce arose out of the BNC. Some of the largest South African companies that have investments in Nigeria are members of the chamber, such as MTN, Standard Bank, First Rand Massmart, and Sun International, etc. The main goal of the South Africa-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce is to identify investment opportunities in Nigeria for South African Corporations. It also provides information on Nigerian government policies and how to do business in Nigeria. The Chamber of Commerce also conducts market research for South African companies wanting to do business in Nigeria. The BNC has been valuable in furthering South Africa's business interest in Nigeria. Indeed, the South African state has used its diplomatic power and the relationship that it has with the Nigerian government to assist South African corporations and parastatals to become big players in the Nigerian economy. Along with this, South Africa, through NEPAD and the signing of the bilateral agreement on trade, has found in Nigeria a very lucrative market for its exports.<sup>284</sup> The BNC looks at tariffs and works with national standards bodies of both countries to ensure high standards of export and imports between the two countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>283</sup> Daniel J., Lutchman J., Naidu S. South Africa and Nigeria: Two unequal centres in a periphery // In: Daniel, J., Southall, R. Lutchman, J. (eds). State of the nation: South Africa 2004-2005. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 2004. P. 544-568.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>284</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 32-40.

Jacob Zuma, a former Vice President of South Africa under Thambo Mbeki, observed in 1999 when he visited Nigeria that "inasmuch as many will agree that such bilateral arrangements will be an unequal one because Nigeria is predominantly a consuming nation, Nigeria still exports not just commodities but also human resources." As such, the relationship between the two countries should not be underemphasized. Seeing Nigeria as a consuming nation, South Africa offers a good market to any viable business in Nigeria.<sup>285</sup>

The predominant foreign policy goal of Nigeria is its quest for the leadership role as the Big Brother in relations with African states. To achieve this goal, it has strategically used its hard power and soft power endowments to achieve this status of a hegemon in the African continent. Nigeria, as the study has revealed, was a founding member of the OAU and often channeled major policy initiatives through that organization. Most of its relations with other African states took place outside the OAU framework but were guided by OAU principles. Nigeria's primary African commitment was to liberate the continent from the last vestiges of colonialism and to eradicate apartheid in South Africa. Promoting liberation had grown from a weak and conservative stance during the 1960s to an increasingly firm push after the Biafra civil war. This commitment was pursued most actively after Murtala Muhammad, the Nigerian President in 1975-1976, successfully backed the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola's ascent to power in Angola in 1975 by providing the swing vote in the OAU decision to recognize the MPLA. Nigeria had played a role in the independence of Zimbabwe and in the late 1980s was active in assisting Namibia to achieve independence of Namibia. In the latter case, it contributed about \$20 million to assist the South West Africa People's Organization in the 1989 elections and facilitated other preparations for Namibian independence. The country also contributed financially to liberation movements in South Africa and to the front line states of Zambia,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>285</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 32-40.

Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, which were constantly harassed by South Africa. Although Nigeria's armed forces were among the largest in Black Africa in the early 1990s, sizable military might has rarely been used in its foreign policy. The army participated in peacekeeping forces, either alone or through the OAU, and contributed personnel to United Nations peacekeeping missions. In line with its ECOWAS commitment, Nigeria was one of the main contributors of troops to the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) sent to Liberia on 23rd August 1990 after the peace talks there failed. Additional forces were sent in late September 1990 under a Nigerian field commander, General Doganyaro. Threats to fight for Southern African liberation were made but not acted on, but Nigeria did give military and financial aid to the African National Congress for its efforts against the apartheid regime in South Africa and provided military equipment to Mozambique to help its struggle against South Africa-backed guerrillas.

Even though there had been occasional border disputes with Chad and Cameroon that sometimes led to the use of military force against these neighbors, Nigeria had cordial relations with all of its immediate neighbors – Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, as well as with other countries in the West African subregion, with most of which it had concluded bilateral agreements. There were occasions such as in the early 1980s when Nigeria decided to expel many illegal immigrants, mainly Ghanaians, but this dispute also was resolved amicably. The guiding principle of Nigeria's regional foreign policy was that of good neighborliness and friendship. In this spirit, it helped to resolve conflicts between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali, and Togo and Ghana. Nigeria also tried to make its neighbors "safe" friends, partly to re-enforce boundary claims and protect human rights of Nigerian citizens who were migrant workers, and partly to stabilize relations between the immediate neighboring countries. For example, since 1988 it has established a strong presence in Equatorial Guinea. All of these illustrate the level of power Nigeria as Africa's giant has in relations with its regional neighbors.

#### 2.3. The Technical Aid Corps as a Soft Power Attraction

Nigeria has given aid and technical assistance to several African states, often through the African Development Bank, of which it was a major benefactor. According to O. Tella, Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps (TAC) has become another important institutional platform to project the country's soft power. The Technical Aid Corps, operating along the lines of the United States Peace Corps, was established in 1987. Nigeria established the Corps as a voluntary international service scheme during the Ibrahim Babangida administration to provide technical assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.<sup>286</sup> Through this initiative, Nigeria sends volunteers to countries with a dearth of skills in fields such as architecture, engineering, law, medicine, and science. Under this scheme, young Nigerian professionals served in other African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, where their expertise was most needed. Nigeria also provided scholarships and fellowships, training facilities, grants, equipment, and medical supplies, and subsidized oil during the 1970s oil crisis to African countries under certain conditions. According to W. Adebanwi, the scheme aims at providing Nigerian technical knowhow to developing countries in critical skill areas such as medicine, engineering, law, and lecturing, etc.<sup>287</sup> Nigerian professionals volunteer to serve in developing countries for two years. The salaries of these professionals are paid by the Nigerian government, easing the financial burden on recipient states.<sup>288</sup> This undoubtedly enhances Nigeria's image and South-South cooperation. O. Tella highlights its major objectives to include:

1. Sharing Nigeria's know-how and expertise with other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>286</sup> *Tella O*. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 113.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>287</sup> Adebanwi W. Government-led service: the example of the Nigerian Technical Aid Corps // Voluntary Action. 2005. T. 7. № 2. P. 57-68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>288</sup> Salami B.O. The Prelude to Babangida Regime's Foreign Policy Initiatives // Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. 2014. T. 5. № 3. P. 81-85.

- 2. Giving assistance on the basis of assessed and perceived needs of the recipient countries;
- 3. Promoting cooperation and understanding between Nigerian and beneficiary countries;
- 4. Facilitating meaningful contacts between the youth of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries.<sup>289</sup>

Since its establishment in 1987, The Technical Aid Corps has provided technical aid to more than 30 countries. While there were 102 volunteers at the inception of the scheme between 1987 and 1988, by 2013, more than 200 volunteers were working in recipient countries and 1500 were providing technical knowhow in fields as diverse as engineering, agriculture, law, medicine, architecture, accounting, radiology, meteorology and lecturing between 2014 and 2016. These moves undoubtedly ensure that Nigeria enjoys international goodwill.<sup>290</sup> The TAC initiative implies that, unlike other African states, Nigeria is not only a recipient of aid, but an important aid donor, boosting its image in the international arena. Its contribution to the development of Africa rekindles its role of big brother on the continent. It also reinforces NEPAD's vision of African ownership of development initiatives and African solutions to African problems.

The Directorate of Technical Aids Corps on its website has emphasized that Nigeria through the scheme has proven that its commitment to the TAC vision goes beyond rhetoric; it has thus taken practical steps and led by example in realizing its objectives. This has enhanced Nigeria's image as a significant promoter of African cooperation in particular and broader South-South cooperation in general. In the words of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, commended TAC's contribution to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>289</sup> *Tella O*. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2.

Directorate of Technical Aid Corps, 2016. URL: http://www.dtac.gov.ng/DTAC/dtac/aboutDTAC#first (accessed: 02.07.2020).

the socio-economic development of African, Caribbean and the Pacific states.<sup>291</sup> Indeed, high-ranking Ethiopian officials, as reported by W. Adebanwi, have stated that 'even though their country was receiving similar manpower training aid from Japan and Britain, their observation in the two years of the TAC scheme in Ethiopia has shown that Nigerian volunteers were the most dedicated.'<sup>292</sup> They added that 'Nigeria's efforts in deepening South-South cooperation ... had renewed their faith in the ability of Africans to help themselves'. Adebanwi highlights further that Namibia's erstwhile President, Sam Nujoma, praised Nigeria for continuing to grant development assistance and personnel to support his government's socio-economic programs through the Technical Aid Corps Agreement.<sup>293</sup>

S. Moguluwa states also that the accolades from international organizations and bodies such as the Commonwealth, the United Nations Volunteer Service, ECOWAS Volunteers Programme and the Japanese Agency for International Cooperation are an eloquent testimony of the international goodwill Nigeria has derived from the TAC.<sup>294</sup> The Premium Times reports also in this regard that personal contact between Nigerians and recipient countries' nationals is critical in transmitting Nigerian culture in these countries and has endeared Nigeria to other countries.<sup>295</sup> It is perhaps for this reason that the Nigerian government has considered sending Nigerian teachers to teach Yoruba (one of the dominant Nigerian languages) in Brazil. Furthermore, centers for the study of Yoruba culture and language have been established in countries such as Benin and Brazil.<sup>296</sup> Continual requests for Nigerian volunteers under the TAC among ACP

Directorate of Technical Aid Corps, 2016. URL: http://www.dtac.gov.ng/DTAC/dtac/aboutDTAC#first (accessed: 02.07.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> Adebanwi W. Globally oriented citizenship and international Voluntary service. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2011. P. 34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> Moguluwa S.C., Achor P. Nigeria foreign policy and reputational projects: an evaluation of the implications and prospects // African Journal of Social Sciences. 2013. T. 3. № 3. P. 140-159.

Nigerian govt. to deploy Yoruba teachers to Brazil // Premium Times, 21.03.2015. URL: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/ssouthwest/178871-nigerian-govt-to-deploy-yoruba-teachers-to brazil.html (accessed: 02.08.2020).

296 Ibid.

countries and beyond testify to the fact that skilled Nigerian workers are admired. This serves as a veritable tool to debunk the unsubstantiated negative portrayal of Nigerians across the globe.

In addition, in July 1974, the Gowon government decided to sell crude oil at concessionary rates to African countries on condition that they had their own refineries and would not re-export to third countries. The decision came despite Nigeria's role as an Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member that was generally in favor of higher prices and after more than two years of deliberations. Nigeria acted largely in response to external pressures: international actors attempted to divide Third World countries into OPEC members and nonoil producers; various African countries, especially Liberia, begged for less expensive oil; and both the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries had established programs to aid poor countries while encouraging other oil producers, especially African nations, to follow the suit. Providing subsidies for African countries was a safe move for Nigeria because Africa comprised only a small portion of the country's total oil export market, it enhanced Nigeria's position and influence in Africa while building African solidarity, and it protected security interests by preventing economic decline. Moreover, this example of generosity aided Nigeria in its efforts to create ECOWAS. In November 1990, Babangida suggested that Nigeria might again offer concessionary prices to other African countries as the Middle East crises pushed oil prices upward.<sup>297</sup>

P. Osunyikanmi reiterates that in recent years, "countries like Venezuela, Brazil and Vietnam that are traditionally outside the ACP regions have all indicated interest in the scheme. Likewise, TAC recipient countries such as Vanuatu, Fiji, Trinidad and Tobago, and Commonwealth of Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis that have earlier declined participation in the scheme are all renewing the TAC Country Agreement. South Sudan,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> Foreign Relations. Nigeria // Country Studies, n.d. URL: http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/80.htm (accessed: 06.08.2020).

the latest independent country in Africa, is working very intimately with the Directorate to enable the scheme to take-off there in the nearest future". <sup>298</sup>

C. Ogbonna and O. Olusola corroborate the above when they emphasize that TAC has an impressive record. Indeed, many African countries such as Namibia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Gambia, among others have benefited from this program. In fact, in estimation, over 35 African and non-African countries express demand for the services of TAC worldwide<sup>299</sup>. With more than 1500 skilled and non-skilled volunteers of Nigerian extraction working in these countries, Nigeria has contributed through TAC in providing key services to these countries. Consequently and more recently, TAC has been listed as part of Nigeria's soft power potentials, which has increased Nigeria's attraction in Africa and can be leveraged upon to advance its national interests on the continent.<sup>300</sup> The variety of high skilled Nigerian professionals sent to other countries through TAC is illustrated in the Table 1 below:

S/N	Year	Country and Nature of Assistance		
1	1999	Training of Academic and non-academic staff of Gambia's		
		first University		
2	1999	Deployment of 50 Nigerian lecturers to Uganda Islamic		
		University		
3	1999	Deployment of 671 Nigerian lecturers to Ethiopia		
4	2006	Deployment of 40 Nigerian medical personnel to Kampala		
		International University Teaching Hospital, located in Ishaka		
		in the Bushenyi district of Uganda, to work and teach.		
5	2006	Deployment of 110 medical professionals to Jamaica		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>298</sup> Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps for ACP countries to expand to Brazil, Venezuela, Vietnam // Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, 2014. URL: http://www.acp.int/content/news-nigerias-technical-aid-corps-acp-countries-expand-brazil-venezuela-vietnam (accessed: 11.08.2020). <sup>299</sup> Ogbonna C. N., Ogunnubi O. Rethinking the role of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps as soft power: Rough diamond or fools' gold // Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation. 2018. T. 7. № 2. P. 121-141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>300</sup> Ibid.

6	2007	Sending 29 Nigerian medical professionals to work in Belize,		
		a Caribbean nation		
7	2009	Spending over 70 million US dollars for the operation of 132		
		highly-qualified Nigerian professionals in Sierra Leone		
8	2009	Over 34 artisans, including fashion designers, auto mechanics,		
		cosmetologists, agriculturists, nutritionists were sent to		
		Namibia for volunteer service		

(Source: Ogbonna and Olusola. *Rethinking the Role of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps as Soft Power*)

The table above aptly captures how through TAC Nigeria has constantly sent skilled workers to other African countries to solve their pressing challenges. According to Ogbonna and Olusola, TAC in this regard has rendered help to other countries in various areas such as engineering, agriculture, medical laboratory research, technology, sport, law, architecture, radiology, accountancy, insurance, metrology, lecturing, coaching and even artisanship. In the light of the above, it has been argued that due to the achievement of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps within Africa and the Global South, which has gained Nigeria international approbation and recognition, it can be used to achieve Nigeria's interest in the international scene. <sup>301</sup> Put differently, they argued that due to what TAC has done for many less developed African countries and other states within the Global South, Nigeria is seen in a positive light in the comity of nations, and therefore it can use this positive review associated with TAC to influence the foreign policy of other states to align with Nigeria's national interest.

Beneficiaries of the TAC include countries in Africa and the Caribbean region. TAC's acts of international public goodwill cut across not just African countries but beyond.<sup>302</sup> In fact, countries outside Africa such as Jamaica, Fiji, and Belize among

 $<sup>^{301}</sup>$  *Tella O*. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>302</sup> Ogbonna C. N., Ogunnubi O. Rethinking the role of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps as soft power: Rough diamond or fools' gold // Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation. 2018. T. 7. № 2. P. 121-141.

others have benefited in one way or the other through TAC. For instance, since the inception of TAC in 1987, Nigeria has sent over thousands of volunteers to other counties in the Global South. In 2014 alone, over 400 requests for TAC service were received from 35 countries around the world<sup>303</sup>. In fact, there is no subregion in Africa that has not received the services of Nigerian expertise through TAC. In some instances, Nigeria's contribution to the socio-economic development of these countries has been recognized and appreciated by heads of states and other high ranking officials of these countries

Ogbonna and Olusola, <sup>304</sup> Adebanwi, <sup>305</sup> and Tella <sup>306</sup> all note that TAC has helped to provide technical knowhow to developing countries lacking critical and very important skills. These scholars points out that in essence TAC has improved Nigeria's image and respectability among states, especially developing states. It is thus argued here that that TAC has gained for Nigeria a considerable prestige and good image of a marketer of peace and development among ACP states and beyond. This is why scholars have advanced the notion that TAC is a potent soft power weapon in the hands of the Nigerian government which it can apply to concertize its hegemonic claims in Africa. They argued that with over 1500 skilled and non-skilled volunteers from Nigeria working in these countries Nigeria has an unlimited pool of soft power that can solidify its hegemonic position in Africa. The list of some countries that are beneficiaries of TAC as presented by DTAC includes the Gambia, Kenya, Congo,

Thousands TAC Nigeria Volunteers Saving Lives in Africa // Nairaland, 2015. URL: https://www.nairaland.com/2256820/thousands-tac-nigeria-volunteers-saving (accessed: 01.02.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>304</sup> Ogbonna C. N., Ogunnubi O. Rethinking the role of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps as soft power: Rough diamond or fools' gold // Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation. 2018. T. 7. № 2. P. 121-141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>305</sup> Adebanwi W. Globally oriented citizenship and international Voluntary service. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>306</sup> Tella O. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 109-128.

Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Niger Republic and Senegal, amongst others.<sup>307</sup>

From 2009 to 2018, over 26 billion Naira (approximately \$68 million) was allocated to TAC. This is illustrated in the table below:

Nigerian Government's Budgetary Allocation to Technical Aid Corp

S/N	Year	Amount
1	2009	1,533,400,704
2	2010	2,021,573,574
3	2011	3,110,482,666
4	2012	1,977,659,825
5	2013	2,143,627,637
6	2014	3,110,482,168
7	2015	3,220,985,668
8	2016	2,554,300,951
9	2017	3,196,585,658
10	2018	3,909,174,942
	Total	26,778,273,793

(Source: Budget (2009-2018), Cited in Ogbonna and Olusola)

It has, however, been argued that with the many years of funding TAC and the provision of key services to many African countries, Nigeria could have benefited more from the scheme through better outcomes in elections to various positions at the African

 $<sup>^{307}</sup>$  Ogbonna C. N., Ogunnubi O. Rethinking the role of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps as soft power: Rough diamond or fools' gold // Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation. 2018. T. 7. No.92. P. 121-141.

Union. Often, Nigeria's interests and position in Africa are routinely disregarded. 308 Evidence abounds of gang up by some African countries that have benefited from TAC during elections in regional organizations in Africa. For example, Niger Republic, which is a beneficiary of the program and receives other benefits from Nigeria, voted against Nigeria's quest for a seat at the United Nations Permanent Security Council in 2015 and for the exclusion of Nigeria from the AU ad-hoc mediatory committee on Libya. 309 J. Ihonvbere posits that the main reason for this disconnection between Nigeria's soft power resources and its manifest hegemonic interest is not unconnected with the crisis and contradictions inherent in the Nigerian economy. 310

No doubt that the activities of TAC can be strongly regarded as a huge soft power tool that has contributed to the social economic development of many African countries, yet it is important for Nigeria to take pragmatic steps against countries that continue to benefit from the scheme but still vote against Nigeria's interest or positions in regional organizations. It is thus suggested in line with contemporary realities that the Nigerian government hinges the provision of its international development support through TAC to certain conditions that advance its regional and global interests. It is in the same manner that the US promotes democracy and democratic ideals globally with specific rewards tied to compliance and sanctions imposed on defaulters.<sup>311</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>308</sup> Ezirim G. Fifty Years of Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Critical Review. – 2011. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gerald-Ezirim/publication/268575383\_Fifty\_Years\_of\_Nigeria's\_Foreign\_Policy\_A\_Critical\_Review/links/57cc840908ae59825185dba1/Fifty-Years-of-Nigerias-Foreign-Policy-A-Critical-Review.pdf (accessed: 06.07.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>309</sup> Ogbonna C. N., Ogunnubi O. Rethinking the role of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps as soft power: Rough diamond or fools' gold // Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation. 2018. T. 7. № 2. P. 121-141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>310</sup> *Ihonvbere J.O.* Contradictions and Crisis in Nigeria's Foreign Policy towards Southern Africa // Civilisations. 1983. T. 33. № 2. P. 147-185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>311</sup> Ogbonna C. N., Ogunnubi O. Rethinking the role of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps as soft power: Rough diamond or fools' gold // Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation. 2018. T. 7. № 2. P. 121-141.

#### 2.4. Cultural Diplomacy as a Soft Power Tool

Cultural instruments have been adjudged as the softest of soft power instruments in interstate relations.<sup>312</sup> Culture here includes the core of societies' norms and values, their dominating ideology, as well as their underlying approaches to their international interactions.<sup>313</sup> Cultural exchange has been intertwined with the pursuit of foreign relations since the 19th century. The practice was highly informed by the belief that culture in diplomacy possesses potentials for enormous influence, which is because it attempts to bypass commercial media images by appealing directly to the people on a non-political level. Thus, "knowing who is the other and explaining to him who we are is the only way to use diplomacy successfully."<sup>314</sup>

The 1988 Nigerian Cultural Policy defines culture as the sum total of the people's way of life, comprising material and non-material components. The material here comprises of technology, clothing, food, machines, buildings, airports, etc. The non-material aspect of culture as given in the above definition includes the political, social, legal and economic institutions, which sustain material and spiritual wellbeing. Culture also comprises the philosophical, which entails ideas, beliefs, manners, attitudes, as well as creativity. One important aspect of culture, as scholars have highlighted, is its dynamism. I. Hagher explains this to be the result of the fact that culture is a product of ever changing historical circumstances, consistently affected by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>312</sup> Benjamin A.U. Cultural Imperatives in Foreign Policy: The Case of Nigeria // In: K. Nwoko, O. Osiki (eds.). Dynamics of Culture and Tourism in Africa: Perspectives on Africa's Development in the 21st Century. 2015. P. 62-82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>313</sup> Ibid.

Evolution of Cultural Diplomacy // Cultural Diplomacy, n.d. URL: http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/Gerome-Evolution-of-Cultural-Diplomacy.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>315</sup> Cultural Policy for Nigeria – Federal Government of Nigeria. – Lagos: Federal Government Press, 1988.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>316</sup> Adeniji O. Essays on Nigerian foreign policy, governance, and international security. Dokun Publishing House, 2000. P. 6.

a number of factors such as population, migration and contact between societies, new ideas, wars, and general developments on the global, continental or national scene.<sup>317</sup>

The American scholar M. Cummings defines cultural diplomacy as the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding, which can also be more of a one way street than a two way exchange, such as when one nation concentrates its efforts on promoting the national language, explaining its policies and pointing out its view or telling its story to the rest of the world.<sup>318</sup> Traditionally, the cultural part of diplomacy meant high culture such as visual arts, literature, theatre, dance and music – cultural expressions that have been the preserve of the intellectual elite; it also came to include popular culture – cultural activities that attract mass audience. 319 Cultural diplomacy can be achieved through direct and indirect, formal and informal processes. The formal vehicles are bilateral agreements; the establishment of a corps of attaches who are part of embassies or staff in cultural centers, which may involve intercultural friendship associations of private entrepreneurs. It can also be achieved through arrangements or agreements between countries.<sup>320</sup> Cultural diplomacy also may be facilitated by the expansion of IT technologies, and Nigeria has initiated certain programs in this regard.321

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>317</sup> *Hagher I.* The Importance of Culture and Cultural Diplomacy in the Foreign Policy of Nigeria. Paper Presented at the Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin, 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>318</sup> Cummings M. C. Cultural diplomacy and the United States government: A survey. Center for arts and culture, 2003. P. 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>319</sup> Benjamin A. U. Cultural Imperatives in Foreign Policy: The Case of Nigeria // In: K. Nwoko, O. Osiki (eds.). Dynamics of Culture and Tourism in Africa: Perspectives on Africa's Development in the 21st Century. 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>320</sup> Hagher I. The Importance of Culture and Cultural Diplomacy in the Foreign Policy of Nigeria. Paper Presented at the Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin, 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>321</sup> Панцерев К.А. Страны тропической Африки в глобальном обществе знаний: возможность прорыва (на примере Кении и Нигерии) // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4: История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. 2011. № 2. Р. 90-97.

In Nigeria, the domestic institutions of culture that underpin and give expression to Nigeria's cultural policy and diplomacy are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture and Tourism, Information and Communications. Others include the country's diplomatic missions, the National Council for Arts and Culture, the Ministries of Culture of each state. In addition, there are the Nigerian Television International and the foreign broadcast service of the Voice of Nigeria. There are also the National Troupe, the Copyright Commission, the universities, the Film Institute, the National Theatre, National Museum and the Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization. These public institutions are supported by the civil society of artists, arts and crafts guilds, traditional festivals, tourist agencies and organizations like Society of Nigerian Theatre Artists or Radio and Television Workers' Union.

From the foregoing, it could be inferred that cultural soft power instruments are countries' cultural attributes in the form of their popular and high cultures, their spoken languages, as well as their views and their status of modernization. At the same time, cultural actions are not merely a government's cultural and educational interactions, exchange programs and promotion of popular as well as high culture abroad, but also the interactions of ordinary people and social groups. There is no doubt that Nigeria employs its culture as a diplomatic platform to project its soft power. Cultural diplomacy has been adjudged as the best form of soft power and a key diplomatic tool in today's multicultural world. Soft power refers to the ability to get what you want through attraction. The study would at this juncture highlight the several soft power instruments in Nigeria's cultural heritage.

 $<sup>^{322}</sup>$  Панцерев К.А. Страны тропической Африки в глобальном обществе знаний: возможность прорыва (на примере Кении и Нигерии) // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4: История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. 2011. № 2. Р. 90-97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>323</sup> *Nye Jr. J.* Hard Power, Soft Power and the War on Terrorism // In: Held D., Koenig-Archibugi M. (ed.). American power in the 21st century. Polity, 2004.

#### Nigerian Cultural Festivals as Soft Power Instruments in Foreign Relations

Cultural festivals have consistently been an important element of Nigeria's cultural diplomacy. Some of these festivals include Argungu fishing festival, Osun Oshogbo festival, Durbar, Eyo festival, Black heritage festival, and Igue festival, among others. These festivals attract participants and spectators, including tourists from different parts of the world. Nigerians have used these festivals to showcase their rich culture. One notable cultural festival held in Nigeria was the global Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977, where all black peoples of the world came to Nigeria to celebrate the black culture.<sup>324</sup> Africa, North America, the Middle East, Asia and Australia, where blacks and peoples of African descent had been dispersed, all came together in Nigeria to reaffirm their common destiny and human dignity. It is interesting to note that the focus of Nigeria's cultural diplomacy encompassed not just Africa as the centerpiece of its foreign policy, but also the Black World. Nigeria considered it in its national interest to "protect the dignity of black peoples". This doctrine was formulated to buttress the natural link between Nigeria and the destiny of all black people. As B. Anaemene rightly stated, "Nigeria shares a destiny with blacks all over the world and any quest for the preservation of its own values and aspirations was bound to encompass the values and aspirations of other members of the black world". 325 Therefore, the hosting of FESTAC could be seen as a faithful implementation of one of the principles of Nigeria's foreign policy.

Another festival worthy of mentioning here is the Calabar carnival – another interesting novelty in the way Nigeria's culture is projected abroad. This carnival is regarded as the biggest street party in Africa which bring together over one million

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>324</sup> Benjamin A.U. Cultural Imperatives in Foreign Policy: The Case of Nigeria // In: K. Nwoko, O. Osiki (eds.). Dynamics of Culture and Tourism in Africa: Perspectives on Africa's Development in the 21st Century. 2015. P. 74.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

revelers to the city of Calabar to dance along a mile-long carnival parade.<sup>326</sup> The carnival parade features hundreds of decorated floats and about fifty thousand costumed participants.<sup>327</sup> Nigeria's reputation as one of the continent's most cultural hubs is well reflected in the arts festivals held across the country. A dynamic form of cultural diplomacy is also emerging from the private sector where telecommunication companies, oil companies, banks and others are beginning to sponsor cultural and art festivals. For example, the Igue festival celebrated annually among the Benin people of Southern Nigeria was sponsored by MTN in 2017. In the literary world, Wole Soyinka's status as Nobel laureate and Chinua Achebe's literary accomplishments distinguished them and set Nigeria on the map of global literature. The young and upcoming writers like Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie are also worthy cultural ambassadors. The performance of these individuals has continued to reflect positively on Nigeria's overall image abroad.

#### The Nigerian Cuisine: an Instrument for Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power

The use of traditional cuisines as instrument for diplomacy and soft power falls under the ambient of culinary diplomacy.<sup>328</sup> Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once proclaimed that "food is the oldest form of diplomacy".<sup>329</sup> M. Phampoints out also that countries use food as a part of their efforts to promote their cultures, build their images, globalize their food industries, attract foreign tourists, and build relations

 $<sup>^{326}</sup>$  Ogwu J. African and the Diaspora in the Strategies of Cultural Diplomacy // National Workshop on Culture, Lagos. 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>327</sup> Benjamin A.U. Cultural Imperatives in Foreign Policy: The Case of Nigeria // In: K. Nwoko, O. Osiki (eds.). Dynamics of Culture and Tourism in Africa: Perspectives on Africa's Development in the 21st Century. 2015. P. 74.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>328</sup> Adesina O.S. Projecting Nigeria's soft power through culinary diplomacy // African Journal for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. 2017. T. 20. № 1. P. 140-149.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>329</sup> Setting the Table for Diplomacy // Huffington Post, 09.21.2012. URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulrockower/setting-the-table-for-dip\_b\_1904521.html (accessed: 01.05.2020).

with foreign publics.<sup>330</sup> O. Adesina describes Culinary Diplomacy, which is also referred to as *gastrodiplomacy*, as the use of cuisine (traditional food) to communicate culture in a public diplomacy context.<sup>331</sup> It is defined by S. Chapple-Sokol as "the use of food in cuisine as an instrument to create cross-cultural understanding in the hopes of improving interactions in cooperation."<sup>332</sup> In other words, culinary diplomacy refers to a government's use of food to promote its power; this takes form in official diplomatic dinners, the promotion of a country's cuisines and food products abroad, etc.<sup>333</sup>

Nigeria is a multicultural country with over 500 ethno-linguistic groups. These ethnic groups employ their specific cultural traits and practices as distinguishing features from other ethnic groups. The three largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, who are predominant in the North, the Igbo, who are predominant in the South-East, and the Yoruba, who are predominant in the South-West. Nigerian cuisines, which consist of cultural dishes or food items from various ethnic groups, are part of the cultural heritage of the country. B. Ayakorama emphasizes that the Nigerian indigenous cuisines are natural, with all their nutritional values intact; original and direct from their various sources, unlike most Western foods, which are often canned and contain a lot of preservative elements which could have harmful effects on the body systems. 334 Nigerian food embellishes a rich blend of traditional African carbohydrates such as yam

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>330</sup> *Pham M.J.* Food as communication: A case study of South Korea's gastrodiplomacy // Journal of International Service. 2013. T. 22. № 1. P. 1-22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>331</sup> Adesina O.S. Projecting Nigeria's soft power through culinary diplomacy // African Journal for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. 2017. T. 20. № 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>332</sup> Chapple-Sokol S. Culinary diplomacy: Breaking bread to win hearts and minds // The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. 2013. T. 8. № 2. P. 161-183. <sup>333</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>334</sup> Ayakoroma B.F. Diasporans As Agents In The Promotion Of Nigeria's Cultural Diplomacy Diasporans. – Keynote Address delivered at the New Yam Festival, Berlin, Germany. 2012. URL: http://www.nico.gov.ng/index.php/category-list-2/283-diasporans-as-agents-in-the-promotion-of-nigeria-s-cultural-diplomacy (accessed: 02.07.2020).

and cassava, as well as vegetable soups made from native green leaves.<sup>335</sup> Praised by Nigerians for the strength it gives, *garri* is a powdered cassava grain that can be readily eaten as a meal and is quite cheap. Yam is often fried in oil or pounded to make delicacies like yam pottage. Nigerian beans, quite different from green peas, are widely popular. Meat is also popular, and Nigerian *suya*, meat roasted in a barbecue-like method, is a well-known delicacy. Bush meat – that is meat from wild game like deer and giraffes – is also popular. Fermented palm product is used to make traditional liquor and palm wine.

Nigeria has a wide variety of cuisines. Nigerian foods are spicy mostly in the western and southern part of the country. Some of their traditional dishes are *eba*, pounded yam (*iyan*), fufu, amala, ikokore, ebiripo, ojojo, soups like okra, ogbono, egusi, etc. Fura da nono (yogurt and fresh milk produced by Fulani pastoralists) is a major food in parts of the North, as well as tuwo (meal made from mashed corn or mashed rice). Nigerian cuisines also include indigenous salads like abacha (popularly known as African Salad), which is common with the Igbos and mostly used for big occasions. It is prepared with dried shredded cassava, ugba (fermented oil beans), garden eggs, akan (potash), palm oil, dried fish and cooked cow skin (ponmo). The country's food culture also includes snacks and sweets like kuli-kuli (groundnuts cakes), ipekere (plantain chips), kokoro (fried dry snack made from corn or garri), dundun (roasted or deep fried slices of yam in palm or vegetables oil), kpokpo-garri (dried fried fermented cassava snack), common among the South-South people of the country. A major cuisine popular in Nigeria, especially in its southern part, is Jollof rice. B. Oderinde describes it as a dish made with rice, tomatoes, tomato paste, onions,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>335</sup> Nigerian Culture // Consulate General of Nigeria, Atlanta, Georgia, n.d. URL: http://nigeria consulateatl.org/nigerian-culture (accessed: 02.11.2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>336</sup> Ayakoroma B.F. Diasporans As Agents In The Promotion Of Nigeria's Cultural Diplomacy Diasporans. – Keynote Address delivered at the New Yam Festival, Berlin, Germany. – 2012. URL: http://www.nico.gov.ng/index.php/category-list-2/283-diasporans-as-agents-in-the-promotion-of-nigeria-s-cultural-diplomacy (accessed: 02.07.2020).

scotch bonnet peppers, salt, spices and vegetable oil. 337 Whatever variations are available, these ingredients are a must in the dish. The long grain rice used to cook this dish is not indigenous to Nigeria, but is imported from Asia. The dish is popular not only in Nigeria, but also some West African countries such as Ghana, Gambia and Senegal. In fact, there is an on-going supremacy battle between Nigeria's *Jollof* rice and Ghana's *Jollof* rice. Nigeria also has a variety of the *Jollof* rice referred to as "*Party Jollof*". The *Jollof* is such a serious business in the sub region that August 22 is set aside every year to celebrate it. 338

There have been efforts within the country to promote local cuisines. For instance, the government of Oyo State organized a three day 'Amala Fiesta' in 2016 with the theme 'From the Farm to the Table' to promote the local food culture and specifically showcase the benefits of Amala and related agricultural produce. According to the Oyo State Commissioner for Information, Culture and Tourism, Toye Arulogun, Amala represents the homogenous nature of Yoruba people. <sup>339</sup> It represents the culture of the people, health of the people, and wealth of the people. Indeed, Amala is the number one food brand of the Yoruba to the extent that even the politics of the South-West was named "Amala Politics." Amala fiesta, also known as "Ajodun Oka", is not just a food and cultural tourism event, but a celebration of the Yoruba food culture and Oyo State's foremost delicacy, which has become an object of national pride with international presence and worldwide acceptance. <sup>340</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>337</sup> The Nigerian Versus Ghanaian Jollof Rice Debate // BellaNaija, 05.07.2015. URL: https://www.bellanaija.com/2015/07/busayo-oderinde-the-nigerian-versus-ghanaian-jollof-rice-debate (accessed: 02.11.2019).

World Jollof rice day: basic facts about jollof rice // The Nation, 22.08.2016. URL: http://thenationonlineng.net/world-jollof-rice-day-basic-facts-jollof-rice (accessed: 02.11.2019).

Oyo to host Amala fiesta December, unveils logo, ambassador // Nigerian Tribune, 25.10.2016. URL: https://tribuneonlineng.com/oyo-host-amala-fiesta-december-unveils-logo-ambassador (accessed: 02.11.2019).

 $<sup>^{340}</sup>$  Денисова Т.С. Нигерия // В: Гришина Н.В., Костелянец С.В. Туризм в Африке: проблемы и перспективы. — Москва: Институт Африки РАН. — 2020. — С. 230-237.

Similarly, in 2016, the "One Lagos Food Festival" was held in Lagos State to showcase the rich diversity of Nigerian cuisine and delicacies, thereby promoting awareness of Nigeria's rich food culture. 341 Culinary diplomacy has become a tool for creating a strong image and good reputation for the country. By showcasing and promoting Nigerian food worldwide, the authorities create awareness of the country's culinary heritage. The high levels of importation and exportation of local Nigerian food ingredients across continents is an indication that Nigerian food is gaining popularity around the world. 342 This may be due, in part, to the increasing number of Nigerians living in the Diaspora and an equally increasing number of foreign nationals taking up employment in Nigeria in light of the oil boom leading to inter-cultural exchanges. Culinary discovery of tastes and flavors is being made by many from Asia, Europe and the Americas who live and work in Nigeria. Like most of the Asian countries, the Nigerian Government can also provide support for Nigerians who are willing to open restaurants abroad. If people abroad are more aware and more interested in Nigerian cuisine, demand for Nigerian food will increase.

Although culinary diplomacy is a relatively new field in the realm of public diplomacy, the idea itself can be traced back to the ancient Romans, who often made peace with their enemies over a good meal. Historians confirm that the historic importance of food goes back to the time of the Greeks and Romans, when opponents used food to resolve and mend disputes.<sup>343</sup> Brillat Savarin, in 1825, notes the meal as a powerful instrument in the process of negotiation in business and politics. He wrote:

"In men not far removed from a state of nature, it is well known that all important affairs are discussed at their feasts. Amid their festivals savages decide on war and

Nigerian Food.... Look Again! // Taste of Nigeria, 2013. URL: http://funke-koleosho.blogspot.com.ng/2013/02/nigerian-foodlook-again.html (accessed: 02.11.2019).

Nigerian Food.... Look Again! // Taste of Nigeria, 2013. URL: http://funke-koleosho.blogspot.com.ng/2013/02/nigerian-foodlook-again.html (accessed: 02.11.2019).

<sup>343</sup> Chefs are the New Diplomats // Business Recorder, 2014. URL: http://epaper.brecorder.com/story2pdf.php?id=439001&ed=2014-07-06 (accessed: 02.11.2019).

peace . . . this was the origin of political gastronomy. Entertainments have become governmental measures, and the fate of nations is decided on in a banquet. "344

Essentially, for a country to display itself on the strength of its food, it requires a national cuisine(s) upon which to establish itself.<sup>345</sup> In a seminal on national cuisines, anthropologist A. Appadurai finds that cookbooks play a fundamental role in their creation, especially in a post-colonial context such as modern India.<sup>346</sup> Thus, once a national cuisine has become established, it can be exploited as a facet of a nation's brand. Ingredients, cooking techniques and culinary philosophies can be advertised by chefs and restaurants and marketed to complement a national outreach campaign.<sup>347</sup> A nation invokes the power of its cuisine as the tool of the national brand, so that when foreigners take a bite of food, they recognize it as belonging to the country of origin, and thereby strengthen their associations with that country. Also, at the highest levels, culinary diplomacy works to create a table atmosphere that will produce a fruitful meeting of world leaders.

Culinary diplomacy is now on the front burners in many part of the world. Rockower points out that the U.S. State Department launched a culinary diplomacy program titled "Diplomatic Culinary Partnership: Setting the Table for Diplomacy" in 2012.<sup>348</sup> The new State Department Culinary Diplomacy Initiative has two stated objectives:

1. Engage formal diplomacy by collaborating with renowned chefs and other culinary leaders to utilize food preparation, presentation and overall dining experience

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>344</sup> Savarin B. La Physiologie du Goût, ou Méditations de Gastronomie Transcendante. – New York: Alfred A. Knopf. – 1971.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>345</sup> Chapple-Sokol S. Culinary diplomacy: Breaking bread to win hearts and minds // The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. 2013. T. 8.  $\mathbb{N}_2$  2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>346</sup> Appadurai A. How to make a national cuisine: cookbooks in contemporary India // Comparative studies in society and history. 1988. T. 30. № 1. P. 3-24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>347</sup> Chapple-Sokol S. Culinary diplomacy: Breaking bread to win hearts and minds // The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. 2013. T. 8. № 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>348</sup> Setting the Table for Diplomacy // Huffington Post, 09.21.2012. URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulrockower/setting-the-table-for-dip\_b\_1904521.html (accessed: 01.05.2020).

in thoughtful, meaningful ways to engage foreign leaders at official State Department functions.

2. Foster cross-cultural exchange by enlisting prominent chefs to participate in public diplomacy programs that use the shared experience of food to engage foreign audiences and bring people of varied backgrounds and cultural identities together.

C. Sokol adds that as part of its protocol office, the USA uses food to illustrate the diversity of American cuisine by inviting famous chefs from around the country to cook for visiting world leaders.<sup>349</sup> It would also be recalled that the U.S. is sending some of its finest chefs to cook at overseas embassies to highlight the country's culinary talent.<sup>350</sup> Apart from culinary nation-branding initiatives, there are other practical applications of culinary diplomacy. The Obama White House and administration engaged actively with food initiatives and appointed the first American 'culinary ambassador'. First Lady Michelle Obama led an outreach drive to both the American people and abroad with a campaign highlighting the importance of healthy and local food. Mrs. Obama oversaw the planting of a garden at the White House that feeds the family and provides fruit and vegetables for state dinners, as well as installing a beehive to produce White House honey.<sup>351</sup>

While many countries are using their cuisines to project power around the world, African countries are not yet exploiting culinary diplomacy as a tool of international relations, despite the fact that the continent can boast of myriad of cuisines peculiar to its various cultures. Essentially, with its massive variety of national cuisines, Nigeria has a huge potential to use these delicacies as tools for diplomacy. The number of culinary festivals and other events held in Nigeria, most of which also attract

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>349</sup> Chapple-Sokol S. Culinary diplomacy: Breaking bread to win hearts and minds // The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. 2013. T. 8.  $\mathbb{N}$  2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>350</sup> Adesina O.S. Projecting Nigeria's soft power through culinary diplomacy // African Journal for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. 2017. T. 20. № 1. P. 144.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>351</sup> Chapple-Sokol S. Culinary diplomacy: Breaking bread to win hearts and minds // The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. 2013. T. 8. № 2.
<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

international audiences, attests that *gastrodiplomacy* has become the country's important soft power approach.

#### 2.5. The Entertainment Industry: A Principal Soft Power Conduit in Nigeria

As emphasized by A. Akinlolu and O. Ogunnubi and corroborated in this study, the entertainment sector in Nigeria is perhaps one of the most prominent attractions that the country possesses in its relations with the African continent and the world at large.<sup>353</sup> Nigerian movies (popularly referred to as Nollywood) and its music industry are widely admired all over the continent to the extent that it has successfully challenged the dominance of Hollywood, Bollywood and other local content production to dominate the movie and music sector in sub-Saharan Africa. In corroborating the above, The UNESCO convention of 2017 emphasizes that:

"Nigeria is an African cultural powerhouse. Its \$600-million film industry, 'Nollywood', is the world's second largest film industry by volume. Nigeria's music and fashion industries are leading Nigeria's cultural exports." <sup>354</sup>

This feat has made African entertainment synonymous to the Nigerian creative industry. O. Idowu notes that the Nigerian creative story right now is one of resilience and creative excellence. One may find Nigerian music playing in places as obscure as Beijing night clubs and Oxford street shops.<sup>355</sup> The movie industry with little or no government support trudged on to the current status of one of the world's best. Feats like these portray invaluable marketing brownie points and the opportunity to weave narratives that help to showcase the Nigerian spirit positively. These acts sell Nigerians,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>353</sup> Akinola A.E., Ogunnubi O. Soft power or wasteful entertainment? Interrogating the prospect of 'Big Brother Naija' // The Round Table. 2020. T. 109. № 1. P. 71-85.

UNESCO Nigeria's creative ability: booming Nollywood, music, fashion and much more // UNESCO, 12.05.2017. URL: https://en.unesco.org/creativity/news/nigerias-creative-ability-booming-nollywood-music (accessed: 01.05.2020).

The untapped power of Nigeria's creative industry // Stears Business, 19.05.2020. URL: https://www.stearsng.com/article/the-untapped-power-of-nigerias-creative-industry (accessed: 01.07.2020).

their excellence and love for fun in a more effective fashion than any marketing campaign could.

## The Soft Power Potentials of the Nigerian Film Industry

The Nigerian film industry, aptly referred to as Nollywood, is unarguably a notable soft power endowment of the country. B. Anaemene reiterates that films have been considered as important art tool for educating and indoctrinating citizens.<sup>356</sup> G. Fafiolu clearly explains that the film industry has become one of the most influential media in the society that has helped in promoting the cultural values of a nation as well as laundering the image of the country abroad.<sup>357</sup>

The Nigerian movie industry in recent years has become the most powerful medium through which the Nigerian cultural narratives are communicated to the world. Nollywood provides the true counter narrative of Western films which hitherto portrayed Africa as the land of jungles and apes. A typical example of such Western films was the Hollywood film *District 9* produced by Sony Corporation in 2010. In this film, Nigerians were portrayed as less than humans to the world. This was coupled with CNN images of how Nigerians rob banks and another film *419 scam*, which seriously injured the already battered image of Nigeria and Nigerians.<sup>358</sup> O. Tella adds that Nollywood showcases the Nigerian story beyond the stereotypes and bad news such as drug trafficking, corruption, and Boko Haram terrorist activities often associated with the country. Indeed, Nollywood may be a veritable tool to rebrand Nigeria's image. Its impact on other African countries is perhaps best illustrated by a series of interviews

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>356</sup> Benjamin A.U. Cultural Imperatives in Foreign Policy: The Case of Nigeria // In: K. Nwoko, O. Osiki (eds.). Dynamics of Culture and Tourism in Africa: Perspectives on Africa's Development in the 21st Century. 2015. P. 75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>357</sup> *Fafiolu G.O.* Nollywood: A viable vehicle of public diplomacy in Nigeria // New Media and Mass Communication. 2013. T. 11. P. 21-24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>358</sup> Benjamin A.U. Cultural Imperatives in Foreign Policy: The Case of Nigeria // In: K. Nwoko, O. Osiki (eds.). Dynamics of Culture and Tourism in Africa: Perspectives on Africa's Development in the 21st Century. 2015. P. 75.

conducted by the BBC in 2010, which revealed that Nollywood and Nigerian music have made many Ghanaians, Cameroonians, Liberians, and even Zambians and South Africans addicted to TV. Some African viewers such as in Zambia have become so intrigued by the movies that they mimic the Nigerian accent and the country's Pidgin English.<sup>359</sup> In many parts of Africa, it is common to find locals giving themselves Nigerian native names like Adaeze (meaning first girl in the family), Oghenevieze (sent by God) and Funnilayo (give me joy) among others. 360 This suggests a reflection of their admiration for the Nigerian language as well as their exposure to the country's culture as displayed on numerous TV platforms and their fraternization with Nigerian people ubiquitous in many parts of the world. It is also not unusual to find many Africans attempting to speak Nigerian Pidgin English using common expressions like 'oga!' (boss or master), 'how you dev now?' (how are you?), 'igwe' (chief), 'welcome ooo' and 'abeg o!' (please). 361 Nigerian Pidgin English is widely spoken in many parts of West and Central Africa with an adulterated version also used in many parts of Southern Africa, especially South Africa. Reflecting on his experience in Kenya, Nigerian Senator Babafemi Ojudu said that when the cab driver that drove him from his hotel to a mall in Mombasa realized that he was Nigerian, he said, "my son is are laiki Nigeria movie. He say dadi dadi come see Nigeria movie."362 This confirms the BBC's observation that Kenyans as well as other African neighbors mimic the Nigerian accent and speak Nigerian Pidgin English and the slang they often hear in movies and music. Indeed, Nigerian words have become popular amongst other African nationals. 363

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>359</sup> Tella O. Is Nigeria a soft power state? // Social Dynamics. 2018. T. 44. № 2. P. 380.

 $<sup>^{360}</sup>$  *Ogunnubi O., Isike C.* Nigeria's soft power sources: Between potential and illusion? // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 2018. T. 31. № 1. P. 49-67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>361</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>362</sup> Tella O. Is Nigeria a soft power state? // Social Dynamics. 2018. T. 44. № 2. P. 380.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>363</sup> Ibid. P. 381.

Today, Nollywood films have become Nigeria's primary cultural tool. These films are broadcast all over Africa, the United States, Canada and the Caribbean. They showcase the good, the bad and the ugly side of life in Nigeria. Indeed, Nigerian films have been major diplomatic tool. Nollywood displays the complex varieties of the Nigerian cultural heritage and its people, sometimes with admiration from other nationalities. Nollywood actors and actresses such as Stephanie Okereke, Genevieve Nnaji, Patience Ozokwor, Mr. Ibu, Osita Iheme (Aki and Pawpaw), Pete Edoche, Omotola Jalade Ekeinde, Mercy Johnson, Richard Mofe Damijo, Ike Owo, Funke Akindele and many others are popular and celebrated in Africa and have become ambassadors for promoting the brand of Nigeria. Furthermore, popular Nigerian soap operas like Jacobs Cross and Tinsel are widely admired and watched by millions of viewers on the African continent. Africa Magic channels (AMEpi 152, AMUrb 153, AMFam 154 and AMWld 155) are dedicated Nollywood channels that mostly showcase the diverse cultural depictions of the Nigerian people. It is for this reason that the first ever Africa Magic Viewer's Choice Awards (AMVCAs) on the continent was held in Nigeria in 2013.364 Study on the sociocultural implications of African immigration to South Africa that sampled 120 African immigrants report that more than 90% of the respondents gained a more positive perception of Nigeria through watching Nigerian movies.<sup>365</sup>

A former Minister of Information and Communications, Dora Akunyili, enlisted Nollywood in 2009 to serve as part of the then rebranding project. Some of these films have been deployed by the Nigerian missions abroad to respond to the negative perceptions about Nigeria. Ukwueze and Ekwugha observe in this regard that Nigerian movies have promoted an understanding of Nigerian culture in the hearts and mind of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>364</sup> *Ogunnubi O., Isike C.* Nigeria's soft power sources: Between potential and illusion? // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 2018. T. 31. № 1. P. 49-67.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

its audience.<sup>366</sup> Nollywood could therefore play a pivotal role in the Nigerian government's attempts to revamp the country's image that has been punctured by negativity.

Nollywood is now a multimillion dollar industry. By and large, the films have been described as promoting social, economic, political and cultural development of the country. Following these diplomatic successes, it is believed that the Nigerian government will as a matter of necessity continue to employ Nollywood as a cultural diplomatic tool in order to attract more goodwill and friendship as a regional power and an aspiring continental power in the 21st century. A. Adebajo adds that, "the Nigerian Movie Industry (Nollywood) has expanded African culture across the continent and created an authentically pan-African cinema." It has played a meaningful role in debunking negative perceptions of Nigeria by offering positive narratives about its culture, values, and societies that win the hearts and minds of its audience. K. Kanayo notes that in recognition of its role, former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan's administration granted \$200 million to the industry.<sup>368</sup>

Beyond their entertainment value, Nollywood has promoted the country's foreign policy objectives in two significant ways. First, Nigerian movies serve as a significant source of national wealth. Nigeria's recalculation of its GDP in mid-2014 revealed that the entertainment industry (particularly Nollywood) is a significant contributor to national revenue.<sup>369</sup> Business opportunities in the Nollywood industry

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>366</sup> *Ukwueze C., Ekwugha U.* Nollywood as a tool for re-shaping Nigerian image and diplomacy // International journal of social sciences and humanities reviews. 2013. T. 4. № 2. P. 179-191.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>367</sup> A Chance for Nigeria and SA to Upstage Pax Gallica // Business Day, 15.10.2013. URL: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2013-10-15-a-chance-for-nigeria-and-sa-to-upstage-pax-gallica (accessed: 01.05.2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>368</sup> Kanayo O.K. Nollywood as an Instrument for Nigeria's Cultural Diplomacy // Presentation at a Roundtable on Culture as Instrument of Diplomacy, organised by Centre for Black and African Arts & Civilisation (CBAAC), Washington DC, USA, January. 2014. T. 17. URL: http://www.sonta.nico.gov.ng/index.php/news/277-kanayo-o-kanayonollywood-as-an-instrument-for-nigeria-s-cultural-diplomacy (accessed: 02.05.2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>369</sup> *Tella O.* Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 112.

include "opening of cinemas in underserved cities, use of technological platforms to enhance distribution, e.g. Iroko TV and Netflix, training and capacity building for cinematography, scriptwriting and directing, and movie production equipment. The local industry employs about a million people and generates over \$7 billion for the economy. The industry accounts for 1.4% of GDP. Nigeria produces around 2,500 films a year with a projection of \$22 million by 2021 for total cinema revenue. Total music revenue in Nigeria is estimated to rise by 13.4% to \$73 million in 2021. However, Nigeria face challenges with copyright piracy and this poses some difficulty in monetizing services in the industry". 370

This is why R. Moudio tagged the Nigeria's film industry "a potential gold mine." <sup>371</sup> It is undoubtedly helping create jobs in a country with an economy that relies mainly on oil and agriculture. Over a million people are currently employed in the industry, making it the country's largest employer after agriculture. Although Nigeria's economy will grow by 7% in 2021, according to the African Development Bank, insufficient jobs for a growing youth population continue to be a huge concern. Thus, as other African nationals consume Nigerian movies, the regional power derives economic gains.

Secondly, Nollywood transmits Nigerian culture across Africa. Today, the Nigeria's film industry is regarded as the third-largest in the world. Its popularity is best embodied by the recent entry of Netflix into Nigerian shores, suggesting that the film market could form a value proposition, as ongoing streaming wars have increased competition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>370</sup> Media and Entertainment Industry (Nollywood and Nigerian music) // International Trade Administration, 2020. URL: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/nigeria-media-and-entertainment-industry-nollywood-and-nigerian-music (accessed: 03.05.2019).

Nigeria's film industry: a potential gold mine? // Africa Renewal, May 2013. URL: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-2013/nigeria%E2%80%99s-film-industry-potential-gold-mine (accessed: 03.05.2019).

Today, in recognition of the soft power potentials of the entertainment, the Nigerian government has taken some key steps to further develop the media and entertainment industry. These include a new financing initiative for the industry: the Central Bank of Nigeria in collaboration with the Bankers' Committee as part of efforts to boost job creation in Nigeria, particularly among the youth, has developed a loan scheme called the Creative Industry Financing Initiative (CIFI).<sup>372</sup> The initiative has four pillars, namely: fashion, music, movie and information technology. Movie production businesses can get a loan of up to 30 million Naira, while Movie distribution business can get financing of up to 500 million Naira. The repayment is flexible over a period 3 to 10 years with a single digit interest rate of 9% per annum inclusive of all charges. The loan scheme also comes with a minimum of 24 months moratorium.<sup>373</sup>

In addition, in response to the low level of internet connectivity, which hampers the digitization of business, the Nigerian Communications has established laws and guidelines aimed at promoting increased access to the Internet through the already licensed Infrastructure Companies (InfraCos) and other initiatives in order to heighten Internet access by the people of Nigeria. The Nigerian Ministry of Communications has vowed to intensify efforts at putting in place an Internet Industry Code of Practice (IICP) that will spell out the minimum acceptable behaviors relating to the provision and use of the Internet in Nigeria.

The federal and state governments are also exerting effort in improving fibre optics deployment. This is expected to improve connectivity which will enhance digital streaming of movies and other entertainment content in the country.

Media and Entertainment Industry (Nollywood and Nigerian music) // International Trade Administration, 2020. URL: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/nigeria-media-and-entertainment-industry-nollywood-and-nigerian-music (accessed: 03.05.2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>373</sup> Ibid. Media and Entertainment Industry (Nollywood and Nigerian music) // International Trade Administration, 2020. URL: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/nigeria-media-and-entertainment-industry-nollywood-and-nigerian-music (accessed: 03.05.2019).

### **Nigerian Music and Dance**

Perceptibly, music possesses transformative power that impacts people's lives, including for those living in areas affected by violence. According to K. Wasfi, "Music transcends the barriers of different cultures and is critically important in times of instability, helping people rise from violence and fear. "374 Nigerian music industry has also dominated the African music landscape as well as making waves in the global scene. O. Ogunnubi and C. Isike emphasize that in the area of media exports, Nigeria's contribution can be strategically propelled and coordinated to improve its often provocative international reputation through music, art, entertainment, fashion, language and literature.<sup>375</sup> For example, Nigeria's entertainment industry, particularly its film and music industry, permeates the airwave of the African continent and beyond. Nigeria boasts of internationally renowned artists who have made their mark in their respective music genres. Indeed, Nigerian music has become a global phenomenon. Nigerian arts and music are increasingly exported, shedding light on the rich cultural diversity of the country. Over the past five decades, Nigerian musicians have toured the world and showcased Nigerian talents. The late king of Afro-beat Fela Anikulapo and his son, Femi Anikulapo Kuti, were the pioneers of Afro-beats, popularizing blackness and Africanness in a world where being black and African was considered demeaning. Other veterans of the Nigerian music scene who can also be referred to as cultural ambassadors include Ebenezer Obey, Victor Olaiya, Sunny Ade, Victor Uwaifo, and Sunny Okosun, Shina Peter, among others.

Today, Nigerian artistes like Olamide, D'banj, P Square, Davido, Wizkid, Tekno, Runtown, Tiwa Savage, Flavour, Yemi Alade, Mavins, and their tracks such as *Oliver Twist, If, Fall, Fia, Personally, Mad Over You, For Life, Pana, Diana, Come Closer*,

Joining forces for cultural diplomacy // UNESCO, 08.06.2017. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/member-states/single-view/news/joining forces for cultural diplomacy (accessed: 03.05.2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>375</sup> *Ogunnubi O., Isike C.* Nigeria's soft power sources: Between potential and illusion? // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 2018. T. 31. № 1. P. 49-67.

Ojuelegba, Nwa Baby, Standing Ovation, Ma Lo, Johnny, Dorobucci, and Shakiti Bobo are admired across Africa. To be sure, for all of its five editions, the MTV Africa Music Awards (MAMA), which celebrates the popularity of African contemporary music, has witnessed international music stars from Nigeria garnering the awards for Best Artist in all of its five editions. Also, in 2015, while P-Square won the award for artist of the decade, D'banj was given the MAMA Evolution award in honor of his indelible mark on African and global music culture for pushing the boundaries of creativity and shaping the soundscape of contemporary Africa (MAMA 2015). The Nigerian artists have dominated the MTV Africa Music Awards.

The 2016 ceremony presented a similar situation, with Nigerian artists winning most of the awards. Wizkid won Best Male and Artist of the Year; Yemi Alade won Best Female, and Tekno was awarded the Best Breakthrough Act. The Song of the Year went to My Woman, My Everything by Patoranking, featuring Wande Coal. It is also worth noting that the Naija swagger exhibited by the country's artists radiates beyond Africa. Many popular U.S. and British artists are of Nigerian origin, including movie stars such as Chiwetel Ejiofor, Hakeem Kae-Kazim, Adewale Akinnuoye-Agbaje, Caroline Chikezie, Nonso Anozie, Richard Ayoade, David Oyelowo, Sophie Okonedo, John Boyega, and musicians like Seal, Sade Adu, Simon Webbe (Blue) Tunde Baiyewu (Lighthouse Family), Wale, Taio Cruz, Chamillionaire, Lemar, and Jidenna. Some of these artists have used their influence to promote Nigerian culture. For instance, one of the tracks on Simon Webbe's album titled *Sanctuary* has Yoruba (a Nigerian language) lines in its lyrics. Similarly, Jidenna wore African traditional attire and included Nigerian pidgin English in the lyrics of his song titled Little Bit More. Such personalities thus increase the attractiveness of Nigerian culture and language and hence Nigeria's international standing and influence.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid.

Buoyed by their artistry mainly in the last decade, the country's massive and attractive entertainment industry has positively transformed perceptions of Nigeria and its people, generally evidenced with many international awards to their credit. Pointedly, these international celebrities with major music collaborations with artistes across Europe and America are reckoned as evidences of Nigeria's cultural capital and useful instruments for its cultural diplomacy. As a way of pursuing its national interest and deepening its leadership influence within Africa, these global celebrities from Nigeria are unarguably unofficial ambassadors for discovering Nigeria's celebrity diplomacy. The Minister of Information and Culture, Lai Mohammed, affirmed that Nigeria's "rich cultural heritage is the soft power to confidently take on the world". 377

The Nigerian choreography (dance) is another area where Nigeria's attractive cultural export is exhibited. I. Hagher recalls how the National Troupe of Nigeria and the Benue Dance Troupe have consistently toured and performed in foreign countries, extending a hand of friendship to the world.<sup>378</sup> The impact of their tours was aptly demonstrated during the Benue Dance Troupe tour to Mexico. The dance enticed a Mexican choreographer, Maria Carmen, to leave Mexico and stay in Nigeria for twelve months.<sup>379</sup> On her return to Mexico, she replicated this and became a Nigerian dance expert at the Safari Resort, Puebla Mexico, achieving a synthesis of Mexican and Nigerian performances. These performances were able to register Nigeria's identity in Mexican consciousness as friendly and entertaining.

The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Information reports that the National Troupe has represented the country in cultural festivals in Africa and beyond. In 1985, the Nigerian Troupe toured countries in the Caribbean including Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Between 1992 and 1995, the National Troupe received invitations to perform

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>377</sup> *Ogunnubi O., Isike C.* Nigeria's soft power sources: Between potential and illusion? // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 2018. T. 31. № 1. P. 59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>378</sup> *Hagher I.* The Importance of Culture and Cultural Diplomacy in the Foreign Policy of Nigeria. – Paper Presented at the Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin, 2011.
<sup>379</sup> Ibid.

in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, where the troupe received accolades for its spectacular performance. Consequently, through its national and international performances, the National Troupe has consistently propagated the values of Nigerian culture.<sup>380</sup>

## The Soft Power Potentials of Sports in Nigeria

It has been said that even though sports diplomacy has been in existence for decades, many states are still hesitant to acknowledge its crucial function in foreign relations. Even as many states partake in international sports, its influence has been growing very slowly. Sport as an instrument for cultural diplomacy came of age in the post-World War I world, when it caught the attention of politicians and governments as a channel through which one could broadcast positive images to a wide audience. Pierre de Coubertin, the father of modern Olympic movement, "foresaw the importance of sports in international relations." Coubertin promoted the Olympic Idea when he stated that "...sport competitions should substitute wars, and the youth from around the world instead of fighting against each other in the wars should compete on the sports stadiums..." He also claimed, that "...wars break out because nations do not understand each other and that there will be no peace unless prejudices between different races pass away..."

Sport is another formidable instrument of cultural diplomacy which reflects Nigeria soft power endowment. Nigerian footballers have been celebrated all over the world. The country has won several international sports competition and football has become a national ideology for unity. Examples of Nigerian football ambassadors who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>380</sup> Culture and its Manifestations. – Federal Ministry of Information. Lagos: Wazad International Press. 1991. P. 2.

 $<sup>^{381}</sup>$  *Murray S*. The two halves of sports-diplomacy // Diplomacy & statecraft. 2012. T. 23. No. 3. P. 576-592.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>382</sup> Kobierecki M.M. et al. International Sport in the Struggle for Political Cooperation // Polish Political Science Yearbook. 2014. T. 43. № 1. P. 317.

have brought goodwill to Nigeria on account of their soccer prowess include Rashidi Yekini, Stephen Keshi, Daniel Amokachi, Kanu Nwankwo and Jay Jay Okocha, Mikel Obi, Mary Onyali Omagbemi and Blessing Okagbare, just to mention a few. In fact today, the Nigerian football prodigies such as Odion Ighalo, Victor Osimhen, Asisat Oshoala etc. are plying their trade across major European football clubs.

The use of sports diplomacy in the promotion of national interest is important today since the world of sport is changing in two ways. In the first place, mega sport events are increasingly hosted in emerging countries, with the FIFA World Cup 2010 in South Africa being the first ever FIFA world cup in Africa, the Olympic Summer Games 2008 in China, the FIFA World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Summer Games 2016 in Brazil."<sup>383</sup> In the past, these were hosted by the developed states only. Secondly, the number of countries winning medals at World Championships and the Olympic Games has increased significantly."<sup>384</sup> This shows that many states to some extent understand the importance of participation in international sports. This participation does not necessarily mean that many states realize they are utilizing sports diplomacy since it is not acknowledged in their foreign policy document. For a state that is looking to promote its national interest, sports diplomacy is therefore a modern and good way to showcase its might and power. S. Bainvel claims that "sports diplomacy can be used to:

- 1. improve and refine the image of one's country;
- 2. amplify friendship, boost peace, and share comradeship among nations;
- 3. promote trade and tourism;
- 4. encourage international development;
- 5. integrate minorities;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>383</sup> *Nuechterlein D.E.* National interests and foreign policy: A conceptual framework for analysis and decision-making // Review of International Studies. 1976. T. 2. № 3. P. 246-266.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>384</sup> Reiche D. Investing in sporting success as a domestic and foreign policy tool: the case of Qatar // International journal of sport policy and politics. 2015. T. 7.  $\mathbb{N}$  4. P. 489-504.

## 6. improve international relations."385

Grix and Lee reiterate that Africa's inability to compete in military power beckons the need to acquire and use soft power such as sports to gain international prestige. In furtherance of Nigeria's avowed commitment to sports development in Africa, it has hosted the All African Games twice (1973 and 2003) since its inception in 1965, in addition to hosting other international sports events. The projection of Nigeria's image through sports is not only effective but also cheap. The benefits of investing in sports are incalculable. Jamaica and East Germany demonstrated the extent of the benefits derivable from investment in sports. It is interesting to note East Germany obtained international recognition through sports.

Nelson Mandela said that 'sport is probably the most effective means of communication in the modern world, bypassing both verbal and written communication and reaching directly out to billions of people worldwide'. He argued further that 'modern sport represents a major political, economic, social and cultural force in today's world'. <sup>388</sup> In other words, sporting laurels and hosting mega events have the capacity to enhance the international prestige of the host nation. <sup>389</sup> In fact, a country's membership of international sports associations signals recognition on the part of the international community. <sup>390</sup> It should be recalled that South Africa was excluded from many international sports associations as a result of its apartheid policies. <sup>391</sup> However,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>385</sup> *Bainvel S.* Sport and Politics: A study of the relationship between International Politics. Master's Thesis. – Linköping University. 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>386</sup> Grix J., Lee D. Soft power, sports mega-events and emerging states: The lure of the politics of attraction // Global society. 2013. T. 27. № 4. P. 521-536.

 $<sup>^{387}</sup>$  Grix J., Lee D. Soft power, sports mega-events and emerging states: The lure of the politics of attraction // Global society. 2013. T. 27. No 4. P. 521-536.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>388</sup> *Beck P.J.* 'The most effective means of communication in the modern world'?: British sport and national prestige //Sport and International Relations. –Routledge, 2004. P. C. 97. <sup>389</sup> Ibid., c. 90.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>390</sup> Levermore R. Sport's role in constructing the 'inter-state' worldview // Sport and international relations. – Routledge, 2004. P. 31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>391</sup> Beck P.J. 'The most effective means of communication in the modern world'?: British sport and national prestige // Sport and International Relations. Routledge, 2004. P. 89-104.

sport was used as a political weapon during the Cold War period. Similarly, Nazi Germany also used the hosting of the Olympic Games in 1936 to advance its international prestige.<sup>392</sup>

In the same vein, Nigeria rallied African, Asian and Caribbean states to boycott the 1986 Commonwealth Games in Edinburg following the British government's policy of keeping its ties with apartheid South Africa. Hence, historically, sport has offered enormous soft power potential as it gives the host nation the opportunity to subtly announce itself as an emerging power or showcase its level of development and economic progress to the international community. This can raise international prestige, while at the same time yielding other potential benefits. Nigeria's contribution to sports in terms of participation, laurels, bidding and successful hosting of megasporting events also presents viable platforms to increase its reputation in the eyes of global stakeholders.

Since independence, as the study highlight above, Nigeria has recorded impressive performance in terms of organizing and participating in major sporting events, particularly football. These achievements could be converted into soft power potential for achieving its external strategies. Recently, Nigeria emerged African champion after it won the CAF Orange African Cup of Nations hosted by South Africa in 2013, a feat that the country last achieved almost two decades ago. Many Nigerian soccer exports to Africa and Europe in the 1990s are still revered in ways that endear Nigeria to other Africans; this has resulted in goodwill which manifests itself in support for the Super Eagles by Africans whenever Nigeria plays any team other than their own. The Nigerian government could take advantage of the popularity of these sporting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>392</sup> Roche M. Megaevents and modernity: Olympics and expos in the growth of global culture. – Routledge, 2002. – C. 104.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>393</sup> *Magee K*. Boycotts and Bailouts: The archives of the Commonwealth Games Council of Scotland // African Research & Documentation. 2011. № 116. P. 25.

 $<sup>^{394}</sup>$  Black D., Van Der Westhuizen J. The allure of global games for semi-peripheral polities and spaces: a research agenda // Third world quarterly. 2004. T. 25. № 7. P. 1195-1214.

personalities as well as its sporting accomplishments as soft power resources in different contexts of international diplomacy.

#### 2.6. Education as a Soft Power Potential

J. Nye aptly notes in his work that nowadays more and more countries are trying to form world quality and accessible system of education to students from all over the world. Such countries as the U.S. are perfectly informed about the fact that the education system is one of the most essential instruments in terms of dominance in the global political arena. Everyone knows that the educational system allows the improvement of economic and political situation of the country.<sup>395</sup> The role of education in the international prestige and standing of a country has been significantly increasing in the recent years, mainly because of major transformations in the global economy and a corresponding shift in values, which have grown in importance in the processes of modernization.<sup>396</sup> It has been acknowledged further that education becomes even more important in the context of the transformation to a knowledge economy and makes it a necessary condition to avoid the so-called 'middle income trap'; it is considered to be one of the intensive factors of economic growth and economic competitiveness. Education is also an important yet rarely discussed element of state building.<sup>397</sup> Not only is quality education an important factor for global economic competitiveness, it also plays a major role in fostering such values as equality of opportunities, empowering disadvantaged societies and individuals. Education is becoming more and more important, especially as knowledge grows in importance in a globalizing world. Knowledge itself becomes more transnational, given information

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>395</sup> *Nye Jr. J.* Soft power and higher education // Forum for the future of higher education (Archives). 2005. P. 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>396</sup> Wojciuk A., Michałek M., Stormowska M. Education as a source and tool of soft power in international relations // European Political Science. 2015. T. 14. P. 298-317.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>397</sup> Green A. Education and state formation: Europe, East Asia and the USA. Springer, 2013.

and communication technology, scientific advances, and the general spread of awareness.

On this note therefore, education comes to be one of the most effective soft power instruments. Cowan and Arsenault add however that only a developed education system that meets the requirements of innovative high-tech economy and is integrated into the international educational and scientific space can become one of the major competitive advantages of the modern state in the "global competition for minds" and attract the most talented foreign students. <sup>398</sup> The provision of educational opportunities for foreign students is one of the most important instruments of soft power of a state

Nigeria's soft power potential can also be derived from the academic strength of its people. Indeed, education has become a key soft power endowment in Nigeria especially in the landscape of international education.<sup>399</sup> Nigeria boasts of one of the most educated populations in the African continent, and Nigerians rank among the most qualified professionals in Africa.<sup>400</sup> While this would seem to represent hard power, if used creatively, its population can be channeled to attract soft power gains. Nigeria is the largest African country in terms of population and is also the most populous Black Country in the world. According to C. Peter, 'Nigeria boasts one of the most educated populations in the African continent', and Nigerians rank among the most qualified professionals in Africa.<sup>401</sup> The health and education sectors in South Africa benefit immensely from Nigerian personnel. For example, there is no public hospital or university in South Africa without a Nigerian doctor or lecturer (from senior lecturer to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>398</sup> Cowan G., Arsenault A. Moving from monologue to dialogue to collaboration: The three layers of public diplomacy // The annals of the American academy of political and social science. 2008. T. 616. N. 1. P. 10-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>399</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>400</sup> Idahosa S., Makpah O., Ikhidero S., Afolabi G., Adebayo K. Education as a viable soft power initiative in Nigeria's foreign policy implementation: the Nigerian foreign service academy as a case study // Revista Inclusiones. 2020. P. 33-47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>401</sup> Peter C.M. Miles Apart But Walking the Same Path: The Right of the People to Control Their Natural Wealth and Resources; Lessons from Nigeria and Tanzania. Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2007.

professor). To support this claim, the database of the Nigerian Union in South Africa indicates that there are at least two medical doctors and a university lecturer in every branch of the association spread across the nine provinces in South Africa. This was further verified from the database of the Association of Nigerian Residents in the South African city of Umhlathuze (ANRU) which has 60 registered members comprised of 25 medical doctors, 4 nurses, 2 university professors, 6 senior lecturers, 2 architects and 4 clergy men/ women<sup>402</sup>. Nigerian students also top the list of foreign African students in both the UK and USA and in South Africa (with the exception of Zimbabwe).<sup>403</sup>

In March 2020, the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, expanded the country's Economic Advisory Council with the appointment of Nigeria's Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as a member of the Council. This was done in response to South Africa's economic challenges, which recently slumped into its second recession in two years. Previously, Okonjo-Iweala spent a 25-year career at the World Bank as a development economist, scaling the ranks to the Number 2 position of Managing Director in Operations.<sup>404</sup>

#### Conclusion

Undoubtedly, using attributes of culture to spread influence has not been a new phenomenon. For example, during colonial times the British and French governments used their languages, education and legal system to strengthen their connection within its colonies. The legacy of these policies has had lasting effects on relations between those successor states, a phenomenon sometimes called "neocolonialism." These linkages, however, can go both ways, as relationships between, for example, rising

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>402</sup> Executive Committee, Past Executive Committees, Members and Constitution // Association of Nigerian Residents in Umhlathuze, 2014. URL: http://anrusa.weebly.com (accessed: 03.05.2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>403</sup> Lee J.J., Sehoole C. Regional, continental, and global mobility to an emerging economy: The case of South Africa // Higher Education. 2015. T. 70. № 5. P. 827-843.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>404</sup> Africa: South Africa Appoints Okonjo-Iweala Member, Economic Advisory Council // All Africa, 08.03.2020. URL: https://allafrica.com/stories/202003080050.html (accessed: 03.05.2020).

powers like Russia and China and their wider hinterlands in Europe and Asia demonstrate. Cultural and soft power tools are only useful if they develop trust between the countries and peoples involved; sometimes they can lead to conflict, as in Eastern Europe after the downfall of the Soviet Union and in areas around China as the attempt to develop new "Silk Roads" leads to fears of domination and increased indebtedness. The use of cultural soft power tools can be highly problematic, and both public and private actors increasingly have to experiment with them. For example, in the digital battle for the control of soft power, culture is potentially very useful as a Trojan horse to hide political messages or spread ideology. When it is formulated and applied correctly, it can be welcomed. Ideology is often at the root of soft power, but not necessarily perceived as an intended foreign policy action. By culture we also mean the dominating ideology.

Democratization, liberalism, and some form of market capitalism are often said to be the drivers of "modernization" in a quasi-Enlightenment framework, but more traditional forms of cultural soft power remain, for example in terms of cross-border ethnic identities, religions old and new, and neo-nationalism populisms in the developed world. Cultural soft power is also about how "progress" is defined, whether in Western terms - whether states, groups and actors need to "modernize" to keep up in a rapidly changing world - or whether modernization needs to be integrated with traditional, quasi-spiritual or ethnic, folk-like norms of social solidarity. The success of cultural soft power depends therefore on the appropriate receiving culture and an ultimately effective understanding by the perception of the target audience. These norms need to be perceived as non-threatening and non-controlling. This means that for example building American schools in the Middle East can only be a successful soft power tool if people in the selected country do not perceive the U.S.'s educational institution as ideologically biased and an existential threat to their people and their domestic culture. In Iraq they may – divisions are rife, as the country itself is an artificial creation of Western powers in the wake of the fall of the Ottoman Empire – and in

Saudi Arabia they may not – although they may threaten the domestic hierarchy of Wahhabi norms and Saudi monarchical tribalism. Furthermore, sending U.S. soldiers to protect an American school may also be interpreted as a coercive action and not as attraction.

As the study has revealed in the preceding chapter, soft power is a kind of mental power and it is an important component of a state's national power. All soft elements of mental power are contained in the category of culture. Culture has been shown to be "an essential aspect of a country's soft power. 405 Many countries have chosen to strengthen international competitiveness and influence through cultural development. Within the competition for national power, a nation's hard power cannot be improved without the development of soft power. However, many people place more emphasis on rivalry in terms of power, neglecting, at the same time, the competition of power, viewed as cultural power. 406 Due to the increased influence of soft power in international relations, the world powers emphasize the enhancement of soft powers. For instance, in the 1980s, the Japanese former Prime Minister Nakasone proposed a strategic plan for "creating a culturally developed country". 407 The former French president Chirac suggested achieving a cultural Europe and establishing a European cultural community. The Russian president Putin has started implementing the "cultural expansion" strategy since he was interim president. In September 1992, the former American president Bush emphasized the importance of using American culture as a new type of soft culture within his agenda entitled "Agenda for America's Revival". 408 In November 2000, another former American president, Clinton, held a seminar on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>405</sup> *Haneş N., Andrei A.* Culture as soft power in international relations // International Conference on Knowledge-Based Organization. 2015. T. 21. № 1. P. 32-37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>406</sup> Nye Jr. J. Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power. – Basic Books, 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>407</sup> Hua Jian et al. The Competition for Soft Power: Trends of Cultural Competition in the Context of Globalization. – Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press and China Higher Education Press. 2001. P. 5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>408</sup> Collection of American National Security Strategy Reports. – Current Affairs Press. 2001. P. 276-279.

topic of American culture and of foreign relations, at the White House, aiming to achieve the 21st century American foreign cultural strategy. In the report concerning the national security strategy, Clinton highlighted "encouraging the development of external democracy" as being one of the three pillars of USA's security strategy and foreign policy. This report states that "extending the great family of democratic societies and of countries with a free market promotes the strategic interests of the United States". <sup>409</sup>

Currently, we consider the following as relevant major issues in terms of soft power competition: the relations between human rights and national sovereignty; the control and influence on international institutions; the employment of market economy to impose culture; rivalry in terms of human resources; the fight for a better position for the media; contradictions and collisions caused by ethnic and religious issues. According to J. Nye, there is a tendency for competition on national power, focusing on cultural power, to continue far into the new century. Although less developed countries are on a disadvantageous position in the competition for "soft" power, the power of the weak ones is not to be neglected. This is another source for intangible power. The competition of a powerful country can be retained due to a weak country, but with a better ability to organize and concentrate. Thus, cultural advantages and disadvantages are relative. 410

It has been observed that in international modern society, due to increased overlap of interests, diverse cultures present and learn reciprocally, while being in conflict with one another. However, nowadays, conflicts between different cultures are limited, partial and will not lead towards large-scale global conflicts. There are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>409</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>410</sup> Nye Jr. J. Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power. – Basic Books, 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>411</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>412</sup> Костелянец С.В. Конфликты в Африке: причины, генезис и проблемы урегулирования (этнополитические и социальные аспекты) //Восток. Афро-Азиатские общества: история и современность. 2014. № 4. С. 196-202.

many localized reasons for these conflicts, which seldom concern global powers even though they tend to cross borders and spread on the regional level.<sup>413</sup>

In the evolution of international relations, the intangible soft power represents an engine that drives the relations between states or unions of states. This soft power, of a state, comes from: ideology, social system, its organizational mechanism, life style, the development model, cultural traditions, national values, ethnic characteristics, religious believes, informational resources, interdependency, mutual trust, etc. In this respect, the soft power can be named cultural power. In the international society of today, the competition concerning national power, based on cultural power, is an important phenomenon in developing international relations. In our opinion, the impact of cultural power on international relations is that culture is a knowledge filter. Culture plays an important role in the decision-making process that involves political leaders who make decisions in the light of cultural perceptions specific to their own culture. Leaders, states and people are affected by cultural differences that reflect their own values, perspectives, interests, customs, and hopes. Failing to appreciate these differences will lead to wrong misinterpretations and misjudgments. Hence, obviously, cultural systems are closely linked to international relations. Culture is a "navigation compass" in decision-making. Different states have different strategic preferences which have their roots in the early experiences of the state formation and which are influenced up to a point, by the psychological, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and of its political leaders. Cultural concepts strongly influence the way national leaders regard political issues, and often determine the solutions they choose to solve the issues, both individually and collectively. Thus, cultures are critical for these leaders, as long as they will address these issues in international relations. Therefore, culture is a "navigation compass" within international relations and represents the architect of international social trust. The competitiveness of a nation depends on a unique universal

 $<sup>^{413}</sup>$  Костелянец С.В. Конфликты по-африкански: динамика и способы урегулирования // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2010. № 1. С. 40-43.

characteristic, and that is social trust. Some countries have a higher level of social trust, others have a lower level, which will influence the degree of cooperation in international relations. Culture determines the degree of social trust and influences the nature of the cooperation institutions. Culture is a model for structuring the social, economic and military institutions, exerting a strong influence on the behavior and outlook of the world community. It also represents an important power for international integration.

The core of culture is the values. As to the content of culture, broadly speaking, we consider it comprises the materials and spiritual wealth created in the history of human society. In a narrower sense, we believe that culture is social ideology as well as the systems and the institutions related to this, including ideas, political thoughts, legislation, morality, art, religion and science. However, from whatever angle we look at it, culture is not a static entity but a dynamic process. As soft power, culture is relative to politics, economy and military. Increased competition regarding current national power involves: economic power, scientific and technological power, defense power as well as cultural power. A country's cultural universality and its capacity to determine norms, rules and regimes to govern international behavior represent the key resources of that country's power.

The Nigerian culture has aspects that are globally admired and considered popular in Africa. Regionally, its African neighbors are being attracted to aspects of Nigerian cultural domain in ways that impact in some ways their perceptions and acceptance of Nigerians and Nigeria as a continental leader. Nigeria's music, films, fashion, languages (Pidgin English, Yoruba, etc.) and literature are cultural elements of the country's soft power in Africa. In terms of political values, in the post 1999 democratic era, and despite its civil war and ethno-religious cleavages, Nigeria has been a relatively good model of peaceful co-existence rooted in the political ideal of unity in diversity. Compared with plural states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe, Nigeria has been able to hold together. For example, outside of

agriculture, Nollywood is Nigeria's second-largest employer, and it generates \$600 million annually. Although hindered by the "Nigerian factor", and issues like piracy and access to funding, these achievements were attained. If the continent and the larger world is dancing to Nigerian music, sharing Aki and Paw Paw memes and getting in the *Jollof* wars, it speaks to reason that this interest must be engaged. Culture and tourism ministry should be engaging the Foreign Affairs ministry and coordinating the country's embassies towards selling these Nigerian stories and narratives that the larger world is already vaguely familiar with. A great example can be made of Edo state in Southern Nigeria, which is pitching a royal museum to showcase the rich and much-vaunted Benin art spread across the world.

Furthermore, its foreign policy principle that makes Africa its center piece and commitment to the liberation and unity of the continent as exemplified in its contributions to peace building in different parts of Africa since the 1960s all help to endear it to other African states and peoples.

The Appeal of Nollywood // Stears Business, 08.10.2017. URL: https://www.stearsng.com/article/the-investor-appeal-of-nollywood (accessed: 01.07.2020).

## Chapter Three STRATEGIC USE OF HARD AND SOFT POWER: LIMITATIONS AND PROSPECTS

#### Introduction

Nigeria has always strived to promote a positive image across Africa and beyond through its soft power attributes. Through its regional activities it has constructed for itself the identity of a peace builder. There is no gainsaying the fact that Nigeria is a major peace builder on the continent of Africa and the globe at large. The study has highlighted in the preceding chapters that Nigeria's peace keeping role in Africa such as in the DRC, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone has significantly boosted its soft power in Africa. Furthermore, it is a significant aid donor and Big Brother in its engagement with other African countries and has provided aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries as a means to strengthen South-South cooperation.

To this end therefore, even though Nigeria has never officially harbored any hegemonic aspirations, this in reality hardly disqualifies it from being Africa's hegemonic power. O. Ogunnubi and U. Okeke-Uzodike and many other scholars have emphasized the fact that Nigeria remains an important regional power on the African continent. This is not unconnected with the fact that it has created the identity of a benign regional power in the eyes of its African compatriots and globally. It has, however, been emphasized that the regional power status of Nigeria is being hindered by several factors. While scholars and leading opinion holders have described Nigeria's influence in Africa as typical of a regional power courtesy its hard and soft power endowments, its dwindling influence in Africa in recent years notwithstanding its current status as Africa's largest economy is a reality worth mentioning. Inherent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>415</sup> *Tella O*. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>416</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>417</sup> Ogunnubi O., Okeke-Uzodike U. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? // African Security Review. – 2016. T. 25. № 2. P. 110-128.

internal dilemmas and external contradictions have been invoked to dismiss Nigeria's hegemonic influence on the continent. However, Nigeria has also been ascribed negative identities such as drug trafficking, corruption and terrorism. While the latter first gained a foothold in North and East Africa<sup>418</sup>, Africa's Islamic terrorism is now increasingly associated with Nigeria's borderlands next to Chad, Cameroon and Niger. It is imperative that Abuja effectively mobilizes its soft power credentials to counteract these negative images and promote its positive attributes that have been recognized in the international arena.

## 3.1. Limitations to Nigeria Power Status in Africa

While Nigeria has often been referred to as the "military giant" of Africa, scholars like E. Osaghae nicknamed it "a crippled giant". A. Adebajo and R. Mustapha pejoratively refer to Nigeria as a giant with rickety feet, rendered thus by its bad governance and a chronic dependency on oil that has stifled growth in the country. Utth on his part derogatively describes Nigeria as 'a giant without gallantry'. In this context, he sees Nigeria as naturally and humanly endowed; very rich in planning and very victorious in speech making but very weak in implementations. Even though the positions of the above scholars may not be absolutely wrong, this study posits that Nigeria remains an important regional power on the African continent; however, Nigeria's soft and hard power endowment is hindered by some factors that are limiting its hegemonic role as African regional power. In making this assertion, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>418</sup> *Костелянец С.В.* Терроризм в северо-восточной и восточной Африке // Ученые записки Института Африки РАН. 2017. №. 2. С. 118-125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>419</sup> Osaghae E.E. Crippled giant: Nigeria since independence. – Indiana University Press, 1998.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>420</sup> *Adekeye A., Mustapha R.* (eds.). Gulliver's troubles: Nigeria's foreign policy after the cold war. – Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 2008.

 $<sup>^{421}</sup>$  Ottuh J.A. A giant without gallantry: A rhetorical-biblical depiction of Nigeria as the giant of Africa // International Journal of African Society, Cultures, and Traditions. 2015. T. 2. № 2. P. 41-55.

study at this juncture considers a number of challenges that increasingly deflate Nigeria's capacity to exhibit its role as the regional power of the continent of Africa.

First, O. Tella reminds us that despite Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS, the African powerhouse (Nigeria) has not been too successful in using this platform to dilute France's influence in the Francophone countries in West Africa. By way of neocolonialism, France still maintains strong ties with its erstwhile colonies in Africa. Tella proves the example of how Nigeria dragged its feet when the 2010 Ivorian conflict broke out as a result of incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo's rejection of the presidential elections that declared Alassane Ouattara the winner, but then France dislodged Gbagbo. 423

The lingering problem of Boko Haram is also worth mentioning. While Boko Haram originated in and is based in Nigeria, other West African countries are not immune to its terrorist acts<sup>424</sup>. Nigeria seems to have handled the Boko Haram insurgency with kid gloves since its inception.<sup>425</sup> Further, Nigeria only began to pay serious attention to the need to strengthen its bilateral and multilateral relations with countries such as Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to tackle Boko Haram after France invited West African countries, including Nigeria, for a summit on this topic in Paris in 2014. <sup>426</sup> France has also been the most visible player in the conflicts in Mali and Central African Republic <sup>427</sup>. This weakens Nigeria's soft power and its leadership ambitions in a region it considers as its primary sphere of influence. <sup>428</sup> The effective translation of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>422</sup> *Tella O*. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>423</sup> *Tella O.* A declining or stable image? An assessment of the United States' soft power in Africa // South African Journal of International Affairs. 2016. T. 23. № 2. P. 151-166.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>424</sup> Костелянец С.В. Терроризм в Африке: особенности, тенденции и перспективы // Пути к миру и безопасности. 2016. № 2. Р. 101-113. <sup>425</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>426</sup> *Amuwo K.* Nigeria's Continental Diplomatic Thrusts: the Limits of Africa's Nominally Biggest Economy. – Pretoria: South African Institute of International Affairs. 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>427</sup> Денисова Т.С., Костелянец С.В. ЦАР: динамика конфликта // Азия и Африка сегодня. 2019. №. 6. Р. 24-31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>428</sup> Tella O. Is Nigeria a soft power state? // Social Dynamics. 2018. T. 44. № 2.

Nigeria's soft power to meaningful influence in Africa and further afield has undoubtedly been so constrained by the above factor that Nigeria would at best be described as a potential soft power state.

# Nigeria-South Africa Bilateral Relations: An Expose of Limitations to Nigeria's Economic Power

Trends in the Nigerian economic sector indicate that South Africa is among the top investors in many sectors of the Nigerian economy. Today, the presence of South African companies is visible in the Nigerian economy. This is felt especially in areas such as telecommunication, engineering, banking, retail, hospitality, property development, construction and tourism, to mention a few. This indicates to a very great extent the level of influence South Africa has in the Nigerian economy. 429

Being more technologically equipped, South Africa's exports to Nigeria machinery, electrical equipment, appliances, wood, paper, prepared food stuffs, beverages, plastics, rubber, chemicals etc. However, oil makes up 97-98% of Nigeria's exports to South Africa. The situation means that South Africa is exporting a wide range of goods to Nigeria, many of which are value added manufactured goods, which places South Africa's exports at a vantage point to grow dramatically. It indicates also the level of technological power (also a kind of soft power) South Africa has over Nigeria since Nigeria's export products to South Africa consist of a single raw material in the form of oil. Its oil exports to South Africa are unlikely to increase dramatically over the next few years and its export products are also unlikely to diversify. This translates into an unequal trade situation between South Africa and Nigeria, in which South Africa is in fact the dominant partner in terms of trade relations. What really highlights the unequal relationship that exists between Nigeria and South Africa is the fact that South

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>429</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>430</sup> Pahad A. Briefing on the Incoming State Visit, 5 May 2002. Pretoria: Union Building. 2002.

African companies have come to dominate many sectors of the Nigerian economy. 431 South African Companies have become big players in the Nigerian economy, but prior to 1999 there were only four South African companies operating in Nigeria. This situation has dramatically changed with the assistance of the South African state, the signing of bilateral agreements and the establishment of South Africa - Nigeria Binational Commission. 432 Today, there are over 100 South African companies doing business in Nigeria. 433 Within a mere 8 years, South African companies have become major players in almost every sector of the Nigerian economy. The biggest investment by South African companies in Nigeria has been made in the telecommunication sector. In 2001, MTN was awarded a license by the Nigerian government to operate a cell phone network in the country. In return, MTN had to pay licensing fees of over \$285 million. In addition, MTN has spent a further \$1 billion on setting up its operations in Nigeria. 434 MTN is currently the largest cellular network company in Nigeria with over 10 million subscribers. 435

South African companies are also heavily involved in Nigeria's media and entertainment sector. DSTV for example, as a major force in the television industry, accounts for 90% of the viewers that watched satellite TV in Nigeria between 2005 and 2009. This has seen DSTV growing into the sixth largest company listed on the Lagos Stock Exchange. The fact that DSTV determines the movies shown to its African

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>431</sup> Adekunle A. (1986) Nigeria and Southern Africa // In: Olusanya G. O., Akindele R. A. (eds.). Nigeria's external relations: The first twenty-five years. University Press, 1986.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>432</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 32-40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>433</sup> *Sifingo B*. South African high commissioner to Nigeria comments on business relations // African Business Journal Issue. 2003. T. 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>434</sup> Daniel J., Lutchman J., Naidu S. South Africa and Nigeria: Two unequal centres in a periphery // In: Daniel, J., Southall, R. Lutchman, J. (eds). State of the nation: South Africa 2004-2005. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 2004. P. 544-568.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>435</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 38.

<sup>436</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>437</sup> Omojola B. The Sky is the Limit // Africa Today, 30 September 2006.

audience prevents the maximization of soft power that can be generated by Nollywood. Nigeria thus needs to establish home-grown satellite companies to transmit Nollywood movies to the African audience and beyond. This will enable it to determine which movies are screened and overcome its heavy reliance on South Africa to project its cultural soft power.

It is also important that the Nigerian government pays more attention to Nollywood's potential to generate soft power. This can be harnessed by the country's cultural diplomacy with the ultimate objective of enhancing Nigeria's influence regionally and possibly globally.

South African companies have also become dominant players in Nigeria's construction sector. ENTECH, a South African based engineering company, headed a consortium of South African companies that were awarded a tender worth R2.1 billion from the Lagos State government to redevelop the Bar Beach and Victoria Island area of Lagos. Many large South African companies have also invaded the tourism and leisure sector in Nigeria. Under NEPAD, the South African parastatal, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), has become one of the largest investors in Nigeria's tourist sector. The United Nations Report of 2005 unveils that IDC invested over \$1.4 billion in tourism and telecommunications ventures in Nigeria. Another major player in the tourism sector is the South African Company Bidvest. Through its subsidiary, Tom-vest, it has purchased one of the biggest tourism companies in Nigeria, Touchdown Travels. The biggest development in the Nigerian tourism sector, indeed, is the ambitious \$350 million Tinapa resort project in the Cross-River state. This massive project falls under the auspices of NEPAD and has the full backing of the South African and Nigerian governments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>438</sup> Pahad A. Briefing on the Incoming State Visit, 5 May 2002. – Pretoria: Union Building. – 2002.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>439</sup> Ebegbulem J.C. An evaluation of Nigeria–South Africa bilateral relations // Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. 2013. T. 1. № 1. P. 32-40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>440</sup> Ibid. P. 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>441</sup> Ibid.

## Nigeria's Hard/Soft Power in the face of Lingering Corrupt Practices

Despite its enormous endowments, the perceptions of Nigeria as a corrupt country limit its soft power and capacity to play a hegemonic moral role in its region and beyond. Corruption is one of the "hydra-headed challenge crippling this purported giant of Africa" (Nigeria). J. Ottuh describes corruption as a pandemic that has eaten deep into the marrow of many Nigerians and stems from its leadership. Corruption is a symptom of numerous difficulties within contemporary societies. It usually involves more than one party. It takes a form of an organized crime.<sup>442</sup>

According to the perception index of Transparency International, Nigeria was ranked 144th most corrupt country out of the 146 most corrupt countries of the world, beating Bangladesh and Haiti to last position. This negative ranking has caused embarrassment to Nigerian government officials during visits to other countries and has significantly dented Nigeria's leverage in the international community and its ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed, aside from factors such as its economic prowess and military arsenal, its image and soft power are major sources of any country's influence in the international arena. In the 21st century, states that are serious about achieving their foreign policy objectives understand the significance of soft power to supplement their hard power. An analysis of the anti-graft/anti-corruption laws in Nigeria shows that corruption will continue in spite of the laws because the perpetrators do not fear any consequences. O. Tella lamented the spate of corruption in Nigeria in his comment that "it is axiomatic that corruption is one of the ills that Nigeria

 $<sup>^{442}</sup>$  Ottuh J.A. A giant without gallantry: A rhetorical-biblical depiction of Nigeria as the giant of Africa // International Journal of African Society, Cultures, and Traditions. 2015. T. 2. № 2. P. 45-46.  $^{443}$  Ibid. P. 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>444</sup> Azeez A. Endangering good governance for sustainable democracy: the continuing struggle against corruption in Nigeria // Journal in Research, Peace, Gender and Development. 2011. T. 1. № 11. P. 307-314.

has been identified with in the international system."<sup>445</sup> It is now dawning on the Nigerian public that the so-called private enterprises and political leaders are free from scrutiny because while the private enterprises claim privacy, serving presidents, legislators and governors hide under the cover of immunity clause. In his illustrations of corrupt practices in Nigeria, J. Ottuh explains that corruption is found in the award of contracts, promotion of staff, dispensation of justice, public offices and it manifests itself in embezzlement of public funds, misappropriation of designated public fund and other abuses of office. <sup>446</sup> Corruption can be systematic in nature and it can affect the whole life of an organization or society. C. Achebe in his work postulated that corruption should be made difficult and inconvenient for those who intend to indulge in corruption in Nigeria and that the right philosophy and ideology be imbibed by leaders and sundry in Nigeria. <sup>447</sup>

The dilemma of corruption in Nigeria has dire consequences for its soft power. 448 Nigeria's decentralized or disorganized corruption is very destructive not only to the economy but to the image of the country. 449 As opposed to centralized or organized corruption, in such a situation, an investor has to bribe different agencies and individuals to obtain a license for the provision of government goods or services. Corruption is pervasive in Nigeria at all levels, across the public and private realms. Since independence, successive regimes, both military and civil, have been enmeshed in devastating corruption. It therefore came as no surprise when former British Prime Minister David Cameron recently described Nigeria as 'fantastically corrupt'. 450 This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>445</sup> *Tella O.* Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>446</sup> Ottuh J.A. Fighting Corruption in Nigeria (Titus 2: 7-13): A Hermeneutico-Theological Approach // Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society. 2013. T. 2277. P. 1-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>447</sup> Achebe C. The trouble with Nigeria. – Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1983.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>448</sup> *Tella O*. Corruption and economic development: Africa and East Asia in comparative perspective // Ubuntu: Journal of conflict and social transformation. 2013. T. 2. № 1-2. P. 47-67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>449</sup> *Tella O.* Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 115.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>450</sup> South Africa regains Africa's 'biggest economy' title from Nigeria // BBC, 11.08.2016. URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37045276 (accessed: 01.07.2020).

illustrates the damage corruption has caused to Nigeria's image in the eyes of the global audience.

J. Nye emphasizes that many countries like Switzerland and Canada enjoy prestige and influence in the international arena arising from their soft power and positive image.<sup>451</sup> The high level of corruption has become a huge constraint to Nigeria's power in the continent of African. Indeed, on what moral grounds can Nigeria as a regional power preach for the eradication of corruption and embrace of good governance in countries such as Zimbabwe, the DRC, Angola, and Sudan when it is notorious for corruption in the eyes of the global audience? Its preaching will definitely fall on deaf ears.<sup>452</sup>

In an age of unprecedented interconnectedness, states have realized that they cannot influence other states through coercion alone. Prestige, respect, attraction and admiration matter. Accordingly states often endeavor to project a positive image and counteract any negative one that they have been identified with. In this light, successive Nigerian governments have attempted (at least at the level of rhetoric) to combat the country's corruption through various institutional frameworks. Notable among these initiatives are the Obasanjo military administration's Jaji Declaration (1975-1979), the Buhari military regime's War against Indiscipline (1983-1985), and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), which were launched by the Obasanjo civilian administration in 2000 and 2003, respectively. Despite these efforts and the EFCC's notable successes such as the prosecution of Tafa Balogun, then Inspector General of Police, Bode George, then deputy national vice chairman (South-West Zone) of the ruling People's Democratic Party, and James Ibori, the former

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>451</sup> Nye Jr. J. Soft power: The means to success in world politics. – Public affairs, 2004. P. 11.; Nye Jr. J. The future of power. Public Affairs, 2011. P. 84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>452</sup> Tella O. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>453</sup> Ibid. P. 117.

Governor of Delta state, corruption is still pervasive. This is a consequence of, among other factors, the lip service paid to these initiatives rather than actual crusades against corruption and the use of the agencies to witch hunt political opponents. While many politicians are alleged to have been involved in corrupt practices, very few have been convicted. The Halliburton scandal comes to mind. Nigerian public officials were bribed to the tune of about \$200 million for the award of a \$6 billion Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas construction contract. Despite the global ignominy and public outcry in the country that accompanied the scandal, no charges have been laid against the culprits because three former head of states and other power brokers were allegedly involved. 454

It is imperative that Nigeria, with its endowments and regional Big Brother status as well as being an exporter of democracy in Africa, restores its image that has been grossly battered by corruption. D. Agbiboa in his work reveals that 'between 1960 and 1999 alone, Nigerian leaders siphoned more than \$440 billion out of the economy. This is six times the Marshal Plan, the sum total needed to rebuild devastated Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. He noted that if the scale of corruption of the civilian regime that began in 1999 is truly unprecedented one can only imagine the extent of the damage it has caused to Nigeria's economy as well as the negative image it has carved for Nigeria beyond its shores. He Nwachukwu, a one-time Foreign Affairs Minister, affirms that Nigeria's battered image in the international arena is largely a consequence of the high levels of ubiquitous corruption which have engendered disregard for good governance, transparency and accountability. Given this reality, it is not surprising that corruption has constrained Nigeria's moral authority, dented its soft power and punctured its regional hegemonic potential.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>454</sup> *Ojo G. U., Aghedo I.* Image re-branding in a fragile state: The case of Nigeria // Korean Journal of Policy Studies. 2013. T. 28. P. 81-107.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>455</sup> Agbiboa D.E. Serving the few, starving the many: How corruption underdevelops Nigeria and how there is an alternative perspective to corruption cleanups // Africa Today. 2012. T. 58. № 4. P. 117. 
<sup>456</sup> Nigerian govt. to deploy Yoruba teachers to Brazil // Premium Times, 21.03.2015. URL: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/ssouthwest/178871-nigerian-govt-to-deploy-yoruba-teachers-to brazil.html (accessed: 02.08.2020).

The successful 2015 presidential election further enhanced perceptions of Abuja in the global arena. It is critical that Nigeria optimizes the credibility and moral identity that the election and the personality of M. Buhari (widely perceived not to be corrupt) have bestowed upon the country, to promote its interests in the international arena. Indeed, prominent among his manifestos is the zero tolerance to corruption. Nigeria, amongst other things, needs also to continually emphasize the importance of democratic regimes in Africa, promote peace and stability, garnering the support of the international community for its aspiration to become one of the permanent members of a reformed UNSC and, most importantly, enhancing its economic interests.

It is also imperative that the Nigerian government moves beyond rhetoric in its domestic and foreign policy and shows more commitment to the plight of Nigerians at home and abroad. This can enhance positive perceptions of Nigerians abroad and ultimately promote Nigerian soft power. Furthermore, the country needs to effectively formulate and execute its foreign policy to achieve optimal outcomes. Whilst Nigeria has often provided aid for altruistic reasons in the past, in light of its economic and domestic challenges, a foreign policy that does not significantly enhance Nigeria's economic prowess and political power is inappropriate.

## 3.2. Nigeria's Hard Power and the Dilemma of Recurrent Insurgency

Insurgency in its diverse form has emerged as one of the greatest threats to human and international security in Nigeria. Nigeria's hard power endowment has been called into question when the country has become the main hub of insurgent operations in the region. It is common knowledge that Boko Haram terrorism is the major insurgent challenge confronting Nigeria, even though many other challenges have emerged in recent years, such as Fulani herdsmen attacks in the Middle Belt and the emergence of bandits in the Northern fringes of the country or in the Niger Delta. Indeed, the activities of Boko Haram sect have threatened one of Nigeria's key hegemonic claims – its

military prowess. While it has been successful in conflict zones in African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Nigerian military has struggled to cope with the terrorist group. This begs the question of hegemony or survival. Does Nigeria desire and have the potential to assume a hegemonic role in Africa or is it struggling for domestic survival amidst Boko Haram terrorism?<sup>457</sup>

Boko Haram, no doubt, dented Nigeria's credentials as a powerful military force to be reckoned with in the continent of Africa. It is therefore no surprise that Global Terrorism Index in the 2020 still ranked Nigeria 3rd – below Iraq and Afghanistan at 1st and 2nd places respectively – in terms of the global terrorism level. As Nigeria scored 9.213 out of a possible score of 10 in the global levels of terrorism. Similarly, the report shows that the sect has emerged as the most deadly terrorist group in the world, even deadlier than the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Globo Haram terrorists kill innocent civilians and bomb symbolic buildings. Their activities have captured global attention; the incident that reverberated across the world was the kidnapping of around 200 schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014. The handling of the Chibok incident was met with global criticism. Indeed, the incident revealed the ineptitude of the Nigerian government in its fight against the Islamic sect. For instance, the Jonathan administration only made an official statement about the girls three weeks after they had been kidnapped. Furthermore, it claimed it was negotiating with the sect for the release of the girls but the sect denied the claim. By the time the president vacated office

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>457</sup> *Tella O*. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>458</sup> Global Terrorism Index 2020 // Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020. URL: https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf (accessed: 02.02.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>459</sup> *Tella O.* Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>460</sup> Global Terrorism Index. Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism // Institute for Economics and Peace. 2015. P. 13-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>461</sup> *Tella O.* Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 118.

in mid-2015, the government had still been unable to locate the girls. 462 This caused global anger and condemnation of the Nigerian government by world leaders, media houses such as CNN and the BBC, civil society organizations like Transparency International, and also ordinary citizens across the globe, culminating in the popular campaign, #Bringbackourgirls. Transparency International noted that 'the slow response to Boko Haram's abduction of the girls is a legacy of an institution not fit for the purpose.' 463 J. Warner argues that '... the nature of the Nigerian government's reactions to the Chibok kidnapping has come to stand as a microcosm of its larger approach to Boko Haram, which many have read to be halfhearted, confused, selfdamaging, and duplicitous.'464 Clearly, rather than been perceived as a hegemon, Abuja is seen as a safe haven for terrorist activities. Nigeria has become a laughing stock and its government has lost face in the international system due to its seeming incapacity to tackle Boko Haram. The audacious bombing of symbolic buildings such as the United Nations building and the police headquarters in 2011 and the on-going killing of innocent civilians in the northern part of the country are just two examples of a reign of terror that has undermined Abuja's soft power in the eyes of the global community and raised questions about its capacity to protect life and property. Indeed, some observers and civil society organizations have likened Nigeria to a failed state. 465 For instance, Nigeria ranks 14 in global list of 'failed states' 2020, with Finland – the best performing and most stable country – ranking Number 178 at the bottom. 466 In summary, Boko Haram terrorist activities have undermined Nigeria's regional

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>462</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>463</sup> Nigeria: Corruption and Insecurity // Transparency International, 21.05. 2014. URL: http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/nigeria\_corruption\_and\_insecurity (accessed: 02.08.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>464</sup> Warner J. Nigeria and "Illusory Hegemony" in foreign and security policymaking: Pax-Nigeriana and the challenges of Boko Haram // Foreign Policy Analysis. 2017. T. 13. № 3. P. 638-661.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>465</sup> *Tella O.* Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017. T. 7. № 2. P. 118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>466</sup> Country dashboard // Fragile States Index, 2020. URL: https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data (accessed: 02.12.2020).

hegemony in its West African subregion and have punctured its pretentions to be a continental hegemon. While the country's peace-making efforts on the continent and further afield garnered it enormous soft power, Boko Haram has challenged this status. Rather than being perceived as a guarantor of peace in the region, Nigeria is increasingly seen as a source of insecurity. I. Sampson points out that the manner in which the Nigerian government has conducted itself in its fight against Boko Haram has also raised global eyebrows. He emphasizes that there have been gross violations of human rights including extrajudicial killings, rape and the intimidation of residents in Boko Haram hotspot states. 467 These tactics have been condemned by governments around the world, nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency International and Human Rights Watch, and even some Nigerian citizens. For instance, Human Rights Watch observes that when the army has acted it has often done so in an abusive manner, rounding up hundreds of men and boys suspected of supporting Boko Haram, detaining them in inhuman conditions, and physically abusing or even killing them.<sup>468</sup> Many other community members have been forcibly disappeared, allegedly by security forces.

When Boko Haram suspects escaped in March from a famously abusive detention center, Giwa Barracks, Nigerian security forces reportedly recaptured and summarily executed hundreds of them. While it is understood that the fight against terrorism is not an easy one and sometimes calls for desperate measures, the Nigerian forces' counter-terrorism operations relegate human rights issues to the backburner. Their disregard for international human right laws might have been responsible for some of the great powers' reluctance to supply the weaponry required to tackle Boko Haram. Human Rights Watch notes that Nigeria's allies' reluctance to provide security assistance stems from the fear of complicity in such abuses. 469 It should be noted that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>467</sup> Sampson I.T. The dilemmas of counter-bokoharamism: Debating state responses to Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria // Security Journal. 2016. T. 29. № 2. P. 122-146.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>468</sup> World Report: Events of 2014 // Human Rights Watch. New York. 2015. P. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>469</sup> Ibid.

the extrajudicial killing of the founder and former leader of Boko Haram partly contributed to the hibernation and re-emergence of the sect as a more brutal and ruthless group in 2009.<sup>470</sup> A. Langer reiterates that since 2009, the security forces have arrested tens of thousands of suspects, many of whom have died in prison.<sup>471</sup>

Human rights and democracy are political values that are widely admired across the globe. A state that upholds such values enhances its soft power in the international system. The activities of the Nigerian military have shown that the country does not take human rights values seriously. This damages its soft power in the hearts and minds of global audience. Boko Haram's effect on Nigeria's soft power is seen in fewer tourists visiting sites in the northern part of the country and the country's increasing unattractiveness to foreign investors. For instance, the Canadian Prime Minister noted in 2012 that 'we cannot allow our citizens to be killed unwarrantedly' (in Nigeria). 472

The inception of the Buhari administration seems to have brought hope of noticeable success in the fight against Boko Haram. This purported success was seen in the recapture of major towns, the seeming weakening of the group and the purported release of 21 and later 82 of the around 200 kidnapped Chibok girls. It remains to be seen if these gains will be maintained and sustained in the near future. And despite the president's claim that Boko Haram had been technically defeated in late 2015, the spate of killing and bombing of civilians across the northern part of the country still makes headlines and continues unabated in Nigeria.<sup>473</sup>

The twin challenges of Boko Haram and corruption seem to be the most damaging for Nigeria's image and its capacity to exert its soft power. However, other

 $<sup>^{470}</sup>$  Onuoha F.C. The Islamist challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis explained // African security review. 2010. T. 19. № 2. P. 54-67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>471</sup> Langer A., Godefroidt A., Meuleman B. Killing people, dividing a nation? Analyzing student perceptions of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria // Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2017. T. 40. № 5. P. 419-738.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>472</sup> *Adeyemi-Suenu A*. Terror and Insecurity: The Impact of Boko Haram Crisis on Nigeria's External Image //International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences. 2014. T. 43. P. 32.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>473</sup> Tella O. Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power // Journal of Global Analysis. 2017.
 T. 7. № 2. P. 119.

negative perceptions have punctured the country's image. Chief among these are drug trafficking and advance fee fraud (popularly called *419* in Nigeria). While these perceptions are often exaggerated, they contain elements of truth. For instance, it has been noted that Nigeria is responsible for a third of the heroin and half of the cocaine seized by the U.S. and South African authorities respectively. <sup>474</sup> As early as the 1990s, the U.S. authorities identified Nigeria as the hub of the illicit drugs that emerged from Asia and Latin America en route to North America and Europe. This negative image is compounded by Nigerians' notoriety for advance fee fraud. The Nigerian criminal network is visible across the globe, including the U.S., Britain, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan and various African countries, and many have fallen victim to Nigerian scammers. <sup>475</sup> Clearly, these criminal acts have painted Nigeria in a negative light across the globe, undermining its soft power and influence among the community of nations.

### 3.3. Implications for Nigeria Power Status within Africa

Assuming the role of a regional/continental power is the main objective of Nigerian foreign policy. On the surface, Nigeria meets the generally prescribed conditions for qualification as a major power in the African continent considering its hard and soft power endowments. However, its power and capacity sometimes seem to be stunted by internal and external problems that challenge the substance of any hegemonic claims. Like every other regional (or global) power, Nigeria has apparent strengths and weaknesses that reinforce or deflate its capacity and willingness to play the role of a hegemon within Africa. A regional power is distinguished first by its claim to leadership; its power resources and the employment of its foreign policy instruments

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>474</sup> Da Cruz J.A., Stephens L.K. The US Africa command (AFRICOM): Building partnership or neocolonialism of US-Africa relations? // Journal of Global South Studies. 2010. T. 27 № 2. P. 192-213. <sup>475</sup> Ampratwum F.F. Advance fee fraud "419" and investor confidence in the economies of sub-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>475</sup> Ampratwum E.F. Advance fee fraud "419" and investor confidence in the economies of sub-Saharan African (SSA) // Journal of Financial Crime. 2009. T. 16. № 1. P. 67-79.

Ogunnubi O., Okeke-Uzodike U. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? // African Security Review.
 2016. T. 25. № 2. P. 110-128.

to pursue its power status and being accepted either subtly or pronounced as leader by its regional and continental neighbors.<sup>477</sup> Accepting leadership role means that the state in question has taken upon itself the responsibility of entrenching peace and stability and crafting policies for economic initiatives.

That Nigeria qualifies to be a major power in Africa is indubitable. Nigeria possesses virtually all features of regional hegemons. In terms of hard power, Nigeria's economic, military and demographic power makes it status as giant of Africa unquestionable. Its soft power endowment ranging from its close interconnectivity with other states in Africa in political, economic and cultural terms; decisive impact of its economic development on the economic fortunes of other countries in Africa; the possession of various instruments of foreign policy at its disposal to assert its interests and equip it for a pre-eminent role in and on behalf of its region; the expression of an ambition, claim or willingness to play these dual leadership roles; predominant influence in regional affairs in terms of setting security, political and economic agendas; and the recognition and respect of other states (within the region and beyond) – all these are enormous credentials that make it a leading state in and on behalf of the region.

However, it has been highlighted in this chapter that several inherent domestic and external challenges and contradictions collectively have a negative impact on Nigeria's capacity to consistently play the role of Africa's hegemon to the extent that it has failed to be a convincing hegemon within the Africa. Rather than disqualifying Nigeria, as argued by some scholars, these multiple challenges coalesce to detract from the country's playing a regional hegemonic role either consistently or decisively. Nigeria has had to grapple with several conflicts within its borders. Factors such as contestations over the control of crude-oil resources, an unwieldy population size and diverse ethnic identities have combined to produce polarizing effects that have been the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>477</sup> Flemes D. Conceptualising regional power in international relations: Lessons from the South African case. Working Paper № 53. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies. 2007. P. 11.

bane of its prospects for continental hegemony. While these kinds of challenges may not have stopped countries such as the U.S., Russia, India, China and many other states from exercising regional or global influence, their poor management in Nigeria – due particularly to endemic corruption and poor leadership – appears to stifle Nigeria's hegemonic prospects. By implication, although Nigeria's regional hegemonic capability may suffer from apparent ambiguities, it may be inappropriate (in the absence of compelling logic) to tag it as a secondary power, especially relative to its South African counterpart.

Nigeria's capacity to effectively influence decisions of regional consequence and assume its 'manifest destiny' to champion the cause of Africa at the global level will be largely determined by the extent to which Nigeria is able to counteract the impediments that obliterate its sources of soft power and fine-tune this source of power with its hard power resources. This will entail paying more attention to the utility of soft power in the international system, directing global attention to the country's soft power and embarking on carefully crafted soft power initiatives that have the potential to accrue regional and global admiration.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>478</sup> Ogunnubi O., Okeke-Uzodike U. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? // African Security Review. – 2016. – T. 25. – №. 2. – C. 110-128.

#### **CONCLUSION**

The study offered a review of the strategic use of hard and soft power approaches in Africa, using Nigeria as the case study. The study adopts the view by J. Nye who argues that hard power is primarily deployed through states' economic and military capabilities. "Hard power can rest on inducements (*carrots*) or threats (*sticks*)," which enables a state to influence other states. However, a state may better achieve its desired objectives in relation to other states through intangible resources. This is primarily because other states admire its values, culture, and policies and aspire to be like it. In other words, in order to influence other states in international relations, a state cannot only rely on threats of economic sanctions and military force. It must thus be equipped with the resources such as culture, political values, and foreign policy. 479

The study unveils that Nigeria, over the years, has been able to use its economic strength as a hard and soft power resource to project its power status, particularly within Africa. For instance, in 1975, at the peak of its economic recovery following a devastating civil war, Nigeria nudged other subregional states to establish ECOWAS. Then Nigerian Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, not only played a pivotal role, but also pledged that the country would be responsible for a full one-third of ECOWAS's financial needs. The unexpected oil boom of the 1970s, which brought about a buoyant economy, increased the impetus for Nigeria's rising continental prominence. The confident posture of its leadership and the economic prosperity and well-being enjoyed by the country at the time afforded it to pursue a rigorous and active foreign policy, clearly manifested in the leading role it played during the struggle to secure independence for Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia and Zimbabwe, as well as the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. 480

 $<sup>^{479}</sup>$  Nye Jr.J. Get smart: Combining hard and soft power // Foreign affairs. 2009. T. 88. № 4. P. 160-163.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>480</sup> *Adeniji A*. Power and representation at the United Nations: A critique of Nigeria's bid for permanent seat in the Security Council // India Quarterly. 2005. T. 61. №. 2. P. 116-137.

It is also the finding of the study that Nigeria has been able to reestablish itself as a dominant economy in Africa despite the severe economic downturn in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Evidences of current reports reveal that Nigeria's economy is undeniably the largest in Africa, even though it peaked in 2014 with a GDP of \$522 billion and a growth rate of 6.2%<sup>481</sup> and since then has seen a certain downturn. In the second place was South Africa with a GDP of \$350 billion and a growth rate of 2.6%. As the 2014 recalibration of its GDP suggests, Nigeria's economy and economic value has become somewhat less conditioned by revenue generated from the exploration for and production and exportation of crude oil, which had a 14% share of the GDP. Other sectors such as agriculture, services and manufacturing enjoy large shares of the Nigerian GDP, along with the informal sector. 482 Indeed, the 2019 CIA World Factbook and other sources still place Nigeria as Sub Saharan Africa's largest economy. 483

The study establishes also that Nigeria's soft power portfolio includes the promotion of African solidarity, decolonization and democratic values; its huge, enticing domestic market and flourishing trade relations with numerous international partners; its peacekeeping and mediating role; its education sector; its entertainment industry, including music and movies, its sports, cuisine, and its cultural festivals. The country's technical assistance to its neighbors and its contribution to peacekeeping and peacebuilding radiate across Africa and beyond. Nigerian movies (Nollywood) and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>481</sup> Nigeria's GDP is ranked 26th in the world. With the addition of the informal sector (not included in official figures) estimates of the true size of its economy are put at US\$630 billion. See: Nigerian Economy Overtakes South Africa's on Rebased GDP // Bloomberg Business, 7.04.2014. URL: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-06/nigerian-economy-overtakes-south-africa-s-onrebased-gdp (accessed: 02.12.2020); *Awojobi O.N., Ayakpat J., Adisa O.D.* Rebased Nigerian gross domestic product: The role of the informal sector in the development of the Nigerian economy // International Journal of Education and Research. 2014. T. 2. № 7. P. 301-316.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>482</sup> Oil accounts for barely 14% of official GDP figures and thus remains a minimal part of Nigeria's economy. See: Nigeria 2015 // African Economic Outlook, 2015. URL: http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2015/CN\_data/CN\_Long\_EN/Nigeria\_GB\_2015.pdf (accessed: 04.12.2020).

Nigeria Economy 2020 // Theodora, 27.01.2020. URL https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/nigeria/nigeria\_economy.html (accessed: 04.12.2020).

music are widely admired in Africa and further afield. This study affirms that Nigeria's soft power has been bolstered by engaging in cultural exports in the form of Nollywood and technical assistance through its Technical Aid Corps scheme as major foreign policy assets.

In addition, the study suggests that Nigeria's strong adherence to multilateralism has provided a platform for a subtle launch of its ambition to become a key power in Africa. Nigeria's reintegration into the international system, against the backdrop of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy, is demonstrated by its reacceptance into the Commonwealth in 1999, hosting rights and chairmanship of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) in 2003, and chairmanship of the G-77 in 2000. The Obasanjo's administration sought to use these multilateral platforms to rekindle interest in Nigeria within Africa and of course in the global South. Nigeria has also represented Africa on five occasions as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, in 1966-67, 1978-79, 1994-95, 2010-01, and more recently in 2014-15. In recognition of the country's efforts towards ensuring peaceful coexistence within Africa, and on the strength of its previous record at the UN, Nigeria was elected unopposed to secure a fifth tenure on the UNSC, with a total vote of 186 out of a possible 193.484 This ultimately puts it in strong contention for one of the two slots for Africa in the proposed enlarged permanent membership of the UNSC. It was reported that the reelection of Nigeria as a member of the UNSC in 2014-5 was a "glowing expression of support and encouragement for Nigeria's active participation in the promotion of peace, security and political stability in Africa and other parts of the world". 485

The study, however, lamented the fact that pervasive corruption has placed undeniable dent on Nigeria claim to regional leadership of Africa despite its hard and soft power endowments. Indeed, Nigeria's economy has been repeatedly undermined

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>484</sup> Saliu H. Essays on Nigerian foreign policy, vol. 1. Ibadan: Vantage Publishers. 2006.
 <sup>485</sup> Nigeria wins UN security seat // All Africa, 18.10.2013. URL: http://allafrica.com/stories/201310180097.html (accessed: 07.12.2020).

by continued bad governance and generalized theft of state assets. At the same time, rampant corruption, poverty and political violence have done little to lessen Nigeria's attractiveness to international investors and investment bankers, and it say sustained strong growth for a period well beyond a decade until 2016.<sup>486</sup>

In the light of the above, it has been emphasized that Nigeria's track record as a regional Big Brother in the African continent must overcome the obstinate traces of an image crisis that was heightened from 1992 to 1999 and from 2007 to date. Nigeria's global identity as a country notable for cybercrime, a poor human rights record, massive corruption, institutional and infrastructural decay, drug trafficking and terrorist insurgency results in serious damage to its reputation, which thus weakens its ability to realize formal foreign policy objectives. 487 Leadership ineptitude has characterized Nigeria's political scene and constituted a challenge to the credibility of any reasonable power claim. A number of examples, especially during the military era, have shown Nigeria in a bad light to other African states that it was aspiring to influence. For instance, many of the commendable works of Babangida in the international arena were subsequently marred by the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election, widely acclaimed in some circles as the freest in Nigeria's election history. In recent times, Nigeria has shown poor leadership in its failure to decisively deal with the Boko Haram threat. Consequently, Nigeria continues to rank poorly in the Global Competitiveness Index.

Nigeria has had to contend, almost on a daily basis since 2009, with an extremist and violent sect of Islamist insurgents known as Boko Haram. This violent sect has increasingly been wreaking havoc across Nigeria and neighboring countries. Using terrorism as a means to sabotage the secular Nigerian state, the sect aims to violently foist Islamist rule on the country. Boko Haram opposes Western civilization by seeking

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>486</sup> Enweremadu D.U. Nigeria as an emerging economy? Making sense of expectations // South African Journal of International Affairs. 2013. T. 20. № 1. P. 57-77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>487</sup> Ogunnubi O., Okeke-Uzodike U. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? // African Security Review. – 2016. T. 25. № 2. P. 110-128.

to entrench Sharia law in Nigeria. We over 10 000 people have been killed and many more displaced by Boko Haram since 2009, and there has been a significant and growing decline in business activities in the north. The ongoing violence and sabotage of Boko Haram raises serious questions about Nigeria's capacity to resolve its own internal conflicts. Boko Haram is arguably a consequence of poor governance and leadership, and its continued acts of terror are a harbinger of poor security in Nigeria. The absence of sustained internal cohesion, evidenced in continued strife, increasingly stifles Nigeria's contention as an African leader and hegemon. It is unlikely that other African nations would readily accept a leader whose house is in turmoil and whose centre is unable to hold together all domestic stakeholders. Clearly, the internal threats to Nigerian security are real and have significant bearing on its prospects for regional hegemonic leadership.

The study, however, posits from the forgoing that Nigeria's formal international behavior and interactions with its African partners – not its domestic challenges – should be the only determining factors in assessing its regional power status. Nigeria's capacity to effectively influence decisions of regional consequence and assume its 'manifest destiny' to champion the cause of Africa at the global level will be largely determined by the extent to which it is able to counteract the impediments that obliterate its sources of soft power and fine-tune this source of power with its hard power resources. This will entail paying more attention to the use of soft power in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>488</sup> Akinola A.O., Uzodike U.O. The threat of 'Boko Haram' terrorism and Niger Delta militancy to security and development in Africa: From myth to reality // Gandhi Marg. 2013. T. 35. № 3. P. 391-418.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>489</sup> The burden of insecurity on the Nigerian economy // Vanguard, 29.05.2014. URL: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/05/burden-insecurity-nigerian-economy (accessed: 09.12.2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>490</sup> Bagaji A. S. Y. et al. Boko Haram and the recurring bomb attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to impose religious ideology through terrorism? // Cross-Cultural Communication. 2012. T. 8. № 1. P. 33-41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>491</sup> *Uzodike U.O., Maiangwa B.* Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: Causal factors and central problematic // African Renaissance. 2012. T. 9. № 1. P. 91-118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>492</sup> Adebajo A., Landsberg C. Nigeria and South Africa as regional hegemons // In: M. Baregu, C. Landsberg (eds.). From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's evolving security. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2003.

international relations, directing global attention to the country's soft power, and embarking on carefully crafted soft power initiatives that have the potential to attract regional and global acclaim. Nigeria, despite its domestic challenges, has strategically employed its hard power attributes to promote peace, security and decolonization of the African continent. Through its soft power endowments, it has attracted itself to regional neighbors that look up to the country as a role model. It has also in no little measure helps promotes economic stability of not just its regional neighbors but also much of the Global South through its Technical Aid Corps. These are the initiatives that make Nigeria worthy of the title "Giant of Africa."

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